

## **WORKSHOP SUMMARY**

### **A FUTURE FOR AID DATA**

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY

31<sup>st</sup> October and 1<sup>st</sup> November 2011, Birmingham, United Kingdom

#### **Introduction**

1. This workshop was convened by the International Development Department, University of Birmingham to inform its on-going DFID's Future of Aid and Beyond Research investigating the incentives and disincentives for non traditional donors to adhere to International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standards, and what challenges and opportunities such non traditional donors bring to the IATI.
2. The aim of the workshop was to present and discuss results of the research project in the context of ongoing work on aid transparency and South-South cooperation; and also to stimulate lively discussion on policy options, in the run-up to the Busan high level forum on aid effectiveness in December by workshop participants researching and advocating greater transparency and consistency in aid data who made presentations on their current work. Workshop participants included a diverse group of practitioners, academics, facilitators and thinkers from civil society. (See attachments at the end for Workshop Program and List of Participants).
3. The draft reports titled 'the Non DAC Donor Data Availability Index', 'Compatibility of South-South Development Cooperation vis-à-vis IATI Standard' and 'How does the Existence of IATI shape the Dynamics of Emerging Donors under South-South Cooperation' were prepared for the event by the researchers and organizers of the workshop, Michael Hubbard and Pranay Sinha. A blog titled "Beyond Busan: the Case for Including Other Public Flows for Development" and conference paper titled 'Marrying New Global Players with the IATI: The Future of Aid Data Governance' by researchers were also circulated prior to the workshop. These papers as well as other materials related to the research can be accessed at: <http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/government-society/departments/international-development/research/projects/future-for-aid-data.aspx>
4. This report summarizes the discussions at the workshop not in chronological order or verbatim but with a focus on the key themes that emerged in the course of the two-day event. This report does not try to reflect any consensus among the participants but instead provides a collection of: observations about current constraints and challenges; comments on existing practices, procedures and lessons learned; views about future trends and scenarios, and recommendations in the run-up to the Busan High Level Forum in December. While views of the participants converged on some of these issues, they were widely diverse on others.
  - A. Transparency as Non-negotiable?
  - B. Global aid governance: The Future of International Cooperation
  - C. What Constitutes ODA? Convergence and Divergence between DAC and Non-DAC donors
  - D. Political Economy of South-South Cooperation
  - E. Suggestions—ways forward

## **A. Transparency as Non-negotiable**

*Transparency is essential to the development effectiveness agenda*

5. As we are approaching the end of the debate on 'Aid Effectiveness' and entering into the 'Development Effectiveness' debate in Busan High Level Forum, future development issues, especially critical perspectives on the future of development cooperation will be framed in the context of Transparency and Accountability. Aid Effectiveness agenda was a main priority of the debate on aid during the last decade (2000-2010) and was the driving force for aid transparency/domestic/mutual accountability. Effectiveness Agenda has made clear the costs and side-effects of weak transparency & weak accountability. There are also issues around predictability, transaction costs, donor coordination, aligning aid to partner countries priorities and governance issues. Accra Agenda for Action was a major step forward as donors and developing countries committed to make aid more transparent. Its follow-up in the form of International Aid Transparency Initiative has kick-started since then and is still in progress.

*Still too little debt transparency*

6. When defining aid transparency, it's important to revisit what constitutes debt, any existing legal framework for public debt for what is received as aid and what is contracted as debt and what are the existing national and international debt dissemination standards designed to improve accountability and transparency. It seems that the traditional donors are more concerned about domestic debt management in recipient countries than Non-DAC donors because aid is more of a business arrangement to emerging donors, and they are hardly concerned about the impact of such lending to recipient countries. In the 1970s, aid from DAC donors was also a form of business arrangement, albeit a different kind from that of non-DAC donors of today. There are stricter conditions attached to loans or aid from non-DAC donors compared to that of DAC donors in yesteryears.

*Do non-DAC donors care about debt transparency and should they?*

7. It seems that the traditional donors are more concerned about domestic debt management in recipient countries than Non-DAC donors because aid is more of a business arrangement to emerging donors, and they are hardly concerned about the impact of such lending to recipient countries. In the 1970s, aid from DAC donors was also a form of business arrangement, albeit a different kind from that of non-DAC donors of today. There are stricter conditions attached to loans or aid from non-DAC donors compared to that of DAC donors in yesteryears.

For the purpose of tracking debt repayments, the debt management system of the Commonwealth Secretariat tracks aid (limited to grants), which can be monitored in terms of transactions disbursed and projections.

*Do debt management systems clash with aid management systems in recipient countries?*

8. Though in about 99% of countries, debt management systems are completely different from aid management systems; there have been attempts to integrate the two for Public Financial Management (PFM). As most countries use Donor Assistance Database or Aid Management Platform, there is a bit of overlap which creates difficulty. The main weakness of the debt management strategy of countries is determining their internal auditing capacities and whether they understand how to distinguish between auditing normal government transaction and aid transaction, why they have to borrow and where it fits into the entire government structure.

*How accessible is debt data to the public?*

9. The World Bank is the custodian of the main global dataset on sovereign debt i.e. World Bank Debtor Reporting system, which is partially public in nature. There is a very strong protocol in accessing that dataset which is tedious. It is also not comprehensive as there is difficulty in accessing transaction level data.

*The case for transparency in "other official flows" for development*

10. Transparency and accountability of public financial flows whether Official Development Assistance or Other Official Finance is non-negotiable. While there is a vigorous effort to create accountability in ODA, there is no equivalent effort to make other official flows (as categorised by OECD) transparent, despite them being public funds. The difference between CRS flows made public and those restricted was found to be incongruous. In the former it includes CRS/ODA and in the latter CRS/ OOF and CRS/Export credits. Along with the same line China's concessional export credits by OECD definition/norms of disclosure need not be mandatory for disclosure. Thus the political drive for transparency is for tax payers of donor countries who want to know how their money is being spent however the transparency through IATI is now also designed for citizens of developing countries. If transparency is to the benefit of citizens of recipient countries, then what should be the mechanisms for bringing transparency for emerging donors, according to DAC standards or some other mechanism?
11. The means potentially available for achieving transparency in export credit flows, aside from transparency in achieving unity in categorizing financial flows include:
  - a. At the National Level: A bill in the UK parliament by November seeks to increase transparency requirement for export credits; USA Exim following open govt. initiative.
  - b. At the international level: OECD guidelines for Export Credit Arrangements seek to provide a framework for the orderly use of official export. But would this be enhanced or threatened by greater public disclosure?
  - c. Information on Indian Export Credits of recent flows is becoming increasingly available. There is a wind of change, as against yesteryears when OECD was the sole custodian of data on Export Credits. If IATI were allowed to address export credits and lines of credit, it would play a critical role; what could the Busan HLF4 achieve in this regard?

*Transparency and competition*

12. Even DAC countries are not transparent about their officially supported Export credits (ECs) because it is an agreement between creditors competing with each other, so they are concerned about protecting sensitive commercial information. The ECs reported are not on an individual basis of what one donor gives one recipient country, but as a gentleman's agreement for participants, some of whom are beyond the OECD membership. The current participants in the arrangement, excluding non-OECD countries, the EU and Brazil, are required to share with others the financial terms and conditions to participant countries. Apart from achieving transparency, the arrangement has the theoretical purpose of helping competitors avoid a race to the bottom, crass competition between OECD countries' ECs to developing countries. It also works better than many OECD arrangements. The argument is that in order to bring transparency to such export credit flows, IATI should be mandated to extend its coverage to cover ECs, military and agricultural flows.
13. There appear to be clashing interests between recipient countries and exporting countries over competition among export credit agencies; some EC agencies are forced

to bargain down interest rates because recipient countries want to have that competition in order to beat down prices and some exporters do not have a larger vision of coming together to put in place arrangements to prevent a race to the bottom.

14. Is the drive for transparency and accountability coming from traditional donors is probably because they feel they are losing out in the competition? North-South divide is built in the systems of many recipient countries, with different administrations for each. That is why some governments like Rwanda are not interested in bringing all donors on the same table. In Mozambique, where there is a lot of donor coordination, there is a shift from focusing entirely on northern ODA.
15. If accountability mechanisms were better established in recipient countries, there will not be so much distinction. If they don't become established, the accountability drive may be threatened: it may be unsustainable for DAC countries to continue sweating it out with accountability issues when it is much easier to build a hospital for example, with less accountability required by non-DAC donors.

*Where does the onus for transparency lie?*

16. Questions abound over who transparency is for, who is supposed to be responsible for it, whether it is for the participants/players or for citizens in the domestic context, and where financial packages close to ODA which are grey areas but not really ODA fit in existing transparency regime.
17. Where does the onus of transparency lie? Despite the intense debate in the Ghanaian parliament to understand the content of its contract with China, the onus of transparency of ECs lies with not just recipients, but with donors as well. Though a strong parliament by debating and approving the investment shows the recipient's concern on how the debt will be accumulated and how it is going to be repaid.
18. What about transparency those financial packages close to ODA that are grey areas, which do not really fit into ODA?

*Are multilateral institutions transparent?*

19. What is the role of multilaterals and how do they work within the Paris Declaration? How do DAC and non-DAC donors use multilaterals?
20. Multilateral institutions such as the G20 are taking up the issue of infrastructure in the developing world, the IMF has a debt sustainability framework to ensure developing countries do not get over-indebted and there is a modelling framework of this debt sustainability, which is questioned and challenged by China. And as noted above, the World Bank dataset on global debt is not openly available.
21. There are political economy issues in both donor country contexts and recipient systems. Multilaterals are in the middle, mediating these issues. But multilateral aid has been on the decrease (30%); they have also become like other donors with their internal dynamics and processes and are increasingly asked to prove themselves in terms of transparency and processes. World Bank for instance has problems with predictability, problems with country systems etc. So if the WB is not helping to build states through its aid, then it is a problem.

*Transparency is for citizens*

22. There are strong common interests between tax payers in donor countries and citizens of recipient countries. This is intermediated by institutions/organizations with other interests: commercial organizations/interests which are getting into the way of these shared interests. The tax payers are the people who will drive the effectiveness of such

aid in recipient countries, because they want to see their aid being beneficial to those who need it in recipient countries. Civil societies in donor and recipient countries have common interests and new donors have growing civil societies e.g. Korea has recently had a surge in the no. of civil society groups.

- a. But could aid transparency initiatives for donors be problematic and a disincentive for donors because it could reduce support amongst donor citizens for aid?
- b. There are many benefits of making aid, EXIM flows transparent: coordination amongst donors, recipient govt planning, recipient govt beneficiaries. That aside, the unstated assumption is that this is non-negotiable, because tax payers of donor countries want to know how their money is being spent. The principle is that it is for voters in giving and receiving countries, a liberal-democratic argument, basically.
- c. If transparency is for citizens of indebted countries where do they have access to the data? Recipients in developing countries do not have a seat on the table.
- d. Have Paris and Accra forums been instrumental in taking forward the transparency of 'other official flows'? Because it is only through Paris, Accra or HIPC initiatives that people can find out however, there is no set of data or public monitoring mechanism in countries.

## **B. Global aid governance: the future of development cooperation**

### *Aid reporting and the changing governance of aid*

23. Paris has moved international aid governance in the area of developing countries; there will be a strong African voice with a view on these issues in Busan, which was not there in Paris. In the era of international development in the 1960s: post WWII, cold war etc leading to the idea of 3 worlds, there was a strong strategic and moral reason for developed countries to help developing countries. This was the context for the formation of the DAC; this also provided the context for the emergence of the South-South framework by developing countries. With the beginning of DAC, there was a context for common definition of aid and effectiveness of such resources, and also to track the use of such resources. This provided the origins of measurement of ODA, the acquisition of UNCTAD, 0.07% etc
24. Incentives such as burden-sharing and peer-reporting by fellow DAC members are crucial to reporting aid.  
To have a well-functioning reporting system, **there needs to be a compelling political agreement to generate incentives, a technical process to ensure statistics make sense and also peer pressure to generate reporting activity.**
25. Post-1995 there is a state-building agenda. Donors are recognizing through Paris and Accra that they have to contribute to PFM towards a state-building agenda. That is why PFM is a central principle. The recognition that aid stream in finite and domestic stream will eventually replace it. Thus aid management and aid data issue become important as a means to interface PFM systems.
26. Current Era: With the arrival of emerging donors as significant players, what are going to be the incentives for emerging donors to see themselves as part of these state-building efforts? What are the developing system efforts to bring them into this system?

## *Global Aid Data Governance for DAC and Non-DAC donors through IATI*

27. IATI is a way of coordinating aid reporting where each donor would publish their comprehensive data sets in an open standard from which it can be openly extracted. It is an information standard for donors to use in publishing information, placed on servers and read by machines which people (users) can use the data to build maps, graphs and tables. It is not a new set of data or a database rather a registry. IATI will cater to the broad constituency wanting more aid information in both donor countries where citizens are concerned whether donors are making sensible decision over what countries or regions to direct aid to i.e. allocation and trends, and in southern countries, where stakeholders (politicians, media, and civil society) rather than allocation questions or categorizations of aid, are more interested in more tangible aspects of execution: how contracts are awarded and how to make it more efficient. Data standards should be extended to reporting published information for grantees, information from beneficiaries and from the supply chains.
28. Previous attempts at building comprehensive data sets of information by bodies such as OECD DAC, UNDP and Development Gateway & Synergy were all problematic as they are retail end of a shared infrastructure. IATI on the other hand would extend the standard, maintain the registry and reach out to new providers, support data providers and support data users.
29. Only about 3-4 people are needed to keep the standard running and all they need to do is to provide machine readable standards. This eliminates the need for UN or DAC to run it, to inadvertently represent their own interests and thereby discourage emerging donors. Thus IATI has the advantage of being multi-purpose: it will standardize open data, it will be a shared infrastructure, would have independent governance and a small secretariat. It would be relatively easier to engage with non-DAC donors on IATI.
30. *Independence:* The DAC donors would not be in charge and IATI would not end up as an extension of the old DAC system, as many non-DAC donors see transparency initiatives as a means of clipping their wings. Its independent governance would ensure all countries DAC, non-DAC and observers in the IATI like France and Canada are part of it. The Technical Assistance Group is open to anyone who would like to be part of it: academics, civil society and partner countries. IATI could also draw lessons from international accounting standards which are presumed to be politically neutral.
31. *Challenges:* Errors do abound in published data from DAC and non-DAC donors. There are political economy issues and questions arise over involving Southern countries in IATI. This poses a major challenge as emerging donors don't really know under what categories they are expected to release their information, there is a logical, practical issue. Even some DAC donors have some problem for instance in the US, as no one knows what is being done in Afghanistan. Do countries like the USA have open data which can be collected using this international standard? The standard provides a framework to move forward. Questions also arise over linguistic differences among countries and how such barriers where countries such as Korea were struggling to report data to IATI would be addressed. Furthermore, IATI only captures part of ODA data but not ODA other than country programme aid.
32. In principle, if a donor agency has data, it should publish it unless it is a life threatening situation. There should be less focus on convincing donors to put tags and categories on things e.g. the DAC CRS system. IATI obligation is on the donors, the signatories to publish their data, though anyone else, including developing countries can publish data.

Intermediaries will then enable local people to apply it for their particular purposes and to share their respective experiences. **This is a democratization of aid effectiveness**, the ultimate goal being the ability to generate pressures on the state to perform. It is up to donors themselves to decide how they want to do it: some countries might want to collect information from all agencies (centralized); others would prefer a decentralized system where each embassy/agency of the country publishes it, others especially small donors might want to outsource it to third parties. The critical issue is to bring down the cost of civil society organizations, and donors can do that by adhering to publish in machine readable formats. Nicaragua and Mozambique already have open data platforms which are accessible. In the 1990s, Japan listed infrastructural projects as environment aid when they were not actually environment aid, for political reasons. This error in reporting could have been avoided if such data were available online. Cross verification could have done the mid course correction.

33. In terms of engaging Southern donors, despite IATI being cast as the ideal building block of the Busan conference, it is possible that it might not be regarded as that ideal transparency/accountability framework by emerging donors. It is also important to consider that IATI has strong power implications; it involves someone giving money and others accepting it. With private actors increasingly involved in providing aid, they might not be interested in publishing their aid transactions. There needs to be a strong enforcement mechanism for this to be effective. However, given that no meaningful development has been made since Accra, the critical thing is to protect IATI from being taken-over by/at the Busan process.

#### *A multi-stakeholder framework*

34. Transparency has now been designed as a multi-stakeholder framework i.e. IATI. But before IATI there was the open-data initiative as part of efforts towards transparency by the World Bank; and motivation by individual stakeholders is needed for a multi-stakeholder framework to succeed.

#### *Export Credits and debt*

35. Non DAC donors' growing development financing without transparent information sharing raises question on how to engage them with IATI. In the past, recipient countries have accumulated debt on the basis of Export Credit/ Line of Credit/ Export Credit Guarantee which led to debt accumulation, debt servicing and debt relief when recipient countries were unable to repay their loans. Similar cycle could resurface in the event of non repayment by the recipients. Non-DAC donors are using Export Credits (ECs) in extending their official aid programmes and DAC donors have also done this in the past. Non DAC donors information is not available as only the DAC donors are part of the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System while the information of Non DAC donors debt stocks are generated while recipients report to the World Bank Debtor Reporting system. While data on export credits are confidential and made available only in aggregate form such as series of stocks, disbursements, principal, and interest payments along with various breakdowns of the data while Loan-by-loan data\_(record level data) are not accessible publicly.
36. The recent report of Inter-Agency Task Force on Finance Statistics admit that, in view of resource constraints, it is not likely that transparency of the export credit stock data will be addressed in the near future. Greater transparency through open ECs data will help understand the debt accumulation of developing countries and help determine the level of sovereign debt due to ECs flow. Importantly to admit that it is not a very big ambition of changing the aid transparency regime. The preceding agency before the Inter-Agency Task Force on Finance Statistics had a methodology for extracting debt information

from the CRS, working with the World Bank, there was a publication on the guide to methodology; there was an international effort to bring together these different methods together, but this consensus no longer exists. The linkage of export credits to debt accumulation has question marks around it as the source of that cannot be verified. Would de-politicising transparency via anti-corruption help in this regard?

37. The case of Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) UK: The Jubilee Debt Campaign (JDC) has been campaigning in the last decade for the cancellation of unjust debt especially those accrued from ECs. Large sources of official finance are loans, not aid and tend to have higher interest rates than official concessional lending but lower interest rates than the private sector would provide.
38. In the UK, there is hardly any transparency either before completion of the deal since there is no requirement for the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) to consult with local or national civil society and after completion of the deal, as request for information is refused on grounds of commercial confidentiality. Morality, human rights as well as transparency issues abound because ECGD loans focus on winning deals for British exporters which mainly comprise of arm sales to countries like Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, a “dubious and unproductive” venture. International standards do not conduct checks if it is a smaller loan, but with larger projects, it is difficult to know how they have improved in the absence of large technical documents. It is usually voluntary initiatives that account for lending practices.
39. JDC is advocating for political mechanisms to ensure the right institutions are put in place. There should be no export credit for arms and the UK should not be underwriting loans or subsidizing for arms which are hardly an economic investment. Export Credit Agencies’ (ECA) focus on national interest should shift to other more productive industries rather than arms. In addition, DFID is barely engaged in the decision process of ECA. Decisions go through the agency if it is a low income country, in order to assess the debt level status of the country. Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) are debt creation agencies which allow debt to be built-up, if repayments are not made, by countries that had recently been through debt relief initiatives. No proactive information on where debt comes from. The ECs officially become aid classified as ODA under DAC when they are cancelled through HIPC such as the case with Nigeria and Iraq, and generally over £1400million in the last decade. Mainly the loan is just written off, but for the HIPCs when the money goes beyond what has been earmarked for cancelling it is transferred. To this end, JDC calls for an audit of all debts owed to ECGD, cancelling those which can’t be shown to have been useful loans and also for change in lending practices so that they only support projects considered as useful not those against human rights practices or the environment.
40. JDCs campaign for transparency covers both the supply and the demand side. By working with civil society in recipient countries such as AFRODAD, transparency in the supply side then helps with transparency in recipient countries. The existing checks in place on activities on ECGD include access to the internet, talking to people, parliamentary process such as a bill recently passed on Vulture Funds. Devaluation certainly creates problems in paying back debt raising concerns with the debt sustainability framework of the WB and IMF as it doesn’t take into account the currency fluctuations. The UK has withdrawn from the participants group in the Helsinki Disciplines (disciplines on Export Credits, to stop the race to the bottom with export subsidies). The Participants group are not part of the OECD but the Export Credits club is part of the OECD.

*Including Non-DAC Donors' Aid Information in AidData Database:*

41. Aid Data is one of the numerous intermediaries that could take data from IATI and transform it to something useful. In the pilot version, AidData was mostly useful to econometricians, students, and researchers or people who know how to make use of data and statistics, not for, journalists, policy makers and citizens. A user friendly locked-down version will be unveiled on Nov 4 2011, AidData 2.0. Data is obtained for non-DAC donors through annual reports published by the donor; Web-Scraping of individual project documents or web pages and direct data transfers shared by the donor agency. After data collection, records are digitized and translated (if necessary), sector coded, arbitrated and published on [www.aiddata.org](http://www.aiddata.org). Multilateral data, World Bank data in particular is easier to map and can be further disaggregated to show detailed contributions, but with the new version of AidData, it will provide a platform for independent researchers to re-categorize accordingly. Project data is easier to map and in some countries, national level data is eliminated because such projects tend to focus on the capital cities. Idiosyncrasies of non-DAC data which make its integration into the traditional ODA framework include the unrefined nature of non-DAC data which does not include financial flows beyond ODA and non-inclusion of financial information. Non-DAC donors might not report data due to political consideration: threat to national security from publishing sensitive information. Since everyone is interested in accessing Chinese data, the current data available to AidData on China is the most comprehensive, from 1980 to 2006. Non-DAC donors are playing a larger role providing development finance, and AidData is expanding its efforts accordingly. AidData's labour force comprise of four part-time faculty staff, four full-time staff and 25 research assistants.

**C. What Constitutes ODA? Convergence and Divergence between DAC and Non-DAC donors**

46. In ascertaining the relationship between established donors and new global players, it is difficult to generalize since the new global players are a diverse group, as are the established players. For instance, some major DAC donors like USA and Canada are not signatories of IATI. The perceptions of both categories of players based on six key aspects are relevant here:
- a. Definitions of ODA: north-south cooperation vis-à-vis south-south cooperation; donor-recipient relationship vis-à-vis mutual interest. Non-traditional donors' aid is cheaper, with less policy Aid instruments: such as concessional and non-concessional loans and grants
  - b. Institutions involved in aid delivery: In the case of DAC donor, important to not just identify the lead agency, but how much money is coming out from the lead agency. Whereas in the case of Non DAC donor's there is also a similar fragmentation in money coming from which aid agency supplemented with issues like lack of any dedicated lead agencies. This is an issue of capacity.
  - c. Debt sustainability framework vis-à-vis development sustainability: Emerging donors like China consider development sustainability as key to investment decisions over debt sustainability. It's important to have a consensus on the principle of responsible lending and thereby transparency of Export Credit is important to ensure future generations do not fall into a vicious cycle of debt.
  - d. Institutional affiliation: Non DAC struggle to identify with any 'body' or forum that 'aligns' with their interests as they argue that the current global aid architecture is

'exclusive' to DAC donor discourse and due to a perceived legitimacy gap and therefore lack of accountability with the Paris Agenda. There seems to be a *co-opetition* as both DAC and non-DAC donors are hostile to each other

*Bridging the Gap between DAC and non-DAC donors:*

47. One area of common ground is to identify where the DAC and non-DAC donors are neutral to each other. Research suggests out of 33 IATI categories, 27 categories are fully compatible with the South-South cooperation definition proposed by the background study commissioned by UNDCF. While it will be too premature to envision how IATI will pan out in the next 3 years, even though it has taken momentum in the past one year, IATI could act as a vehicle of international aid data governance – standards, disclosure, compliance and the principles of “open data”, “open government” and “open society”. This could provide an avenue for emerging donors to develop their own standards, not as parallels to IATI, but as something that could work with and within the context of the IATI. From the citizens’ perspectives in both donor and recipient countries, IATI is only one mechanism to marry the two players; it is not only a technocratic instrument, but a strong political instrument. Though there are other institutional factors at play.
48. In the case of the *Japanese Sustainable Environment Management Project in Northern Palawan (SEMP)*, it was categorized as an environmental project but in reality was not based on grants and was not characterized by intensive NGO participation – loans accounted for 44% but the Japanese ODA grants accounted for only 6.3%. This presented a dilemma of different pictures presented, for while Japan was “uncomfortable” fitting-in with the DAC’s neoliberal development agenda, Japan was gradually moving into DAC rhetoric and neoliberal DAC norms. While in principle Japan favoured decentralization of development cooperation in developing countries, Japan felt it would be imprudent to push the program hastily in the wake of lack of capacity of recipient governments to support this. Noticeable areas of convergence with South Korea are that Japan recently frames and promotes infrastructural development and partnerships as a tool to achieve good governance. There is also a divergence from the DAC’s neoliberal norms. Differences include Korea’s ambitious aims to develop successful development experience via participation in DAC’s agenda, for geopolitical and strategic reasons, to be recognized as one of the emerging powers. The Key Challenges Japan and Korea face include the idea of what constitutes effective economic development as both have not been able to fully comply with the standards.

#### **D. Political Economy of South-South Cooperation**

*A new Hegemonic Bloc based on Southern Ideology?*

*Southern Ideology:*

49. Looking at the international politics of development assistance, concepts of donors as charity givers do not make sense because states are not in the business of charity giving. For instance, while Brazil’s development assistance is an instrument of foreign policy – ABC is an arm of its foreign policy – it does not mean that there is no element of solidarity in involvement in providing ODA. States are also concerned with legitimacy, defined within a particular liberal framework and aid is an instrument for emerging powers to achieve new ideational and normative goals. The use of aid by emerging powers to win the hearts and minds of developing countries has less to do with donations themselves than with politics of developing countries. Thus a new hegemonic bloc is built by these countries comprising of a historical, institutional and

ideological/political ideology, a southern ideology. This southern ideology is expressed when emerging powers use rhetoric to legitimize their policies. For example, the rhetoric around Brazil's development cooperation is that "it is not about aid, it's about technical cooperation, and it's about brotherhood, shared cooperation, retrieval of national identity and diplomacy of solidarity". These states are taking advantage of the decline of Japan and the West. The bloc is not built around BRICS or South-South Cooperation as these do not have a common normative agenda, but is formed around international politics such as policy on non-intervention and respect of sovereignty, with development cooperation as a framework for defining aid intervention. At the vertical level South-South Cooperation leverage to achieve some objectives and at the horizontal level South-South cooperation fora such as IBSA or BRICS are used to achieve climate change. Brazil Workers' Party still sees the world in a North-South perspective and sees itself as part of the suppressed. So OECD-DAC is regarded as a rich country club, and this negates the dominant Brazilian narrative which regards itself as part of the global south. Even though being part of the UNSC negates this narrative as well. Russia channels aid primarily to former Soviet Republics: like Tajikistan, Afghanistan and in 2008, members of Eurasia established a Eurasian Development Bank. Russia is also becoming increasingly active in humanitarian aid.

#### *Image and Identity:*

50. Apart from rational national interest, status and identity play an important role in guiding the behaviour of these emerging donors. In international cooperation, before these countries enter an agreement it is important that such an agreement gives them first class status. Thus the UN Security Council supports this ambition for inter-institutional mobility for a country like Brazil while the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) however ties Brazil down to second class status, so does it to India. Brazil receives less attention in the aid architecture, relative to India and China with a future important role ascribed to it. Brazil's desire to be a global player is part of its reason for playing a role as an emerging donor and international engagement is seen as an important element of "big power status". It is an achievement for both Brazil and India to become IMF donors because of their negative experiences with the IMF and the World Bank. For Russia, the status of a recipient of development assistance was demeaning because it was once a Super power.

#### *Northern vocabulary and Standards:*

51. There is sensitivity over the dominance of northern vocabulary used, a sense of being trapped by rich countries using such vocabulary and forcing standards put in place recently on emerging donors. Northern perception of transparency is the dominant narrative because Northern civil society and donors are in charge of the system built to answer their questions and not that of Southern and recipient countries. There is also a sense of injustice that concepts such as transparency and accountability represent Western attempts of tying down emerging donors, of taking additional baggage whose benefits are uncertain. Brazil sometimes avoids being called a "donor", a designation it believes implies a hierarchy and the creation of unequal relationship which emerging donors generally seek to avoid.

#### *Interests:*

52. While emerging donors have different motivations, they try to provide alternatives to the prevailing neoliberal model, creating a tension between established donors and emerging powers. The various perspectives (realist: unipolarity, bipolarity; liberal) of the debate about rising powers and states as interest driven provide evidence. Conceptualizing in the case of China, if a rogue donor is defined as an interest-driven

donor, then every donor is a rogue donor given the US's and the West's involvement in conflict situations.

*Alternatives to Mainstream-DAC model:*

53. China's arrival as an emerging donor has created a space for *alternative* development thinking that may have been marginalized due to the dominance of "international best practice". On the one hand it is argued that China has undermined international best aid practices; on the other hand, by offering a new vision for aid effectiveness, China is seen as undermining the traditional donors' existing development hegemony. This influence is not a deliberate effort from China, but it helps in opening up space for diversified ideas of development cooperation. This is in terms of divergences in:
- a. Aid Philosophy: While aid is seen as one way traffic by traditional donors, with no space for national interests and should be delinked from commercial activities, China and emerging donors see aid in a reciprocal manner enhancing the partner's potential, acting as a catalyst and leverage of other resources especially in Africa, as a tool for national sovereignty.
  - b. Untied Aid: Conventional thought believes aid should be untied, delinked from trade and investment. However, the estimated consequences of tied aid become problematic if conventional assumptions of untying aid do not hold. There is an increasing contestation among DAC donors of how little consideration is given on the developmental impact of untied aid projects.
  - c. Infrastructural Financing: There is innovative co-financing instrument of the EU-Africa Partnership on infrastructure while the China-DAC Study Group explores how trade, investment and aid linkages and financing packages can mobilize additional actors and capital for economic transformation processes in Africa.
  - d. Debt Sustainability Framework: IMF's debt sustainability framework ignores the growth potential of countries while China's co-financing is geared at building up Africa's own dynamics of development."

*Relationship with Africa:*

54. China and emerging donors see Africa as a land of opportunity, not a lost continent in need of help. The China-African Oxford student network will assess empirical evidence on how African countries perceive China particularly as regards the debt sustainability framework. Anecdotal evidence shows that Brazil is very popular in Africa, though it is a much smaller player than China. There is no real opposition in Indian or Brazilian societies over their status as emerging powers despite high levels of existing poverty at home. Brazilian view of aid has been very positive and Brazilians have individually contributed to this. Some African countries find it easier to relate with emerging donors, as they have some shared experiences. Brazil's foreign policy motivation to head to Africa rather than focus entirely on countries in the region is borne out of former President Lula's commitment to South-South solidarity in the 1980s, resulting in agreements with over 30 African countries presently. African countries represent a new market for Brazil, with huge companies playing a role in extractive industries in Africa and this is also part of its ambition for the UNSC. Brazil is now increasingly seen as a threat in South America, as a hegemon increasingly replacing the US

*Challenges of Fragmentation and Capacity:*

55. The difficulty in establishing agency is possibly because of the fragmentation of aid outflows from emerging donors e.g. different agencies say and are responsible for

different functions within the development assistance programmes of emerging donors. There is a lot of competition between the different fragmented institutions, EMBRAPA, ABC and other ministries in Brazil for instance have different views of development cooperation. This is the case with a few DAC donors as well. In 2007, the Russian President issued a document on development assistance which outlined the nature of cooperation among the different arms of government for international cooperation. The latency of Russian aid and the ambiguity of its aid delivery mechanism mean that it is spread between different ministries such as finance, health and education, but the creation of a dedicated aid agency has been proposed to be established in January 2012. A part of the complexity could be that it is only periodically that politics and state interests come into play. E.g. OECD or DFID dialogue is only occasionally tampered by politics; it is mostly a dialogue by aid professionals, there is another tier of aid practice separate from what is driven by politics. Problems of capacity abound because the number of development specialists from the South is low: in comparison to India, where there are only a few people with the expertise in development assistance, in Brazil there are improvements. But there is still a problem of capacity in the academia for instance, and this creates a sense of insecurity, unwillingness to engage in an open debate and the tendency to block and reject proposals. It partly explains the institutional chaos, lack of responsibility and lack of accountability. This problem of capacity at the technical level has resulted in Brazil's success at home not being successfully translated to its development cooperation. The World Bank has made efforts to reach out to emerging donors and engage in partnerships with soft loans to restructure their development cooperation agencies.

56. In Russia, apart from few government officials few private sector and few business people are stakeholders involved in development cooperation and therefore have little grasp of how they could benefit from tied aid. Russia's focus on global health and humanitarian assistance rather than energy, their comparative advantage means the private sector and business community haven't been fully involved. Academics and think tanks actually have the best grasp of what aid could do. Think tanks are very sophisticated and active, some of which are now at IDS being tutored over how to manage Russian development cooperation. There are a number of sophisticated NGOs, but there is hardly any notion of project aid that could be delegated to NGOs, possibly an oversight on the part of the Russian government. Involvement of Russia as an aid donor is very low across all regions. Despite the WB's enthusiasm in providing training, many are sceptical about Russia's publicising of its aid programme which has barely taken off as there might be a public backlash, even though the public strongly supports humanitarian assistance. Russia rather than an emerging donor is a "recruited" donor.

*Coordination:*

57. This is necessary because if there is no coordination, we may end up with crass competition and if there is too much coordination, we end up with hegemony and run the risk of ruling out alternative thinking on development cooperation. The top-down approach of "best practices" i.e. International → Regional → National, is inherently problematic as there has been no systematic process for examining how the aid process is working at country level, what is working and what needs to be fixed. The pyramid rather should be bottom-up i.e. respecting local diversity → regional learning process → international network. Rather than using coordination (division of labour organized by the partner country), the issue should be how to agree upon principles and best practices of aid. Will such division of labour lead to diversity and complementarity within the aid architecture?

### *Transparency and Incentives:*

58. Aid transparency in IATI is a form of standardization. China has existing criticism of standards used by DAC donors and advocates bridges be built for dialogue. While China regards IATI as visionary, it is based on a series of preconditions and assumptions that donors have an obligation to publish data. This is unlikely to happen as DAC donors are also reluctant to publish all their data (ODA and OOF) to the public. One of the main reasons why China is reluctant to share their data to researchers and aid practitioners is because historically current DAC donors did not initially share their data; there was most likely a reason that pushed them to start publishing their data. China is an emerging donor, and might be on course to becoming more transparent, especially with the White Paper published every three years. The right incentive for emerging donors to be transparent comes when the recipients demand for information not when DAC donors pressure emerging donors to be transparent. China is becoming more responsive to its domestic constituency. It also raises the question of *accountable to whom?* Though there is a focus on aid effectiveness in Brazil's development assistance, there is a rejection of Paris and DAC norms, even though Brazil has started publishing some of its aid data. Theoretically, nothing would prevent Brazil from adopting IATI, apart from human resources capacity issue. However, if China and India do not adopt IATI, Brazil will most likely not take huge steps to move away from the global south. Brazil not wanting to join IATI or DAC is not necessarily negative as the efficiency of its development cooperation may be a catalyst towards greater transparency. There isn't much incentive at home in Brazil to engage in IATI donor harmonization as there is hardly any media focus and scrutiny apart from the occasional press release, and also lack of a single, large development cooperation agency.

- a. Emerging donors would join an institution only if they are regarded as first class participants, then it behoves that China should take IATI seriously as it is now a major donor. Though the BRIC have hardly taken a common stand within the ambit of South-South cooperation e.g. Chinese white paper has taken an individual stance, more or less aligning with DAC standards on some key issues. It will be interesting to see if other BRIC members will take an individual stance, what positions they would take or whether they will follow China's trajectory.
- b. Agencies like World Bank and DFID are engaging with emerging donors through partnerships to improve the capacity of their development cooperation agencies and Open-government Partnerships with resource-rich countries are possible ways of engaging Brazil with this agenda. Different programmes and workshops have been taking place to assist Russia for instance, in its development cooperation programme. Even though the World Bank's assistance to Brazil and Russia to develop a donor profile could be an avenue of making aid transparency non-political and tied to capacity building, transparency comes when an active public demands for it, not when there is a disinterested public.

### *Gap in Southern Donors' Aid Statistics:*

59. The data gaps in the Non-DAC donor's aid data generated through AidData initiative is put into the context of Non-DAC Donor's Data Availability Index. The data gap is defined as 'the lack of data for a particular Non DAC donor with specific type of information required in the AidData database'. In the fields indicating level of data availability, there is no information available for 35 out of 89 fields, only 10 fields have fully available information for all the donors and 6 fields have 100% data availability. This raises the question of whether the responsibility lies with the data capturing mechanism or from

those who should be publishing it. Data is collected through public sources, data available online and from sources interviewed. South-South cooperation has no established definition of transparency. However important to note that 51 out of 89 fields used for capturing Non DAC donor's aid data are taken from the CRS, that is a DAC reporting standard and which Non DAC donor does not adhere to. Further out of 33 IATI categories, 27 are fully compatible with the South-South Cooperation definition while only 2 are not fully compatible and four categories are almost compatible however it needs some minor modifications or addendum. The non-compatible categories are default flows and finance. Though proposed South-South Cooperation definition by UNDCF includes Export Credits and Debt Relief, the Chinese White Paper does include Export Credits and Debt Relief as foreign aid. In addition, DAC donors have included commitments of gender, environment, good governance which non-DAC donors are not bound to.

60. Since a range of non-DAC donors report to the CRS, it will be useful to see how CRS data would be useful at the local level, whether South-South reporting would be set-up and then include their export credits. This could pose a challenge to DAC countries to report their export credits, even though they already do at the aggregate level. There would need to be a govt arrangement and formal commitment to transparency on the level to which non-DAC donors are willing to give to their export activities. So long as they use the same codes, they could upload as much or as little as they wish in IATI, but then it would be a situation where countries report certain things and others do not. On the basis of research findings, IATI is a good starting point for all donors to report official flows and other flows as well. The way forward is to take one definition of South-South cooperation and then look at ways of integrating this within the IATI framework in order to give it legitimacy in the eyes of non-DAC donors.
61. To understand why southern donors' aid data is not captured, it's important to see it two levels. At the donor level there are capacity challenges, lack of interest to be seen as donors by their constituents and unwillingness to cooperate. And at the global-institutional level, there is the lack of incentive to report to any global institution, lack of a formal place in the aid architecture, technical and institutional problems of data definitions and collection and evaluation of this data. The possible challenges to IATI and existing DAC donors' architecture are that would the same yardstick (confidential, aggregate nature) be applied for 'non ODA' flows of south-south cooperation providers? And what if southern providers disclose their export credits and ask IATI to extend its coverage to DAC donors Export Credits as well?

## **E. Improving the Aid System/Future of International Cooperation**

### *Legitimacy questions*

62. Legitimacy of the present fora is being questioned. A shift in the aid effectiveness agenda is imminent because it is seen as a traditional donor agenda, a core group of like-minded donors. It is hardly a global agenda encompassing all actors and due to a new political landscape in traditional donor countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, UK all of which have new leaders in charge who have indicated the wording, content and outcome of the Busan High level conference might be different. In addition, if aid is not the driving force of the future of international cooperation, emerging powers might not be automatically interested in continuation of aid agenda or to join traditional aid debates. Aid and poverty are losing momentum as other policies could be starting points of international cooperation policy (climate change, foreign economic affairs, scientific collaboration and migration).

### *Coordination:*

63. Emerging donors could run into the same problems with transparency and accountability ten years from now, and then there would be a realization that it is not sustainable. But at present, they just may not have the interest or the capacity. When non-DAC aid becomes bigger and more important, they have to become more concerned about the consequences of their actions such as political backlash for instance the recent Chinese White Paper mentions aid effectiveness. Therefore, it is not certain that current emerging donor practices would push out current practices in future. China as a recipient did not consult extensively with donors, but had a very efficient coordination system within the Chinese government. There is a dynamic in the process of international aid rather than financial flows more generally which pushes towards standards and coordination. Therefore, those who impose fewer demands emerge winners. Perhaps we are looking at the survival of global coordination, built upon earlier practices to address these sorts of upcoming problems.

### *State-building agenda:*

64. Donors are recognizing through Paris and Accra that they have to contribute to PFM towards a state-building agenda. PFM is a central principle based on the recognition that aid stream is finite and domestic stream will eventually replace it. Thus aid management and aid data issues become important as means to interface PFM systems. With the arrival of emerging donors as significant players, what are going to be the incentives for emerging donors to see themselves as part of these state-building efforts? What are the developing system efforts to bring them into this system? But another force at work in public policy is the public-popular (problem-oriented) supported policies which make politicians popular but makes problem-oriented aid intersect with state-building efforts. The working party for aid effectiveness has essentially become a global forum. After Accra, this working party is both a subsidiary of DAC and also an international partnership.

### *Multilaterals:*

65. The role of multilateral agencies within the framework of the Paris Declaration is a political economy issue in both donor country contexts and recipient systems. Multilaterals are in the middle, mediating these issues. Multilateral aid has however, been on the decrease (30%) as they have also become like other donors with their internal dynamics and processes and are increasingly asked to prove themselves in terms of transparency and processes. World Bank for instance has problems with predictability, problems with country systems etc. It becomes problematic when the World Bank is not helping to build states through its aid.

### *Decline of Aid in International Cooperation:*

66. The role and impact of aid is going to decline as the number of typical aid dependent countries is decreasing. In 2011, statistics show that aid dependency has dropped by 1/3<sup>rd</sup> in some of the world's poorest countries such as Ghana, Mozambique and Rwanda all of which have debt exiting strategies. This data however covers only ODA, not Export Credits. Countries have mobilized more of their own resources even as aid has increased. Though aid helps in increasing policy autonomy, promoting accountability and predictability of policy expenditure, it can assist countries to be in the driving seat of their own development, it can also disincentivize governments to collect tax. Aid can end aid dependency by helping to promote national accountability, resource and tax systems mobilization, ownership, value for money and country leadership.

67. According to Action Aid, real aid is that which is targeted at the poorest countries, in the poorest communities, supporting country leadership, using recipient systems, budget support and is efficient. Statistics in 2011 show just over half of aid is real: 66\$bn out of 120bn and that real aid has not grown much: from 51% in 2005 to 55% in 2009. In order to reduce aid dependency, donors should increase real aid sharply, make aid more predictable, focus on policy coherence while recipient countries take clear leadership on making aid more effective, be fully accountable to domestic stakeholders, mobilize resources, continue to improve systems of financial mgmt, procurement and M&E. Donors and recipients should jointly design and support strong national development strategies based on democratic ownership, give preference to local procurement and accelerate aid delivery. Citizens of developed and developing countries should participate fully in national accountability demand greater tax justice globally and nationally.

#### *Humanitarian Assistance:*

68. Development aid is a small percentage of aid flows and humanitarian assistance is even smaller. *Development Initiative* looks at the humanitarian assistance component of development aid which is supposed to be neutral and short term.. Humanitarian assistance now involves a complex group of diverse donors, especially non-DAC donors some of whom are vulnerable to domestic disasters/chronic poverty. An increasing volume and number of non-DAC donors are reporting humanitarian aid and are also channelling resources to underfunded crises, such as the increase in contributions of Saudi Arabia to Palestine and Pakistan. There are new channels for delivering humanitarian aid and new emerging partnerships, for instance, Brazil and Spain signed an MOU on humanitarian aid; China and Gates Foundation have an MOU for Health and Agriculture. Non-DAC donors are also filling gaps left by DAC donors. In 2010 there was a shift in the way non-DAC donors give aid towards humanitarian assistance, moving away from bilateral aid to country level pooled funds such as in Haiti and Pakistan. The databases used for Non-DAC donor humanitarian assistance is still very poor and it is not clear how much of humanitarian aid that proportion of reported aid makes up. Since databases tend to suit the party or person who set it up, it is sometimes not very useful to others. There is also inconsistent reporting of non-DAC humanitarian aid. Despite China's unwillingness to sign-up for IATI, it is expected that it commit to transparency, improve data collection and publishing and comply with the standard. Though some Non-DAC donors are committed to transparency, e.g. UAE is prepared to report its data to DAC, but the legitimacy of IATI is weakened because it did not include non-DAC donors at the table at inception. In tracking Non-DAC donor data, *Development Initiative* uses OCHA's data captured for non-DAC. One of the problems with IATI is that it has focused less on humanitarian aid and more on other ODA. There are plans to encourage countries to report humanitarian aid and also for IATI to include more of humanitarian aid

69. A future of aid data should be a single data source, publicly available where access to information would be easy. AidData is at a position where it can reach as a single source for all the donors. The aim is to create a system where the user can choose different data sources for each donor for instance IDS, Sussex has just published data on aid from philanthropy (non official source of finance): <http://www.bellagioinitiative.org>

#### F. Suggestions and way forward

70. Politicization of aid flow information while other shared government information systems could be because of the path dependence in the past few decades.

71. The aid transparency dynamics have a strong incentive to reduce dependency not just for independence but also for ownership. This is related to political and moral questions. Recipients are not just governments but also the civil society. An issue is having data that recipients can actually use and understand.

72. *How to involve Non-DAC governments in the IATI Process:*

- a. Getting the UAE – which is ready to report its data to DAC – and small European donors on the table could help. Involving a government official in the non-DAC country govt, sympathetic to such standardized approaches;
- b. Creating a public demand, through civil society at home to pressure government to be part of this;
- c. Getting some developing countries who have already signed on to IATI to talk about it, share their experiences, the difficulties they have experienced and how it is beneficial for other non-DAC donors to be part of it
- d. For south-south cooperation providers, they have legitimate concerns over not being part of the initial process while standards were discussed and consensus was reached. As the categorizations used are still OECD DACs which forms the basis of disagreement with DAC donors. However it could be useful to involve UNDCF (an institution which Southern donors relate well with) as one of the institutions along with IATI to initiate the process of south-south data categorization on the line of IATI standards to make south-south cooperation data reporting compatible with IATI expectations. .



# UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

**INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT  
SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY  
WORKSHOP PROGRAMME: A FUTURE FOR AID DATA  
31<sup>ST</sup> OCTOBER AND 1<sup>ST</sup> NOVEMBER 2011**

**31 October 2011**

<b>Time</b>	<b>Paper Title</b>	<b>Invited speakers</b>
10.00	Registration & Coffee	
10.30	Welcome & background - A Future for Aid Data research	Michael Hubbard (University of Birmingham)
<b>First Session: Transparency: Chaired by Heather Marquette (University of Birmingham)</b>		
10.45 – 11.15	Transparency and accountability as one of the critical perspectives on the legitimacy of future development cooperation	Stephan Klingebiel (German Development Institute)
11.15 – 11.45	Debt Management & Transparency	Mac Banda (Commonwealth Secretariat)
11.45-12.15	Beyond Busan: the case for including other public flows for development	Michael Hubbard & Pranay Sinha (University of Birmingham)
12.15 – 13.00	<b>Open for discussion and questions and answers</b>	
13.00-14.00	<b>Lunch</b>	
<b>Second Session: Global Aid Governance: Chaired by Richard Batley (University of Birmingham)</b>		
14.00 – 14.25	Aid Governance and Aid Reporting: Current Issues in a Historical Perspective	Richard Carey (former Director, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD )
14.25-14.50	Global aid data governance for both DAC & Non DAC Donors- which institution is fit for purpose OECD or UNDCF or any new one?	Owen Barder (Centre for Global Development)

<b>Time</b>	<b>Paper Title</b>	<b>Invited speakers</b>
14.50 – 15.15	Convergence & Divergence among established players and new global players: Where is the common ground?	Pranay Sinha & Michael Hubbard (University of Birmingham)
15.15-16.00	<b>Open for discussion and questions and answers</b>	
16.00-16.15	Break	
<b>Third Session: Global Aid Governance (continued) Chaired by Simon Delay (University of Birmingham)</b>		
16.15 – 16.40	How Much Aid is Real Aid?	Lucia Fry (Action Aid)
16.40- 17.05	Whether bridging of 'two type of aid players' is really effective way to deal with the current divergence: The case of Korea and Japan	Soyeun Kim (University of Leeds)
17.05-17.30	Will China, India & Brazil make 'South-South' cooperation a reality?	Marco Vieira (University of Birmingham)
17.30-18.00	Open for discussion and questions and answers	
18.00 -18.30	Delegate drinks reception	

### 1<sup>ST</sup> November 2011

<b>Fourth session: Non DAC Donors Chaired by Andrew Nickson (University of Birmingham)</b>		
9.00-9.25	The Political Economy of Development Cooperation: China's Unintentional Influence on the Aid Effectiveness Debate	Jiajun Xu (University of Oxford)
9.25-9.50	India and Brazil's foreign aid and their role in the future development architecture	Oliver Stuenkel (Fundação Getulio Vargas)
9.50-10.15	Brazil's development cooperation: a new paradigm	Jennifer Constantine (Institute of Development Studies)
10.15-10.40	Public perception of foreign aid in Russia	Patty Gray (University of Ireland)
10.40-11.15	<b>Open for discussion and questions and answers</b>	
11.15-11.30	<b>Break</b>	
<b>Fifth session: DAC &amp; Non DAC Donors at the Crossroads Chaired by Mike Hubbard (University of Birmingham)</b>		

11.30-11.55	DAC and Non-DAC Donors at the Crossroads: The problem of Export Credits	Pranay Sinha (University of Birmingham)
11.55-12.20	Transparency in Export Credit Agencies: The case of ECGD: what's the way forward for Non DAC Donors?	Tim Jones (Jubilee Debt Campaign)
12.20-13.00	<b>Open for discussion and questions and answers</b>	
13.00-14.00	<b>Lunch</b>	
<b>Sixth session: Capturing South-South Development Cooperation Chaired by Oliver Stuenkel (Fundação Getulio Vargas)</b>		
14.00-14.30	South –South Cooperation Data: Issues around southern donors' aid statistics	Pranay Sinha & Michael Hubbard (University of Birmingham)
14.30-14.55	Experience with including Non DAC Donors aid information in AidData database	Mike Tierney (AidData)
14.55-15.20	Non DAC Donors and Humanitarian Assistance Flows	Kerry Smith (Development Initiative)
15.20-16.00	Discussions & Way Forward: Future Research Agenda	Michael Hubbard & Pranay Sinha (University of Birmingham)
16.00	Workshop ends	