Journal articles

Sullivan-Bissett, E. (forthcoming) Explaining Doxastic Transparency: Aim, Norm, or Function? Synthese.

Larkin, M., Boden, Z., Newton, E. (forthcoming). If Psychosis Were Cancer. BMJ Medical Humanities (Special issue on Communicating Mental Health).

Puddifoot, K. (forthcoming). Stereotyping: A Multifactorial Account. Philosophical Topics.

Stoneham, T. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (forthcoming). Another Failed Refutation of Scepticism. Teorema.

Puddifoot, K. (forthcoming). Dissolving the Epistemic/Ethical Dilemma over Implicit Bias. Philosophical Explorations.

Sullivan-Bissett (forthcoming). Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity. Philosophical Explorations.

Jefferson, A., Bortolotti, L. and Kuzmanovic, B. (2017). What is Unrealistic Optimism? Consciousness & Cognition 50: 3–11.

Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). Aims and Exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy. doi 10.1111/ejop.12183

Antrobus, M. and Bortolotti, L. (2016). Depressive delusionsFilosofia Unisinos 17 (2): 192-201.

Polonioli, A. (2016). New issues for new methods: Ethical and editorial challenges for an experimental philosophyScience and Engineering Ethics. doi:10.1007/s11948-016-9838-2

Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2016). The role of emotions and values in competence. Journal of Medical Ethics. doi:10.1136/medethics-2015-103315

Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2016). Malfunction Defended. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1062-8

Bortolotti, L. and Miyazono, K. (2016). The Ethics of Delusional BeliefErkenntnis 81 (2): 275-296.

Bortolotti, L. and Miyazono, K. (2015). Recent Work on the Nature and Development of DelusionsPhilosophy Compass 10 (9): 636-645.

Bortolotti, L. and Antrobus, M. (2015). Costs and Benefits of Realism and Optimism. Current Opinion in Psychiatry 28 (2): 194-198.


Book chapters

Holroyd, J. and Puddifoot, K. (forthcoming). Implicit Bias and Prejudice. In M. Fricker, P.J. Graham, D. Henderson, and N. Pedersen (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge.

Puddifoot, K. (forthcoming). Epistemic Discrimination. In K. Lippert-Rasmussen (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Discrimination. Routledge.

Bortolotti, L. and Puddifoot, K. (forthcoming). Philosophy, bias and stigma. In D. Bubbio et al. (eds.) Why Philosophy. Noesis Press.

Sullivan-Bissett, E., Bortolotti, L. (forthcoming). Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief: reviving the teleologist’s dilemma. In Sullivan-Bissett et al. (eds.) Art and Belief. Oxford University Press.

Sullivan-Bissett, E., Bortolotti, L., Broome, M.R. and Mameli, M. (2016). Moral and Legal Implications of the Continuity between Delusional and Non-delusional Beliefs. In G. Keil, L. Keuck and R. Hauswald (eds.) Vagueness in Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.

Bortolotti, L., Gunn, R. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2016). What Makes a Belief Delusional? In I. Mac Carthy, K. Sellevold and O. Smith (eds.) Cognitive Confusions: Dreams, Delusions and Illusions in Early Modern Culture. Legenda.


Other relevant publications

Fineberg, S. and Corlett, P. (2016). The Doxastic Shear-pin: Delusions as Errors of Learning and Memory. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 21 (1): 73-89.

Letheby, C. (2016). The Epistemic Innocence of Psychedelic States. Consciousness & Cognition 39: 28-37.

Bortolotti, L. (2016). Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematised Delusions in SchizophreniaBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3): 879-900.

Miyazono, K. and Bortolotti, L. (2015). The Causal Role Argument against Doxasticism about DelusionsAvant V (3): 30-50.

Bortolotti, L. and Miyazono, K. (2015). Are Alien Thoughts Beliefs? (Commentary on Transparent Minds). Teorema 34 (1): 135-148.

Bortolotti, L. (2015). The Epistemic Innocence of Motivated Delusions. Consciousness & Cognition 33: 490-99.

Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2015). Implicit Bias, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence. Consciousness & Cognition 33: 548-60.

Fulford, W., Bortolotti, L. and Broome, M. (2014). Taking the Long View: an Emerging Framework for Translational Psychiatric Science. World Psychiatry 13 (2): 110-117.

Craigie, J. and Bortolotti, L. (2014). Rationality, Diagnosis, and Patient Autonomy in Psychiatry. In J. Sadler et al. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics. Oxford University Press.