Special issues

  1. Bortolotti, L. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (eds.) (2017). False but Useful Beliefs. Philosophical Explorations 20 (S1). 

Journal articles

  1. Stammers, S. (2017). A patchier picture still: biases, beliefs and overlap on the inferential continuum. Philosophia.
  2. Bortolotti, L. and Sullivan-Bissett (forthcoming). Epistemic Innocence of Clinical Memory Distortions. Mind & Language.
  3. Puddifoot, K. (2017). Stereotyping: The Multifactorial View. Philosophical Topics 45 (1): 137-156.
  4. Larkin, M., Boden, Z., Newton, E. (2017). If Psychosis Were Cancer: A speculative comparisonBMJ Medical Humanities 43: 118-123 (Special issue on Communicating Mental Health).
  5. Stoneham, T. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). Another Failed Refutation of ScepticismTeorema XXXVI (2): 19-30.
  6. Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). Explaining Doxastic Transparency: Aim, Norm, or Function? Synthese.
  7. Puddifoot, K. (2017). Dissolving the Epistemic/Ethical Dilemma over Implicit BiasPhilosophical Explorations 20 (S1): 73-93.
  8. Sullivan-Bissett (2017). Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity. Philosophical Explorations 20 (S1): 94-110.
  9. Jefferson, A., Bortolotti, L. and Kuzmanovic, B. (2017). What is Unrealistic Optimism? Consciousness & Cognition 50: 3–11.
  10. Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). Aims and Exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy. doi 10.1111/ejop.12183
  11. Antrobus, M. and Bortolotti, L. (2016). Depressive delusionsFilosofia Unisinos 17 (2): 192-201.
  12. Polonioli, A. (2017). New issues for new methods: Ethical and editorial challenges for an experimental philosophyScience and Engineering Ethics 23 (4): 1009–1034.
  13. Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2016). Malfunction Defended. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1062-8
  14. Bortolotti, L. and Miyazono, K. (2016). The Ethics of Delusional BeliefErkenntnis 81 (2): 275-296.
  15. Bortolotti, L. and Miyazono, K. (2015). Recent Work on the Nature and Development of DelusionsPhilosophy Compass 10 (9): 636-645.
  16. Bortolotti, L. and Antrobus, M. (2015). Costs and Benefits of Realism and Optimism. Current Opinion in Psychiatry 28 (2): 194-198.

Book chapters

  1. Holroyd, J. and Puddifoot, K. (forthcoming). Implicit Bias and Prejudice. In M. Fricker, P.J. Graham, D. Henderson, and N. Pedersen (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge.
  2. Puddifoot, K. (forthcoming). Epistemic Discrimination. In K. Lippert-Rasmussen (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Discrimination. Routledge.
  3. Bortolotti, L. and Puddifoot, K. (forthcoming). Philosophy, bias and stigma. In D. Bubbio et al. (eds.) Why Philosophy. Noesis Press.
  4. Sullivan-Bissett, E., Bortolotti, L. (forthcoming). Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief: reviving the teleologist’s dilemma. In Sullivan-Bissett et al. (eds.) Art and Belief. Oxford University Press.
  5. Sullivan-Bissett, E., Bortolotti, L., Broome, M.R. and Mameli, M. (2016). Moral and Legal Implications of the Continuity between Delusional and Non-delusional Beliefs. In G. Keil, L. Keuck and R. Hauswald (eds.) Vagueness in Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
  6. Bortolotti, L., Gunn, R. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2016). What Makes a Belief Delusional? In I. Mac Carthy, K. Sellevold and O. Smith (eds.) Cognitive Confusions: Dreams, Delusions and Illusions in Early Modern Culture. Legenda.

Other relevant publications

  1. Bortolotti, L. and Gunn, R. (2017). Delusion. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.
  2. Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2016). The Role of Emotions and Values in CompetenceJournal of Medical Ethics. doi:10.1136/medethics-2015-103315
  3. Fineberg, S. and Corlett, P. (2016). The Doxastic Shear-pin: Delusions as Errors of Learning and Memory. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 21 (1): 73-89.
  4. Letheby, C. (2016). The Epistemic Innocence of Psychedelic States. Consciousness & Cognition 39: 28-37. For this paper Letheby was honoured with a Breaking Convention Humanities Research Award in July 2017.
  5. Bortolotti, L. (2016). Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematised Delusions in SchizophreniaBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3): 879-900.
  6. Miyazono, K. and Bortolotti, L. (2015). The Causal Role Argument against Doxasticism about DelusionsAvant V (3): 30-50.
  7. Bortolotti, L. and Miyazono, K. (2015). Are Alien Thoughts Beliefs? (Commentary on Transparent Minds). Teorema 34 (1): 135-148.
  8. Bortolotti, L. (2015). The Epistemic Innocence of Motivated Delusions. Consciousness & Cognition 33: 490-99.
  9. Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2015). Implicit Bias, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence. Consciousness & Cognition 33: 548-60.
  10. Fulford, W., Bortolotti, L. and Broome, M. (2014). Taking the Long View: an Emerging Framework for Translational Psychiatric Science. World Psychiatry 13 (2): 110-117.
  11. Craigie, J. and Bortolotti, L. (2014). Rationality, Diagnosis, and Patient Autonomy in Psychiatry. In J. Sadler et al. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics. Oxford University Press.