Dr Darragh Byrne BPhil, DPhil (Oxon)


Lecturer in Philosophy

Department of Philosophy


Contact details

ERI Building
University of Birmingham
B15 2TT


My main interests are in philosophy of mind, and language, where I tend to defend broadly empiricist views. I’m also well disposed towards philosophical logic and epistemology.


I joined the Department in 2000, after completing a doctoral degree at Oxford.



  • Yr 1: Logic B (Semester 2)
  • Yr 2: Thought and Language  (Semester 2)
  • Yr 2: Independent Study (Several seminars in semester 2)


  • Epistemology - 5 seminars on contemporary issues in epistemology (Semester 2)
  • Supervising 2 MPhil students (Imogen Smith on conventions in language, and Chris Devereux on holism and conceptual role semantics) and half of 1 PhD (Andrew Wright, on pain).

Postgraduate supervision

I’m happy to supervise PG students in many areas of philosophy of mind and language, epistemology and metaphysics, and I’d like to have more PG students. More specifically, I’d be especially delighted to supervise on the following areas:

  • Reference
  • Consciousness (especially semantic and epistemic issues)
  • First-person knowledge
  • A priori knowledge
  • Epistemic contextualism
  • Objectivity, realism and anti-realism
  • Rule-following and the ‘normativity of meaning’


I recently completed two long-standing projects – both of these are now under submission:

  • The Candour of Sense’ -  an epic paper on Fregean externalism and cognitive perspective.
  • Phenomenal Senses – another lengthy paper, this one bringing Fregean externalism to bear on the current debate over phenomenal concepts.

Work in Progress



  • (co-edited, with Max Kölbel) Arguing About Language, Routledge, Dec., 2009
    A  c. 600 page anthology of classic and contemporary readings on the philosophy of language, with extensive editorial commentary.


  • 'Three Notions of Tacit Knowledge', Agora: Papeles de Filosofia, 23 (2005) (a special issue commemorating the 25th anniversary of Gareth Evans's death), pp. 61-85. read abstract
  • 'Compositionality and the Manifestation Challenge', Synthese, 144: 101-36 (2005). read abstract
  • 'The "Compositional Rigidity" of Recognitional Concepts', Philosophical Papers, vol. 33(2), (2004) pp. 147-69. read abstract 
  • 'Gardiner on Anti-realism: A Defence of Dummett', Dialogue, XLIII (2004), pp. 3-24. read abstract
  • 'Horwich's Semantic Deflationism', International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 8(3) (2001), pp. 371-91. read abstract
  • 'Liberalising Verificationism: Peircean and Dummettean Possibilities', in Weingartner, P., Schurz, G., & Dorn, G. (eds.) Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Vienna, 1997.

Commissioned encyclopaedia entries, critical notices etc.

  • ‘Intentionality’, forthcoming in Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy
  • ‘Further Issues in the Philosophy of Mind’, forthcoming in Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy
  • ‘Metaphysics of Mind’,  in Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy
  • 'Consciousness',  in Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy
  • 'Casullo on A Priori Justification', Philosophical Books, 48 (3), 241-251
  • 'The Private Language Argument', in Brown, K. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics (2nd Edition) Elsevier Science, 2005.
  • 'Wright, Crispin', in Brown, S. (ed.), The Dictionary Of Twentieth-Century British Philosophers, Thoemmes Press (2005)

Book reviews

  • Frege on Sense and Reference, by Mark Textor, Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming.
  • Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge, by Drew Khlentzos, Mind, forthcoming.
  • Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again, by Mark Rowlands, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 232 (July 2008)  from Wiley InterScience).
  • Semantic Challenges to Realism: Dummett and Putnam, by M. Q. Gardiner, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 53, no. 210, (Jan 2003), pp. 117-20.

Unpublished papers / Research in progress

Awards and grants

  • 2004 (spring semester): Research Leave Award from UK Arts and Humanities Board.

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