Professor Hartry Field B.A. (Wisconsin), M.A. and Ph.D. (Harvard)

Department of Philosophy
Distinguished Research Professor

Contact details

ERI Building
University of Birmingham
B15 2TT

Hartry Field is University Professor and Silver Professor of Philosophy at New York University. He is famous for developing and defending Fictionalism as a theory in Philosophy of Mathematics. He has also made important contributions to many other core areas of philosophy including Metaphysics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Logic, Logic, Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Language. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2003.


  • Ph.D. in Philosophy, Harvard University, 1972.
  • M.A. in Philosophy, Harvard University, 1968.
  • B.A. in Mathematics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1967.


After receiving his PhD from Harvard University where he was supervised by Hilary Putnam, Professor Field has held positions at Princeton, University of Southern California and City University of New York Graduate Centre. He joined NYU in 1997 where he is currently Silver Professor of Philosophy. He has also held visiting positions at Alls Souls College Oxford, MIT, and University of Arizona.

In addition to being a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Professor Field has received Fellowships and Grants from the National Science Foundation, Guggenheim Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. He won the Lakatos Prize for his book Science without Numbers in 1986. In 2008, he gave the Locke lectures in Oxford (with the title "Logic, Normativity, and Rational Revisability"). He has also given the Shearman lectures (University of London), the Paul Benacerraf lecture (Princeton), and the Nelson Lecture (Michigan). 

Postgraduate supervision

Professor Field will co-supervise PhD students at Birmingham with other members of staff in his areas of research.


Areas of Research:

  • Metaphysics
  • Epistemology
  • Philosophy of Mathematics
  • Philosophy of Logic
  • Logic
  • Philosophy of Mind
  • Philosophy of Science
  • Philosophy of Language



  • Saving Truth from Paradox (OUP, 2008)
  • Truth and the Absence of Fact (OUP, 2001)
  • Realism, Mathematics and Modality (Blackwell 1989)
  • Science without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism (Blackwell and Princeton 1980)

Selected Articles:

  • "Epistemology without Metaphysics". Philosophy Studies 143, 2009: 249-290.
  • "Pluralism in Logic". Review of Sympolic Logic 2, 2009: 342-359.
  • "What is the Normative Role of Logic?". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83, 2009: 251-268.
  • "Truth and the Unprovability of Consistency". Mind 115, 2006: 567-605.
  •  "Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes". Journal of Symbolic Logic 32, 2003: 139-177.
  • "No Fact of the Matter". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81, 2003: 457-480.
  • "Saving the Truth-Schema from Paradox". Journal of Symbolic Logic 31, 2002: 1-27.
  • "Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle", Nous 34, 2000: 1-30.
  • "The A Prioricity of Logic". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96, 1996: 359-379.
  • "Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content". Mind 103, 1994: 249-285.
  • "The Conceptual Contingency of Mathematical Objects". Mind 102, 1993: 285-299.
  • "A Nominalist Proof of the Conservativeness of Set Theory". Journal of Philosophical Logic 21, 1992: 111-123.
  • "Realism, Mathematics, and Modality". Philosophical Topics 16, 1988: 57-107.
  • "On Conservativeness and Incompleteness". Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985: 239-260.
  • "Is Mathematical Knowledge Just Logical Knowledge?". Philosophical Review 93, 1984: 509-552.
  • "Realism and Relativism". Journal of Philosophy 79, 1982: 553-567.