I am a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy. I work primarily on issues at the intersection of philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and epistemology. For more information, please visit my personal webpage.
PhD, Philosophy, King's College London, 2003
M.Phil, Philosophy, King's College London, 1997
B.A., University of Oxford, 1995
Before coming to Birmingham, I was a Jacobsen Research Fellow at the University College London, a Junior Research Fellow at St Catherine's College, Oxford, a temporary lecturer in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, and a post-doc at the University of Antwerp, Belgium.
I am happy to supervise postgraduate work in philosophy of mind and psychology, and a range of areas in epistemology (especially self-knowledge, perceptual justification and knowledge, and disagreement).
My research mainly concerns issues in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and epistemology. Recently, I have focused on the nature and extent of introspective knowledge and the proper use of introspective data in philosophical and scientific theorizing about the conscious mind. I am also interested in questions about methodology in philosophy and scientific psychology more generally, such as how to reconcile personal-level with subpersonal-level theorizing. Other current research activities concern the distinction between general and specific abilities, and the notion of intuition or intuitive judgment.
"Moderate Scepticism about Introspection", Philosophical Studies forthcoming.
"Mind-Independence and Visual Phenomenology". In Smithies, D. & Stoljar, D. (eds.): Introspection and Consciousness (OUP, 2011).
"Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology". In Bayne, T. & Montague, M. (eds.): Cognitive Phenomenology (OUP, 2011).
"Using First-Person Data", Journal of Consciousness Studies 18, 2011: 165-179.
"Expecting Phenomenology", Behavioural and Brain Sciences 30, 2007: 526-527.