I am a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy. I work primarily on issues at the intersection of philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and epistemology. For more information, please visit my personal webpage.
- PhD, Philosophy, King's College London, 2003
- M.Phil, Philosophy, King's College London, 1997
- B.A., University of Oxford, 1995
Before coming to Birmingham, I was a Jacobsen Research Fellow at the University College London, a Junior Research Fellow at St Catherine's College, Oxford, a temporary lecturer in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, and a post-doc at the University of Antwerp, Belgium.
I am happy to supervise postgraduate work in philosophy of mind and psychology, and a range of areas in epistemology (especially self-knowledge, perceptual justification and knowledge, and disagreement).
My research mainly concerns issues in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and epistemology. Recently, I have focused on the nature and extent of introspective knowledge and the proper use of introspective data in philosophical and scientific theorizing about the conscious mind. I am also interested in questions about methodology in philosophy and scientific psychology more generally, such as how to reconcile personal-level with subpersonal-level theorizing. Other current research activities concern the distinction between general and specific abilities, and the notion of intuition or intuitive judgment.
- "Moderate Scepticism about Introspection", Philosophical Studies forthcoming.
- "Mind-Independence and Visual Phenomenology". In Smithies, D. & Stoljar, D. (eds.): Introspection and Consciousness (OUP, 2011).
- "Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology". In Bayne, T. & Montague, M. (eds.): Cognitive Phenomenology (OUP, 2011).
- "Using First-Person Data", Journal of Consciousness Studies 18, 2011: 165-179.
- "Expecting Phenomenology", Behavioural and Brain Sciences 30, 2007: 526-527.