Commentary on the Joint Report
A ‘Constitutional Conundrums: Northern Ireland, the EU and Human Rights’ Project Report

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JOINT REPORT FROM THE NEGOTIATORS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT

ON PROGRESS DURING PHASE 1 OF NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 50 TEU ON THE UNITED KINGDOM’S ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION

1. This report, presented jointly by the negotiators of the European Union (Union) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), records the progress made in the first phase of negotiations under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) on the UK’s orderly withdrawal from the Union.

2. Both Parties have reached agreement in principle across the following three areas under consideration in the first phase of negotiations, on which further detail is set out in this report:
   a. protecting the rights of Union citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the Union;
   b. the framework for addressing the unique circumstances in Northern Ireland; and
   c. the financial settlement.

3. Progress was also made in achieving agreement on aspects of other separation issues.

4. The positions detailed in this report form a single and coherent package. Agreement in principle has been reached on the package as a whole, as opposed to individual elements.

5. Under the caveat that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, the joint commitments set out below in this joint report shall be reflected in the Withdrawal Agreement in full detail. This does not prejudice any adaptations that might be appropriate in case transitional arrangements were to be agreed in the second phase of the negotiations, and is without prejudice to discussions on the framework of the future relationship.

Citizens’ rights

6. The overall objective of the Withdrawal Agreement with respect to citizens’ rights is to provide reciprocal protection for Union and UK citizens, to enable the effective exercise of rights derived from Union law and based on past life choices, where those citizens have exercised free movement rights by the specified date.

7. To date, both Parties have reached a common understanding on the following:1

8. The specified date should be the time of the UK’s withdrawal.

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1 This common understanding is based on a more detailed consensus between the Parties, as expressed in the latest joint technical note that summarises the UK and EU positions.
10-16. These paragraphs are significant for Ireland and Northern Ireland. The right of the Northern Ireland populace to choose British and/or Irish citizenship meant this arena was always likely to be complex in the context of the island of Ireland.

Following Brexit, the proposals set out in these paragraphs will result in the creation of at least six different combinations of Northern Ireland residents, with different rights:

1. Northern Ireland Residents with Irish Passports
2. Northern Ireland Residents with UK Passports but who are entitled to Irish Passports
3. Northern Ireland Residents with UK Passports not entitled to Irish Passports
4. Northern Ireland Residents with EU Passports resident pre-Brexit
5. Northern Ireland Residents with EU Passports resident post Brexit
6. Northern Ireland Residents with non-EU/UK/Ireland passports

Categories 1 and 4 are covered by this section on ‘citizens’ rights’ and how these will be guaranteed for them in Northern Ireland. The paragraphs to the left make clear that these categories of Northern Ireland residents will continue to benefit from non-discrimination as defined under EU law (11); will continue to have the right to be joined by their family members (if family members on the day of withdrawal) and their children, where both parents of the child hold an EU nationality or one holds an EU nationality and the other holds UK nationality (12). What this excludes is children born to EU nationals and third country nationals – they are not covered by the Withdrawal Agreement and consequently do not retain EU rights unless born in Northern Ireland where they would be entitled to Irish citizenship. Those born in Britain, would have UK nationality, their right of residence in Northern Ireland would not be impaired but their access to the EU would be same as category 3 above. The EU rules on durable relationships also continue to apply to those EU nationals in durable relationships prior to the withdrawal date (13), but all relationships created following Withdrawal will be subject to national law instead (14). Frontier workers (who are acting as frontier workers on the day of Withdrawal) also have their rights protected by this Withdrawal agreement – this is of particular interest to those working on the Irish border (15).
17. This paragraph requires that the process of registration for EU citizens in the UK will be straightforward, meaning proportionate and as light-touch as possible. It is also not to be costly: the maximum charge suggested by this agreement is the cost of a UK passport. This is important for the large numbers of Northern Ireland Residents with EU Passports in category 4 above. The level of detail contained in these paragraphs are an indicator of the priority with which this issue is seen on the EU and Irish side; for example, requiring a family’s application to be considered together.

Relevant in the context of Northern Ireland is para. 52 below, which guarantees the Northern Irish (who hold Irish passports or who are entitled to them) to continue to have EU citizenship through their Irish citizenship. Their applications for status confirmations (should they choose to apply, they will also be covered by the Common Travel Area) rooted in EU law and the Withdrawal Agreement, should they wish for them, are consequently also covered by the provisions on citizenship rights set out in this section of the Joint Report.

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16. The UK and EU27 Member States can require persons concerned to apply to obtain a status conferring the rights of residence as provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement and be issued with a residence document attesting to the existence of that right. Where the host State requires persons concerned to apply for a status, no status is obtained if no successful application is made, subject to paragraph 17. The UK and EU27 Member States can also continue with the present system under which entitlement of rights under the Withdrawal Agreement may be attested by any other means of proof than a residence document;

17. Administrative procedures for applications for status will be transparent, smooth and streamlined, in particular:

   a. The Withdrawal Agreement will specify that the host State cannot require anything more than is strictly necessary and proportionate to determine whether the criteria have been met. The Withdrawal Agreement will contain provisions that follow a similar approach to the provisions on evidential requirements in Directive 2004/38;

   b. The host State will avoid any unnecessary administrative burdens;

   c. Application forms will be short, simple, user friendly and adjusted to the context of the Withdrawal Agreement. The host State will work with the applicants to help them prove their eligibility under the Withdrawal Agreement and to avoid any errors or omissions that may impact on the application decision. Competent authorities will give applicants the opportunity to furnish supplementary evidence or remedy any deficiencies where it appears a simple omission has taken place. A principle of evidential flexibility will apply, enabling competent authorities to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant where appropriate;

   d. A proportionate approach will be taken to those who miss the deadline for application where there is a good reason. Applications made by families at the same time will be considered together; and

   e. Where an application is required to obtain status, adequate time of at least two years will be allowed to persons within the scope of the Withdrawal Agreement to submit their applications. During this time period, they will enjoy the rights conferred by the Withdrawal Agreement. Residence documents under the Withdrawal Agreement will be issued free of charge or for a charge not exceeding that imposed on nationals for the issuing of similar documents;

18. Pending a final decision by the competent authorities on any application made for status under the Withdrawal Agreement, as well as a final judgment handed down in case of judicial redress sought against any rejection of such application, the citizens’ rights Part of the Withdrawal Agreement will apply to the applicant. The host State may remove applicants who submitted fraudulent or abusive applications from the territory under the conditions set out in Directive 2004/38/EC, in particular Articles 31 and 35, even before a final judgment has been handed down in case of judicial redress sought against any rejection of such application;

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2 For information: the UK has published a technical note – see https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/citizens-rights-administrative-procedures-in-the-uk - setting out proposed procedures under its national law, which it will continue to develop over the coming months.
19. Decisions taken under the procedure for obtaining status under the Withdrawal Agreement will be made in accordance with the objective criteria established in the Withdrawal Agreement (i.e. no discretion, unless in favour of the applicant). There will be safeguards in the Withdrawal Agreement for a fair procedure, and decisions will be subject to the redress mechanisms and judicial controls provided in Directive 2004/38/EC;

20. The conditions for acquiring the right of residence under the Withdrawal Agreement are those set out in Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 2004/38/EC, including the right to change status;

21. The conditions for acquiring the right of permanent residence under the Withdrawal Agreement are those set out in Articles 16, 17 and 18 of Directive 2004/38/EC, with periods of lawful residence prior to the specified date included in the calculation of the conditions set out in Articles 16 and 17 of Directive 2004/38/EC;

22. The UK and EU27 Member States can apply more favourable national provisions in accordance with Article 37 of Directive 2004/38/EC;

23. In order to obtain status under the Withdrawal Agreement by application, those already holding a permanent residence document issued under Union law at the specified date will have that document converted into the new document free of charge, subject only to verification of identity, a criminality and security check and confirmation of ongoing residence;

24. Systematic criminality and security checks can – in the specific context of acquiring status under the Withdrawal Agreement – be carried out on all applicants for status under the Agreement and applicants can be asked to declare criminality. Any consequences arising from such checks and declarations shall be subject to the procedures in paragraphs 17 to 19;

25. Persons who acquired the permanent residence rights in the host State under the Withdrawal Agreement can be absent from its territory for a period not exceeding five consecutive years without losing their residence right under the Withdrawal Agreement;

26. Any restrictions on grounds of public policy or security related to conduct prior to the specified date of persons covered by the Withdrawal Agreement will be in accordance with Chapter VI of Directive 2004/38/EC;

27. Any restrictions on grounds of public policy or security related to conduct after the specified date will be in accordance with national law;

28. Social security coordination rules set out in Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009 will apply. Social security coordination rules will cover Union citizens who on the specified date are or have been subject to UK legislation and UK nationals who are or have been subject to the legislation of an EU27 Member State, and EU27 and UK nationals within the scope of the Withdrawal Agreement by virtue of

19-22. These paragraphs create legal certainty regarding the actual processing of applications to 'retain' EU status in the UK and the right to reside in the EU for UK nationals under the Withdrawal Agreement. No requirements beyond those set out in Directive 2004/38/EC are permissible, and paragraph 22 actually encourages a lessening of requirements.

23. This paragraph ensures a ‘like-for-like’ swap for all those who already have permanent residence documentation in Northern Ireland; they can cost-free trade that for a ‘settled status’ document. The status transfer can only be subject to criminality and security checks, though para. 24 does permit those to be systematic.

25. This paragraph makes clear that EU nationals in the UK (including in Northern Ireland) can leave the UK for a period of up to five years without losing their right to reside. **It should be noted that this presumably will not apply to Irish EU nationals** – who, under the Ireland Act 1949 and the Common Travel Area, possess unlimited rights to reside in the UK (including in Northern Ireland). The consequence of this is that Northern Ireland nationals with an Irish passport as well as other Irish nationals will have more expansive free movement rights post-Brexit than all other EU citizens in the UK, and all UK citizens in the EU, will, even when they are all covered by the Withdrawal Agreement (as opposed to covered only by domestic law, as alluded to by para. 10 of the Joint Report).

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3 This includes beneficiaries of the Withdrawal Agreement who hold valid domestic immigration documents conferring a permanent right to reside in the host state (such as UK Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) status).
28-32. These paragraphs set out what rights are to be retained for all those EU nationals and UK nationals covered by the withdrawal date. This includes social security rights (28), the EHIC health insurance cards (which continue to exist for both UK and EU nationals resident in either the UK or the EU27 at the time of Brexit, as long as they remain resident in the relevant State) (29), and equal treatment rights as set out in the citizenship-relevant provisions of EU law (31).

Note that for all of these provisions, the rights fall away once either the EU national or UK leaves the relevant territory for more than 5 years (and then returns). However, the combination of the ‘ongoing’ EU citizenship rights for Irish nationals in Northern Ireland, and the 5 year cap on ‘leaving’ the UK, do not seem to completely fit together: they seem to suggest that an Irish national can leave the UK for any number of years, before then taking up residence in Northern Ireland and still being entitled to all these rights, including the EHIC. It is genuinely unclear if this is intended.

The EU and UK also promise, in para. 30, to continue to coordinate social security so as to make these rights obtainable. This is of particular relevance for Ireland, which under the Common Travel Area must continue to grant any EU nationals living in the UK and then moving to Ireland the same social security coverage that the UK national in that position would have.

Paragraph 32 is also of high significance for cross-border cooperation on the island of Ireland, as it ensures mutual recognition of qualifications under EU law that is in place before the withdrawal date continues to exist. However, separate legislation would need to ensure that that mutual recognition of qualifications continues after the withdrawal date; the paragraphs below on Northern Ireland make clear that the UK has committed to preserving cross-border cooperation, but do not explicitly state that separate legislation covering mutual recognition of qualifications is necessary to put that into practice post-withdrawal.

Legal effects of the citizens’ rights Part

33. It is of paramount importance to both Parties to give as much certainty as possible to UK citizens living in the EU and EU citizens living in the UK about their future rights. The Parties have therefore reached agreement on the following specific set of arrangements to implement and enforce the citizens’ rights Part of the agreement.

34. Both Parties agree that the Withdrawal Agreement should provide for the legal effects of the citizens’ rights Part both in the UK and in the Union. UK domestic legislation should also be enacted to this effect.

35. The provision in the Agreement should enable citizens to rely directly on their rights as set out in the citizens’ rights Part of the Agreement and should specify that inconsistent or incompatible rules and provisions will be disapplied.
36. The UK Government will bring forward a Bill, the Withdrawal Agreement & Implementation Bill, specifically to implement the Agreement. This Bill will make express reference to the Agreement and will fully incorporate the citizens’ rights Part into UK law. Once this Bill has been adopted, the provisions of the citizens’ rights Part will have effect in primary legislation and will prevail over inconsistent or incompatible legislation, unless Parliament expressly repeals this Act in future. The Withdrawal Agreement will be binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States from its entry into force pursuant to Article 216(2) TFEU.

Consistent interpretation of the citizens’ rights Part

37. The Agreement establishes rights for both UK citizens living in the EU and EU citizens in the UK. To protect these rights and give citizens legal certainty, a consistent interpretation and application of the citizens’ rights Part is in the interest of both Parties to the Agreement and therefore appropriate mechanisms should be established to ensure this.

38. This Part of the Agreement establishes rights for citizens following on from those established in Union law during the UK’s membership of the European Union; the CJEU is the ultimate arbiter of the interpretation of Union law. In the context of the application or interpretation of those rights, UK courts shall therefore have due regard to relevant decisions of the CJEU after the specified date. The Agreement should also establish a mechanism enabling UK courts or tribunals to decide, having had due regard to whether relevant case-law exists, to ask the CJEU questions of interpretation of those rights where they consider that a CJEU ruling on the question is necessary for the UK court or tribunal to be able to give judgment in a case before it. This mechanism should be available for UK courts or tribunals for litigation brought within 8 years from the date of application of the citizens’ rights Part.

39. Consistent interpretation of the citizens’ rights Part should further be supported and facilitated by an exchange of case-law between the courts and regular judicial dialogue. In the same vein, it is envisaged to give the UK Government and the European Commission the right to intervene in relevant cases before the CJEU and before UK courts and tribunals respectively.

40. The implementation and application of the citizens’ rights Part will be monitored in the Union by the Commission acting in conformity with the Union Treaties. In the UK, this role will be fulfilled by an independent national authority; its scope and functions, including its role in acting on citizens’ complaints, will be discussed between the parties in the next phase of the negotiations and reflected in the Withdrawal Agreement. There should be regular exchange of information between the UK Government and the Commission.

41. The approach agreed in the context of the citizens’ rights Part of the Withdrawal Agreement reflects both Parties’ desire to give those citizens certainty. It is in no way prejudges discussions on other elements of the Withdrawal Agreement, including

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36. This paragraph is one of the most interesting ones in the entire Report, in that it makes clear that the part of the final Withdrawal Agreement between the UK and the EU that covers the preceding provisions on citizenship rights are going to be implemented in the UK as an Act that will have constitutional status in the sense discussed in Thoburn. This is actually a more concrete foundation for their irrevocability than even exists with regard to the ECA 1972; the wording makes it clear that implied repeal is ruled out.

It also further sets out that while the Withdrawal Agreement requires UK domestic legislation to have full force in the UK, it will serve as a form of international agreement binding the EU institutions and the EU27 as well.

37-41. These paragraphs are focused on ensuring legal certainty in enforcement of the relevant citizens’ rights set out. There are significant concessions here made by the UK government when considering its previously stated red lines; paragraph 38 thus indicates that UK courts and tribunals will continue to have a right to refer preliminary references to the CJEU for a period of 8 years from the date of entry into force of the Withdrawal Agreement (and relevant UK Bill). Moreover, for a seemingly indeterminate period, UK courts will give ‘due regard’ to CJEU interpretations of citizenship rights legislation produced by the EU. Even more interestingly, paragraph 39 makes clear that the European Commission will be permitted to intervene in all UK cases on citizenship rights for an equally indefinite period; conversely, the UK Government will have a right to intervene in all CJEU cases involving citizenship rights. This all suggests significantly more involvement of the CJEU and the EU generally in post-Withdrawal UK law than was originally considered desirable by the UK Government.

Of interest to Northern Ireland residents as well as all other UK residents, the UK has also agreed to establish an independent national authority that will be receptive to ‘citizens’ complaints’ in the same way that the European Commission is to EU national complaints. This effectively takes enforcement of the citizens rights agreed in this Joint Report partially away from the Home Office, and places it in the hands of a separate, new body. However, details on how those ‘citizens’ complaints’ will operate in practice is one of many details not elaborated on in this Report.
42. This paragraph contains the language and reaffirmations that would be expected, given what was known about the Irish position (and EU support of it) in the negotiations. Inclusion of the ‘practical application’ of the Agreement is significant to capturing the manner in which its benefits and coverage has evolved since 1998.

43. What constitutes a ‘hard border’ has been defined in paragraph 43 as ‘any’ physical infrastructure or checks; this appears to preclude any purely technological solutions to the ‘border problem’, as all of those nonetheless require some form of infrastructure in order to facilitate that technology. (i.e., cameras, etc.)

44. This paragraph contains an assertion that the agreement complies with the principle of consent under the Good Friday Agreement. Many would contend that this is not the case, because the process by which the UK government arrived at its positions as set out in this Joint Report did not include representation from all Communities in Northern Ireland. However, this is unlikely to become a problem given the agreed position now set out in paragraphs 49 and 50, which have obtained Unionist approval and seem to comply with the position held by the Nationalists in terms of avoiding Irish border controls at all costs.

46. This paragraph is of key importance; it makes clear that the principles agreed at this point regarding Northern Ireland, in this Joint Report, will have primacy over any and all agreements that are made between the UK and the EU in later negotiation phases. Even though all contents of the Report are noted as being subject to further negotiation in paragraph 5, this seems to suggest that the Irish border solution found here is indeed subject to ‘unique’ treatment within this negotiation.
47-48. These paragraphs closely follow some of the language and provisions of the Good Friday Agreement. This, combined with the increased importance of North-South cooperation in the absence of common EU frameworks, will have made this an easy aspect for all parties to agree.

49-50. For Northern Ireland, these are the key paragraphs of the document. They set out a flowchart of ways of dealing with the Irish border situation, in order of the parties’ preference:

First, ideally, the UK and the EU would like to strike a future trade arrangement that means that there will be no hard border. If this cannot be achieved, the ‘back-up’ solution is that the UK will propose ‘island of Ireland’ solutions. It is very difficult to see what these would look like if not ‘special status’ for Northern Ireland, by declaring it an autonomous customs territory that is able to strike a trade deal with the EU that prevents a hard border without participation from the rest of the UK.

Should even that ‘back-up’ solution fail, the UK has in paragraph 49 guaranteed that the UK as a whole will maintain ‘full alignment with those rules of the Internal Market and the Customs Union which, now or in the future, support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the 1998 Agreement.’ This seems to suggest that the UK is promising to effectively adopt the EU legislation in all those areas of law that have an impact on both the all-island economy and the Good Friday Agreement’s core content. This goes beyond the Good Friday Agreement as it specifically enumerates three bases for full alignment, namely: (1) North-South cooperation, (2) the all island economy and…. (3) 1998 Agreement. While this will not need to involve free movement of persons rules, as the Common Travel Area ensures such movement between the UK and Ireland, it seems to suggest full regulatory alignment with the Single Market rules on free movement of both industrial goods and agricultural goods, and a customs union between the UK and the EU that obviates the need for border controls.

(See next page for para. 50).
mapping exercise, which shows that North-South cooperation relies to a significant extent on a common European Union legal and policy framework. Therefore, the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union gives rise to substantial challenges to the maintenance and development of North-South cooperation.

48. The United Kingdom remains committed to protecting and supporting continued North-South and East-West cooperation across the full range of political, economic, security, societal and agricultural contexts and frameworks of cooperation, including the continued operation of the North-South implementation bodies.

49. The United Kingdom remains committed to protecting North-South cooperation and to its guarantee of avoiding a hard border. Any future arrangements must be compatible with these overarching requirements. The United Kingdom’s intention is to achieve these objectives through the overall EU-UK relationship. Should this not be possible, the United Kingdom will propose specific solutions to address the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland. In the absence of agreed solutions, the United Kingdom will maintain full alignment with those rules of the Internal Market and the Customs Union which, now or in the future, support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the 1998 Agreement.

50. In the absence of agreed solutions, as set out in the previous paragraph, the United Kingdom will ensure that no new regulatory barriers develop between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom, unless consistent with the 1998 Agreement, the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly agree that distinct arrangements are appropriate for Northern Ireland. In all circumstances, the United Kingdom will continue to ensure the same unfettered access for Northern Ireland’s businesses to the whole of the United Kingdom internal market.

51. Both Parties will establish mechanisms to ensure the implementation and oversight of any specific arrangement to safeguard the integrity of the EU Internal Market and the Customs Union.

52. Both Parties acknowledge that the 1998 Agreement recognises the birth right of all the people of Northern Ireland to choose to be Irish or British or both and be accepted as such. The people of Northern Ireland who are Irish citizens will continue to enjoy rights as EU citizens, including where they reside in Northern Ireland. Both Parties therefore agree that the Withdrawal Agreement should respect and be without prejudice to the rights, opportunities and identity that come with European Union citizenship for such people and, in the next phase of negotiations, will examine arrangements required to give effect to the ongoing exercise of, and access to, their EU rights, opportunities and benefits.

53. The 1998 Agreement also includes important provisions on Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity for which EU law and practice has provided a supporting framework in Northern Ireland and across the island of Ireland. The United Kingdom commits to ensuring that no diminution of rights is caused by its departure from the European Union, including in the area of protection against forms of discrimination enshrined in EU law. The United Kingdom commits to facilitating the related work of the institutions and bodies, established by the 1998 Agreement, in upholding human rights and equality standards.

50. This paragraph then further sets out something interesting – namely, that this ‘full alignment’ will not be abrogated by the UK, but should the Northern Irish Executive and Assembly wish to grant special status to Northern Ireland, the UK will at that point guarantee that no border arises in the Irish Sea. This is an unlikely prospect – the Unionists are adamant in not wanting special treatment now, and ‘full alignment’ addresses the concerns that Nationalists have about the border. There is ample room across these options to give comfort to proponents of something of a single market membership, technology-based solutions, a special solution for Northern Ireland, and those that fear none of those will result.

53. ‘No diminution of rights’ was a core principle of the original mandate given to EU negotiators so it is unsurprising to see its inclusion in this paragraph. This provision seems to envisage a reinvigorated role for human rights institutions on the island in stepping in where the EU has left off to ensure the maintenance of human rights standards. It implies, though it does not explicitly state, that there is an expectation that Northern Ireland at the very least maintains not only the level of protection guaranteed by the ECHR, but also by the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and all legislation giving effect to the non-discrimination provisions in that Charter. This suggests that devolution of human rights protection to Northern Ireland may be coming sooner rather than later – even though the wording of paragraph 53 suggests that the UK in its entirety commits to upholding this level of human rights. One presumes that is unintentional, however, as (and this is worth stressing) that this is the only mention of human rights in the entire Joint Report – they do not come up in the context of ‘citizens’ rights’.
54. Both Parties recognise that the United Kingdom and Ireland may continue to make arrangements between themselves relating to the movement of persons between their territories (Common Travel Area), while fully respecting the rights of natural persons conferred by Union law. The United Kingdom confirms and accepts that the Common Travel Area and associated rights and privileges continue to operate without affecting Ireland’s obligations under Union law, in particular with respect to free movement for EU citizens.

55. Both Parties will honour their commitments to the PEACE and INTERREG funding programmes under the current multi-annual financial framework. Possibilities for future support will be examined favourably.

56. Given the specific nature of issues related to Ireland and Northern Ireland, and on the basis of the principles and commitments set out above, both Parties agree that in the next phase work will continue in a distinct strand of the negotiations on the detailed arrangements required to give them effect. Such work will also address issues arising from Ireland’s unique geographic situation, including the transit of goods (to and from Ireland via the United Kingdom), in line with the approach established by the European Council Guidelines of 29 April 2017.

Financial settlement

57. Both Parties have agreed a methodology for the financial settlement.

58. This methodology consists of:
   a. a list of components;  
   b. a set of principles for calculating the value of the financial settlement and payment modalities; 
   c. arrangements for continued participation of the UK in the programmes of the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) until their closure; and  
   d. financial and related arrangements for the European Investment Bank, the European Central Bank, European Union trust funds, the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, Council agencies and also the European Development Fund.

Components of the settlement

UK participation in Union annual budgets to 2020

59. The UK will contribute to, and participate in, the implementation of the Union’s annual budgets for the years 2019 and 2020 as if it had remained in the Union (including revenue adjustments\(^3\)), on the basis of the applicable Union legal provisions including the Own Resources legislation. By derogation, any amendments to the Multiannual Financial Framework Regulation or Own Resources Decision adopted after the date of withdrawal, having an impact on the UK’s financial obligations, will not apply to the UK.

\(^3\) This will include the UK’s share of net financial corrections and fines imposed until 31 December 2020, once definitively settled.

54. This paragraph confirms that, despite its very frequent invocation by the UK government, the Common Travel Area is not seen as significant to resolving the border question by the EU side. The CTA can continue to be used by the UK and Ireland to supplement arrangements for the movement of people (but the EU does not reserve a role for itself in this); the UK guarantees to not prevent free movement of EU nationals across the Irish border, and to instead engage in ‘internal border controls’ in the UK via landlord checks, GP checks, and bank checks, etc, appears to have satisfied the EU that the CTA does not prevent Ireland complying with its EU obligations on free movement of persons.

55. This paragraph promises to honour commitments on current funding programmes specifically related to the Irish peace process – but uses the somewhat ambiguous language of ‘favourable examination’ to consider future support. This is, like many other details of post-withdrawal relations, being reserved for phase 2 of the negotiations.

56. This final paragraph on Northern Ireland makes clear that in many ways, this has at best started negotiations on avoiding a hard border and preserving the Good Friday Agreement. The real work will take place in phase 2, where the UK will not only have to ideally find a solution to the Irish border (or end up with ‘full alignment’ to vast portions of Single Market law), but also consider the complications that stem from Northern Ireland residents having at least six different combinations of rights, all of which will vary post-withdrawal.
60. The normal process of annual revenue adjustment in respect of the year 2020 will be completed in accordance with the Own Resources Decision and the other relevant Union provisions. Amounts to be returned to, or returned by, the UK will be calculated as if the UK had remained in the Union. The UK will also participate in the surplus exercise with respect to 2020. In the second phase of negotiations, some simplification of the revenue adjustment procedure including time limitation could be agreed between the UK and the Union.

Outstanding commitments at the end of 2020 – Reste à liquider (RAL)

61. The UK will contribute its share of the financing of the budgetary commitments outstanding at 31 December 2020 (RAL).

Liabilities, contingent liabilities and corresponding assets

62. The UK will contribute its share of the financing of the Union's liabilities incurred before 31 December 2020 except for liabilities with corresponding assets and any assets and liabilities which are related to the operation of the budget and the Own Resources Decision.

63. The UK will remain liable for its share of the Union’s contingent liabilities as established at the date of withdrawal. For those related to guarantees given by the Union budget to support financial operations (e.g. back-to-back loans for financial assistance, financial operations managed by the EIB such as EFSI or the external lending mandate, financial operations managed by other financial institutions, Union budgetary financial instruments), the UK liability will be limited to decisions on each financial operation adopted prior to the date of withdrawal. By derogation, for contingent liabilities related to legal cases as a result of participation in the budget, programmes and policies, the cut-off date will be 31 December 2020. In the event of triggering of the Union contingent liabilities for which the UK is liable, the UK will receive its share of any subsequent recoveries.

64. As the provisioning needs for the financial operations associated with these contingent liabilities decline, the UK share of the paid-in guarantees constituted from the budget until the end of 2020 will be returned to the UK, provided that it has not been used for covering losses on the underlying financial operations, as well as any gains from these financial operations to be returned to all Member States, even if such funds would be re-committed.

65. Similarly, as the financial operations supported by the net asset of the European Coal and Steel Community in liquidation and of the European Investment Fund decided before the withdrawal date, mature, the UK will receive its share.

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6 In this context, the following will not be included in the financial settlement: Union financial assistance loan assets and the associated balance sheet liabilities, and assets corresponding to property, plant and equipment and provisions related to the Joint Research Centre nuclear site dismantlement, and all trade-related obligations and all provisions other than in respect of fines, legal cases and financial guarantee liabilities, intangible assets and investments, any assets and liabilities relating to the management of foreign currency risk, accrued and deferred income.

7 Outstanding pre-financing advances, receivables, cash, payables, and accrued charges including those related to EAGF or already included in the budgetary RAL will not be included for the calculation of liabilities.

8 The triggering event will be decided in the second phase.
66. Union assets relating to Union space programmes (FGNOS, Galileo & Copernicus) are not part of the financial settlement. The UK’s past contribution to the financing of space assets could be discussed in the context of possible future access to the services offered.

**Principles for calculating the value of the financial settlement**

67. The implementation of the agreed methodology and the schedule of payments will be based on the following principles:

a. The UK will not finance any commitments that do not require funding from Member States, and will receive a share of any financial benefits that would have fallen to it had it remained a Member State. In particular, the value of the R&I, as audited by the European Court of Auditors, will be adjusted to take into account the actual implementation of the Union’s commitments, taking into account decommitments and assigned revenue. The UK opt-outs leading to non-participation in Union programmes existing at the date of withdrawal will continue to apply in respect of the financial settlement.

b. Except for the UK payments relating to UK participation in Union annual budgets to 2020 as set out in paragraphs 59 and 66, the UK share in relation with the Union budget will be a percentage calculated as the ratio between the own resources made available by the UK from the year 2014 to 2020 and the own resources made available by all Member States, including the UK, during the same period.

c. Payments arising from the financial settlement will become due as if the UK had remained a Member State. In particular, the UK will not be required to incur expenditures earlier than would be the case had it remained a Member State unless agreed by both sides. It may be appropriate for the UK and the Union to agree on a simplified procedure for settling some elements of the payment schedule in the second phase of negotiations. Such a procedure should be based on an agreed forecast and, where appropriate, provision for subsequent review and correction.

68. The financial settlement will be drawn up and paid in euro.

69. Data for the calculation of UK obligations will be drawn up from publicly available sources where possible, and audited by the European Court of Auditors. Additional information necessary for the calculation of the UK’s share of Union obligations will be transmitted to the UK. The Union will provide the UK with the management and accounting information necessary to verify the components of the financial settlement in a timely manner.

70. The second phase of the negotiations will address the practical modalities for implementing the agreed methodology and the schedule of payments.

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9 The UK’s share of the liability related to pension and other post-employment benefits for Union staff and staff from the European Defence Agency, the European Union Institute for Security Studies and the European Union Satellite Centre as established on 31 December 2020 will be paid when these amounts fall due, unless an earlier schedule is agreed. The accounts record this liability in accordance with standard international accounting practice. This liability has a long time-span and the forecast of its net present value (NPV) depends on a number of assumptions and is sensitive to, in particular, the real discount rate, which has a historically low value at the time of drafting of this Joint Report.
UK participation in programmes of the MFF 2014-2020

71. Following withdrawal from the Union, the UK will continue to participate in the Union programmes financed by the MFF 2014-2020 up until their closure (excluding participation in financial operations which give rise to a contingent liability for which the UK is not liable as from the date of withdrawal). Entities located in the UK will be entitled to participate in such programmes. Participation in Union programmes will require the UK and UK beneficiaries to respect all relevant Union legal provisions including co-financing. Accordingly, the eligibility to apply to participate in Union programmes and Union funding for UK participants and projects will be unaffected by the UK’s withdrawal from the Union for the entire lifetime of such projects.

72. In the second phase of negotiations it could be agreed that some rules related to Union programmes that would be considered as not relevant in relation to a departing Member State would not apply. As part of the second phase of negotiations, the Union and the UK could also decide to agree to simplified procedures so as to avoid unnecessary administrative burdens extending well beyond the end of the current multiannual financial framework, provided that they respect the sound financial management of the Union budget and do not result in discrimination in favour of the UK or UK beneficiaries. The UK and the Union could also agree on administrative procedures to facilitate the management of specific programmes.

73. The UK states that it may wish to participate in some Union budgetary programmes of the new MFF post-2020 as a non-Member State.

Other components of the settlement – Union bodies and funds related to Union policies

European Investment Bank (EIB)

74. The financial settlement should not disrupt the operational functioning of the EIB as a result of the UK withdrawal in relation to the stock of operations (i.e. loans and other financial instruments) at that point.

75. In this context, the UK will provide a guarantee for an amount equal to its callable capital on the day of withdrawal. This guarantee will be decreased in line with the amortisation of the stock of EIB operations at the date of withdrawal, starting on the date on which the outstanding stock reaches an amount equal to the total subscribed capital on the date of withdrawal and ending on the date it equals the total paid-in capital on the date of withdrawal, both as defined in the EIB statute.

76. The UK share of the paid-in capital will be reimbursed in twelve annual instalments starting at the end of 2019. The UK remains liable for the reimbursed amount of paid-in capital until the outstanding stock of EIB operations equals the total paid-in capital on the date of withdrawal, at which point the liability will start to be amortised in line with the remaining non-amortised operations.

19 European Agricultural Guarantee Fund scheme 2020 is not financed by the MFF 2014-2020.
20 The first eleven instalments will be EUR 300 000 000 each and the final one will be EUR 195 903 950.
77. Apart from these reimbursements, the EIB will not make any other payment, return or remuneration on account of the withdrawal of the UK from the EIB or on account of the provision by the UK of a guarantee.

78. Any call to the callable guarantee or the paid-in (cash or guarantee) will be “pari-passu” with calls on or payments made by the Member States provided that it is used for covering operations at the withdrawal date or for covering risks (such as ALM (Asset-Liability management) risks or operational risks) attributable to the stock of operations at the date of withdrawal. For other such risks not associated with specific loans and not attributable to the stock of operations built after the date of withdrawal, the UK responsibility will be proportional to the ratio between the stock of outstanding operations and the total amount of operations at the date of the event.

79. The UK will maintain the EIB’s privileges and immunities under Protocols 5 and 7 annexed to the Treaties throughout the amortisation of the EIB’s stock of operations at the date of withdrawal.

80. The UK considers that there could be a mutual benefit from a continuing arrangement between the UK and the EIB. The UK wishes to explore these possible arrangements in the second phase of the negotiations.

81. After the date of withdrawal, UK projects will not be eligible for new operations from the EIB reserved for Member States, including those under Union mandates.

**European Central Bank (ECB)**

82. The paid-in capital of the UK in the ECB will be reimbursed to the Bank of England (BoE) after the date of withdrawal. Modalities and other practical arrangements will be established by the ECB Governing Council following the rules of the Treaties and its Protocol 4.

**Facility for Refugees in Turkey, European Union trust funds**

83. The UK will honour the commitments it made before withdrawal for participating in the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa. The existing modalities of payments will be maintained unless otherwise agreed in the second phase.

**European Development Fund (EDF)**

84. The UK will remain party to the European Development Fund (EDF) which is governed by a separate international agreement and is outside the Union budget until the closure of the 11th EDF. The UK will honour its share of the total commitments made under this EDF and the payments related to its share of the outstanding commitments made under previous EDFs. The existing modalities of payments will be maintained unless otherwise agreed in the second phase.

85. The UK share of the Investment Facility of the EDF from successive EDF periods will be returned to the UK as the investment matures. Unless agreed otherwise, the UK’s capital share will not be recommitted beyond the end of the 11th EDF commitment period or rolled over into subsequent periods. Reflecting the ongoing commitment in
relation to the EDF, the UK and the Union will agree on governance arrangements in
the second phase, that take into account the continued participation of the UK in the
11th EDF, that the EDF falls under a separate international agreement and the UK’s
withdrawal from the Union.

86. The Commission welcomes the UK Government’s offer to discuss with Union
Agencies located in London how they might facilitate their relocation, in particular as
regards reducing the withdrawal costs.

Other separation issues

87. In the negotiations to date, both Parties have engaged in thorough discussion of the
other separation issues in scope in this phase. These discussions have enabled good
progress in identifying areas of convergence and divergence. The below text records
the progress made in achieving agreement on a number of issues. There remain areas
where further discussions will be required to reach agreement during the next phase of
negotiations.

88. The UK and the Commission have both proposed further issues for consideration in
this phase. However, where there was not mutual agreement that an issue should be
discussed in this phase of the negotiations, it has been agreed to return to it later.

89. On Euratom-related (nuclear specific) issues both Parties have agreed principles for
addressing the key separation issues relating to the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom.
This includes agreement that the UK will be responsible for international nuclear
safeguards in the UK and is committed to a future regime that provides coverage and
effectiveness equivalent to existing Euratom arrangements. Both sides have also
agreed the principles of ownership for special fissile material (save for material held in
the UK by EU27 entities) and responsibility for spent fuel and radioactive waste.

90. On ensuring continuity in the availability of goods placed on the market under
Union law before withdrawal both Parties recognise the need to provide legal
certainty and minimise disruption to business and consumers. Both Parties have
agreed the principles that the goods placed on the market under Union law before
withdrawal may freely circulate on the markets of the UK and the Union with no need
for product modifications or re-labelling; be put into service where provided in Union
law, and that the goods concerned should be subject to continued oversight.

91. On cooperation in civil and commercial matters there is a need to provide legal
certainty and clarity. There is general consensus between both Parties that Union rules
on conflict of laws should continue to apply to contracts before the withdrawal date
and non-contractual obligations where an event causing damage occurred before the
withdrawal date. There was also agreement to provide legal certainty as to the
circumstances under which Union law on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of
judgements will continue to apply, and that judicial cooperation procedures should be
finalised.

92. On police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters there is a need to provide
legal certainty and clarity. Both Parties broadly agree on the principle that all
structured and formalised cooperation procedures ongoing on withdrawal date that have passed a certain threshold (to be defined) should be completed under Union law.

87-93. While none of these paragraphs are specific to Northern Ireland, they obviously will also affect a wide variety of individuals and businesses operating in Northern Ireland. Particularly of interest, given the specific circumstances that Northern Ireland finds itself in, is paragraph 93, setting out that the UK and EU will continue Police and Judicial Cooperation procedures that have been started prior to the withdrawal date. Given the duration of the average justice proceeding, this will extend EU influence on policing and judicial matters to well beyond the date of withdrawal.

One Further Observation:

What is noteworthy about the Joint Report’s content, given issues in Brexit of particular importance to Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland economy, is that while PEACE and INTERREG funding is considered, CAP payments are not. This seems to suggest that there is no interest on the side of either the UK or the EU to ensure the continuance of CAP payments following Brexit, regardless of how heavily Northern Ireland’s farming communities depend on this funding. It bears repeating that current UK government promises also do not cover the post-Brexit period, suggesting that the agricultural sector in Northern Ireland will experience significant financial stress regardless of the form that the future EU-UK partnership will take.

93. On ongoing Union judicial procedures, both Parties have agreed that the CJEU should remain competent for UK judicial procedures registered at the CJEU on the date of withdrawal, and that those procedures should continue through to a binding judgment.

94. On ongoing Union administrative proceedings both Parties have deepened their understanding of the respective positions, and explored some areas, such as competition, state aid and examinations of the Community Plant Variety Office.

95. On issues relating to the functioning of the Union institutions, agencies and bodies, both Parties agree that an arrangement which closely mirrors Union privileges and immunities should remain applicable to activities that took place before withdrawal and as regards new activities foreseen in the Withdrawal Agreement; that both sides continue to ensure compliance with obligations of professional secrecy; and that classified information and other documents obtained by both sides whilst the UK was a Member State retain the same level of protection as before withdrawal.

96. This report is put forward with a view to the meeting of the European Council (Article 50) of 14 and 15 December 2017. It is also agreed by the UK on the condition of an overall agreement under Article 50 on the UK’s withdrawal, taking into account the framework for the future relationship, including an agreement as early as possible in 2018 on transitional arrangements.