SPATIAL ARTICULATION OF THE STATE:
REWORKING SOCIAL RELATIONS AND SOCIAL REGULATION THEORY

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1998

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1.0 **Introduction**

The dominance of the nation state as overarching power and taken for granted societal unit has been thrown into doubt since the 1960s by transnational economic integration, by territorial disparities between political and economic organisation, and by the revaluation of regions and localities as commercial or political spaces. Increased locational flexibility and the economic integration of capitalism have brought a ‘relativisation of scale’ which deprives dominant territorial units at whatever level of their taken for granted primacy, placing nations alongside continental and global spaces on the one hand, regional and local spaces on the other hand in theoretical and political discourse. This process has highlighted not only the position of the ‘nation state’ but also the significance of borders around and within states, borders in both functional and territorial senses.

In this context it has been argued since the 1980s that the production and reproduction of spatial relationships has been overlooked in social science, and that classical thinkers such as Marx and Engels “prioritise time and history over space and geography” (Harvey 1985, p.141). Recent events have therefore conditioned an increased interest in the spatiality of society and the state, and have prompted an extension of existing theories to the interpretation of processes at different scales, of (for example) globalisation, supranational states, regional and local states, central-local relations and ‘glocalisation’ (e.g Mandel 1967; Cockburn 1978; Duncan and Goodwin 1982a, b; Swyngedouw 1992; Cox 1993; Jessop 1994; Peck and Tickell 1995; Painter and Goodwin 1995). Significant progress has been made in the theorisation of spatial social relations within the Marxist tradition since the 1980s, but despite this progress there remain important limitations with current formulations. First of all, existing accounts have generally been scale specific, focusing at (say) the local level or perhaps at global-local articulation, and have not as yet encompassed the organisation of social structures across the range of spatial scales. Secondly, the spatiality and scale differentiation of social structures has generally been assumed and inserted into existing theories without being deduced from their underlying principles. Finally, recent debates are prone to an eclecticism that seeks to combine elements from different theories in substantive contexts without grounding their compatibility at a theoretical level. For these reasons it is suggested that within the Marxist tradition there is as yet no adequate general theory of the spatiality and scale differentiation of society and the state.

The present paper attempts to address these shortcomings by focusing on spatiality in the context of the state. It argues that neo-Marxist state theory is at present bifurcated, divided between one paradigm that is broadly neo-structuralist (social regulation theory) and another that is broadly post-structuralist (social relations theory). These theories are dialectically or diacritically inter-related, so that the principles of each are reflected in a shadow form within the other and tend to reassert themselves when the principles of its host are pushed to the limit. At present the regulation approach is dominant, but as this approach is extended the social relations shadow is making itself felt, reasserting itself to an increasing extent (e.g. Peck and Tickell 1995; Painter and Goodwin 1995). But so far this reaction has been set within the terms of regulationism, and has occurred without reworking social relations theory in order to show how this would itself address spatiality. The present paper attempts to disentangle these theories and to specify the explanatory principles upon which they are based. It begins with a review of the development of the spatial orientation of Marxist thought in reference to the state. It then suggests a way of reworking social regulation and social relations theory in order to derive from first principles two distinct theories of the scale
articulated state system. Finally, and on this basis, it considers the scope for combining these theories in specific substantive contexts.

2.0 Spatial Dialectics of State Theory

This is not the first period of history to have experienced a restructuring of the global capitalist state system in its territorial articulation, nor the first to have shown a theoretical awareness of issues of scale. Indeed it is possible to describe an approximate relationship between historical changes in the territorial organisation of politics and the state and the development of the spatial orientation of neo-Marxist state theory, an exercise that will help us to establish the contours of this tradition and to diagnose its current shape.

The merging of regions into nation states and the consolidation of bourgeois state forms against revolutionary pressures especially between the 1830s and 1870s was perhaps the first of these episodes. The disparate writings of Marx and Engels on the state were decisively influenced by the transformation of feudal state forms which accompanied the consolidation of capitalism in France, Britain, Germany, USA and elsewhere, and the vulnerability of these forms as revealed in the European revolutions of 1848. Their writings show an awareness of the nationalist movements which were prominent in, for instance, the unification of Germany and Italy out of separate principalities. Marx and Engels recognised that the state is a territorial entity associated with a civil society defined in spatial terms such as a Province or Nation, and acknowledge that the nation state evolves between different scales and may extend across territories through subjugation and annexation (e.g. Marx and Engels 1970, p.58, p.78; Marx and Engels 1983, p.20; Marx 1968). But the nation state system as such receives little or no attention in their theoretical writings, and Marx explicitly abstracts his analysis of capital from the existence of a plurality of nation states whilst revealing his attachment to the national unit by treating “the whole world as one nation” (Marx 1954, p.581).

The collapse of the European Concert of Powers, the intensification of national imperial rivalry from the 1880s culminating in World War One, and the emergence of revolutionary movements in central and eastern Europe, represents a second phase of capitalist state development. This was associated with a reorientation of Marxist theory in the first decades of the century to account for the persistence of capitalism, to respond to the emergence of revolutionary situations and the assertiveness of national independence movements. For the Second and Third Internationals imperialism was not only a relationship of exploitation and oppression between territories but also a stage of capitalist development. Bukharin, Lenin and Luxemburg in different ways described a coordination of the (nation) state with monopoly or finance capital giving rise to national state capitalist trusts or cartels (Bukharin 1972; Lenin 1932; Luxemburg 1963). The question of scale appears in the debate around ultra-imperialism; cartels are assumed by Bukharin and Lenin to form at the national level, and (contra Kautsky) to be prevented by uneven development between nations from arising internationally (Kautsky 1970). Imperialist rivalry between nation states in Western Europe culminated - as the world was divided and virgin territories were depleted - in world war and state monopoly capitalism.

The defeat of revolutionary movements outside Russia after 1918 followed by the economic crisis of capitalism, the collapse of democracy and the rise of fascism and of Stalinism culminating in World War Two represents a third phase of capitalist state
development. In exile between 1922 and 1940 Trotsky analyzed the rise of fascism in Germany, the social formations in England, France and Spain, and developed a theoretical perspective on the Soviet state under Stalin (Trotsky 1962; Anderson 1979, p.97). Gramsci’s theory was also prepared in the general context of the national question - national unification and the formation of the bourgeois nation state, the growth of nationalism, the development of revolutionary strategy in the period from the first world war to the 1930s - and also contains important territorial insights. His analysis of hegemony was developed in order to conceptualise relationships within the nation between leaders and their followers, and between power in society and power in the state based on an unstable equilibrium of compromises. It is used, for example, to consider how different classes (workers and peasant) from different regions of Italy (north and south) or from the city and the country could be welded together into a national coalition of the oppressed, a ‘national popular bloc’ with a ‘national collective will’ (Hoare and Nowell-Smith 1971, p.90-102; Hoare 1977, p.150-153). Gramsci retained national culture and strategy as his central focus but recognised that hegemony can arise internationally and in the context of imperialism.

The emergence of national independence movements and the dissolution of formal empires, the postwar capitalist boom and the development of the welfare state, and the growth of the cold war after 1945 constitutes a fourth phase of political and state restructuring. In these circumstances the theory of state monopoly capitalism came to the fore within the Comintern and in regions with strong communist parties. Formal analyses were concerned with the endogenous relationship of the state to capital, and the state was seen as the ultimate point of capital accumulation responsible for marshaling restabilising counter-crisis tendencies. Inter-system and inter-state confrontation between capitalism and communism was expected to bring the general crisis of capitalism by reducing the size of the capitalist market and withdrawing territories from colonial exploitation (Jessop 1982, p.66). Analysis of the colonial or neo-colonial state was limited until Baran’s preliminary account, but following Baran there were sophisticated analyses of the formation of the nation state apparatus inside colonial territories, and it was acknowledged that capitalism may restrict economic development under some conditions and expand it under others (Baran 1973; Amin 1976). The choice between formal and informal empires, and between the use or destruction of indigenous social and state forms, is a strategic decision that imperialist capitals and nations will take according to their assessment of the costs and benefits (Murray 1971; Rey 1975; Arrighi 1978; Fine and Harris 1979; Wolpe 1980).

The internationalisation of production and the expansion of multinational companies, the emergence of inter-imperialist rivalry and economic crisis, the attenuation of nation state power and growing salience of international state apparatuses from the early 1970s constitutes a fifth phase of state restructuring. The focus of theoretical debate in this period was upon the balance between ‘class’ and ‘capital’ interpretations of the state, and the debates which arose in part reflected different views on the dependence or autonomy of the state in relation to capital. Some commentators argued at the beginning of this period that the internationalisation of capital and ‘territorial non-coincidence’ between political and economic organisation was weakening the nation state, whilst others argued that the nation state was becoming stronger with economic integration and that all capital - however transnational - is linked to a sponsoring nation state (Murray 1971; Warren 1971; Rowthorn 1971). This debate tied into the question of neo-imperialism; some scholars argued that the US was likely to reinforce its position as dominant imperialist power, whilst others suggested that Europe and Japan were likely to break US economic dominance giving rise to ultra-imperialism or to international conflict (Nicolaus 1970; Varga 1968; Mandel 1967, 1970, 1978;
The important implications of European integration were appreciated from the late 1960s, serving to weaken the impression of national autonomy and to prompt theorisation of the supranational state (Mandel 1967, 1970; Murray 1971; Warren 1971; Rowthorn 1971; Radice and Picciotto 1971, and Poulantzas 1975; Holloway 1976). To Mandel the internationalisation of capital can be expressed either through the international dominance of one nation state (e.g. the USA) or the creation of new supranational states depending upon how the territorial interpenetration of capital unfolds (Mandel 1967; 1970, p.57/58, p.98; 1978, p.326-9). For Poulantzas, however, the most likely development would not be (say) a Common Market super-state but the continued dominance of US capital by the penetration, assimilation or destruction of European national capitals: “the present phase is not at all marked by emergence of a super-state above nations or by loss of importance of the national state” (Poulantzas 1975 p.81; 1980, p.212-3, p.239). Fine and Harris consider that international state apparatuses, such as the EC and the IMF, are infused with the influence of international fractions of capital, whereas national states are factors of social cohesion and reflect the balance of power of bourgeois and proletarian classes and fractions (Fine and Harris 1979, p.159).

In the 1960s and 70s Marxist theory was as much concerned with the expanding role of the welfare state in capitalist society as with neo-imperialism and national liberation. The debate between Miliband and Poulantzas from 1969, for instance, was rooted partly in a concern to achieve a theoretically adequate critique - from within a political and class centred perspective - of statist social democracy (Miliband 1969; Poulantzas 1972; Miliband 1973). Combining Gramscian and Althusserian strands Poulantzas develops a theory pitched at the level of the capitalist state in abstract, which is conceived as the (imperialist) nation state. The main feature of the state is its existence as the source of structural and social cohesion, integrating the levels of the segmented social formation and orchestrating the political unity of hegemonic class and power bloc (Poulantzas 1973, p.192; 1976, p.71). In his later writings (where the influence of Foucault is apparent) Poulantzas moves towards a relational theory of the state as a material condensation of the social relations of capitalism, and argues that there is a dialectic between social conflict and the structural forms through which conflict is negotiated. In particular he argues that the relations of production induce spatial and temporal matrices which are presupposed in the social division of labour of capitalism, and that “the state establishes the peculiar relationship between history and territory, between the spatial and the temporal matrix” (Poulantzas 1980, p.114). Poulantzas sees that the nation need not coincide with the state, that states pursue the establishment of national unity, and that social formations may cross the boundaries of states (Poulantzas 1980, p.103-106, p.113). But he nevertheless argues that the modern nation remains the focal point of bourgeois reproduction: “the modern nation is written into the state, and it is this national state which organises the bourgeoisie as the dominant class” (Poulantzas 1980, p.117, see also p.95).

The derivationist approach which emerged in the 1970s participated in a revaluation of Marx’s Capital, viewing this not as an ‘economic’ text but as an account of the capitalist social relationship which pervades each sphere. The existence of an autonomous state form is deduced as a necessary consequence of the logical prerequisites of capital accumulation. The state is seen as an integral part of accumulation, able to represent the interests of capital in general against those of particular capitals, guaranteeing the reproduction of labour, legal rights and contract law (Müller and Neußüs 1975). Later derivationists sought to derive the form and function of the state not only from the law of value and the functional requirements of capital, but also from the class relations and political struggles of capitalism, and on
this basis to combine ‘logic’ and ‘history’, ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ explanations: “within the framework of its general laws, capitalist development is determined rather by the actions of the acting subjects and classes, the resulting concrete conditions of crisis and their political consequences” (Hirsch 1978, p.75; Holloway and Picciotto 1978). Towards the end of the 1970s derivationism too moved towards a relational theory of the state as a form of the social relations of capitalism, and on this basis converged with the post-structuralism of Poulantzas (Holloway and Picciotto 1978; Clarke 1983; Poulantzas 1980; Jessop 1983a,b, 1985). Jessop, for instance, sought to combine ‘structural’ and ‘strategic’ moments by analysing hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies, and describing the articulation of these with state and value forms through the process of ‘structural’ or ‘strategic selectivity’. The central theoretical axis of social relations theory which crystallised from these strands is the dialectic of struggle (or strategy) and structure, taking struggle as its primary reference point and viewing structure from this angle.

This relational convergence coincided with a greater awareness of the territorial complexity of the state, and attention was focused upon the subjection of the nation state to the law of value, and the contradictory position of the nation state in an internationalised economy (Braunmühl 1978; Barker 1978; Picciotto 1991). There was a debate conducted in broadly neo-Gramscian terms during the 1970s about the break up of Britain (Nairn 1977a, b; Hobsbawm 1977), and as the fiscal crisis developed there was a growth of interest in sub-national states and central-local relations (e.g. Cockburn 1978). Duncan and Goodwin (1982a, 1982b, 1986, 1988) took relational theory forward by viewing local state institutions not only as an extension of the national state representing interests dominant at the centre, but also “as a response to local class relations” representing interests dominant in the locality (Duncan and Goodwin 1982b, p.163, p.168; 1986, p.16). Central-local relations provide a region of class conflict and may operate in a contradictory manner, with local government serving both as an “instrument of central control and an obstacle to it” (Miliband 1969, cited in Goodwin and Duncan 1982b, p.160). Analysis of the local state was associated with the beginnings of an analysis of the regional state in the 1980s (Saunders 1985, p.153; Duncan and Goodwin 1988 p.251). Cox and Mair examined the behaviour of city authorities in economic development in terms of the articulation of ‘accumulation strategies’ and ‘hegemonic projects’ (e.g. Cox and Mair 1988). Peck has developed a relational, ‘institutionally embedded’ analysis of business elites, in which these are seen as a force that is constituted and sponsored through action by the nation state in the creation of a non-elected tier of local government (Peck 1995).

The historical derivationism of Hirsch and the relational approach of Jessop from the early 1980s were also linked - albeit loosely at first - to the ‘neo-structuralist’ framework provided by regulation theory. The (nation) state is viewed as one part - the central core - of a constellation of social institutions and relationships (the ‘mode of regulation’, which approximates to the wider ‘state apparatus’ in Althusserian usage) that orchestrates arrangements within the ‘regime of accumulation’ (De Vroey 1984; Jessop 1990b). The central theoretical axis of regulationism is also the dialectic of structure and struggle, but starting from the structural end and assimilating struggle from this point of view; hence it has been criticised from a relational angle for playing down struggle and reifying structures (Bonefeld 1987; Clarke 1991). Regulationism has become the dominant paradigm in political economy in the 1990s, and has given rise to analyses that are indeed scale differentiated (e.g. Stoker 1989, p.152; Hoggett 1990; Tickell and Peck 1992; Peck and Tickell 1992; Goodwin, Duncan and Halford 1993). Painter and Goodwin have argued, for instance, that the local state and local agencies should be viewed as vehicles of ‘local modes of regulation’, while challenging
and attempting to dilute the structuralism of regulation theory by emphasising process and contingency (Painter and Goodwin 1995). Peck and Tickell suggest not only that nations may vary in their coupling of modes of regulation and regimes of accumulation, but so may subnational spaces, producing national and subnational sub-couplings of a regime of accumulation (Peck and Tickell 1995, p.21).

This review of the territorial dialectics of state theory has revealed a broad relationship between changes in the territorial restructuring of the state system and the spatial orientation of state theory. Increasingly it is acknowledged that the capitalist state is a complex structure, possessing a manifold and bounded territoriality and politicality (Althusser 1971, p.252, p.260; Poulantzas 1972, p.248; 1976, p.75; Harris 1980; Hirsch 1983, p.81; Jessop, 1983a, p.154; 1994, p.17; cf Jessop 1982, pp.112-117; Benington and Harvey 1994). From the first there has been a tendency to abstract formal analyses of the capitalist state from analyses of space and territory, but the latter have made themselves felt in substantive contexts and given rise to a substantial albeit unsystematic body of knowledge. At present the central conceptual axis in state theory is that of structure/struggle, and the principle tension is between social regulation theory (which is based upon the analysis of structure and reaches towards struggle) and social relations theory (which starts with struggle but reaches back towards structure). The dominant paradigm of these two is regulationism, but increasingly social relations theory is reasserting itself albeit within the terms of the regulation approach.

Each of these paradigms has inspired and informed a growing body of substantive theory, and each has begun to elaborate a scale differentiated approach. As yet, however, they have focused at particular scales or combinations of scale and have assumed spatial social structures rather than deriving these from first principles. In particular, there has been insufficient recognition of the differences between these theories in terms of the principles by which they operate, and insufficient attention given to reworking these principles to generate social spatiality before attempting their merger. Jessop has proposed that “before one can investigate the nature of the state apparatus and state functions in [specific conjunctures] one must first derive the general form of the capitalist state and its implications for the functionality of the forms of state intervention” (Jessop 1982, p.75). This point can be extended by pointing out that the general form of the state is spatial and scale articulated from the first. The next step is therefore to work through the two abstract theories to deduce spatial formulations and then on this basis consider how they are to be combined.

3.0 Social Relations and Territorial Form

The first source from which to derive a territorial account of state form is by reference to the relational, strategic theory developed from different starting points by Holloway and Picciotto, Clarke, Poulantzas and Jessop. Whilst relationalism reflects the wider theoretical and political preoccupations of its time, it was developed and crystallised in particular reference to the theory of the state. The capitalist state is interpreted from a relational perspective by analogy with capital, as a specific material condensation of the relationship of class forces and the result of a (national) process of struggle (Poulantzas 1980, p.119; p.128; Jessop 1985, p.337; see also Holloway and Picciotto 1977; Clarke 1983). Power is now seen as a relation of force, and class powers and struggles are constituted and reproduced by being ‘materialised’, embodied in a system of structural sites provided by economic, state and ideological apparatuses (Poulantzas 1980, p.147). The state itself plays a pivotal role in the materialisation of struggles: “right from the beginning, the state marks out the field of struggles, including that of
the relations of production ... it stamps and codifies all forms of the social division of labour - of social reality - within the framework of a class divided society” (Poulantzas 1980, p.38; see also p.147-148). Poulantzian relational theory is still imbued with the structuralist problematic - history is viewed as a process without a subject, the state in its relative autonomy is viewed as an effect of the capitalist relations of production and the social division of labour, and the state’s contribution to the reproduction of the capitalist social formation as a whole is taken as a central point of reference (e.g. Poulantzas 1980, p.114). Indeed Poulantzas places if anything greater stress on the diacritical relationship between the relatively autonomous economic, political and ideological instances of the social structure. Class powers in the relations of production do not stand in an external relationship to the state. Class powers and struggles are to be found both within relations of production and within political and ideological regions including the state, and the state’s presence in the constitution of the relations of production is associated with the presence of class struggle in each of these two spheres (Poulantzas 1980, p.17; p.26-27; p.36). The modes of separation, articulation and interpenetration of state and economy are renegotiated as the relations of production and labour processes change. Although the focus of attention is upon political conflicts, Poulantzas maintains that only a relational theory can account for the impact upon the state both of changes in the relations of production and changes in the political class struggle (Poulantzas 1980, p.158). Political class struggles - which are rooted in the relations of production and the social division of labour - are inscribed in the institutional structure of the state, and changes in political class struggle bring changes to this inscription (Poulantzas 1980, p.115, p.159). Nevertheless the state structure is relatively autonomous, and has a resistance and opacity such that change in the relations of production and political relations affect it in a refracted and differential way (Poulantzas 1980, p.130-131).

Even in his early, structuralist writings Poulantzas acknowledges that, within functionally prescribed limits, “the concrete relations of forces in the class struggle” have a causal impact on the state’s policies (Poulantzas 1973, p.194; Jessop 1982, p.161). But in accordance with the relational ontology these struggles are now held to play the fundamental role and to exceed the apparatuses which embody them (Poulantzas 1980, p.38, p.149). Reference is also made in Poulantzas’ later writings to the subjective purposes of fractions of capital and other classes in terms of their ‘strategic calculation’ (Poulantzas 1980, p.90-91). The political power of a class is seen as depending not simply upon its class determination in regard to other classes, but also “on the position and strategy it displays in relation to them - on what I have called opposition strategy” (Poulantzas 1980, p.147). The state is no longer viewed as essentially unitary but as pluricentred, containing class contradictions, traversed by popular struggles and providing a power base for different class interests in different branches: “we are dealing with fiefs, clans and factions: a multiplicity of micro-policies” (Poulantzas 1980, p.135). The state is a strategic field in which power is moved around in a tactical manner by the use of devices such as functional trans-state networks, and in which the tactics of different branches and fractions intersect in a ‘muddling through’ - involving selective communication, (in)decision and implementation - that produces a general line of force comprising the state’s policies (Poulantzas 1980, p.137, p.194). The struggles of dominated classes have forced upon the state a variety of concessions concerning popular needs, the reproduction of labour and the limitation of state power, but it is through these concessions and the inclusion of dominated classes that the state constitutes the bourgeoisie as the dominant class and organises the hegemonic power bloc (Poulantzas 1980, p.132-133, p.140, p.184-6). The state still has a ‘fissiparous unity’ based upon hierarchical centralism in which one branch, apparatus or network is dominant and reflects the dominance of the hegemonic
fraction, with ‘screens’ between branches to give selective access of dominated class interests to different apparatuses and to ensure the presence of subordinate classes in subordinate positions (Poulantzas 1980, p.136, p.152, p.227-9). A likely point of conflict within the power bloc is the precise form of the state to be established against the popular masses, an issue which is complicated by the need to involve these masses, and by the appeals of different bourgeois fractions for mass support (Poulantzas 1980, p.144).

Holloway and Picciotto, and Clarke (like Hirsch) depart from German derivationism by stressing the primacy of class struggles over either the abstract logic or substantive history of capital, and as such they too have evolved a relational approach: “the unity of the social relations of production is both conceptually and empirically prior to their elaboration in differentiated ideological, political and economic institutional forms” (Clarke 1991, p.38, p.40-4; cf Holloway and Picciotto 1977, p.85; 1978, p.12; Clarke 1983, p.118). Following Marx’s critique of bourgeois economic categories, Holloway and Picciotto construe the separation (‘doubling’) of the ‘economic’ and ‘political’ forms from each other and from the underlying social relations of capital as an aspect of class conflict around the reproduction of capital, involving the decomposition of the working class into the distinct categories of ‘consumers’ and ‘citizens’ (Holloway and Picciotto 1977, p.78-80; 1978, p.4; Clarke 1983, p.128). These social relations, whilst unified in everyday social existence, are fragmented under capitalism and expressed as “fetishized surface forms” (such as ‘money’ and ‘commodity capital’, or the ‘state’), and the task of theory is to criticise this fetishism in order to disclose “the unity in separation” of these spheres (Holloway and Picciotto 1977, p.80; 1978, p.4, p.15, p.17; Clarke 1983, p.41, p.115). This reflects the imprint of the Frankfurrian distinction between form and essence, and reveals a similarity here with Lipietz’s distinction between ‘esoteric’ and ‘exoteric’ accounts of societal conditions (Adorno 1973; Lipietz 1985). The functions of the state - guaranteeing private property and exchange, providing the framework of compulsion that permits transactions to occur as ‘economic’ - are derived from the requirements of the capital relationship and of accumulation in each epoch (Holloway and Picciotto 1977, p.86).

The basic contradiction of capitalism is that the pursuit of surplus value implies the tendential destruction or elimination of the source of valorisation - the productive worker - from the production process (Holloway and Picciotto 1977, p.95). The state is one arena of struggle through which capital attempts, but succeeds only provisionally, to resolve inherent contradictions between its material and social reproduction (Clarke 1983, p.123/124). The state responds to crises of accumulation by restructuring social relationships in order to increase the rate of surplus value, undertake the devalorisation of constant capital, and engineer a redistribution of profit: “for a rigorously theorised historical analysis of capitalist economic and political development, it is therefore necessary to focus on this process of constant reorganisation by struggle and through crisis of capitalist social relations, economic and political” (Holloway and Picciotto 1978, p.26; 1977, p.93). Clarke addresses the contradictions inherent in the reproduction of capital in the following terms: “the contradictory foundations of the capitalist mode of production imply that permanent structures of social relationships cannot exist, for no sooner are the conditions for the reproduction of such structures created than they are destroyed by the very same process of reproduction, only to be recreated or transformed through the process of class struggle” (Clarke 1991, p.52-53; p.41). Bonefeld refers to something similar when he suggests that “the crisis-ridden process of social reproduction should be understood in terms of the de- and recomposition of society” (Bonefeld 1987, p.106). Institutional restructuring concerns the whole of the capital relationship rather than merely its presence within the sphere of
production, and represents “a shift in the form of capital’s rule imposed upon capital by
the pressure of class conflict expressing the contradictions of its own domination”
(Holloway and Picciotto 1977, p.94). As economic crises deepen, however, the state is
obliged to intervene more intensively, with the consequence that its ostensible
neutralit and its separation from capital is undermined.

For Jessop the relational approach focuses upon structural articulation of the “relations
amongst social relations” comprising the social formation, and agents are viewed as
non-unitary, interactively constituted. The state is not a source of power or a ‘power
subject’ but the product of relations between forces in society: “state power is a form-
determined, institutionally mediated effect of the balance among all forces in a given
situation” (Jessop 1982, p.225). On the other hand the state is also a constituting
apparatus and institutional medium for power in society, and the structure of the state
effects the ability of different forces to be constituted politically and to realise their
interests through political action (Jessop 1982, p.224). Jessop shifts away from a
functionalist account - the functionality of the state for capital is not given by capitalist
mode of production but is contested and precarious by virtue of the state’s relative
autonomy: “formal correspondence among economic and political forms, if any, is the
result of specific social practices” (Jessop 1982, p.240). The state is capitalist to the
extent that its effects are conducive to the reproduction of the conditions of capital
relations of production and capital accumulation (Jessop 1982, p.221). Several
alternative viable paths of capital accumulation are possible, the conditions of existence
of each path are complex and contradictory, and it is therefore imperative for any
analysis “to specify which particular conditions contingently necessary for a given
course of accumulation are being secured in what respects, over what time period, and
to what extent” (Jessop 1982, p.226). States vary in their contingent contribution to
sustaining political domination and the conditions of capital accumulation, to
undermining the social bases of resistance to capital, and where economic crisis results
the state “will then be subject to various pressures to respond to such crises ... the state
responds to the political repercussions of crisis and not to the economic crisis (or
crises) as such” (Jessop 1982, p.235).

Jessop develops the Poulantzian ‘strategic-theoretical’ approach in terms of the
articulation of accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects, and uses this
conceptualisation to investigate the dialectic of struggle and structure, and to combat
economism (Jessop 1985, p.343). The ‘value form’ is the arrangement of elements
markets, labour process and profit distribution - involved in the circuit of capital
of the value form and the specific interests of capital are not structurally given (as
suggested in economistic theories) but depend upon agency, upon the exertion of
economic dominance or upon economic hegemony involving the elaboration of an
‘accumulation strategy’ within and beyond the economic sphere (Jessop 1983a, p.145;
1983b, p.92). Economic hegemony is leadership that integrates different fractions of
capital and stages of the value form behind one fraction and its ‘accumulation strategy’
comprising an economic ‘growth model’ together with the means of its achievement
(Jessop 1983a, p.149). Just as the substantive reality and coherence of the value form in
each context is contingent upon (for instance) the particular ‘accumulation strategy’
that is adopted, so the substantive reality and unity of the state form depends in part
upon the ‘hegemonic project’ that is pursued (Jessop 1983b, p.107/8). The successful
organisation of hegemony, bringing different fractions and classes into political
alignment, involves the acceptance of an hegemonic project which differs from an
‘accumulation strategy’ in that it is directly concerned with wider, social or political
themes ‘such as military expansion, moral regeneration, social reform, or political
stability” (Jessop 1983a, p.155). The hegemonic project asserts a general interest behind activities that advance the long term requirements of the hegemonic class or fraction, opposes activities which might confound these interests, and reconciles in the abstract conflicts between particular and general interests (Jessop 1982, p.243, 246; 1983a, p.155). The efficacy of an hegemonic project in welding together an historical bloc depends upon its relationship to the ‘structural selectivity’ of the state form, its ‘strategic orientation’ towards the integration of the interests of subordinate classes, its capacity to link to a viable accumulation strategy, and its capacity to sustain the substantive unity of the state apparatus (Jessop 1983b, p.101). Jessop views hegemony as provisional and allows for the possibility that it may fall into crisis in particular places at particular times. He also allows for the possibility that the hegemonic force in society may not be the same as the economically dominant force (Jessop 1983b, p.103). The state is necessarily fragmented and fissured, and its unity and bourgeois character must be constituted politically through a combination of bureaucratic control and a unifying hegemonic project underwritten by the dominance of particular departments and ministries (Jessop, 1983a, p.154; 1994, p.17; cf Jessop 1982, pp.112-117, p.222, p.231-2, p.245).

Despite important differences of emphasis - upon structure and struggle, upon capital reproduction and political domination - between Holloway and Picciotto, Clarke, Poulantzas and Jessop, their respective relational theories share certain core features, and reflect a convergence from which it is possible to construct a distinct relational account of the territoriality of state form. It is suggested that this account will emphasise struggle, have an emergent and dialectical but also a substantive and diacritical construction, and will be set within a detotalised and non-functionalist framework. The (emergent) dialectic of content and form will be operative (avoiding the struggle reductionism of some accounts), so that past territorial struggles inform present territorial structures which condition future territorial struggles, but this will be combined with the (structural) dialectic of relatively autonomous state, social and value forms. It is essential in a relational explanation to find ways of combining the struggle over political dominance with the struggle over capital accumulation, and to do so without reducing either one to the other. From a relational perspective the state is in the first instance a function of political relations, although these are in turn bound up with the reproduction of the wider system of social and material class relations. Territoriality is only one attribute of the form of the state system, but an important attribute that must be accounted for naturally in the course of explaining the other characteristics of this form. The territorialised state form will on this basis be explained as a material condensation of political class struggles which develop according to a political logic set in the context of the drives and the contradictions inherent in capitalist reproduction. The complex separation, articulation and interpenetration of distinct social forms in their respective territorialities (and so of ‘political’ and ‘economic’ spheres) is mediated through the permeation of each of these forms by the same class struggles. The separate territorialised state form is therefore an effect, albeit in a refracted and differential way, of the dynamics of political class relations associated with the contradictory development of the value form. Indeed these class struggles are to be seen as reflexive and self-thematizing, both rooted in and concerned with the assertion of political dominance and, ultimately, with the contradictory and crisis ridden reproduction of capitalist accumulation.

To extend this analysis we must, however, introduce the assumption - or rather reactivate the assumption tacit within relational theory - that class struggles, and the contradictory relations of capital in which they are rooted, are processes extended and limited in space and time. Furthermore, class relations and capital circuits are
territorially patterned, involving spatial (dis)continuities, (in)congruities and (dis)integrations which are socially mediated and help to condition class (dis)organisation and the development of class antagonisms. Spatial continuities and discontinuities, integrations and disintegrations arise, for example, both within and between capital and labour, bringing a territorial dimension to the contradictions of capital and the fracturing of classes. Indeed the spatial patterning and mediation of class relations within and beyond the value form is on the one hand a fundamental condition of capital accumulation and class struggle, and on the other hand an important reflexive object and consequence of these struggles. The contested reproduction of capital therefore gives rise to political class struggles which are territorially orientated, concerned both with the foundations of political class power (including the continuity of capital accumulation) and with the assertion of political dominance in particular places, and it is for this reason that they favour the condensation of territorially determinate state forms.

The territoriality of the state system is itself an important parameter in the founding of class power and the struggle for political dominance amongst classes, a parameter of state form which is involved in the territorial patterning of political forces and of capital accumulation. As such the territorial organisation of the state system (like other aspects of its organisation) will be contested strongly through opposition strategies amongst class fractions and alliances in the course of attempting to reproduce value forms and to install dominant classes or hegemonic blocs. Struggles over political hegemony and over capital accumulation will involve the condensation of territorially orientated state apparatuses and articulations at the global level - unities, divisions, nested tiers, networks, conflicts and alliances with different territorialities - and they will involve the movement of power through these articulations and between these apparatuses. Furthermore, economic and political struggles will generally involve the assertion of one territorial level of the global capitalist state system - and of the global capitalist social formation - as dominant over other levels, and will entail conflict over the extent of this dominance and over the functional and territorial unity and division of states.

The global structure, forms and functions, and dominant spatial level(s) of the state system will all be determined in the course of rivalry between nascent hegemonic blocs forming at different scales, and in different places. As a first approximation, we can say that this rivalry will be mediated by the interaction of inter-class struggles around the constitution of hegemony and territory, and intra-class struggles around the division of hegemony and territory. The societal dominance of an hegemonic bloc depends upon its capacity to assimilate, subordinate or destroy nascent blocs in the same place at the same and other spatial levels, and to coexist with nascent hegemonic blocs in the other places. Assimilation will be achieved by the incorporation of assertive class fractions and alliances organised at other spatial levels into the hegemony and state apparatus established at this level. Subordination will be achieved by permitting hegemonic blocs and state apparatuses to emerge at other levels but ensuring that these take a form that is readily subject to the dominant level. It is entirely possible that rival hegemonic blocs may subsist in a latent (assimilated or subordinated) position until circumstances permit their renaissance and assertiveness. Destruction will be achieved by undermining the material and social foundations of nascent blocs at other levels and by structuring the state form to ensure their exclusion, disorganisation and repression. Coexistence will be achieved by ensuring that hegemonic blocs which emerge at the same level in other places are not in a position to assimilate, subordinate or destroy the bloc concerned. In order to preserve its societal dominance an hegemonic bloc may need to sacrifice its unity and sub-divide its power internally; in order to preserve its
existence a bloc may have to sacrifice its dominance and accept its subordination externally.

The emergence of nascent hegemonic blocs, and the course of rivalry between these, will be conditioned by the pre-existing spatial pattern of capital accumulation and of class relations, which equips fractions with differential scope and powers of assertion. The need to constitute a strong power base will tend to favour blocks which are more inclusive of powerful fractions and so forming at a higher spatial level, whilst the demands of building and sustaining political cohesion will tend to favour blocs forming at lower spatial levels (these scales will change as the spatiality of class relations and the techniques of political organisation evolve and are restructured). The former constraint will place a lower limit on the spatial scale of viable hegemonic blocs, while the latter constraint will place an upper limit on this scale. If there is no single solution to these opposing requirements then the rivalry of nascent blocs will tend to favour a segmented and compound hegemony in which one spatial level is dominant, or an outcome in which there is an approximate balance of power between hegemonies at different levels. In the medium term the outcome of this rivalry will depend upon the relative success of rival fractions and nascent blocs in reflexively aligning political class relations - (dis)organising power bases, reorganising the state apparatus, articulating viable hegemonic projects, and interpellating territorial unity - at their respective spatial scales. In the longer term it will depend upon their relative success in restructuring the wider social relations of capital - moulding the interests of capital fractions, articulating viable accumulation strategies, reorganising value forms - in order to manage contradictions and restore capital accumulation to a growth path.

The territorial unification and division of the global capitalist state system, together with the other aspects of the form and function of the state, therefore emerges in the course of political struggles within and between spatial levels, struggles over the installation of a series of rival hegemonic blocs and territorial unities. Cohesion, proliferation and interaction of discrete hegemonic blocs and territorial units will occur at and between several spatial levels, but will be focused at the dominant level (where there is one) together with the attempted assimilation, subordination or destruction of nascent hegemonic blocs and territorial units at other - higher and lower - levels. Over the last century the nation has served as the primary axis of state unity and division, and has played the dominant integrative and disintegrative role in the state system. The precarious administrative and territorial unity of the state is pursued under this dominant hegemonic bloc and through the dominance of particular departments and particular territorialities. These political struggles are in turn part of - conditioned by and conditioning - wider struggles to reproduce territorially differentiated and crisis ridden capitalist relations of production. The different moments of this dialectical process can be separated out for analytical purposes:-

1. In their **inward unifying moment** class struggles concern the constitution of a dominant hegemony bloc and the reproduction of a cohesive, viable value form. Hegemony will be established at the spatial level at which one of a series of nascent hegemonic blocs in broadly the same location is able to assert its dominance over others at the same and lower levels in this location. The societal dominance of an hegemonic bloc depends upon its capacity to assimilate, subordinate or destroy nascent blocs at the same and lower spatial levels. The scale of the dominant hegemony is conditioned by the pre-existing spatial patterning of the political and material foundations of class powers. It is also conditioned by the need for a dominant hegemonic bloc to strike the optimum balance between being inclusive enough to constitute a strong power
base, and compact enough to reduce the demands of organising this power base into a cohesive force, a constraint which sets lower and upper limits to its territory. The outcome of this contest will depend in the medium term upon the skill with which class fractions construct alliances, articulate hegemonic projects, interpellate territorial units, restructure state forms, and use these reflexively to reconstitute the political foundations for power at their respective spatial levels. In the longer term it will depend upon their skill in moulding the interests of capital fractions, developing accumulation strategies, restructuring social relations and value forms in order to contain contradictions and restore a growth path at their spatial level. The integration of territory and society at this level, and the determination of the dominant form - including territorial form and level of the state - will be a central part of this process.

2. **In their outward dividing moment** class struggles concern the constitution of a series of adjacent hegemonic blocs and territories, and the reproduction of a series of adjacent value forms. Hegemony will be established at a spatial scale at which each of a series of nascent hegemonic blocs at broadly the same level but in different places is able to assert its separation from the others, and from more encompassing blocs at higher levels. The societal dominance of each hegemonic bloc depends upon its capacity to sustain a balance of power with these others, and to resists assimilation, subordination or destruction by these and by nascent blocs at higher spatial levels. The scale of this series of dominant hegemonies is conditioned by the pre-existing spatial patterning of the foundations of class powers across these spaces. It is also conditioned by the need for blocs to achieve an optimum balance between the inclusiveness and the cohesiveness of their respective power bases, a balance which sets an upper limit on the territory of each bloc. The outcome depends upon the skill with which each class alliance or nascent bloc restructures state forms, reconstitutes the foundations of power, and secures the viability of capital accumulation at its level. The separating and bounding of a series of territorial and social units in relation to one another, and the determination of the dominant form, territoriality and level of the state, will be a central part of this process.

3. **In their outward unifying moment** class struggles concern the reproduction of hegemony through the constitution of lateral relations (of co-operation, merger; or of competition, conflict, subjection, assimilation and destruction) amongst a series of dominant hegemonic blocs in different places, and the production of links amongst a series of value forms. Inter-hegemonic blocs and networks will be established at a spatial scale at which one of a series of a series of rival nascent super-blocs is able to assert its independence from others and from its component blocs, and at which involvement in these can be sustained by these components. This scale is conditioned by changes in the pre-existing spatial patterning of the political and material foundations of class powers across these spaces. It is also conditioned by the need for component blocs to extend the inclusiveness of their respective power bases in the face of rivalry, whilst attempting at the lower level to preserve their cohesiveness. In the polar case of co-operative merger, allied hegemonic blocs will seek to reproduce their dominance and their value forms at their own, lower spatial level by forming a more extensive hegemonic super-bloc in which their separate identities will to some extent be submerged. This super-bloc will be negotiated through strategic alliances and wider opposition strategies which co-ordinate territorially defined class equilibria, draw these into higher level
unities and divisions, and undertake the restructuring and networking of state forms. In the polar case of hostile merger, rival hegemonic blocs will seek to reproduce their dominance and strengthen their respective value forms by raising their spatial level, extending their inclusiveness by imposing their identity on other territories, destroying rival blocs and assimilating their state forms and power bases through force and warfare. Between these polar extremes lie a range of other possible circumstances. The revaluation or renegotiation of state boundaries, and of the dominant territorial forms and levels of the state, together with novel patterns of inter-state articulation, will be central to these processes.

4. In their **inward dividing moment** class struggles concern the reproduction of hegemony through the constitution of a series of adjacent, linked hegemonic sub-blocs and the reproduction of a series of adjacent, linked value sub-forms. Intra-hegemonic blocs and networks will be established at a spatial scale at which each of these is able to sustain its separation from other sub-blocs and from an overarching hegemonic bloc, and to be sustained in this separation by the latter. The spatial scale of this series of sub-blocs is conditioned by the pre-existing spatial patterning of the foundations of class powers within this space. It is also conditioned by the need for dominant blocs to increase the cohesiveness of their respective power bases in the face of rivalry, whilst attempting at the higher level to preserve their inclusiveness. In the polar case of voluntary demerger, a network of hegemonic sub-blocs will be crystallised which assist the overarching bloc to reproduce its dominance and the strength of the value form at its own, higher level by forming more cohesive hegemonic sub-blocs in which its identity is to some extent diffused. This demerger will be negotiated through the controlled fracturing of blocs along spatial lines, and through state restructuring involving decentralisation, devolution and subsidiarity. In the polar case of hostile demerger, rival nascent sub-blocs will emerge and seek to secure dominance and a viable value form at a lower spatial level, by forming more cohesive blocs in which their separate identities are constituted, and by seeking the destruction of higher order blocs through civil war. Between these two extremes lie a range of other possible circumstances. The restructuring of state (territorial) forms, the emergence of internal boundaries, and novel patterns of intra-state articulation, the fragmentation of states and reduction in the dominant level of the state will be central to these processes.

This analysis presents a relational account of the four moments involved in the determination - creation and reproduction - of the territorial form of the global state system. These moments are closely interwoven in the course of historical events, but for various reasons they have not been acknowledged, or have been acknowledged differentially, during the development of Marxism. The first was touched upon during the classical period in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and by state theory as this emerged especially during the 1970s. The third was encountered in the context of imperialism, and has been addressed together with the fourth in recent accounts of European integration, central-local relations and ‘glocalisation’. But different moments have not been acknowledged or deduced as such, nor explained in their interdependence through a single frame of reference. In particular, relational theory and other varieties of Marxist state theory have generally assumed that struggles arise between class fractions and nascent blocs at the same spatial scale. Mainstream relational theory may on this basis be viewed as a special theory of the state assuming a single, uniform spatial scale. The present account, on the other hand, sketches out a
general theory of the state and society which assumes multiple, differentiated spatial scales with interactions across these.

The account so far has tended to emphasise class struggles as the origins of structural change, and has viewed the patterning of class relations and value forms as a condition of state territoriality. However, the reciprocal relationship of state forms, class relations of power and of production, and value forms means that within this paradigm none of these in their respective territorialities can be taken as originary. For example, the territoriality of the state is not only a consequence of the patterning of class relations and value forms, but also a parameter in the founding and focusing of class power and in the determination of its territorial pattern. Likewise the reproduction or change of existing state (and value) forms depends upon struggles between nascent hegemonic blocs at different spatial levels, but the nature and course of these struggles will in turn be moulded by the materiality of the existing territorial apparatus of the state. The territorial form of the state is structurally selective towards the constitution and dominance of nascent blocs organised at particular spatial scales, and towards the constitution of certain combinations of territorial units and territorial dominance. For a complete understanding, state and value forms must be seen as the outcome of struggles and strategies that are in turn conditioned by the political and territorial possibilities of the forms amongst which they are conducted.

Spatiality is a fundamental aspect of the physicality and materiality of the global state system which supports its relative autonomy and its effectivity in helping to condense the complex territorialities of global class relations, value forms and social formations. ‘Territory’ may be regarded as the socially mediated spatiality of political relations, producing formations which are interpellated as units such as ‘nations’, ‘regions’ and ‘localities’. There is an essential complicity between territory and hegemony - territory is the hegemonically mediated and interpellated spatiality of political relations, and hegemony is the territorially mediated dominance of specific political alliances. The territorial form of the state refers here not to its territorial limits or shape alone, but to the entirety of the state form considered as a territorial and indeed dimensional social form. Territory reflects the spatial differentiation and delimitation to the commitments of the state, its ‘sovereignty’. Territory is the spatial dimension of the societal unit that is identified with and interpellated by the state, in a two way relationship. Territory and the complex territoriality of the state provides a kernel - or rather a multiplicity of kernels - around which it is possible to constitute hegemonic apparatuses and blocs involving (for example) parliamentary democracy or corporatism, and to project their unity. Hegemonic factions are able to achieve dominance, as Gramsci recognised, by presenting their interests as the interest each ‘people-nation’ has in its material reproduction in the context of rivalry with other peoples (including those at other spatial levels). It is the territoriality of the state that enables it to appear neutral as between classes whilst partisan as between social formations and territories; class neutrality and territorial partisanship may therefore be seen as the two sides of one coin.

The territoriality of the state is determined, from a relational point of view, through struggles amongst class fractions and nascent blocs at the same or different spatial levels, struggles that arise in the course of attempting to create the conditions to install an hegemonic bloc and reproduce the value form. These struggles will be pervasive and ongoing, but will be fuelled in particular by capitalist crisis tendencies and counter-tendencies. Political crises will arise where the dominance or the cohesion of a bourgeois hegemonic bloc is undermined by the assertiveness of rival blocs and class fractions at the same or different spatial levels. This assertiveness may reflect a failure
of the dominant bloc to maintain the alignment of political class relations at its chosen scale of operation and, perhaps, to embody this in the structural selectivity of the state. But political struggles will also be influenced by crises of accumulation as fractions of capital seek to reproduce a viable path for accumulation at this level by restructuring the capital relationship in their favour. The state’s form including its territoriality may no longer be capable of securing the conditions of dominance or the rate of accumulation required by the hegemonic fraction, or of meeting the requirements of non-hegemonic fractions in the equilibrium of compromise. The existing territorial structure of the state, for example, may not have been adjusted in accordance with changes in the spatial organisation of class relationships, and in the material foundations of these, as capital accumulation drives across state boundaries. The response to crises will include attempts to overcome the limitations of the form of the state by reunifying and redividing its territoriality - through negotiation or through warfare - in order to increase its functionality for capital, and to buttress the power base of the hegemonic bloc. It is entirely possible, however, that steps taken to secure political domination in the medium term may conflict in their consequences with steps taken to restore capital accumulation in the longer term. Restructurings which attempt to meet the economic requirements of capital by harnessing the territoriality of states more closely to the spatial requirements of accumulation may conflict, or instance, with attempts to meet the political requirements of hegemonic fractions by harnessing states more closely to existing popular territorial units, as can be seen in the ambivalent response of the predominantly English Conservative Party to European integration.

4.0 Social Regulation and Territorial Form

The second resource for a neo-Marxist theory of territorial state form is provided by the regulation approach. Regulation theory stems principally from the work of Aglietta and others during the 1970s which emerged as a critique of orthodox economics and of Althusserian structuralism, and crystallised as a distinctive paradigm from the early 1980s (Aglietta 1979, p.9-10; for critical reviews see Jessop 1990a; Tickell and Peck 1992). Regulationism develops the Althusserian notion of the articulation of complex ‘state’ apparatuses which co-ordinate political and civil powers in the reproduction of the capitalist relations of production (Althusser 1971, p.141-147; cf Aglietta 1979). Structuralist concepts of (for example) ‘relative autonomy’, ‘reproduction’ and ‘overdetermination’ are retained but displaced towards a political economy and a systems theory in which the cybernetic, self-organising principle is embodied in the notion of ‘regulation’ (Aglietta 1979, p.12-13; Lipietz 1985, p.xvii; 1993; Jessop 1990, p.169-171). In its more nuanced forms regulationism presents a model of capitalist society not as a totality but a totalising process, a process governed by one or more latent totalities that are in practice only realised to varying degrees, and are themselves contradictory and crisis-ridden. A regulationist account is therefore not necessarily one that assumes capitalist society has an ordered structure, but one that measures the condition of society and its direction of change by its distance from this ordered condition. Regulation theory combats the productivism of Althusser and Poulantzas by bringing circulation and market relations into the picture, focusing upon “the articulation of the laws of capitalist accumulation and the laws of competition” (Aglietta 1979, p.17). At the same time it combats the static disposition of economics and of structuralism by addressing long term historical change and the periodization of capitalism, asking “what forces transform the social system and guarantee its long run cohesion” (Aglietta 1979, p.16). Finally, many regulationists have resisted Althusserian objectivism by acknowledging the dialectic of structure and agency, and drawing upon relational concepts: “the institutionalisation of social relations under the effect of class
struggles is the central process of reproduction” (Aglietta 1979, p.29). Nevertheless, the central concern of regulationism is to weave these relational strands into a structuralism which can illuminate the operation of ‘blind’ regulation and explain “how capitalism could survive even though the capital relation itself inevitably produced antagonisms, contradiction, and crises” (Jessop 1990, p.170; for the debate between social relations and regulationist perspectives see, for example, Bonefeld and Holloway 1991).

Jessop has identified seven schools of regulation theory (Boccarian, Parisian, Grenoblois, Amsterdam, West German, Nordic and American) to which one might add an eighth, the British school associated with Jessop himself. These schools and their members differ according to whether they incline more towards formulations in terms of political economy, structural articulation or class struggle. Mainstream regulationism is perhaps represented by the Parisian school around Aglietta and Lipietz (Aglietta 1979, 1982; De Vroey 1984). The ‘regime of accumulation’ (RA) describes the arrangements through which the accumulation of capital is secured, involving articulation of a system of production and consumption, a system for dividing the product between production and consumption, and the articulation of the capitalist mode of production with other coexisting modes (Lipietz 1984; 1993, p.132). The ‘mode of regulation’ (MR) comprises a social framework of civil and political institutions that orchestrates relations between the systems of production and consumption to ensure their proportionality, and is conducive to orderly progress in capital accumulation. As the RA develops over time so the existing MR gradually ceases to be effective, the institutions (e.g. state planning) and norms (e.g. industrial relations) governing economic activity breakdown, giving rise to a structural crisis and a vicious circle of decline. Only when new institutions and norms are established which are consistent with the newly emerging regime of accumulation can stable development be restored. The Great Depression in the 1930s is seen as a structural crisis of ‘extensive accumulation’ and ‘competitive regulation’ which prepared the way for the establishment after the war of ‘intensive accumulation’ (based upon Fordist mass production and consumption) and ‘monopolistic regulation’. Since the 1970s there has been another period of crisis associated with the maturity of Fordism, the collapse of class compromise, macroeconomic instability, and growing internationalisation. The exhaustion of Fordism, however, has stimulated the emergence of flexible (post-Fordist) production arrangements based in particular upon information technology, and this is associated with a reorganisation of class relations and reform of political structures leading to a new mode of regulation. Recent debate around this initial formulation has centred upon the degree to which the contours of a viable post-Fordist accumulation regime can at present be discerned, or whether societies are remaining in an unstable, disordered condition (e.g. Jessop 1990; Peck and Tickell 1995).

It is widely acknowledged that the state has been neglected within regulation theory (Jessop 1990a, p.199, p.202; Tickell and Peck, 1992). Typically the nation state has been viewed as one part - the central core - of the mode of regulation that orchestrates the articulation of regulatory forms and hegemonic blocs (De Vroey 1984; Jessop 1990a, p.197). Lipietz, for example, views the state as “the archetypal form of regulation - it is the level at which the class struggle is regulated, it is the institutional form in which the compromise is condensed. Without this the different groups of the national community would destroy themselves in the endless struggle” (Lipietz 1984, p.88). For Hirsch, Esser and others the social formation contains an ‘accumulation strategy’ and a ‘model of accumulation’, a corresponding ‘hegemonic structure’ including the state and other regulative forms, and a ‘form of societalization’ whereby individuals are integrated and a mode of social development established at national or international level (Hirsch 1983, 1991). The co-ordination of regulative forms is
undertaken by an hegemonic power bloc which is focused upon the state and political system, and structural correspondence of the model of accumulation and the hegemonic structure is achieved through the establishment of an historical bloc. The state contributes to societalization by constituting social groups - e.g. consumer interest and distribution groups such as trade unions - as the main elements of society, elements which are conducive to social coherence. The state has therefore a central role in coordinating regulation and pursuing societalization, achieving social and system integration through hegemonic and historical blocs that are conducive to reproduction of the model of accumulation. The historical bloc falls into structural crisis when it is no longer possible within this framework to counteract the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, at which point the social formation must be restructured (Hirsch 1991, p.12). Hirsch takes a broadly structural functionalist approach: “the implementation of an accumulation, and hegemonic, structure is always the result of structurally determined and contradictory class and group action, and thus a ‘process without a subject’” (Hirsch 1991, p.12). The Fordist model of accumulation meant the destruction of pre-existing social and cultural patterns, and necessitated greater action by the state to make good the deficit in social solidarity and reproduction of labour (Hirsch 1991, p.17). The Keynesian, corporatist welfare state contributed to the expanded reproduction of Fordism, the institutionalisation of class conflict and the organisation of mass consumption, and emerged along with “statified” social democratic parties and trade unions whose functions include mass integration (Hirsch 1991, p.18). But as the distinction between political and civil society was blurred so the conflicting interests of society were reproduced within the state, limiting its capacity for action (Hirsch 1983). The post-Fordist state must pursue a form of political regulation and hegemonic structure which promotes the introduction and stabilisation of a post-Fordist model of accumulation and bind with this to form a coherent historic bloc. It will be committed to deregulation, to the dominance of repressive over integrative means of regulation, to reduced spending and taxing, to the division of society into core and periphery, and the enabling of political parties which emphasise public relations and an authoritarian populist discourse (Hirsch 1991, p.29-31).

Capitalism and the state itself are analysed by Jessop at four levels - labour processes, accumulation regimes, social modes of economic regulation (e.g. comprising competition, enterprise management) and modes of societalisation. But whilst the state partakes of each level it is analysed particularly in reference to the promulgation of accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects as part of the social mode of regulation (Jessop 1993, p.26; Jessop 1994, p.32-34). The typical form of the state under Fordism is the Keynesian welfare state (KWS), which complements or “corresponds” to the accumulation regime such that it partakes of the ‘structural coupling’ and ‘contingent coevolution’ between accumulation regimes and social modes of regulation (Jessop 1993, p.11; 1994, p.16). The KWS has the objective of securing full employment in national economies through demand side policies, and promoting mass consumption through welfare benefits and regulated collective bargaining in order to match Fordist mass production (Jessop 1993, p.8-9). The state responded to the crises of Fordism by attempting to limit their impact upon its unity, but when this failed it began to lose effectiveness as a force in regulation, giving rise to deeper crises which intensified the restructuring of state and other forms (Jessop 1993, p.9-11; Jessop 1994, p.23). Jessop has conceptualised the tendential product of this restructuring of the state’s role in economic and social reproduction as the transition from the fordist, demand-side, Keynesian welfare state to the post-fordist, supply-side and ‘hollowed out’, Schumpeterian ‘workfare’ state (SWS) (Jessop 1993, p.16-21; 1994, p.24). The new state form has the objective of strengthening the structural competitiveness of the national economy by intervening on the supply side, stimulating technological
innovation, seeking labour market flexibility at the expense of full employment, and subordinating the welfare state to market forces (Jessop 1993, p.9, p.13, p.15). The power of the nation state is, however, being eroded by the emergence of a world society and global functions, the displacement of responsibility upwards, downwards and outwards: “this loss of autonomy creates in turn both the need for supra-national co-ordination and the space for subnational resurgence” (Jessop 1993, p.10-11, p.16; p.22; 1994, p.24; p.26). The SWS is post-Fordist if it resolves the crisis tendencies of Fordist accumulation and or the Keynesian welfare state, and helps to consolidate the emerging new dynamic of the global economy: “the ‘hollowed out Schumpeterian workfare state’ could prove structurally congruent and functionally adequate to post-Fordist accumulation regimes” (Jessop 1994, p.27; 1993, p.26, p.27-28). The SWS is therefore likely to be found in successful capitalist economies, and “economic spaces which fail to make this transition in some form or other will fall down the global hierarchy” (Jessop 1993, p.36).

In order to test the coherence of regulation theory we have to examine the nature and position of the causal links which supposedly condition structural realignments. Aglietta adopts a functionalist short hand when he tells us that the break down of reproduction poses a threat to the existing system, which “reacts as a totality to plug the gap by modifying the form of regulation” (Aglietta 1979, p.20). Lipietz advances our understanding by arguing that regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation are neither fore ordained nor consciously designed, but emerge through a kind of ‘a posteriori functionalism’ whereby institutional innovations, whatever their original motivation, will tend to be reproduced where they have a beneficial stabilising effect upon accumulation: “accumulation and regulation are discoveries in the history of men’s struggles and they have worked for so long as they have guaranteed some regularity and permanence in the social reproduction” (Lipietz 1984, p.86, p.90-91; 1993, p.120-121, p.134). By no means all modes of regulation accord with regimes of accumulation or succeed in establishing a virtuous circle of development, and the result in this case will be an enduring state of crisis and disorder reflecting a ‘regulatory deficit’ (Lipietz 1984, p.86; Peck and Tickell 1995, p.35). The focus of regulationism to Lipietz is not the autonomous development of a structure, but the real concrete emergence of order through the evolution of social relations. Likewise Jessop argues that changes flow from innovation and chance, that specific modes of regulation are historically contingent, and are moulded through morphogenesis or autopoesis: “time alone is the test of whether a putative transitional regime will prove adequate to its alleged task” (Jessop 1994, p.22, p.18; 1990a, p.186; see also Peck and Tickell 1995; Painter and Goodwin 1999; on morphogenesis see Maruyama 1963; Archer 1982; Jessop 1990b, p.320ff). However he seeks to avoid pessimistic functionalism - in its strong and weak (a posteriori) forms - by arguing that regulatory practices do not come into existence to reproduce a pre-existing object, or remain in existence because they reproduce this object: “modes of regulation and their objects [should] be seen as structurally coupled and historically coevolving and no a priori primacy would (or could) be accorded to one or another” (Jessop 1990, p.186). The state plays a role in organising the regime of accumulation in relation to other aspects of the social mode of regulation, but there is a two-way relationship here: “the state itself must be an object as well as an agent of regulation” (Jessop 1990a, p.200; cf 1993, p.35-36).

Jessop also seeks to avoid both voluntarism and structuralism, arguing that neither strategies nor structures are originary, that structures have only a relative unity which is the outcome of a clash of multiple strategies (Jessop 1994, p.15). A degree of unity amongst state apparatuses is required for these to “perform effectively in securing the political conditions needed for an accumulation regime”, but this unity is never
structurally given - and never achieved in full - but depends for its partial realisation upon the outcome of practices and struggles (Jessop 1990a, p.201). The institutional patterns of capitalism exist only tendentially and their laws of motion are indeed ‘doubly tendential’, depending upon conditions that are only actualised under certain conditions, and upon lawful relations that are themselves fully realised only when the patterns that embody them are fully constituted through social practice (Jessop 1990a, p.189). Nevertheless the state apparatus is structurally selective towards class forces and strategies: “to understand how capitalism is reproduced despite these complex contingencies, we must examine both the institutional inertia and strategic selectivity inscribed in specific accumulation regimes, modes of growth, and modes of regulation” (Jessop 1990a, p.196, p.201). The “mediating link between structural changes in the global economy and the transformation of the state” is provided by “discursive-strategic shifts into new accumulation strategies, state projects and hegemonic projects” formed, for example, in response to new economic constraints in the wage and money form (Jessop 1993, p.19). But although these new functions may be effected by short-term practices, they “correspond to the emerging dynamic of global capitalism” by helping to solve the crisis tendencies of Fordism or the KWS (Jessop 1994, p.24; Jessop 1993, p.7, p.11-12).

The regulation approach has been criticised for operating mainly at the national level, even though it has addressed international regimes and trading blocs, and the role of regional and local spaces (Jessop 1990a, p.160-161; Peck and Tickell 1995, p.19). However the British school of regulation theory in particular has developed an approach which acknowledges the significance of scale and of scale differentiation. Jessop draws an interesting distinction between models of ‘top down’ macro-regulation which accords each micro-site its role in a global order, and of ‘bottom up’ regulation whereby the macro-order emerges from the interaction of a multiplicity of micro-orders (Jessop 1990a, p.190-191). An emergent approach has been adopted by Lipietz: “the development of world capitalism” is an abstraction from national and international relationships, not the cause of national development”, and global arrangements (such as imperialism) are therefore ‘partial totalisations’ emerging from the behaviour of nations (Lipietz 1984, p.91, p.89). The totalised ‘demergent’ approach is taken by Palloix and Perroux, and by Aglietta and Hirsch, each of whom argues that the current macro-order is determined as a global system under the hegemony of the currently dominant world order, power or transnational fractions of capital (e.g. Hirsch 1991, p.15). Jessop favours an approach which “would deny the existence of a simple micro-macro split and just argue that there are many different sites of regulation and that they can be articulated in various ways and at different levels” (Jessop 1990a, p.193). Taking the term ‘global’ as relative, he defines “a global regulation strategy as a strategy which attempts to sub tend and articulate a number of smaller sites or regulation (social forms, structural forms) within its orbit ... these smaller sites none the less continue to have an independent existence and to constitute potential sites of structural recalcitrance and/or social resistance to the global strategy” (Jessop 1990a, p.193). Even here, however, “a world order ... could never be more than an emergent, contingent, provisional, and unstable result of various global strategies on a complex, international and transnational terrain with different types of world order as their ultimate objective” (Jessop 1990, p.194). If there is no macro-necessity in social regulation then no one scale of social formation is the essential site of regulation (Jessop 1990a, p.193). The hollowing out of the nation state opens the possibility that the different routes to the SWS - neo-liberal, neo-statist, neo-corporatist - or combinations of these may appear at sub- and super-national levels, although the central state is still generally perceived as dominant and providing a centrally co-ordinated framework (Jessop 1993, p.31-33).
From the late 1980s there have been various attempts to develop an account of ‘local spaces of regulation’. Goodwin et al argue, for instance, that the local state and local agencies should be viewed as vehicles of ‘local modes of regulation’ (Goodwin, Duncan and Halford 1993). The state - including the local state - is seen as central to the creation, orchestration and restructuring of local spaces of regulation especially under Fordism. Following the post-war settlement the local state took on a key role in organising production and reproduction, planning and developing the infrastructural requirements of industry, managing the welfare state and restructuring family relationships, and providing a basis for social democratic politics. These helped to establish “new ways of living and thinking and feeling life” which were essential to the fordist regime of accumulation, and represented “the local objectification of an abstract mode of regulation” (Goodwin, Duncan and Halford 1993, p.73). Since the 1970s, however, class alliances underpinning local fordist modes of regulation - often based on skilled, white, male workers - have broken down and there has begun a transition towards new kinds of urban politics associated with privatisation, city promotion and consumerism, and partnership working. The state at national and local levels is being restructured as part of the preparation for the new mode of regulation, moving broadly in the direction of the Schumpeterian workfare state (Goodwin, Duncan and Halford 1993, p.81; for a revised formulation see Painter and Goodwin 1995). Peck and Tickell suggest that subnational spaces may involve distinctive sub-couplings of a regime of accumulation and mode of social regulation (Peck and Tickell 1995, p.21). As the power of the nation state is eroded so the coherence of the RA/MR coupling may no longer be focused at the national level: “the question of functionality in accumulation-regulation relationships consequently needs to be opened up at other spatial scales” (Peck and Tickell 1995, p.26). Processes of social regulation need to be seen as operating at a variety of spatial scales including the sub- or super-national: “thus, regulation theory can, and indeed must, be spatialised” (Peck and Tickell 1995, p.36). There is uneven development of RAs and MRs, such as the ‘north-south’ divide, but there is also a need to regulate these uneven developments and to manage their contradictions and conflict, at the national level (Peck and Tickell 1995, p.28, p.34). One ‘object’ of regulation in sustainable regimes of accumulation will be the dominant form of uneven spatial development, and the economic and political tensions to which this gives rise. Different regulatory functions may be sited at different spatial scales, and may be associated with the emergence of local modes of social regulation (Peck and Tickell 1995, p.26-27). These will be defined especially by their position and their mode of integration in the wider accumulation regime and mode of social regulation.

Despite significant differences of approach within regulationism it is possible to identify the parameters of a regulationist account of territorial state form. This account will be focused upon the tendential establishment of structural order and the tendential disruption of this order through structural crisis. It will combine the emergent dialectic of struggle and structure, and the interplay of chance and morphogenesis, with the structural dialectic of accumulatory and regulatory forms. These concepts will be linked within a diachronic framework which suggests that ordered structures of capitalism (regimes, modalities, institutional couplings) tend to emerge and to collapse over time, and perhaps to effect a periodisation of history in the process. The basic argument is autopoietic - that innovations in accumulation and regulation, whatever their origins, will tend to be preserved and woven into a stable pattern if they contribute to expanded capital accumulation. But the emergence of these patterns is contingent upon chance discoveries and class practices that are themselves mediated by structural forms, and the persistence of these patterns depends upon the development and management of crisis tendencies which are endemic to every capitalist structure. Shifts and crises in the regime of accumulation will occur which destabilise the mode of
regulation (including the state) and force its restructuring, but these crises may themselves be conditioned reciprocally - or suppressed - by changes at the level of regulation. It is important in this account to approach spatiality as a dimension of accumulatory and regulatory practices, and not to hypostatise this by treating it as a separate institutional form. Territorial state forms will therefore be explained as the outcome of selective pressures which tend to stabilise patterns of regulation that secure the reproduction of capital accumulation, countervailing structural contradictions which tend to disrupt the stabilisation of these patterns and the reproduction of accumulation, and the processes of chance and struggle which effect the actualisation of structural forms and of their deformations.

To clear a path for this analysis we must first address some ambiguities surrounding the terms ‘regime’ and ‘modality’. Particular regimes of accumulation or social modes of regulation may be shared by economies and societies which are relatively distinct and separate from one another. In the 1930s, for instance, Fordism spread through a system of relatively independent and protectionist industrial economies partly by means of diffusion and parallel development as well as through inward investment and extension of the capital nexus. Even where a regime of accumulation is increasingly integrated at a supranational level, as Fordism has been since the 1950s, it may still be divided and focused in certain respects at other scales. An international nexus for circulation and for the formation of larger capitals may be combined, for instance, with the existence of national economies providing a nexus for - say - ownership of smaller capitals, and production and circulation of associated goods. Likewise regulatory practices may be organised according to similar principles in different places, perhaps involving similar Keynesian welfare states, without these being merged together into one society. The emergence of regulatory institutions which function at a supranational level does not preclude and may depend upon the coexistence and the interaction of relatively autonomous states and societies at lower levels. A distinction must therefore be drawn between ‘modes’ and ‘structures’ of regulation, and between ‘regimes’ and ‘systems’ of accumulation, if we are to focus upon the systemic features including the spatial (dis)continuities and scale articulations constituting different patterns of accumulation and regulation.

Modes and regimes are attributes - principles of operation - of structures and systems which, if successful, contribute to ongoing accumulation and (like spatiality) should not be hypostatised as institutional forms in their own right (nor idealised as abstract types or forms waiting to be actualised in particular settings). Needless to say systems of accumulation participating in broadly the same regime will tend to be associated with similar structures of regulation sharing (a range of alternative) corresponding modalities. Systems of accumulation and structures of regulation will be scale articulated - spatially integrated on certain dimensions (e.g. in respect of circulation) at certain scales, spatially divided on other dimensions (e.g. in respect of production by smaller capitals) at other scales, and change their pattern of scale integration and division over time. It is therefore necessary to see the plurality of (say) national economies and of nation states as a feature of the scale articulation of systems of accumulation and structures of regulation. Furthermore, systems and structures (and their attributes) as stable patterns of activity are problematic, not given but constituted and reproduced through morphogenesis, and always tending to decay. The development of regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation is involved dialectically with the development of their subtending systems and structures, but the relationship between these is likely to be complex and requires close examination. Only on this basis can we address the spatiality of accumulation and regulation, the ‘structural coupling’ of accumulatory and regulatory practices. A further distinction
must also be introduced, however, before we can resolve the question of ‘top down’ versus ‘bottom up’ regulation and separate this from the issue of ‘demergent’ and ‘emergent’ autopoiesis. ‘Regulation’ refers to a social process of control or guidance over society and over accumulation, a process involving norms and institutional powers that may contribute to ‘autopoiesis’ - to viable self-organisation of accumulation and regulation - through their effectivity. ‘Autopoiesis’, on the other hand, refers to a structural process whereby successful regulatory and accumulatory patterns - ones that can ‘accumulate’ and ‘regulate’ - are selected for preservation. Autopoiesis is the self-organisation of a system which is expressed in the stabilisation of modes of regulation which can then play a part in the establishment and reproduction of regimes of accumulation. It follows that the issue of ‘top down’ versus ‘bottom up’ regulation (e.g. of states controlling those higher or lower in the hierarchy) is different from the issue of ‘demergent’ and ‘emergent’ autopoiesis (e.g. the existence of a self-ordering whole which expresses itself through its parts, or the emergence of an ordered whole from the interaction of these parts). Regulation is control that tends towards but may fail to achieve autopoiesis, whilst autopoiesis is self-organisation that tends towards but may fail to stabilise a pattern of regulation and accumulation. If this distinction is blurred so that autopoiesis is equated to regulation - self-organisation with control - then either regulationism is reduced to a theory of social control, or the structural functionality of the regulation process is assumed in advance.

At each stage in the development of capitalism there are conditions which must be met in order to secure the reproduction of capital accumulation, conditions which constrain the organisation of accumulation and regulation. It is particularly important for our purposes here to recognise that these conditions will have a spatial dimension, and constrain the spatial organisation and articulation of accumulatory and regulatory activities. Systems of accumulation that are to resolve the economic problems of the preceding period and to avoid difficulties themselves must meet certain conditions involving a spatial patterning of accumulatory practices - locations of activities, inter-dependencies, (dis)continuities, articulations at different scales - which complements the other aspects of their emerging organisation and contributes to their reproduction. These spatial conditions can be referred to as the spatial prerequisites of accumulation during each phase of capitalism. Likewise structures of regulation that are to help secure the conditions for viable systems of accumulation, including their spatial prerequisites, must meet certain conditions involving a spatial patterning of regulatory practices including those of the state - locations, inter-dependencies, (dis)continuities, articulations with accumulation - which complements other aspects of the emerging regime of accumulation and the institutional materiality of capitalist society. These spatial conditions can be referred to as the spatial prerequisites of regulation for each phase of capitalism. An orderly pattern of expanded accumulation therefore requires that accumulation and regulation be organised according to certain principles which solve the problems of the previous period, including spatial patternings and combinations of spatial scales which are suited to the realisation of these principles and the solution of these problems. More dynamically, we can suggest that the structural coupling of accumulatory and regulatory practices will depend in part upon the degree to which the complex spatial patternings and scale articulations of each with the other are conducive to their emergence together in a form that embodies organisational principles which are suited to ongoing expanded accumulation at that stage in the development of capitalism.

The scale differentiation and articulation of structures of regulation will therefore tend - but only tend - to reflect their ability to undertake ‘spatial regulation’, to engender, stabilise and bind with viable and spatially patterned systems of accumulation, and so
their ability to meet the spatial prerequisites of accumulation (viability in this context may be operationalised as “sustained economic growth”, or “the reproduction of capital accumulation”, or a space’s position in the “global hierarchy”, or “the rate of profit” (Peck and Tickell 1995, p.34; Jessop 1993, p.36; Lipietz 1984, p.99-104)). The different patterns of scale articulation of accumulatory systems and regulatory structures (e.g. localism, regionalism, centre-periphery patterns, trading blocs, glocalisation), which are adapted to the organising principles implied in the different emerging regimes of accumulation and social modes of regulation, will tend to break down as these regimes and modalities fall into crisis. Whether regulation and accumulation actually become organised on these principle and at these scales, and whether an optimum spatial order from the point of view of accumulation is ever achieved, will depend upon the outcome of innovation, conflict and struggle. When an appropriate spatial pattern of regulation fails to emerge then this will give rise to a ‘spatial regulatory deficit’; when an appropriate spatial pattern of accumulation fails to emerge then this will give rise to a ‘spatial accumulatory deficit’ which may or may not be related to the former. In the former case the result may be ongoing disorder, whilst in the latter case there may be orderly economic failure.

One danger in the notion of ‘structural coupling’ is that it may lead us to assume a simple one-to-one spatial relationship between accumulatory and regulatory apparatuses without considering the conditions under which spatial correspondences might arise. A fundamental problem for capitalism is, however, the difficulty of establishing and sustaining - of regulating - accumulatory activities that tend to become scale differentiated, to become organised across a range of different spatial scales. The reproduction of capital depends, as we have seen, upon achieving the spatial prerequisites of accumulation during each stage in the development of capitalism. This general requirement breaks down into three specific prerequisites as follows:-

a. The different steps or moments in the circulation of capital - capital formation, factor and raw material circulation, manufacturing and services production, circulation and exchange, consumption and labour reproduction, and the markets and hierarchies these entail - are qualitatively different from one another, and will during each period tend to become scale differentiated, organised at a number of distinct spatial scales which are suited to their different requirements and to the requirements of the network of circuits as a whole.

There is an economic dynamic which leads the different accumulatory activities to be extended or restricted to the scale at which they are most viable in their own terms and in the reproduction of the entire circulatory network. In Britain in the 1850s, for instance, production and reproduction were organised locally, capital formation was for the most part organised at the local and sub-regional levels, whilst circulation was organised locally, at the global level (in the context of world trade and of imperialism), and at several intervening scales.

b. The overall operation of these circulatory networks will, on the other hand, be facilitated by tending to become spatially integrated, with the formation of spatially cohesive accumulatory systems at appropriate scales, scales at which common conditions (currencies, laws, infrastructures, languages, principles of social organisation, political identities) can be established which reduce uncertainty and transaction costs at each moment in the circulation of capital and across the network of circuits.
There is a tension between these two prerequisites such that the spatial integration of accumulatory systems will be constrained by the countervailing tendency towards scale differentiation of accumulatory activities. Certainly cohesion is a matter of degree, and each moment in the circulation of capital may well be associated with partial spatial integration at its respective scale.

c. During each period of capitalism, however, there is a tendency for the balance and tension between scale differentiation and spatial integration to be managed, the overall operation of circulatory networks and the emergence of a viable pattern of accumulation to be facilitated, by an accumulatory system at one particular scale, perhaps associated with a particular moment in the circulation of capital, becoming the most well integrated, to dominate those at other scales, and on this basis to form a spatialised economy.

The dominant spatial system of accumulation and so the spatial economy will tend to be scaled to facilitate maximum valorisation amongst the circulatory networks it comprises. This scale could in principle be related to the requirements of any one of the moments - capital formation, factor circulation, production, circulation, labour reproduction - in capital accumulation. Indeed it may be that the dominant moment in the spatial integration of accumulation systems will change from one period of capitalism to another. It appears from observation, however, that the scale of the accumulatory systems which offers the greatest potential to become a strong nexus in the circulation of finished goods and services will tend to become the most cohesive scale - the integrated economy - and to dominate the rest. Hence the establishment of a cohesive market across Britain from the 1830s onwards made this scale dominant over its regions and localities (where capital formation was still organised). A similar process over the last fifty years at the European level - which is merging first as a market for goods and services and only latterly for capital, labour or production - is likewise tending to make this the dominant spatial system of accumulation. But it is possible that the decisive moment in the spatial integration of accumulation systems will vary according to the principles - regimes and modes - of the emerging systems of accumulation and regulation. This is one of several issues to emerge which can only be resolved empirically.

The achievement of these spatial prerequisites of accumulation will not occur in isolation, however, but will depend upon the contemporaneous emergence of regulatory activities which contribute to these developments. Indeed the dominant moment in the spatial integration of accumulation systems, and the dominant spatial scale of these systems, will be determined in interaction with the crystallisation of regulatory activities also at particular scales. To succeed in meeting the spatial prerequisites of accumulation these regulatory activities will themselves have to meet three analogous spatial prerequisites of regulation. That is to say, regulatory practices will tend to emerge which are themselves scale differentiated and spatially integrated, being applied at different levels in order to contribute to the scale differentiation of accumulatory activities, being integrated at certain levels in order to contribute to the spatial integration of accumulatory systems, and being dominated at one level that is suited to the management of the contradictions between scale differentiation and spatial integration. It was, for example, through concerted action by the nation state, private capital and local state that a cohesive British economy was forged during the nineteenth century. The extension or restriction of different moments in accumulation to different scales - to local, regional, national, continental, imperial, global levels - will therefore tend to be associated with the operation of different regulatory practices at these scales. But whilst regulatory activities will operate at each level of accumulatory activity, and
contribute to the emergence of accumulatory systems at these levels (e.g. international rules for trade) they will themselves be integrated into regulatory structures which are organised only at particular scales (e.g. at the national or regional levels). It can be anticipated, furthermore, that there will be a tendency for the tension between scale differentiation and spatial integration of regulatory activities to be managed by structures organised at one of these scales becoming the dominant spatial structure of regulation or spatialised hegemonic structure over those at lower and higher spatial scales.

The dominant spatial structure of regulation (hegemonic structure) will tend to emerge together with the dominant spatial system of accumulation, through a process of mutual dependence or spatial structural coupling, creating a spatialised society at a scale that is most appropriate to the reproduction of the types - modalities and regimes - of regulatory and accumulatory activities they comprise. It is, in other words, only at this dominant scale of accumulation and regulation that we can speak of a direct structural coupling. The scaling of this society will in practice tend to be conditioned reciprocally by the requirements of the emerging mode of regulation as well as the requirements of the emerging regime of accumulation. The viability of capital reproduction at each stage in its development will depend upon the effectiveness with which the scale differentiation of accumulatory and regulatory activities is organised, scale integration of accumulatory systems and regulatory structures achieved, and on this basis the spatial structural coupling of regulatory and accumulatory activities - sociatisation - is accomplished. This process will condition endogenously the main axis of spatial unification and division of regulatory structures, the formation and deformation of discrete societies, and the particular combination of top down and bottom up regulation that occurs. In cases where the national level is the scale of spatial structural coupling of regulation and accumulation, the role and ‘mode’ of sub- or supranational structures will tend to be determined by their relationship to this dominant scale, and in particular by their role in the reinforcement of regulation and accumulation at this level. Local structures of regulation and systems of accumulation, for example, will tend to contribute to the dominance of regulatory structures and accumulatory systems controlled at higher scales, just as continental or global structures of regulation and systems of accumulation tend to contribute to the dominance of regulatory structures and accumulatory systems controlled at lower scales. When there is spatial structural coupling at a particular scale then regulatory and accumulatory activities at other - higher and lower - scales will, if they are coupled at all, tend to be ‘coupled’ indirectly; that is to say, they will tend to be aligned to each others’ requirements and reinforce each others’ development to the extent and in a manner that meets the requirements of the primary scale of structural coupling. The issues of sub- or supra-coupling cannot, therefore, be considered apart from this more general question of scale articulation, and of spatial structural coupling at a dominant scale.

The structural coupling of accumulatory and regulatory forms will involve the reciprocal crystallisation of accumulatory and regulatory integration at a dominant scale giving rise to a society at that scale, but a society that will be set within a complex web of activities, accumulatory moments and regulatory practices crystallised to lesser degrees and with variable reciprocities at other scales. The emergence of the dominant scale of society and the state through an endogenous process of causation outlined so far will under most conditions, however, give rise to a plurality of societies at the same scale, and engender a simultaneous exogenous process of causation in which the crystallisation and reproduction of each is constrained by the crystallisation and reproduction of all the others. A fourth spatial prerequisite of accumulation, regulation
and indeed of structural coupling can therefore be stated by bringing endogenous and exogenous causation together:

d. Structural coupling and the emergence of a spatial society will tend to occur at a scale which is dominant because it facilitates the emergence of a viable pattern of accumulation and regulation; it does this by meeting the other spatial prerequisites of accumulation and regulation, and by securing its ability to do the latter through the reproduction of each society as a distinct unit in the context of the emergence of all the others on the same basis. Together these processes will condition endogenously and exogenously the main axis of spatial unification and division of societies.

Any complete account of structural coupling and societalisation must encompass both endogenous and exogenous causation and show how these arise naturally together from a single set of explanatory principles. It is important to remember, however, that structural coupling may be a relatively rare event, and it is likely that for much of the time spatial systems of accumulation and spatial structures of regulation will not be coupled, but in a process of transition involving several rival scales of potential structural coupling and societalisation.

To develop a regulationist analysis of the (territorial) state we must consider its relationship to other regulatory forms and practices as well as to the process of accumulation. The interaction of regulatory practices with one another and with accumulatory practices is an important element which has been neglected in regulation theory. A range of apparatuses may be identified - the family, trade unions, employers associations, political parties, mass media, voluntary associations, racial and gender divisions, religious groupings and others - which in varying degrees contribute alongside the state to the overall process of regulation including spatial regulation. Also included here are business enterprises and market institutions which, like other structures, may be multifunctional and contribute to regulation (e.g. philanthropic enterprises) and perhaps even societalisation (e.g. the East India Company) as well as to accumulation. The state, the family and other regulatory forms and practices are not autonomous, but are shaped reciprocally in the process of meeting the requirements of accumulation or failing to meet these requirements. These apparatuses will play different and perhaps fluctuating roles - repressive, ideological, mass integrative, productive, reproductive - and be articulated with one another and with the process of accumulation in different ways. Relations amongst regulatory practices can be conceptualised as tending under certain circumstances to contribute to the composition of hegemonic blocs and to form spatial hegemonic structures in which components are more or less aligned and mutually reinforcing in their goals, scope and methods of operation. These regulatory and hegemonic structures correspond broadly to ‘the state’ in its extended Gramscian and Althusserian sense. As a first approximation we can suggest that the circumstances which give rise to spatial hegemonic structures will include the determinate role of one or more apparatuses in conditioning the alignment and integration - the regulation - of the others at one or more scales, and the dominant role of the state apparatus over the others in facilitating and co-ordinating the establishment of an regulatory structures at these scales. The assignment of these roles will be conditioned by the tendency for nascent apparatuses and structures to be retained where they are able to reinforce and bind with an emerging accumulation system.

Different apparatuses have performed a determinate role in the establishment of regulatory structures at different times and in different places, according to the
tendential requirements of the emerging regimes of accumulation. During the industrial revolution and throughout most of the nineteenth century in Britain it may be argued that regulation was mediated primarily by the bourgeois family, which performed a determinate role by underpinning production and consumption, the supply of capital, reproduction of labour, political organisation and societalisation. The family was however supported in this function particularly and increasingly by the local and national state, which performed a complementary political role in the forging of hegemonic blocs, and used its greater repressive power to exert dominance towards the establishment of a spatial society. During the middle decades of the twentieth century these roles are generally considered to have been combined within the state system, which provided both the dominant and the determinate site of regulation - at the national and local levels respectively - during the period identified with Fordism. More recently, however, there is evidence to suggest that in some places these roles are once again separating, that in the period after Fordism the state is losing its determinate role within the regulatory structure and transferring this directly to the market and corporate capital. In other places, however, the two roles are being reallocated within a restructured state system, with quasi-private arms and bureaucratic layers of the state taking on a determinate role, buttressed by the repressive power of the state apparatus at national levels.

In either case, however, it is likely that the state will remain the dominant institution in regulatory alignment, tending to facilitate spatial structures of regulation and spatial systems of accumulation, and to contribute decisively to spatial structural coupling at a dominant scale and to the crystallisation of dominant societal units. The successful emergence and reproduction of accumulatory activities will therefore require a scale differentiation and spatial integration of the state system which is itself appropriate, helping to meet the four spatial prerequisites of accumulation and regulation. There will therefore be a tendency for the state to become organised, its apparatuses scale differentiated and spatially integrated, and in particular its dominance and powers of demarcation distributed in the manner which is most appropriate to societalisation and the reproduction of capital during each historical period. To clarify the analysis of substantive social formations it is useful to consider four hypothetical situations or moments in state development:

1. Spatial structural coupling and the formation of a (spatialised) society will tend to occur at a scale which is dominant because it is most conducive to the emergence of a viable organisation - including regimes and modes - of accumulation and regulation in the new phase of capitalist development. Viability will be revealed in the relative performance of different circulatory networks and regulatory patterns within this society. The emerging society will tend to be scaled in order to meet the spatial prerequisites of accumulation and regulation during each phase of capitalism, and so to maximise this ‘inward’ viability. For its part the state system will tend to contribute to this viability by constituting a dominant apparatus at a scale that is optimal for spatial structural coupling and crystallisation of a society. The process of spatial integration will tend to be combined with the formation of an hegemonic bloc, the political - coercive and discursive - interpellation (by for instance state domestic power projection) of a determinate territory, political unit and a place-based collective identity.

2. The emergence of a plurality of spatial structural couplings and societies in different places will tend to occur at a scale which is dominant because it is most conducive to the emergence of regimes of accumulation and modes of
regulation that are viable in the new phase of capitalist development. Viability will in this case be revealed in the relative performance and survival of the spatialised economies and societies considered as distinct units subsisting alongside one another. Emerging societies will each tend to be scaled in order to meet the spatial prerequisites of accumulation and regulation during each phase of capitalism by securing their existence in the context of all others doing the same, and to maximise this ‘outward’ viability. The state system will tend to contribute to this viability by spatially integrating in each of these places, constituting a series of dominant apparatuses at scales that are optimal for the emergence and reproduction of a series of spatial structural couplings, and the crystallisation of a series of societies that can survive as distinct accumulating and regulating units from one another. The process of spatial division will tend to be combined with the formation of a series of hegemonic blocs, the political - coercive and discursive - interpellation (by for instance state external power projection) of a series of contrasted territories, distinct political units and place-based collective identities.

3. Accumulatory and regulatory activities will each tend to be integrated to some extent at lower levels within each society, sub-dividing the dominant spatial system of accumulation and the dominant spatial structure of regulation when this facilitates the emergence and reproduction of a viable regime of accumulation and mode of regulation at the dominant scale. The inward division of the spatial economy will tend to coincide with the scale of non-dominant moments in the circuit of capital and to enhance the contribution of these moments to the ‘inward’ and ‘outward’ viability of the dominant scale. The inward division of the spatial hegemonic structure will tend to coincide with non-dominant apparatuses in the process of regulation, and to enhance the contribution of these apparatuses to this inward and outward viability of the dominant scale. The state system will tend to contribute to this viability by being spatially sub-integrated and forming a series of subordinate state apparatuses at lower levels, and by contributing to the sub-integrations of the economy and the hegemonic structure at scales that are optimal for spatial structural coupling at the higher, dominant scale and the survival of this as a unit distinct from others. These sub-integrations may emerge together at particular scales in an indirect coupling which is subordinated to the direct structural coupling and societalisation at the dominant scale; or there may be little or no lower order coupling, depending upon the requirements of the dominant level of structural coupling. If the spatial prerequisites of accumulation and regulation change during the development of capitalism such that their viability depends upon smaller spatial units, then structural coupling at the dominant scale will tend to break down and be replaced by the emergence of spatialised economies and societies, and dominant state apparatuses, at lower levels. The process of spatial sub-division will combine with the formation of a series of sub-hegemonic blocs, the politics - coercive and discursive - interpellation of a series of contrasted territories, political sub-units and a series of place-based collective sub-identities. The breakdown and reduced scale of the dominant society will be negotiated peacefully or by violent civil conflict.

4. Accumulatory and regulatory activities will each tend to be integrated to some extent at higher levels embracing several societies, supra-integrating the dominant spatial systems of accumulation and the dominant spatial structures of regulation when this facilitates the emergence and reproduction of viable
regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation at the lower, dominant scale. The outward integration of spatial economies will tend to coincide with the scale of non-dominant moments in the circuit of capital and to enhance the contribution of these moments to the inward and outward viability of the dominant scale. The outward integration of spatial hegemonic structures will tend to coincide with non-dominant apparatuses in the process of regulation, and to enhance the contribution of these apparatuses to the inward and outward viability of the dominant scale. The state system will tend to contribute to this viability by being spatially supra-integrated and forming a subordinate state apparatus at higher levels, and by contributing to the supra-integration of economies and hegemonic structures at scales that are optimal for a series of spatial structural couplings and societalisations at the lower, dominant scale and the survival of these as units distinct from one another. These supra-integrations may emerge together at particular scales in an indirect coupling which is subordinated to the direct coupling and societalisation at the lower, dominant scale; or there may be little or no higher order coupling, depending upon the requirements of the dominant scale. If the spatial prerequisites of accumulation and regulation change during the development of capitalism such that their viability depends upon larger spatial units, then the spatial structural coupling at the dominant scale will tend to break down and to be replaced by the emergence of spatial economies and societies, and dominant state apparatuses, at higher levels. The process of spatial supra-integration will combine with the formation of supra-hegemonic blocs, the political - coercive and discursive - interpellation of a shared higher territory, political supra-unit and a place-based collective supra-identity. The breakdown and raised scale of the dominant society will be negotiated peacefully or by violent warfare.

The foregoing analysis suggests that it is possible to develop a regulationist account of the tendency towards unity and division of the state system, an account which will explain this tendency as a response to the spatial prerequisites of regulation and accumulation. The aim has been to construct a general theory which generates the scale articulation of society, and indicates the principles of autopoesis which will establish the dominant scale of society and so the balance between top down and bottom up regulation in the different eras of capitalism. In each case the patterns of regulation and accumulation are emergent features which are associated with the crystallisation of a dominant scale of the state and society which then undertakes both ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ regulation in the context of a series of others doing the same. It has been necessary in undertaking this analysis to show how the scaling of these practices and institutional patterns is deduced from theoretical principles rather than inserted by assumption from beyond the terms of the theory. Objects such as ‘localities’, ‘national social formations’, ‘national modes of growth’ and ‘international relations’ - where they can be shown to exist - need no longer be taken as given and introduced from outside of the terms of the theory but may be seen as a natural expression of this theory. The transformation of the spatial prerequisites of accumulation and regulation will in each period condition a reorganisation of the dominant pattern of society including the state in the search for a new viable structural coupling. A full explanation of state scaling and societalisation requires that endogenous and exogenous accounts flow naturally and together from a single theoretical account.

It is important to remind ourselves at this point that regulationism - as an autopoetic theory - claims merely to identify the structural tendencies that flow from the selection of practices according to the spatial prerequisites of accumulation and regulation, and
from changes in these prerequisites over time. The existence of coherent structures of regulation, spatial systems of accumulation, spatial economies and societies remains problematic and depends upon the moulding and selection of circulatory networks and regulatory apparatuses, each of which is itself only precariously ordered. Whether or not the changes outlined above actually occur will depend upon their realisation through the kind of strategies, processes and conflicts that are described in the preceding section, and upon the working out of the key autopoetic principles of self-organisation in the context of contradictions and crisis tendencies at the level of structure. Structural contradictions which might be expected to disrupt spatial autopoesis include a shift in the relationship of the different spatial prerequisites of accumulation as modes and regimes evolve. For example, the scale differentiation of moments in the circuit of capital may develop and undermine existing spatial integrations and structural couplings of accumulation and regulation through scale misalignment giving rise to reintegration either by peaceful or violent means. A second kind of contradiction might be the differential development of places such that (for example) one spatial economy tends to dominate others at the same scale through spatial unevenness, giving rise to reintegration under ‘spheres of influence’, international hegemony, imperialism, or regional dominance.

5.0 Subject and System Teleology

Reworked relational theory as set out in Section 3 has a number of attractions. It accommodates both struggle and structure, and both domination and accumulation, without reducing either pole to the other in the determination of state systems. It is recognised that the capital relationship carries developmental tendencies, and that crisis tendencies are likely to invoke a political response which includes a restructuring of the state system (Holloway and Picciotto 1977, p.86). Relationalism is therefore conducive to an historical analysis without implying an historicist periodisation of the state or capital as sometimes occurs with regulation theory. Despite the abstract nature of this theorisation, and despite Holloway and Picciotto’s injunction against reified bourgeois concepts such as ‘politics’ and ‘economics’, this approach is amenable to empirical investigation (e.g. Duncan and Goodwin 1982b). Holloway and Picciotto point out that state intervention is limited by its character as a deduction from surplus value, and the foregoing analysis might in principle be developed by observing that at certain (larger) scales this deduction may be less of a constraint upon capital than at others, and that the scales at which this is a constraint may increase as capital accumulation grows. Of particular significance in this regard is the way that relational theory permits territorial crises including warfare to be dealt with as an integral part of an analysis of capitalist crisis and state restructuring, and thereby opens a new field of substantive study. It provides an explanation of the territoriality of the state which treats this as one, albeit fundamental, aspect of the capitalist state that must be integrated into a wider account of state form and institutional materiality in order to make the latter convincing. It offers a natural way of developing a scale differentiated account of the state, an account which does not take existing territorial units (such as the nation state) as given, confine itself to particular spatial scales, or assume scale uniformity on the part of class forces or value forms. Indeed the theory assumes that similar social processes may in principle be observed at different spatial scales, and that societal dynamics operate across as well as within these scales.

On the other hand, there are a number of problems with a relational theory of territorial state form which require attention. If structures are regarded as formalised patterns of agency, then attempts to base a theory upon the dialectic of structure and agency
requires further clarification to determine in what sense there can be a causal relationship between social phenomena at different logical levels (cf Archer 1982; Lipietz 1993, p.125). The emphasis upon struggle, upon the mediation of social forms, is important and can be seen as redressing an imbalance in structuralism. But there is a tendency to privilege struggle over structure, as can be seen from the absence of structural concepts such as ‘historical bloc’ or ‘territorial structural cohesion’. Linked to this is a failure to examine the actual processes by which social forms ‘condense’ and are restructured through struggle, or to analyse the degrees of freedom available to agency operating under the quasi-objective constraints and pressures deriving from the operation of the law of value or the political logic of state forms (a similar point is made by Jessop 1990a, p.191). The absence of systemic considerations is reflected in the limited attention given to the ways in which crisis tendencies operate to provoke restructuring activities, and impinge on the outcome of these activities. Finally, there remains an undercurrent of system teleology - or at least an ambiguity between system and subject teleology - in the writings of Holloway and Picciotto, and in Jessop’s account of the contested, contingently determined, functionality of the state for capital (Jessop 1982, p.226, p.236-240; Jessop 1983a, p.157).

Turning to the scale differentiated regulation theory set out in Section 4, this too has a number of attractions. It provides a comprehensive theory of concatenated ‘economies’ and ‘societies’ which acknowledges both the temporality and the spatiality of these systems from the outset. In particular, it restores the place of structures - of formalised patterns of agency - whilst acknowledging that the existence of these patterns is problematic. Regulationists are right to examine the consequences of social institutions for one another, and to stress the interdependence and mutual adjustment of different parts of society. Institutional patterns have requirements that must be met if they are to continue to operate, and so a complete explanation of a social pattern requires an examination of the interaction of institutions. Showing the positive impact of A upon B's maintenance (say the state upon the conditions of capitalist production) does not explain the behaviour of A unless we show A's requirements are themselves met, perhaps by B itself in return as part of an 'exchange' relationship, by a third institution C or a chain of institutions C ... N, or by some combination of these (Gouldner 1973). The sort of patterns of interdependence that can emerge include virtuous and vicious circles, involving positive and negative feedback loops and structural coupling. Interdependence may vary between institutions and institutional contexts, with wide or narrow interconnectedness, high or low autonomy, symmetrical or asymmetrical dependence relations. This approach allows for the possibility that the sustaining impact of institutions upon one another may not be wholly recognised or intentional, and that the parts of a system may interact unintentionally in a reinforcing or eroding way. It also allows for the appearance of impersonal strains or tension in the web of relations between institutions, with contradictory requirements being imposed upon institutions by those with which they interact. The regulationist theory is not principally a theory of the state but a theory of regulation and accumulation in which the state plays a role, and thus it obliges us to think through the relationship of the state to regulation before we draw firm conclusions about its relationship to accumulation.

On the other hand, there are many general criticisms that can be levelled against regulationism, such as the arbitrary division of society into the two gross functions of accumulation and regulation, and in particular the tendency to down play or to marginalise political processes in favour of structural articulation. Jessop claims that “regulation is a process and a result - it is not a specific site or object of regulation” (Jessop 1990a, p.178). Likewise other writers have stressed the processual nature of regulation and its dependence upon practice, and seek to avoid hypostatising structures.
by stressing their tendential nature (e.g. Painter and Goodwin 1995). Nevertheless a surprising weakness in regulationism is the lack of clarity about the relationship of structures to processes, and of processes to functions. There is a tendency in some regulationist writings for structures to drop from view and to be replaced in the analysis by practices and processes. This goes back to the failure to distinguish clearly between systems and structures on the one hand, and their attributes such as regimes and modalities on the other. But whilst we must avoid seeing structures as settled and coherent, every attempt to dispense with structural concepts ends up with these returning through the back door as ‘sites’ or reified ‘regimes’ and ‘modalities’. Bonefeld hits the mark in his criticism of this kind of formalism: “the Fordist/post-Fordist debate interprets historical tendency in terms of its more or less close approximation to a model whose pure form is allegedly progressively disclosed” (Bonefeld 1987, p.123). There is an associated failure to distinguish clearly between social ‘regulation’ and structural ‘autopoesis’, a failure which is encouraged by the ambiguity of the term ‘regulation’ itself. This discourages us from exploring the impact of the state and other institutions - positive and negative - upon accumulation in a neutral way, and reflects a functionalist bias built into regulationism. Whilst structure and struggle are not exactly disarticulated as Bonefeld suggests, there is a clear tendency which is endemic to the principles of regulationism to privilege structural logic, and indeed a danger that structuralist regulationism “reduces the importance of class struggle for the development of capitalism and construes class struggle merely as a component of structural development” (Bonefeld 1987, p.121). Finally and most importantly, whilst the basic strength of regulation theory remains its autopoetic model of society, which confronts the issue of system teleology head on, its basic weakness to date lies in the failure to develop and delimit this model, and to test it against the evidence of history.

Jessop argues that no monocausal explanation of the capitalist state - in terms of (say) the circuit of capital or class struggle - is possible, that several explanations must be combined (the ‘method of articulation’) according to the specific circumstances under consideration (Jessop 1982, p.29, p.71). These explanations must be drawn from different ‘planes of analysis’ - not only value analysis but also analysis of political domination - and so from different levels of abstraction (Jessop 1982, p.138-139). The preceding critique has shown that social relations and social regulation theory possess significant areas of complementarity and are up to a point implicit within one another; there is a shadow operation of ‘structural change’ within social relations theory, and a shadow operation of ‘struggle’ and ‘chance’ within social regulation theory. Each theory adopts broadly the same ontology, stressing the emergent dialectic of structure and struggle and the structural dialectic of politics/economics or regulation/accumulation. The ‘tendential’ nature of regulationism and its non-specificity is to an extent made good by the ‘action’ focus of relationism. Their respective explanatory principles - the principles of subject teleology (struggle and its institutionalisation) and the principle of system teleology (structural self-organisation and its collapse) - are both likely to be required in any adequate theory of society. It may therefore be concluded for all these reasons that the two theories must be used in conjunction with one another.

But this is not the same as saying that they can readily be combined or merged together. To begin with, whilst focusing upon different planes of analysis these theories function at the same level of abstraction and thereby evoke a basic duality within state theory. Theoretical bifurcation is not uncommon in science, and in order to move theorisation forward it is necessary to work upon dualisms such as capital/class or structure/struggle, to examine the interface between their respective theories through
what might be called the ‘method of juxtaposition’. In this case the central issue that arises through juxtaposition is the precise nature of the relationship between system tendency and subject agency, the way in which these interact and the ‘degrees of freedom’ available for the latter in the context of the former. The central lacunae of each theory - the processes though which social forms are condensed and recondensed out of struggle, and the processes though which innovations are selected and preserved in the course of autopoesis - must be addressed together. The present paper has sought to extend the understanding of the ‘most abstract determinations’ of the state by reference to its spatiality and its scale differentiation. It is suggested that to develop a formal understanding of the state it is essential to bring scale articulation to the centre of the analysis, that the reworked of first principles associated with this endeavour will strengthen the theories concerned, and that these theories in a revised form must not be blended together but juxtaposed and used in conjunction with one another.
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ABSTRACT

Whilst significant progress has been made in the theorisation of spatial social relations since the 1980s there is as yet no adequate general theory within the Marxist tradition of the spatiality and scale differentiation of society. The spatial dialectics of state theory are reviewed and it is argued that the latter is currently divided between social regulationism and social relations theory, but that neither of these has so far established a rigorous approach to spatiality. These theories are then examined in detail to suggest how their explanatory principles may be reworked in order to develop accounts of the spatial articulation of state systems. It is argued in conclusion that whilst social relations and social regulationism form complementary approaches, most progress is likely to be made not through their merger but by working upon the interface between them through the ‘method of juxtaposition’.

KEY WORDS

space; state; regulation; relations; theory; Marxism.
NOTES

1. Bonefeld makes the same point when he states that “the reality of ‘tendencies’ is a tendential reality for its part” (Bonefeld 1987, p.124).

2. Autopoetic in the general sense not in the neo-Parsonian form developed by Luhmann and assessed in Jessop 1990b, p.320ff.

3. This usage of the term ‘societalisation’ is rather wider than that of Hirsch and Jessop.

4. Jessop acknowledges this interaction: “we must explain how regulatory procedures merge, interact, and combine to produce this particular object of regulation rather than another and, once produced, what follows for the crisis tendencies of capitalism” (Jessop 1990a, p.188).