Whose Public Action?
Analysing Inter-sectoral Collaboration for Service Delivery

Pakistan Sanitation Case Study:
Orangi Pilot Project-Research Training Institute’s (OPP-RTI’s) relationship with government agencies

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1. Introduction
This report provides an understanding of the evolution and nature of the relationship between OPP and the Karachi City Government (KCG) and the Karachi Water and Sewage Board (KWSB) to improve access to sanitation facilities for poor communities. The report attempts to identify the key factors shaping the relationship and whether and how the relationship has influenced the working or agendas of the participating organisations.

1.1. Methodology
The information and analysis provided in this report is based on documentary evidence, in-depth interviews with staff within the NSP and the relevant government agencies and the observation of the realities witnessed during the fieldwork conducted with the NSP and the relevant state agencies during November 2006 to September 2007. The report also draws upon analysis of the evolution of the state-NSP relationship in Pakistan and the programme analysis for each sector conducted during stage 2 of this research project. Drawing on those reports was important to identify the over all conditioning factors shaping the relationship under study.

In developing an account of the conditioning factors the report draws upon government policy documents, Five Year Development Plans, interviews with prominent civil society members who have seen the NSPs evolve, academics, and senior officials within the ministry of education, health, and social welfare. The analysis also drew upon the country strategy plans of the multilateral and bilateral donors based in Islamabad to understand their role in the evolution of state and NSP relations in Pakistan. Most of these interviews were conducted during stage 2 of the research project. At the first stage of the fieldwork, the obvious players within each sector were identified. These in particular included the government, the leading NGOs working within education, health, and water and sanitation, and international donor community. Interviews were initially conducted with the main focal point/ministry spokesmen within each ministry to help identify those government programmes within which there are some obvious relationships with the NSPs. These exploratory interviews were followed up with in-depth interviews with the heads or senior officials of the relevant programmes. Interviews were also conducted with many NSP providers in all the three sectors especially those, which are involved in some form of relationship with the state in service provision. Some big NSPs, with a national or regional presence, which were not involved in a relationship with the state, were also interviewed to get a critical perspective on the partnership programmes. At the same time, interviews were conducted with sector specialists in leading development agencies, including the multilateral and bilateral organizations like the World Bank and DFID.

This was in recognition of the fact that the government development plans and sector strategy papers, as well as initial interviews with the government and non-profit providers, made it clear very early on that the international donor agencies were often key players behind initiation of many of these partnerships. The international literature on partnerships had also suggested the likelihood of finding
a strong donor influence on them—‘partnerships’ being a key objective of the millennium development goals. Reports of independent research think-tanks on each of the three sectors were also consulted. Where possible, a few seminars and conferences on the related subjects were attended. For example, the Second South Asian Conference on Sanitation (SACOSAN) provided a valuable opportunity to identify the programmes within water and sanitation and to verify the information gathered from different sources. Similarly, a workshop organised by an INGO in Islamabad with leading education NGOs from across the country was utilised to help identify the various types of relationships/programmes that exist among them and the state in the provision of education services. The country strategy plans of the bigger donors were also consulted. All these stages of the fieldwork helped identify the broader conditioning factors shaping state-NSP relations in each sector and the key programmes and prominent cases to pursue for in-depth investigation.

The next stage of the fieldwork focused specifically on the chosen case-study. During the time spent on the specific case, it was felt important to get perspective of not just the leadership of the NSP and the government departments but also those of the middle and field level staff and of any actors in the wider network who influence the relationship. Thus, in addition to the NSP leaders, staff members, and government officials, interviews were conducted with the community and the representatives of the NGO networks if they had a role in the shaping of the relationship.

1.2. Selection of OPP

Given that the case under study was selected after extensive exploration of the possible programme and case options, it might be useful to recall the reasons for selecting OPP as the case study. Out of the four potential programmes (1. Involvement of the Rural Support Programmes (RSPs) in Water and Sanitation, 2. Municipal Collaboration with Non-State Providers in Jaranwala, 3. Replication of Orangi Pilot Project approaches, 4. Collaboration of Water Vending Services in Orangi, Karachi) the reason for focusing on OPP model of low cost-sanitation was that it is a much older programme, presents multiple levels of interaction with the state, and is also being replicated by other NSPs in other provinces. In terms of case selection, the reason for choosing OPP over Lodhran Pilot project (LPP) was that OPP engages with the government at multiple levels and is much bigger organization than LPP thus providing an opportunity to analyze the relationship at multiple levels. OPP operates in Karachi, the largest city of Pakistan, while LPP was based in Lodhran a small town. This also made OPP a better case as being based in a big city it faces many more challenges. Finally and most importantly, being the parent organization OPP had a much longer history and had evolved gradually as opposed to LPP where political influence of Jehangir Tareen has played a key role in its sudden rise.

In selecting OPP, the only concern was that the programme had already been studied a lot. But, it was felt that it has not been analysed so far from the angle of
this study—the focus on government-NSP relations. It is true that it has received more attention than any other sanitation programme in Pakistan but, as for proper analysis, the model has been studied mainly as an effective tool for mobilising community participation for effective sanitation services. There is still scope to study how it has (successfully) managed to involve the government. Focusing on OPP also had the advantage that this programme has had a large impact and is constantly in negotiation with the government about extending its programmes as well as its core project. OPP-RTI is now the Karachi City Government's team member for developing the cities main sewage disposal and drainage channels. Karachi Water and Sewerage Board too has lately accepted OPP-RTI proposals. They are currently also advising the Karachi government on how to deal with floods caused by recent rains. OPP has also been approached to contribute to National Sanitation Policy, which is dealt by the federal government. So, the collaboration is on-going at multiple levels.
2. Organizational profiles & factors shaping them

This part of the report elaborates on how the NSP and the relevant government authorities are structured to pursue their visions of or commitments to public action. It further tries to identify the diverse interests of the actors within these organization and their motives for engaging in public action.

2.1 The organization today

OPP-RTI is one of the three main units of Orangi Pilot Project and is focused on water and sanitation. On the government side, it deals with the Karachi City government as well as the Karachi Water and Sewage Board.

Structure
Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) is an NGO that began its work in Orangi in 1980. Situated in the periphery of Karachi, Orangi is a low-income settlement with a population of one million. OPP’s role has been to support community initiatives for development, mobilize local resources and build partnership between people and government. In the process it aims to strengthen government’s capacity for delivery of infrastructure. Over the years, OPP has developed projects in multiple sectors: low cost sanitation, housing, education, health, and credit for micro enterprise. In 1988, these programmes were divided into three independent institutions of which one is Orangi Pilot Project-Research and Training Institute (OPP-RTI); Orangi’s sanitation work comes under OPP-RTI.

Model
The low cost sanitation programme, which is central to OPP’s partnership with the government, began with providing social and technical support to residents in Orangi to lay self-help lane and secondary sewers. This model has now expanded all over the city, and has been replicated in 12 other cities and a number of villages. This model has come to be known as component sharing model within development. The latrine in the homes, the lane sewers and secondary sewers known as ‘internal development’ are financed, managed and maintained by the people, while the trunk sewers and treatment plants known as ‘external development’ remains the responsibility of the government.

Successes
Through the programme 1,45,466 houses have invested Rs 191.5 million (US$3.2 million) in latrines in the homes and lane sewers with government investing more then Rs 276 million (US$4.6 million) on trunk mains. In 1992 the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation accepted the OPP model for its Asian Development Bank (financed sewerage project for a part of Orangi). In 1994 Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority, the provincial government agency responsible for provision of land title and upgrading of Katchi Abadis (informal settlements), adopted the OPP approach. In 2003 the Punjab Katchi Abadi and Urban Improvement Directorate too accepted the model; replication is underway. OPP-RTI is now the Karachi City Government’s team member for developing the cities main sewage disposal and
drainage channels. The City government has lately allocated Rs 2.15 billion (US$ 36 million) for the work. Karachi Water & Sewerage Board (KWSB) too has lately accepted OPP-RTI proposals. In addition, the National Sanitation Policy (NSP) that has lately been approved by the President includes OPP-RTI’s model of component sharing to be adopted nationwide. OPP is assisting the government in preparing the procedures and rules.

**Current activities**

OPP continues to expand its work of low cost sanitation within Orangi with cooperation of the government. In addition, it continues to expand its services across the city level. The KWSB has requested OPP-RTI support for the provision of water supply and sewage disposal for Karachi’s katchi abadis. During 2004, the city government made OPP-RTI a member of its focal group for the development of nalas/drainage channels in Karachi. OPP-RTI has been identifying, prioritizing, designing, and estimating major drainage channels for Karachi. During 2005, Karachi Water and Sewage Board, which for a long time was a strong supporter of mega projects and foreign loans has also started to support OPP-RTI’s low cost model. Parveen Rehman, Director of OPP adds: ‘We are now making a water plan with Karachi Water and Sewage Board. It is a water supply plan to the city. We will put it to the government, politicians, and NGOs. For every issue we try to provide a situation analysis, list the issues, and provide solutions.’

For these interventions, OPP interacts with the government at multiple levels. Parveen Rehman, the head of OPP, meets the Director of City government and the Karachi Water and Sewage Board fortnightly. In addition, the government field staff interact with the OPP field staff on daily basis. OPP office based staff also hold a meeting with the government field staff every Tuesday of the week. The purpose of the meetings is to discuss problems being faced in current programmes as well as to help the government officials develop new programmes to meet the sanitation needs in the area.

**Replications**

Since 1994, the OPP-RTI partner NGOs/CBOs that started replication are now expanding work beyond their towns and cities. They are constantly negotiating project and policy changes in partnership with the people and government. The replication partners are: Anjuman-e-Samaaji Behbood (ASB) in Faisalabad and Jaranwala; Lodhran Pilot Project (LPP) in Lodhran, Khanpur and surrounding villages; Conservation and Rehabilitation Centre (CRC) in Uch Sharif, Ahmadpur Shariqa and Alipur; Akhtar Hameed Khan Memorial Trust (AKHMT) in Rawalpindi; Organization Pan environment (OPE) and Al-Watan Forum (AWF) in Gujrawala; Muawin in Lahore and Shahpur Chakar Welfare Society (SCWS) in Sanghar. ASB, LPP, CRC, AHKMT and Muawin are now mature partners replicating work at city level and partnering with government agencies.

During the interview, Perween Rehman, the Director of OPP explained that the replication process started in late 1980s to early 1990s but the process was not smooth: ‘The first replication attempts were failures. Out of seven, five failed.
Initially, we were excited at any attempt at replication and were ready to support it. Some people also abused it as OPP’s approval meant that many donors were willing to give large sums of money. After some bad experiences we became more careful in replication attempts. Overtime, we have had some very good experiences.’ She explained that OPP has some quite mature partners in Punjab. However, within Sindh the replication process has only expanded now. The nature of replication is also different in Sindh as here often three to four NGOs come together with a request while in case of Punjab requests were normally from individual organizations.

Ironically, Akhtar Hameed Khan’s death contributed to the dramatic expansion of OPP’s influence in the last couple of years. ‘When Dr sahib expired it was also a turning point in terms of expansion. A lot of people who had been inspired by him said that they will now put in effort to take his ideas and work forward. This gave a new boost to the organisation and led to new replications and extending OPP’s influence to Karachi city government level and now the national level. Currently, two things are taking a lot of our time: new replications and strengthening our partners,’ explains Perween.

**Website**
OPP launched its website (www.oppinstitutions.org) in 2000. It has already completed the computerisation of the mapping system as far as Karachi city is concerned. The entire mapping of Karachi is computerised now and uploaded on the website. The hard copy mapping and its forwarding to the government officials concerned when done manually was a very time consuming process. Therefore, OPP moved to computerization of the mapping system as ‘it saves so much time.’ Mr. Ashraf Hussain, in charge of computerisation of the mapping system and developing the web-links explained ‘Technology makes life easier. Before that too much time was consumed on the mapping. Hard copy work was taking months. So we digitized it.’

Computerisation has made sketching, free hand mapping, drafting and verification of the mapping of any Katchi Abadi easier. Before computerisation, OPP was focused on manual site surveys, public demands surveys, sketching, mappings and its verifications. Now, OPP staff search internet through google (Google Earth) and digitise mapping from there. Before computerisation, they were unable to get the real proportion of the map. Now according to Mr Hussain, they have 100 per cent accurate information because of the computerization. At present, the OPP is busy in preparing computerised mapping of Nullahs (rains and flood drains). It is getting the exact location/direction of the drains. They are also being able to do it at very low cost. According to Mr Hussain, ‘If any MNC (Multi National Company) does this (computerised mapping) it will be very costly.’

OPP has already done the mapping of the drainage system of Karachi and has uploaded these maps onto their website. It is now trying to upload maps for the 200 Katchi Abadis in Karachi. The plans are ambitious where they want to computerise mapping of Sindh province and then the entire Pakistan. There are 18
towns in Karachi and 18 Town Nazims are working under CDGK (City District Government of Karachi).

On the government side, the organizational structure is relatively more complicated for water and sanitation than the other two sectors. There is no federal ministry for water and sanitation as a consequence multiple government agencies share this role. Plus the co-existence of formal and informal settlements and use of natural channels for sewage disposal in many areas have led to confusion over responsibilities between different government agencies. Officially the main divides are as follows: storm drains and natural channels (nalas) are taken care of by the city, town and Union Council governments, while the sewerage system has been outsourced to the semi autonomous Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB). Thus, City District Government Karachi (CDGK) Department of Works and Services and KWSB are the two main authorities carrying out the water and sanitation responsibilities in Karachi and with which OPP has to work closely. The CDGK is mainly responsible for planning, development and maintenance of storm drains, and special development programmes. The KWSB is a semi-autonomous body under the CDG and is responsible for construction, improvement, maintenance, and operation of sewage works and industrial waste disposal systems in Karachi. The agency is divided into a sewerage maintenance wing and a sewerage development wing. The maintenance wing’s budget is generated through service delivery charges and a subsidy from CDGK.

Until 2000, development wing financed its operations mainly through IFI-funded projects. KWSB for long was an advocate of mega projects and foreign loans. Refusing to build on what exists, preferring high cost technical solutions depending on pumping, while negating low cost gravity flow systems-the nalas/drainage channels as the main disposals. Most ADB and World Bank funded sewerage projects for Karachi worth more then Rs. 4 billion including, those specially for Katchi Abadis (K.A.) have been a waste (OPP-RTI, partner URC and ADBs audit reports document these). In 1999 due to citizens advocacy supported by OPP-RTI’s technical design a US $ 100 million Korangi sewerage project for a part of Karachi was cancelled by the Govt. Since then citizens lobby and similar views within a number of KWSB’s senior team has brought about a process of change in the mindset and so the flexibility in planning. Now it is mainly funded through grants from the provincial and federal government.

2. History and conditioning factors

2.2.1 Political climate
OPP started work in the 1980s, when a military led government was in power. This was also a time when much was happening: Afghan Jihad, the weakening of the Soviet Union, rising international influence of neo-liberal thinking through the Bretton Woods Institutions, and the influx of international development aid to non-governmental organizations as opposed to the state in the developing countries. All these factors played an important role in shaping the voluntary
sector in Pakistan. It is in the early eighties that Pakistan registered the birth of NGOs as a specific form of NSP, and a dramatic shift of prominent leftist workers to this platform. What this new term represented was a new way of funding social or voluntary organisations, where these organisations could apply for development aid. Many people of the left being persecuted by the military government found their shelter within the NGOs.

OPP was thus established during a period at a time when the NGO culture was budding in Pakistan. It also attracted many of the people from the left. Dr Shameem Zainuddin who heads the health programme of OPP explained how some of the senior staff members of OPP were political activists who worked in Orangi area and who Dr Akhter Hameed Khan convinced over time to work with OPP. The motivation in their case was never the monetary aspect but a sense of bringing a change. As Dr Shameem Zainuddin explains, we joined only due to our respect for the intellect and personal commitment of Dr AHK.

Anwar Rashid himself has a very political background and along with Perveen represents the current leadership of OPP. Before coming to OPP, he was a lecturer in Karachi University. Before that he had spent seven years in the politics of the left. ‘We got this training from there day and night. The main issue is that how do you look at things. I joined the left because there are two kinds of people: one is the man with the briefcase who runs after a lot of things; the other category is that looks at things in his own way. I came from Bengal and when I came the material things became very meaningless for me,’ he argues. According to Anwar Rashid, incidents do have an impact on life. He was in his 20s when he joined Awami League despite the fact that none of the non-Bengalis used to join it and that his father was against this. But, he left his family and came to Karachi and took an independent decision. Then he started studying in the Karachi University and later taught in development economics. Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan used to come and teach there too and Anwar Rashid was impressed by the way he talked. ‘He was my teacher. He was also a very good historian,’ elaborates Anwar Rashid. Then in Zia period, orders were given to prepare list of all those people in universities who were against the Islamic thought. Anwar Rashid was against the university being interfered in that manner by the government and questioned. So, it became impossible to stay within the university and this made him join Dr AHK. By this time Ahktar Hameed Khan had already involved him in the work in OPP especially because he had political links within the communities. Dr AHK gave him only Rs 600/= as salary but said that “here you will have the freedom to do what you feel is right. He said that you sit in the library and read books and then discuss them with me.” Thus, the political climate of Pakistan, where the left was persecuted under the military government, played a role in pushing leftist workers into NGOs, including OPP. Therefore, the independence of thought and the desire to fight for ones ideals has remained critical to OPP work.

2.2.2 Characteristics of the leader
Despite being born in the period when many other prominent NGOs in Pakistan were established, OPP has been able to retain a very distinct identity from the
broader NGO community. The general reputation of OPP within the NGO sector matches these claims. It is well known about OPP that it has never taken to the NGO culture – where offices are normally located in posh localities, salaries are high, and four-wheel drives is considered a necessity. Dr Akhter Hameed Khan is widely respected for living a very simply life despite the fact that he could have chosen a very luxurious lifestyle. As Mr Aliuddin from OPP-RTI explained: ‘Akhtar Hameed Khan always said that you cannot work with the community and win their confidence if you have salaries 5-10 times higher than what they get.’

By his personal example, Akhter Hameed Khan was able to set the incentive structure with the organization in such a way that monetary compensation was never allowed to be the primary motive for the work of the senior management. Perween also explained: ‘Personally, I don’t feel the temptation for higher salaries because we have our reward in terms of a very good team spirit. It eventually depends on what you want in life. Dr AHK developed in us all a sense of responsibility for our work and a team spirit. The freedom that we have had in OPP has kept us here.’

Elaborating on his experience, Anwar Rashid further elaborates this point: “World Bank has offered me to come but why should I go to World Bank and do “chakari” (a slang for job for the sake of money alone). Perveen can also very easily get Rs 200,000/= per month but she wont do it. Working in the World Bank will take all our thought away. If I was in charge of Sindh area could I have said go ahead and produce this documentary and undertake action.”

Anwar Rashid is also critical of the general NGO culture: “Micro-finance has become a mafia now. They are out to make money. I criticize them openly in meetings and they now say that I should not come to these meetings. I have told all members of Pakistan Poverty Fund that why they have made all partners of this platform beggars.”

The feeling that they are not driven by money has also been important in forming the relationship with the government. Perween highlighted how OPP-RTI does not take any money for the work done for the government. They do not charge any fee for the consultancy work they do for the government. The feel that if they take money they will lose the power to influence the government. ‘By not taking money for our services we are able to have a bigger influence on the policies, which is our main purpose,’ explains Perween. The government officials interviewed also mentioned how OPP-RTI helps them even design the TOR of the consultants without taking any fee. It also raises the issue of how in fact OPP-RTI is providing a supporting role to the government officials by taking on some of their workload rather than acting as a rival.

2.2.3 Obvious need: rise of slums in Karachi
The city of Karachi has seen massive rural to urban migration from the very beginning. The current population is estimated to be above 13 million. The rapid influx of rural migrants led to increasing housing demands within the city. The
failure of the state to respond to this demand led to a complex system of informal housing referred to as *katchi abadis* (slum dwellings) where the land is occupied by professional land grabbers and then sold in small plots to low income households without the legal paperwork. This leads to sprawling illegal housing colonies where the state shoulders little responsibility for social service provision given that they do not fall in its official planning area. These unplanned urban areas - *katchi abadis* - today accommodate approximately 6 million people, a little under half the population of Karachi. In 1975, a policy of *katchi abadi* regularisation was adopted, which led to the establishment of the Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) to regularize the illegal settlements but the process has been very slow with only 1.5 per cent of *katchi abadis* being regularised per year. The desperate living conditions in these slums were a key reason motivating Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan, who had acquired much reputation in the Comilla Pilot Project in Bangladesh, to establish OPP when Aga Hasan Abedi, the founder of one of the biggest Pakistani banks BCCI, offered funds to initiate a pilot project drawing upon the lessons from Comilla.

The following excerpt from Akhtar Hameed Khan’s book feels explain how the conditions within the slums shaped formation and working of OPP itself:

Orangi is Karachi’s biggest *katchi abadi*. It is not an inner-city slum, but a new suburban settlement which began twenty-five years ago. Its population is estimated to be about one million persons, consisting of *mohajirs* (old Indian immigrants), *Biharis* (immigrants from Bangladesh), *Pathans* (immigrants from the Northern Areas), *Punjabis*, *Sindhis*, and *Balochis*. It is proudly called a mini Pakistan. The majority belong to the working classes. A survey made in 1989 shows that there were 110 *mohallas* or sectors, 6,347 lanes or streets, and 94,122 houses. More immigrants are coming and building more houses every year. The people are fully aware of their vote power and street power. There are *anjumans* and associations everywhere; lobbyism is very popular; demands are pressed and complaints made about deprivation ceaselessly.

The official agencies have neither the resources nor the competence to satisfy the demands. The facilities which they have provided are grossly inadequate. OPP as an NGO could not aspire to improve the ability or capacity of officials, and there was no need for OPP to engage in lobbying, of which there was more than enough. OPP found a new role.

Research revealed that the people of Orangi were doing most things for themselves:

- Ninety-five thousand houses were built without any help from the Development Authority or the House Building Corporation;
- 509 private schools and 646 private clinics had been set up. Transport was almost entirely under private management,
- More than eleven thousand shops, workshops, and micro-enterprises were providing employment to thousands of families.
To improve the quality and expand the scope of people’s own efforts, OPP became a supporting institution with a small staff of technicians and social organizers, who gave social and technical guidance. Later a Trust was registered for giving loans.

OPP followed a research and extension approach. First it thoroughly analysed the problems and the popular methods of solving them. Then it tried to develop a better package of advice and offer it to the people.

### 2.2.4 Choosing donors without strings

One reason that OPP has been able to maintain a different culture than other NGOs, which started at the same time, is that OPP was very selective in its donors and maintains very low organizational costs to stay independent of dependence on donors. This has enabled it to ensure consistency in its philosophy as well as the geographical focus. OPP was sponsored by Aga Hasan Abedi and began work on 1st April 1980. OPP model is low-cost sanitation where the emphasis is on achieving results with minimum of input. As Perveen Rehman explained, ‘you have to remember that our annual running costs are quite low.’ OPP has been building reserves and its management claims to have reserves that can help it last 10 years. For an organization of OPP-RTI’s scale, the annual budget of Rs.60 hundred thousand per annum reflects its low-cost policy. The model is such that the government and the community are expected to contribute the financial resources; OPP provides the technical expertise.

The running cost of OPP comes from its seed money and some select donors. In the first instance, OPP does not take money from any donor. OPP remains very selective in accepting donor funds. Its core funds come from the seed endowment given a Pakistani bank at the time of establishment of OPP. OPP does not take money from international financial institutions and even the UN. According to Perween, ‘Initially, we did not know much about them so we engaged with these institutions like World Bank, ADB, and the UN agencies. But our experiences with them did not prove good so we decided not to work with them in future. Even with the UN we do not enter formal programmes. We feel it is a waste of time so we do not work with them. They can, however, take our trainings where they are free to send their staff members and we charge them the training fee. But, we do not enter into any agreement or contract with them.’

If a donor approaches OPP, the leadership asks them to just come and see OPP’s work. If they find a mutually agreed goal then they consider collaborating further. ‘The issue is not the money. Our current donors, like Water Aid and Homeless International, have been our friends for a long time and money has come in only recently’, explains Perween. She further adds: ‘Our philosophy is that if someone comes to you, we have to see them but we don’t have to go to their meetings unless we feel they fit our work ethics. For example, ADB and WB always get time when they want to come to Orangi but we have a policy not to take on their consultancy work,’ she adds.
OPP is currently trying to develop a new model with Messero where it is trying to develop its own endowment funds to fund smaller organizations. “We have Rs 30 Lakhs for it. With another 70 lakhs we will have an annual income of around Rs 10 lakhs which will support 5 organisations. We are saying to donors that you can get the basic donation back in 3 years as we will only be working out of the interest money’, explains Perween.

2.2.5 Staff
The OPP staff is mostly from within the community and their salary bracket is not very high. The emphasis is on motivating the staff through mentoring, inspiration, and team building rather than purely material incentives. Anwar Rashid summed up OPP’s staff policy in these words: ‘Our staff profile is very different. Many leave only after death. You won’t get trained people. You have to make people; you have to invest in them. When you will make people, and you will train them then they will get moulded the way you want them. What the employee value is flexibility, freedom, respect, and decisions are all made by consensus. Our view is that we will take those who do not know anything and we will make them. We bring them to that level that they can do work. Then we pay them at the market level.’

He further adds, ‘The human relations are critical here. These are our children. We motivate them by ‘behavioural culture’ rather than ‘material incentives’. The behavioural culture is based on respect and recognition. No one likes to be lost in the ‘Hajoom’ (crowd). We give them that individual recognition for their contributions. When you recognize them and their work, they stay happy. The real thing is the human relations. If you connect at the basis of these relations they will not go anywhere.’

Perween placed similar emphasis on building relationship in motivating the staff. ‘There is also a difference in our working methodology. It is teamwork not just leadership. The ‘humanness of relationship’ is very important to the relationship.’ She recollected similar relationship with Akhtiar Hameed Khan. ‘Dr Sahib used to order a lot but no one used to listen. In our relationship there was a lot of love, so we can fight with each other. Similarly, we are very close to Arif Hasan and call him ‘Guru’.

The importance of this philosophy in building the staff was clear in interviews with the junior staff members. Mr. Javaid Ali/head of field operations explained, ‘The personalities of Ms Perween Rehman, Mr. Anwar Rashid and Mr. Salim Aliuddin are very motivating. They involve us in decision-making. They inspire us to keep working with the organization. We play multiple roles in OPP.’ He further added, ‘I live in Orangi because of the relationship with the community, I’m glued to the OPP. I’ve freedom here, this is the motivation. Madam (Ms Parveen Rehman) has made every one independent. I’m with the OPP since 1982 and I’m not going anywhere. Ah! Yes, I’m satisfied with my salary.’
Mr. Ashraf Hussain, in charge of computerisation of the mapping system and developing the web-links, was similarly very proud of his association with OPP. He did B-Tech from a private university (from Karachi) and then joined OPP because it offered him a fellowship in 1996. He left OPP in 1999 and rejoined two years later in 2001. He explained, ‘I came here as a student. I got a chance in (an) MNC (Multi National Company), where I worked for two years on GIS (Geographic Information System). It was a two-year work contract. When it ended they (the Multi National Company) offered me extension. I refused and rejoined the OPP. We started computerisation of the mapping (system) two years ago. This is our third year.’

From my observations during visits to OPP, it seems that OPP also has a strong emphasis on self-regulation and flexibility for the staff. Many of the staff members came after 10.30. Also, Dr Shameem Zainuddin mentioned that I had told Dr AKH that I will work for very little but what I want in return is my independence to carry on doing other work. One of the field staff interviewed also mentioned that she has been working with OPP for the last sixteen years, as the management is very understanding. She was allowed to have flexible working hours during the years she had small children. Thus, the organizational philosophy has shaped a flexible working culture where the staff feel strong ownership of the organization.

OPP has also constantly tried to provide new opportunities to people who train with it. Sirajuddin who now runs an independent organization with the name of TTRC was trained in Orangi for some years before he was encouraged to start an organization of his own which trains youth from within Orangi in basic mapping skills. During 1994-1998 he took training at OPP. Working since 2001, TTRC has given mapping training to over 10 organizations. Sirajuddin explains: ‘First I was in Korangi. My bigger brother was working with OPP. 4 years ago, Homeless International gave us Rs 5 lakhs, which was placed in an endowment. The boys who come from the area for training get free training. We give the boys training and then also try to get them jobs. We try that they work for the community. We also train young girls.’

Discussing TTRC’s case, Perween elaborates: “We had to push him out by Dhaka (push). A lot of this we don’t plan. We continuously see and adjust. We saw the potential in him so we encouraged it. At the beginning we did not know that it will do so well.” Now most OPP replications within Sindh are being done with TTRC, which gives training to organizations within different areas to do local mapping and replicate Orangi’s low cost model. By the time OPP expanded in Punjab, TTRC was already doing very well within Sindh.

Interviews with junior staff also show that the nature of the work is also an important motivating factor. As Mr. Javaid Ali/head of field operations elaborates his work as follows: ‘This is a hard nut to crack. It is social work. It immensely requires passion for work. I’ve been working here for last 25 years. I’ve seen riots, ethnic and sectarian killings, bullet-riddled bodies, dead bodies in gunny bags (jute bags). There is no payment (reward) for this for anyone and vice-a-versa.
It is very easy for the one who is willing to do this but very difficult for one who is not motivated. There were several organisations...now no more here (he meant a number of organisations closed down because of the political/sectarian instability of the city during the long span of 25 years).

2.2.6 Embeddedness within the community
OPP is very integrated within the community. Its office is physically based within the Orangi area. The staff members mostly come from the local area too and represent a nice gender balance. Thus within OPP, it is really the community’s interests that are most clearly demonstrated and this has greater shaped the organisational culture and method of work. A strong team spirit and mutual respect is the driving force behind the working of the organisation.

The close ties that OPP maintains with the community have been evident during visits to OPP and interviews with the staff members. From the senior management staff there is evidently a lot of consideration for the junior staff where the seniors see their roles more as mentors. During one of the interviews, the head of one of the local organization that OPP had supported over time had come in to meet Anwar Rashid and had sat down with us. Anwar introduced him as: “This guy is our Dost (friend) and Shagird (student).” The visitor in turn responded: “Whenever I come here I learn something from him (Anwar Rashid). I am just a very small shagird (student) of his. When we come we come prepared that we will be scolded on many things.” Also reflective of the way he looks at the junior staff and trainees was Anwar’s statement: “People have both good and bad within them. One needs teachers to motivate the good part.”

2.2.7 Process of involving the community
Orangi Town consists of two localities i.e., legal and illegal/encroached/non-leased. For legal Abadi (settlement), OPP expects the community to give OPP a two-line written application seeking the OPP’s help. For illegal/encroached/non-leased settlements, everything depends on the community. OPP gives presentation to the community. It uses projector for explaining to them the problems and the low-cost solution for it. The field staff of OPP convince them that it is for their interest, for their betterment, for their health, and for their kids. They tell them about what OPP has done in their neighbourhood and tell them about the low cost and the quality of work. OPP holds two informal meetings with the committee on a weekly basis, which finally leads to implementation process. When it sees 50 per cent of the community is willing to go for self financing, it start weekly meetings with them. “We chat with them. Tell them about repercussions of not having the proper sanitation” explains Mr. Javaid Ali/head of field operations.

OPP also involves its lane managers to persuade the community. When 80 per cent of the community agree to sanitation work, OPP asks the lane managers to bring the construction material at the site such as sand and gravel, iron rods and bars, cement, contractor and construction machines, etc. When people see it, particularly the standard of the material, almost entire community reportedly joins the work. OPP persuades CBOs (Community Based Organisations such as Mohalla
Committees) to tap Town Nazims' office. ‘We have been partnering with the
government for last 15 years, now we have enough experience to guide the
community to get their work done by the city government,’ adds Javaid Ali.

As for their mobilization strategies, Mr. Javaid Ali/head of field operations
elaborates: “We ask people to believe in something is better than nothing. We ask
them to pool Rs 25,000 (Pakistani Rupees) - less than 500 US dollars. This much
amount is nothing. We tell people if the government does the same work it will
cost Rs 400,000 to 500,000. We ask them to visit the neighbourhood and see
themselves the work, which had been done at a very low cost through our help.
I've never witnessed 100 per cent community participation as it is a very poor area
of the city. There are widows, orphans, mentally retarded persons, and disabled
individuals. The community ignores them as such people cannot contribute
genuinely or excusably. You can safely say 80 to 90 per cent of the community goes
for self-financing,’ he adds.

2.2.8 Relations with activists within the community
As part of its relations with the community, OPP also places great emphasis on
working alongside the local activist organisations to facilitate their efforts to build
pressure on the government. Shamsuddin Sahib, a local activist who has worked
with OPP for a long time, elaborated his community work as follows: “This
community work only a ‘paghal’ (crazy) can do. When there is a problem people
get together. In Katchi abadis, people know about each other and they know about
each other till the time that they face a common problem. When these people sit in
the evening they talk and discuss the problems. When there is no electricity there is
also no star TV. When there is no star plus so where will people sit. They will sit
together and share things.’

Before coming to Oragni, Shamsuddin was in Korangi. He came to Orangi in 1980
after living in Korangi for two years. In 1984, after meeting a lot of people, as every
one was new for each other, he mobilized the people to make an organization and
work together. So Ghaziabad Welfare Tanzeem (GWT) was established, which
works very closely with OPP. After having around 20 meetings the members of
GWT decided to approach the councillor with their requests.

Initially, the councillor refused to come arguing that he did not get votes from this
area but the community promised him future votes. ‘This way we started inviting
elected people. We had two demands: arrange a system for taking away dirty water
from the area; and provide a water tanker. By 1986 we were able to win these
concessions. In 1987, on people's recommendations, I also fought the councillor’s
election but lost,” elaborates Shamsuddin.

The reason for giving the above details is to highlight that OPP is very keen on
engaging in this indigenous process of lobbying where the community undergoes
the internal mobilization rather than being artificially mobilised by the NGOs. It
also tries to strengthen them in every way possible without taking over this
indigenous mobilisation process. The main support it provides is to give the
community the technical solutions to their problems so that they can then make specific demands on the government. “Our relationship with OPP is that we look at it as our ‘darsgah’ (place of learning). You can come and learn here and understand. From OPP we have been able to learn their mapping skills. The mapping, costing and estimating skills are very important. They don’t give any support of material kind,” adds Shamsuddin. He further argues that the difference is that OPP is not inside the community while he is inside the community. He adds: ‘I am union council, while OPP is city council. OPP is a Bank where people from different communities come and leave their problems as well as their ideas. This way they spread their message to other people.’ Thus, OPP’s close connectedness with the community and responsiveness to its needs has been critical to the shaping the working philosophy of the organization and its relationship with the state.

This critical role of community in shaping OPP is summed in Akhtar Hameed Khan’s own words: “In one respect the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) was very different from the Comilla Academy….But, in another respect OPP and the Comilla Academy were very similar: both followed the same research and extension principles—first learning, then teaching,” (Khan, 1996, pp 42).

“I acknowledged my total ignorance. I had never lived in Karachi; I was a newcomer. The megalopolis was very different from Comilla. So I first educated myself. For several months I wondered around Orangi in my battered jeep, looking at the lanes, talking with the people, the officers, the councillors, lobbyists, chairmen of associations and clubs. Fortunately, I was a free agent, not sent by a boss, with plans or targets. Gradually I learnt what sort of people were living in Orangi, what their problems were, what they thought of these problems what was being done for them, and what they were doing for themselves,” (Khan, 1996, pp 42).

2.3. OPP’s vision of public action

As the organization has evolved so has its vision of public action. OPP has a very clear vision of public action, which is based on a very strong sense of confidence in the ability of the community to address its own needs. It believes that the community, which faces the given problem, also often has a good solution for it but the problem is that they often don’t have the technical skills to put it across to the government convincingly. OPP tries to bridge that gap by tapping on the community’s own knowledge and documenting it in technically rigorous ways so that it helps the community to convince the government of that solution. OPP’s approach is that the community has to defend for itself and is very capable of doing so all it requires is a bit of mobilization and technical support.

The philosophy of OPP is captured well in interviews with the senior leadership of OPP. Anwar Rashid, head of OPP Micro Credit Programme and along with Parween Rehman the key figure within OPP elaborates on the organisational philosophy in the following manner:
“Basically there are three rules that we follow: working with the people, organizing the people and facilitating the people. We aim to organize them to use their important capacity and resources. Why? Because that is the way they get confidence in themselves. This is the way to make them confident. And they love it. Once they have confidence they lobby with the government effectively.

We want to see a partnership between people, technicians, and politicians. The government officials are competent. They have technical expertise but the problem is that there are no working ethics in the department. The question is how to utilize this technical capacity? Once people, government, organizations like us come together, it develops understanding on how to utilize each party’s capabilities to the maximum. This is the way of developing a partnership in development.”

He further adds: “We are facilitators. We are not helping them; we are not implementing the project. We are catalysts. We are like psycho-therapists. We are not the implementers; we are not there to solve people’s problems. All we do is to provide the linkages between different organizations. Our view is that people themselves have to take responsibility of their problems. If they are not willing to come out then let them die.” OPP vision of public action is thus very clearly about unleashing the energies of the people and letting them take responsibility of their actions rather than leading them.

In terms of the government side, the two main interest groups within the government are the bureaucracy and the elected leadership. The bureaucracy is responsible for the actual administration of the delivery of the service, while the elected representative is more responsible for the overall policy and planning. The two at times have differing interests as the elected elite often thinks in terms of policy which will get is popular support, while the bureaucracy which has the real power to implement the programme is often also concerned with how the policy is going to impact their own power and authority. The bureaucrats within the Karachi District Government as well as the KWSB and district and union level elected representatives are thus the two main groups whose interests are involved in the government structure.

From the government side, the vision seems to be that the government should tap on knowledge and skills of non-state providers, which have a genuine knowledge of the problem and are able to provide good technical support, which the government either cannot have or can have at a much higher cost than what the NSP is able to provide. At the same time, it is clear in the interviews with the government officials that they are clear that the primary provider in the area of water and sanitation is the state, the NGOs can provide limited contributions only and for that they are to be welcomed.

In terms of actual interaction, OPP takes the responsibility for mapping the area, developing low cost solution in collaboration with the government field staff and engineers, and for mobilising the communities to put in their share of the financial
and labour contributions. The government on the other hand is required to take responsibility for undertaking the major infrastructure development including building the big sewers and covering the nalas. Also, by now OPP has also built enough of a moral clout that it is expected that the government officials will take OPP’s concerns about any existing or future planned projects seriously.

3. Factors conditioning the partnership

3.1 Organizations and their agendas: the proximate factors

The Water and Sanitation sector in Pakistan presents relatively less diversity of relationships between the state and non-state providers. The most quoted nationwide survey of Pakistani NGOs conducted by SPDC under a non-profit sector research project supervised by John Hopkins University does not even provide a category of NGOs working within water and sanitation, while it maintains a distinct category for education and health (Ghaus-Pasha et al. 2002). Therefore, it is difficult to come up even with vague estimates of the number of NSPs working in water and sanitation. However, the signs are that there is a growing emphasis of the government and donors on this sector since the 1990s. With the allocation of more funds to be spent through NSPs, more NGOs are coming into this sector. Even on the government side, water and sanitation have traditionally not had a clear focus. Unlike the other two sectors, there is no one ministry devoted to this sector, though increasingly the Ministry of Environment is being given a bigger role. According to the Local Government Ordinance of 2001, planning and implementation of sanitation and related development programme is a responsibility of the Tluka/Tehsil/Town Municipal Administrations (TMAs), or city government in the case of larger cities. At the federal level, the Ministry of Environment is the lead agency in the sanitation sector. Other ministries, which deal with sanitation related matters include Health, Planning and Development, Local Government and Rural Development, and Housing and Works. At the provincial level, water and sanitation are dealt with by a number of departments including Local Government and Rural Development, Works and Services, and the Public Health Engineering Department.

According to the Pakistan country brief presented at the SACOSAN-2 conference held in Islamabad during September 2006, the first policy statement of the government for the comprehensive combined water and sanitation initiative did not come about till 1988. This also took place after a donor-supported sanitation sector review and follow-up conference that supported the preparation of a strategic investment plan and project preparation for rural water supply and sanitation. This new-found emphasis was actually put into practice under SAP, where sanitation received high funding throughout the 1990s (MoEnv 2006). One of the key objectives of SAP within the water and sanitation sector was to involve communities in the operation and management of small water and sanitation facilities. Rural sanitation was especially emphasised.
Since 1999, under the present government, the language of PPP is equally emphasized within the water and sanitation sector. The World Bank and the government officials are actively talking about PPPs within water and sanitation. At the SACOSAN conference in Islamabad, a whole session was devoted to the Community Led Total Sanitation Programme in Bangladesh, and the World Bank specialist for Water and Sanitation present at the occasion highlighted how the Bank is helping encourage the Pakistani government to adopt this model. It was also highlighted that the Government of NWFP had already initiated this model and a relatively successful replication had started in Mardan.

Also, it is stated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper that “The government is encouraging the local communities and NGOs to actively participate in planning, designing, implementing, operating and maintaining water supply and sanitation schemes,” (p. 80, GoP 2003). Grants for NGOs and communities to establish community managed water and sanitation schemes are also available through the federally administered Khushali Bank and the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF). The beneficiary communities are required to contribute 20 per cent of the capital cost of such projects.

In addition to these overall conditioning factors where donor intervention and a growing recognition on the part of the state about its inability to provide the services to all on its own has led to government opening up to NSP and the private sector, the factor that has been important in conditioning the OPP and government relationship is the large presence of slum dwellings in Pakistan. The development of massive slum dwelling around Karachi starting from 1970s with government’s complete inability to respond to the problems of the area was critical to the rise of Orangi. The main conditioning factor for the initiation of the partnership was that it was not possible to resolve the sanitation problem without engaging the government to shoulder part of the responsibility.

The donor intervention in sanitation programmes in Pakistan has also played a role in opening space for OPP within the government officials in an indirect way. The big loans for sanitation projects given by World Bank and Asian Development Bank and their failure were critical in making OPP sell its model to the government. Thus, though the relationship between OPP and the government did not get shaped with the help of any donor but the donor intervention in the sector did influence the way the relationship evolved. Also, the fact that the project became very popular with the development agencies and it got much appreciation internationally increased its appeal for the government too.

4. The shaping of the relationship

4.1 Formation of the relationship

The relationship developed very slowly and gradually over a long period of time with constant effort on the part of the OPP management to cultivate the
relationship. It was only with time when OPP was able to demonstrate its ability to provide low cost sanitation solutions and was able to establish strong roots within the community that the government officials started to engage with it seriously. The interviews with OPP-RTI and the government officials show that now there is not only a strong interaction between OPP-RTI and the Works and Services Department of the Karachi City Government and the Karachi Water and Sewage Board, but also that the concerned government officials are quite positive about this relationship.

During the interview, Mr Rasheed Mughal, District Officer/Chief Engineer, Union Council Programme, Works and Services Department, City Government Karachi explained that “Perween visits me on regular basis. We discuss various developments in the city in our meetings. OPP also help us develop reports and TORs for consultants.” Similarly, while I was waiting for Mr Mughal to get back from another appointment, his Personal Assistant, Abdul Salam explained to me that “Yes, we have very good contacts with OPP. We can easily find any map through them. We are in regular contact with them. We remember all their phone numbers.”

4.2. Purposes and motives of the relationship

The OPP’s philosophy is that the government collects taxes to provide basic facilities to the public and it should deliver it responsibilities. Anwar Rashid explains the reasons for evolving a model of collaboration as follows: ‘In development world the problem is that NGOs think that they can solve the problem, Rubbish they cannot. In history of development this has to be the role of the government without this the problem cannot be solved. We have to take the government, get them involved in the development process. Peoples’ solutions should be integrated in government policies. The fellows facing the problems also have a solution in the mind. Technically, they may be wrong; they might not be able to articulate it. They cannot do the work of the engineer professional. It is work of the technical professional to present that idea in a technically viable way where it can be implemented. We give government taxes to do this technical work and get it implemented.’

4.3. Individuals and factors shaping the relationship

OPP-RTI’s experience with government shows that it was not easy to win government cooperation. Perween Rehman explained that initially when Akhtar Hameed Khan (AHK, who initiated OPP) used to go and visit the city officials they entertained him with cup of tea and then would send him off. They did not take him seriously. The only option that was left with OPP was to go the community. It became clear to OPP that if it wants to work it will have to focus on mobilization of the community and improving its technical expertise. From 1980 to 1987 there was therefore hardly any cooperation with the government. It was in 1987 when the union council system was being introduced that the union councilors started to engage with them. But OPP got through to the government in
a serious way in 1992 when ADB tried to promote a heavy loan for sanitation in Karachi. It was at this time that OPP undertook heavy lobbying. By this time OPP had been working in Orangi for almost a decade and the team had developed the technical expertise as well as community mobilization abilities. In particular, its mapping process had dramatically progressed and this really increased its bargaining power with the government. The government officials had also seen by now that they have stayed the course and had developed good and low-cost responses to local needs. At this time OPP challenged the ADB consultants and provided much cheaper alternatives to what was being proposed.

The government officials interviewed similarly emphasized the gradual evolution of this relationship. Mr Mughal from the city government added: I have known OPP since 1992 when I was posted in Orangi area. OPP has involved local councilors to support their work and we were also in touch with them so we learnt about OPP through them. OPP did make mistakes initially but kept working and overtime developed a good system. Once I got posted at this position, I was asked to look at the drainage system. I approached OPP and they helped us develop the plan. Initially, they had resistance from our lower staff. But over time they have also won their cooperation. They invite our field-staff in Orangi area over to their office for a meeting every week. We have asked our field staff to attend their meetings.

Dr Saleem, KWSB, also similarly mentioned how he has seen the relationship between OPP and KWSB evolve over time. ‘It was in 1990 that we started formal partnership with OPP. There has been a growing realization that the government alone cannot address the sanitation needs of the entire population. So there is scope for the private sector and the NGOs to come in. OPP had been working in the area for a long time so we engaged with them in 1990. Now we are following the policy of component sharing in all the katchi abadis and slum areas in Karachi,’ he explained.

4.3.1 Technical expertise and mapping skills
Interviews with the OPP-RTI staff and the government officials make it very clear that technical competence which led to introduction of efficient low-cost alternatives to government models has been critical in winning government cooperation. The basis of these low-cost but efficient alternatives has been OPP’s philosophy to draw upon local knowledge. For example, OPP was able to change the government design of digging extra depth for the sewers, which decreased costs.

Within technical expertise the importance of detailed mapping system was most clear. Perween explained: mapping is very important to mobilise community and winning government cooperation. We have mapped all the drainage points in Karachi. When I joined OPP in 1982 we spend so much of our initial time just mapping the area. Once the map was ready it helped the community as well as the government visually see the problem and our solutions seemed much more realistic to them then.
Similarly, Rasheed Mughal from district government highlighted that OPP’s mapping system and paperwork is very good and they have a very well designed documentation system. So we often ask them for documents or maps as within the government system it is often difficult to locate them on short notice.

Perween explained, ‘Our first step was demonstration of our technical skills. When we started mapping it took us 10 years. People are now themselves coming. The first month I came, it was clear that we need maps. Dr Sahib was trained as a social scientist. We were engineers we could map things. We came with technical skills and we started doing it.’

Interesting even in case of Lodhran Pilot Projects, Interviews showed that like in the case of OPP-RTI, detailed mapping was critical in winning the cooperation of the municipal authority. Khalid Warriach, the field operations officer at LPP who has been the focal point for LPP since the start explained that once they mapped the drainage system it was much easier to convince the government officers that LPP was proposing realistic solutions. With the map in front everyone can see the problem and its roots. Also, it gives the higher officials a feeling that we are serious and know the subject. He further added: Akhtar Hameed Khan taught us that often the resistance from the government side is psychological rather than financial. Therefore, one important factor in winning government support has been to present options. ‘We showed new options to undertake the sanitation work in the area, which were financially also very economical and this helped win over the concerned government staff. To get to know the option thus in itself is a big step towards establishing a relationship.’ He further argued that the fact that the solution being proposed was also low cost further added to its appeal for the government officials. ‘The estimates get easily approved when they are low cost. Corruption can only take place when there are high profit margins as then there is a surplus amount, which is available to be distributed among interested parties. In government project the officials give very high estimates so that there is a higher margin for corruption. As opposed to government estimates, we were proposing very low-cost alternatives in which there were clearly no corruption margins. So, it was then easier to convince the top ranks within the municipal authority to support the project.’

On the other hand, Shazadi Uzma Noreen, LPP’s Social Mobilizer, highlighted how low cost of the project is also critical in mobilizing the community to cooperate. She explained: ‘When we mobilize the people, the most effective tool is to highlight the low cost of the project as compared to the benefits they will get. We brief them about our project and tell them that if they invest this small amount of money in building this sanitation facility they can save so much extra cost that they incur in terms of medical costs. We also tell them about other monetary benefits of making this investment. For example, we explain to them that if they invest in developing this drainage system then the value of their property will rise.’

4.3.2 Engaging in broader advocacy
OPP-RTI’s interaction with the state agencies also shows that sometime engagement in broader advocacy issues helps facilitate an NSP’s relationship with the state in service delivery. OPP-RTI has been very persistent in advocacy against ADB initiated sanitation project loans in Karachi since 1992. Perween explains: Initially ADB thought that OPP were putting up this resistance just to get some money out of it. But OPP leadership kept persistent and then USAID and World Bank also came in to support OPP. The ADB had in the past carried out a sanitation project in the same area, which had been a complete failure so OPP really brought out details of that failed project to convince everyone that the currently proposed project is too expensive and not designed to respond to local needs. OPP highlighted the problems with that project and provided its low-cost alternative. At that time Farooq Sattar was the Mayor of Karachi. He was eventually convinced with OPPs’ arguments and refused to go ahead with the ADB project. ‘After this experience we realized that it is no point trying to influence the development agencies as they don’t listen; all they are interested in is dishing out the loans. If we want change it has to be through the government as eventually the project was stopped because we were able to convince the government. At the same time, from then on the city sanitation authorities started to engage us regularly. In 1994, we were also asked to become advisors to Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority. They agreed to copy our model to all the Katchi Abadis’, explains Perween. Here again OPP realized the importance of direct advocacy by the community. Perween adds, ‘We encourage the associations to undertake their direct advocacy with the government functionaries. We then go in to support them with technical expertise. We have realized that just doing advocacy does not work; you have to provide concrete suggestions and estimates. We don’t go in as leaders; we go in as technical experts’.

4.3.3 Constant innovation, improvement and responsiveness to community needs
Interviews also show that the partnership with the government was a result of constant innovation and improvement of the OPP-RTI model over time in response to community needs. Perween explains, it has to be remembered that we did not start the work with component sharing model. Initially, we ourselves had no clue of how exactly should the sanitation problem be solved. It was only through involving the community and through trial and error that we developed this model, which involved contributions from the community as well as the government. It was only after 1997 that we started talking about this model in terms of component sharing.

Also a lot of OPP’s expansion has happened in response to public demands rather than due to planned activities. For example, OPP has now gotten involved in resisting eviction of people from certain areas on the pretext of sanitation planning. OPP gets involved into this because it gets complaints from the people. OPP is now developing mechanisms to check land grabbing of prime areas again on pretext of sanitation expansion plans. ‘So the point is that in case of OPP at the point of starting the work we often do not know how far we might end up going. A lot of our achievements, which today are seen as phenomenal started as simple responses
to immediate community needs, which gradually evolved as we tried to address those needs,’ elaborates OPP.

The Lodhran Pilot project also highlighted the importance of involving the community for multiple reasons. It appears that LPP’s ability to mobilize the community to take part in this programme also helps convince the elected representatives to take their work seriously. Asghar Ali Shah, Tehsil Nazim Lodhran, added: ‘I feel LPP has been very good at mobilizing the community which is very useful. This way the people get to develop a sense of responsibility in providing social services for themselves. He also added that the community itself acts as a monitor of LPP. They come to me and tell me what rates LPP is asking them to contribute to the project. This helps me keep an eye on LPP activities. At the same time when I give a positive response to people questions and approve of the rates LPP is asking for they are more willing to engage in the scheme.’ Amjad Mahmood, TMO, also appreciated that LPP is able to mobilize the community to participate in the work. He argued that this is very important for sustaining the work.

4.4 Formal rules governing the relationship

4.4.1 Form of agreement
OPP does not maintain any formal contract with the government. The main argument is that formal contracts often bind organisations to specific targets and take away the flexibility to adapt to changing requirements so that at the end meeting the contract targets rather than addressing the actual objectives becomes more important. Parveen Rehman explains, ‘In the beginning we had some formal tripart agreements between the UNICEF and government but later we decided that this does not work. We had few pages of agreement. MOU is only needed when they give us money. We feel that just taking money does not build a partnership. There are many aspects of each work, and it is not possible to include them all in an MOU. Not having a formal agreement is much more powerful. It gives us more room to negotiate and to establish trust.’

When OPP entered formal agreements it found that they got bound to delivering certain things, which eventually were not important, and this disrupted their real emphasis on the project. ‘MOUs are more about delivery organizations. Our working relationship with the government is spread over a long time, so we do not need an MOU. We want to do things that excite us rather than things that we are bound to do by the contract. We have an understanding so we don’t need an MOU to state it. Just like we don’t have contracts with the community and the other organizations that we work with’, adds Perween.

4.4.2 Building relations across teams and not individuals
Interviews also show that an important success factor has been that OPP believes in building relationship with officials at different layers within the concerned
government offices rather than just the top official. This has been critical as people at lower government ranks are the ones who implement the policies and if they are not convinced of an idea they can create many hurdles. Perween also emphasized this: ‘Now over the years we have cultivated good relations with people at different layers across all the concerned offices. Many of the government officials who we initially started engaging with as junior officers are now at top positions. They have seen us work for a long time and are very cooperative.’ She elaborated that this way change of one officer does not make a difference to OPP as overtime they have come to work with the whole team and not just the top person. The actual work has to be done by people in lower ranks; unless they are also convinced they can create a lot of hurdles, she adds. Therefore, OPP-RTI holds weekly meeting with the government field officers in Orangi in addition to having regular meetings at the district government level.

Dr Saleem in KWSA also supported this. He explained: ‘OPP has built relationship with staff at different levels in this office so cooperation with them is not contingent on my presence alone. The working relation is very good.’ However, he did note that there are continued tensions especially on issue of loans. ‘We agree with them that many development loans are unnecessary and often result in failed projects. However, at the same time we do genuinely need loans for other projects. OPP is very rigid when it comes to this issue and it does create some tension. But, overtime, we have learnt to negotiate over it,’ he added. He explained that they had recently hosted a seminar where they got OPP and a few other NGOs who were critical of KWSB current plans to take an ADB loan for sanitation work together and explained to them why we are taking this loan. We also involved them in designing that project and in developing the TORs of the consultants. So, they can now see why we are taking the loan. Mr Mashqoor, Chief Engineer, who had joined this interview towards the middle also emphasized this point.

4.4.3 Expanding advocacy networks
Another way of making the government engage with OPP has been to expand its advocacy networks. The advocacy networks are very important. Now documentation is very important and web is very important for mobilizing people and building pressure. Perween comments: ‘These communities don’t know how to send the right message. We can bring their problems on the map. ‘Nara Lagana’ (slogan shouting) is important but there should also be a concrete solution. The relationship with the community is based on a lot of trust and friendship.’

The Urban Resource Centre (URC) runs a water and sanitation network and Orangi is an important member of this network. This network is also very important for Organi to advance various issues. Yunas Baloch, a senior official at URC himself worked with Orangi for two to three years beginning in 1991. He explains, ‘Orangi has been able to establish its credibility because it has been working in the area for many years. Normally, NGOs do not work so consistently in an area. The NGOs’ reputation is very negative. If you introduce yourself as an NGO people think you must be in it for the money. People take salaries of Rs
280,000 within NGOs and drive Parados. You can’t hide these things from the community for long. OPP is very different in this respect and this has definitely helped build its credibility within the government as well as the community.’

In his view the advocacy work is critical to Orangi’s work strategy and that is why it actively works with the network. ‘Advocacy is required to get the government to agree to change its practices but also to get the approved policies implemented. It therefore requires a consistent effort’, he explained.

He further explained that to get a policy approved is just the beginning; you need to carry on the advocacy to ensure that the policy is also implemented. Given that the top government officials are frequently moved around, advocacy is also important to keep the new appointments informed of the previous decisions. URC have also actively lobbied alongside Orangi to stop some of the ADB funded sanitation programmes, which would have caused more trouble than solving the problem.

Baloch further elaborates: ‘OPP adds a lot of strength to the network due to its strong roots within the community. The best part about OPP is that it is very open to sharing credit for any work and unlike ordinary NGOs allows us to take credit for the mobilization that it undertakes. It is not actively pursuing credit for itself but is more interested in getting the work done. This makes a lot of difference given that typically NGOs are very difficult about letting anyone else take the credit of their work.’

I don’t see any threat to Orangi’s partnership with government in coming years as OPP has now even overcome the political challenges. Initially, PPP’s government used to think that maybe OPP is with MQM (a Karachi based political party). When MQM used to come to power, it used to view OPP as a PPP’s supporter. However, over the years, both parties have realized that OPP is a neutral player and is solely concerned with improving the conditions in the area irrespective of who is in power so it has acceptance within both the parties now.

Another important aspect of OPP’s work has been its constant evolution. According to Perween: ‘We don’t see the end; all we do is to support people in their actions. Some things are thought through. For example, a big media campaign. But, like TTRC we never thought that he would become an organization. One overarching factor in our work is that whenever we see an opportunity we get more devoted and concentrated on it whether it is within the government or the community. Where we see an opportunity we put in maximum effort for that time. This flexibility is critical to our work style. We were never able to foresee what mapping and digitalization will do. Whenever you have to give prints, they are expensive and time consuming to produce. Colour prints are especially very expensive. So you can’t spread them around easily. Now we give a CD or have it placed on our website. Due to high demand for these prints, we are setting up a separate office in central Karachi where people can easily access and purchase this digitalized information.’
5. The relationship in practice

At the time of the fieldwork, OPP’s relationship with the government is going very strong. In recent years, the partnership has expanded from Orangi town to Karachi city level where OPP-RTI is working with the city government to develop plans for water drainage around natural ‘nalas’. There is evidence of close collaboration with the officials with the city government as well as the Karachi Water and Sewage Board. Also, the partnership involves working with the entire tier of government officials within the organisation starting from the Executive Officer to fieldworker level.

It is a very balanced relationship where neither party feels that the other is dictating. The two sides engage on regular basis to discuss current or future problems in the area of services and explore the possibilities. This, however, does not mean that there are no challenges. Many of the OPP’s activities actually involve stopping projects, which government officials are initiating because they are hopeful of getting some kickbacks and cuts in them. This means that through OPP’s action interests of some of the officials within the system are affected. But, OPP’s approach is to build the pressure on the government through advocacy that it undertakes through broader NGO networks, engagement with the media, and through supporting the community activists to take up the issue. It does not enter into direct confrontation with the government as they think this would block all channels of communication and then nothing will get done. The approach is to work consistently and to use advocacy intelligently to build the pressure on the government to engage and then to identity the better officials within the government who are less driven by material interests.

5.1 The relationship in practice: day-to-day routine and critical incidents

In order to see the difference between what was stated in the contract and what happened in reality, this section of the report first captures the expressions of the community about the effectiveness of the programme. Then it captures the views of the government officials about the programme as it helps see how they saw the relationship as opposed to what PRSP claimed. Then it documents the level and type of interaction witnessed between the NSP and government officials. And, finally, it tries to explore some critical points that help highlight the key dimensions of the relationship in practice.

5.1.1 Views of community members

There is overwhelming evidence that OPP is deeply embedded within the community. It has deep respect for its work within the community members, it has very strong links with the local activists and organisations within the community, and most of its staff comes from within the community. All of this has been discussed in detail in the Section 2 (please refer back to section 2.5).
5.1.2 Views of government officials

The views of governmental officials have all been on the whole very positive about OPP. Mr Bhatti (government field staff) Additional Executive Engineer, District Authority, Works and Services Division explained: I have engaged with OPP-RTI since October 2002. Working with OPP has been very useful as OPP greatly facilitates our work. The weekly meeting that is held with OPP every Tuesday is very useful. We discuss the various problems confronted in the field or new sanitation problems requiring attention in the area.' He said that OPP is very good with mapping the drainage systems and in preparing cost estimates. He explained that he has recently prepared a PC1 (term used for government projects) worth Rs. 11 million for work on 9 major nalas (natural water flows) within Karachi with support from Parveen Rehman and OPP's field team. It is because of OPP’s efforts that 30 percent nalas in Karachi have been covered, he argued. In his view, OPP’s strength is that it is very strongly rooted within the community so it knows the area much better than the government. It is therefore very useful to work with them. ‘I would like them to now also initiate some work on improving the road networks and water supply within the katchi abadis,’ he said.

Syed Riffat Hasan, Executive Engineer, Works and Services Department, shared similar views: ‘Whatever project OPP develops, it is very well worked out. I have been impressed with their work. We also hold weekly meetings with them on Tuesday at the OPP office.’ He was of the view that their roots in the community are much stronger than the government. He said that they discuss day to day issues with OPP’s field staff on daily basis. ‘We exchange information, discuss the possible solutions to any challenges we are facing in implementing a project and discuss any new problems being created due to rain or other natural developments,’ he added.

5.1.2 Level and type of interaction

There is regular contact between the OPP and the Karachi City Government Works and Services Department and KWSB. Perween Rehman pays fortnightly visits to the top officials within these organisations. Plus there is frequent contact on the phone too. The OPP field staffers meet with executive engineers, civil engineers, work contractor, work mason, XCNs, EDO, DDO, assistant engineers and KW&SB officials on regular basis in the field. Likewise, OPP field staffers meet with site supervisors, site engineers, UC and town Nazims. XCN is the top authority for the project. EDO and DDO monitor entire project, revise and expand the project as well as EDO and DDO do transfers and postings of the government staff. EDO, DDO report to the XCN.

5.3. Who dominates and how?

There seems to be no dominant partner in the relationship. Both sides engage voluntarily without any compulsion of an external donor or higher government authority. The bureaucrats sitting within the Karachi City Government Works and Services Department and KWSB have voluntarily moved towards working with
OPP over time without having pressure of some political figure to under this partnership.

5.4. Changes in the relationship: disputes or turning points

There have been disputes and tension during the relations but never a direct confrontation as OPP’s philosophy is to work with the government and not confront it. OPP is very clear not to confront the government officials. Its policy is that it has to work within the system so it cannot confront. ‘We have to find ways to work around the system. What we have to do is find people within the government who are less corrupt. And there are some people in the system who do want to get things done. We do not pin point any one individual for the corruption. Rather we show them that in this particular situation there has been corruption. For example, the government currently got a project for lying down lanes which were already there. So we showed the community, government, and media that the lanes were already there. But, we did not pin point any one as responsible for this. We don’t blame people we blame the system,’ explains Perween.

This approach was also visible in the way OPP build its resistance against ADB funded big sanitation projects, which has perhaps been the most critical point in the development of government and OPP relationship. A critical point showing OPP’s strength was when in 1992 accepting the OPP-RTI low cost alternative (also promoted by a number of NGOs/CBOs) an ADB loan of US $100 million for the Korangi sewerage project in Karachi was cancelled by the government so work could be undertaken with local resources. In the process evolved a citywide network of NGOs, CBOs and citizens advocating alternatives to the mega projects in Karachi, while promoting the use of local resources and the need to build on what exists. In dropping this project, personal interests of many officials were at stake but the reason OPP succeeded in getting the loan cancelled and in the process developing a very close relationship with the government was mainly to do with its skillful approach in dealing with government officials.

Perween explained that even with Arif Hasan they say that don’t go on media and criticize the government as they will then not engage with him. OPP’s leadership does not go on media with their views. ‘We project the issue but we don’t project ourselves or our views,’ explains Perween. She add, ‘The government will not link with you or engage with you if you criticize them on the media. If we make the tension very public then they will not engage with us or give us any information. We want to push the issue on the TV rather than ourselves. So we don’t go on TV. Dr Sahib never went on TV. Then government and secretary don’t call him to events. Be ready then that there won’t be a dialogue.’

Instead directly confronting the officials, OPP lobbies the concerned officials with the help of its broader NGO networks, community activists, and the media to highlight the need for the given activity so that the government itself feels the pressure to undertake that work. The OPP field wokers also emphasized the same
approach. As head of field operation narrated: Government field officials co-operate with OPP field staffers on many issues but at times their own interests are threatened by our actions so we have bitter and sweet relationships with government field officials. But, generally, the government field officials do appreciate OPP field staffers. I will say it all depends on personal interaction. To be more precise friendship matters the most as the two go side by side through out the years. How we don’t accept substandard work from government officials and if we arrive at the threshold of collision we withdraw.’ He was however of the view that the OPP field officers and government field staff interact over such a long period of time and the day in day out chit-chat turn them into acquaintances with closer ties with the result that the tension never gets out of control.

Also he highlighted that in case of any difference of opinion, OPP field workers have to provide solid evidence to support their claims. ‘We always show them proof of sub-standard work; we take photos and get laboratory test done. We work very hard on them. So eventually they cooperate. They never co-operate only because of the order from the higher officials; it takes us six months to one year in establishing the friendship then they co-operate.’

Lodhran Pilot project experience also showed the benefits of this approach. During the field visits, Amjad Mahmood, TMO, also highlighted that the fact that LPP is supporting rather than rivaling the work of Tehsil Municipal authority makes him appreciate their work. He explained: ‘LPP is focusing at the village level. This is complimenting our efforts as our primary focus is on city level. So their work expands the sanitation services to a broader community. We feel that they are sharing our burden, which is very useful. We want people to join hands to help expand the sanitation services.’

Similarly, even in LPP, the staff was clear that it was very important to the partnership to let the government officials take credit for the work. Imtiaz Ahmed, head of a small NGO in Baratiwala village whose organization did the social mobilization work for LPP in that village explained: ‘The main resistance from the Village or Tehseel Nazim is generally linked to the fear of creating opposing political forces through this work. So we go to great pains to assure them that we do not have any political ambitions. For example, we have given stamp paper to some nazims stating that we are not going to come into politics.’

The Tehsil Nazim also acknowledged the same fact when he said: ‘LPP is very good in convincing people to cooperate in their schemes. At the same time they don’t give an impression that they have any political agenda so it is easier to trust them. They have not kept their role parallel to the government rather they have always played the role of assisting the government department.’

Mr Warriach similarly, added: ‘We must remember that the Nazim and DCO also need people who can work. If you are willing to help them do their work and are not challenging their authority then in our experience they are willing to
cooperate. So, we also keep ourselves in the background and let them take the credit for this work.’

6. The effects of the relationship on the organizations

6.1 Changes to organizational agendas or working

OPP has been able to hold on to its original mission very well. It has a very focused approach and is expanding its services in a systematic way, where it builds on its prior work rather than moving into completely different areas of work or geographical setting every few years. This clarity of vision/philosophy is central to its stable relationship with the government as well as the community. The strength of this partnership is that it is genuinely engaging and the NSP has been able to build inroads and win respect across the tiers of the relevant government departments. In my view, this model has no obvious weakness and in many ways is the ideal type. However, it is a very demanding model for the NSP as it requires commitment to certain core value and a lot of self-discipline and ability to say no to material benefits including tempting donor projects and consultancies. Given that a lot of NSPs are focused on short-term projects, this ideal type partnership while most desirable from the angle of sustainable development might not be practically the most feasible for the NSPs and their donors structurally conditioned to work on short term projects.

6.2 Impact of relationship on NGPA

As discussed in this section, the research shows that OPP has been very effective in shaping the government’s notion of public action by successfully manoeuvring increased space within government circles to influence policy and planning.

6.2.1 Views about current experiences

For OPP, the relationship has over the years matured into a very reliable level of interaction. With OPP there is never the feeling that they want to get some things done by the government officials rather the focus is always on working on the government officials to best serve the community needs. Thus, in many ways OPP supports in fulfilment of the needs that become apparent by the interaction with the community and state agencies. In OPP’s view the relationship was currently working smoothly but they have to constantly work on lobbying as well as developing technical solutions to remain relevant for the government as well as the community.

6.2.2 Ideal relationships

In case of OPP, the notion of an ideal relationship rests on building a sustained relationship with the government based on in-depth experience of one community context and then coordinating with other organisations to share that learning in other regions while retaining its focus on the original community. Here the vision of ideal type relationship with the state is that the NSP becomes a supporting arm of the state agencies in meeting the demands of the community without directly
confronting the state officials. But, through this support, it also makes the state adapt to OPP’s philosophy. It is a model where the NSP starts small with humble ambitions but its commitment, hard work and consequent successes make it a very influential partner in the relationship.

6.2.3 Conditions for effective relationships
The experience of OPP shows that eventually the most important factor in shaping an effective relationship is the approach of the NSP towards engagement with the state rather than any other factor. OPP started at a time when PPP was still not actively being promoted by the donor agencies nor was it so explicitly stated in the government policies as it is now. Yet, OPP was able to cultivate a willingness within the bureaucracy to engage with it in a regular manner. What this shows is that often the most important conditioning factor for shaping an effective relationship is the approach of the NSP rather than external factors or state policies.

7. Conclusions
In the case of OPP’s relationship with the government, we have a case of an NSP, which does not suffer from the weakness of over dependence on donor agencies. It is a strong independent NSP which has been able to retain its core values over 27 years of its operation. Rather what we see is that it has been able to influence the state agencies into alternating their philosophy of work and public action: from complete rejection of the OPP’s model, the KWSB today uses OPP’s low cost sanitation model of component sharing as a key strategy for tackling sanitation problems in slum settlements across Karachi.

The key feature of the relationship is no written contract but a clear working understanding developed over 27 years of interaction and regular contact. It is voluntary relationship with no compulsion from the donors or political elite. This is in many way the ideal partnership in terms of shared responsibility as neither one of the two parties dictates the relationship rather both engage, deliberate, and plan the activities by mutual consent. There do not seem to be any special conditioning factors that have helped this relationship. What seems critical in building the relationship is the nature of the NSP rather than the state.

The case shows that a leadership which was committed to certain ideals rather than material incentives, was embedded within the community, and was willing to let the community take lead in finding the solutions, and at the same time had good technical expertise to convert community’s local knowledge into technical solutions was able to develop a genuine demand for its work within the government agencies. The relationship also shows that for a strong relationship to emerge it is important that the NSP never directly confronts the NSP but always stays in the supporting role as while for the NSP there will always be a willingness to influence the government, the government officials have no incentive to engage
unless they feel they will be strengthened by cooperating with the NSP. For more specific analysis of the conclusions please see the comparative report.

References


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