The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Impact of Integration and Association (EUBorderConf)

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The EUBorderConf project (The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Impact of Integration and Association) analysed the impact of European integration and association on the transformation of border conflicts. The project used a communicative definition of border conflicts as the articulation of incompatible, opposing views that are linked to a territorial political border, classically between two states or entities aspiring to statehood. Such conflicts are of varying intensity on a continuum from mere conflict episodes to issue conflicts, identity conflicts and eventually violent subordination conflicts. More intense conflict stages are characterised by more intense “securitisation”, the representation of the other side as an existential threat, and the infiltration of larger parts of societal life by securitisation. An intensification of securitisation in attempts to legitimise the use of force normally precedes violence and is therefore a useful early warning signal.

The European Union has a positive influence on border conflicts if it helps the transition from a higher to a lower conflict stage. It can do so through concrete policies, or through the effects of the integration process as such. Concrete policies can provide incentives or sanctions such as the offer or withholding of membership (compulsory impact), or they can facilitate meetings and dialogue between conflict parties (connective impact). The integration process can provide a justification for conciliatory policies (enabling impact) or lead to a redefinition of identities so that they are no longer incompatible and antagonistic (constructive impact).

Our case studies (Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Greece-Turkey, Europe’s North-Russia and Israel-Palestine) demonstrate that integration has a stronger effect than association, but that this effect is not always positive. Integration can be conflict reproducing or intensifying if one conflict party is not included in the integration process, and if competing norms or interests reinforce conflictive identities or lead to a policy of hard borders. Our cases also confirm that the EU’s strongest transformative power in the short term is its compulsory impact in membership candidacy situations, which are however dependent on the credibility of the membership offer. Other conditions for positive EU impact include the priority given by conflict parties to EU membership, the ability of EU programmes to involve hardliners, the willingness of conflict parties to accept the EU and EU funding as legitimate, the accessibility of funding to broad sections of societies and the professionalism and diplomatic training of EU representatives. Most importantly, EU impact in all of our case studies was conditioned by events outside the control of the EU and was dependent on how integration or association was used by local actors. There is therefore no direct causal effect of integration and association on border conflict transformation; such an effect is always mediated by local events and actors. Policy-making should therefore be focused on working towards an organisational structure that can be used and referred back to once a window of opportunity arises, while integration provides the context in which local actors working towards peace can substantiate their claims, and which increases the likelihood that identities are increasingly constructed in less conflictive ways. Given that there is no automatic translation of EU involvement into peaceful transformation, the measure of success of EU policies should not be the achievement of conflict resolution as such, but whether or not it has been possible to provide a structure that supports peaceful transformation once a window of opportunity has opened.
1. Executive summary

1.1. Introduction

As the European Union (EU) enlarges, it faces an increasing number of border conflicts, both within its territory and on its own external borders. These conflicts are defined by incompatible identities and interests of states or actors aspiring to statehood on two sides of a geographic line that is either an international border or is seen by at least one of the actors as such a border, even though it may not be internationally recognised as such. The EU itself is often seen as one of the driving factors in transforming Western Europe from a zone of ever re-occurring war into a zone of lasting peace, and substantially downgrading and transforming many of its internal borders in this process. While the very process of integration in this sense has led to the evolution of a ‘security community’ among former long-time foes, the proliferation of cross-border co-operation for instance in the context of the Interreg programme, which not only embraces co-operation within the EU, but also among border regions at its current outer borders, can be seen to supplement the developments in the realm of ‘high politics’ by attempts to promote integration on a micro-scale in cross-border regions.

This record suggests that European integration and the EU as a regional organisation have the potential to transform border conflicts and to create and deepen a security community. Whereas there is widespread recognition of the Union’s success in this respect, however, little is known about the conditions under which Union involvement in border conflicts can be successful, i.e. the conditions under which the Union can contribute to the transformation of a border from being the source of violent conflicts to providing a focal point for the construction of common identities or disappearing. Likewise, there has been little investigation of the various instruments of the EU’s influence as well as the actual processes through which this influence occurs. Such knowledge will, however, be central to turn enlargement into a success, and to avoid it being overshadowed by the increasing number of border conflicts at the Union’s fringes and, after enlargement, possibly within it. It will also help to promote the further development of civil society in those countries affected by border disputes. This development of civil society will be a crucial step to integrate the people living in regions of border conflicts in a wider, peaceful European society, and to enable them to participate actively in policy-making processes not only in their respective regions but also within the EU at large. The central objective of the EUBorderConf project therefore was to establish the conditions under which and the processes through which the EU as a regional organisation can, through membership or association, help to transform the nature of borders from lines of conflict to lines of co-operation.

In pursuing this objective, EUBorderConf has developed a theoretical framework that allowed for assessing the impact of the EU on border conflicts (whether positive or negative) and uncovering the specific pathways the EU’s influence may take. The six case studies – five border conflict cases (Northern Ireland, Europe’s north and Russia, Turkey/Greece, Cyprus, and Israel/Palestine) and a study of EU policy-making towards border conflicts based on a wide array of qualitative methods (in-depth interviews, surveys of media, analyses of political documentation, school textbooks and other cultural material) – have provided empirical material for testing and developing the framework, which in turn helped integrate the results and assure comparability.
1.2. Theoretical Framework

1.2.1. Definitions and the model of conflict stages

This study of the impact of integration and association on border conflict transformation rests on a discursive definition of conflict as the articulation of the incompatibility of subject positions. It implies that the existence of a conflict can be observed when an actor constructs her identity or interests in such a way that these cannot be made compatible with the identity or interests of another actor. In this context, violence is not considered a necessary element of conflict; and what the literature refers to as ‘latent’ conflicts, in which an incompatibility is deducted from ‘objective’ predispositions rather than actual communication, is not considered as constituting a ‘conflict’ (Efinger et al. 1988; Diez et al, 2006).

A specific mode to capture conflict communication in the border conflict cases is securitisation, which the project defined, following Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, as the representation of the other as an existential threat which justifies extraordinary measures (Buzan et al. 1998: 21, 24; Buzan and Wæver 2003: 71). Securitisation takes place when actors articulate an incompatibility by referring to another as an existential threat to the self. In observing securitisation, the project focused in particular on public discourse, as it is there that border conflicts gain political salience. This approach allowed us to assess degrees of securitisation, which are to do with the extent to which individual attempts to securitise (so-called ‘securitising moves’) gain acceptance by other members of the group or society, the frequency with which securitising moves occur, and the extent to which a given group or society perceives the threat of the other as ‘existential’.

Regarding the transformation of border conflicts, the project has adopted an ideal-typical model of conflict stages which formed the basis for our analysis of EU impact. Transformation then refers to the transition from one stage of conflict to another. The continuum of conflict stages is established by the following variables: (a) the intensity of securitisation and (b) the infiltration of societal life by securitisation (see also Messmer 2003). An increasing intensity of securitisation is characterised by a greater stress on the existentiality of the threat; an increased frequency of securitising moves, as well as their greater acceptance by the public. Whether securitisation is accepted by the political elites, individual societal groups or the society at large, allows us to determine the degree of infiltration of society by securitisation.

Conflict is at its weakest if the articulation of an incompatibility occurs as a one-off, isolated incidence with no reference to an existential threat, which we call a conflict episode. An issue conflict displays conflict communication that is limited to a particular issue and contains no or few securitising moves. Issue conflicts are largely about specific conflicting interests. Although identities are partly expressed through interests, at the stage of issue conflicts the parties do not explicitly invoke identities as such as part of the conflict. This, however, becomes the case in identity conflicts, where securitising moves abound and existential threats to the ‘self’ become explicitly articulated as a clear reference to an identity dimension. The other becomes viewed as a source and the cause of conflictive issues, whose resolution is ultimately linked to the nature (and sometimes the very existence) of the ‘other’. Conflict communication begins to overshadow most spheres of societal life. In the final stage of subordination conflicts, the conflicting parties widely accept the existential threat posed by the other, as well as the need to counter this threat with extraordinary measures (including violence). Conflict communication dominates all aspects of societal life, including the
From an empirical perspective, these different conflict stages are not discrete, but rather overlapping zones on a continuum between conflict episodes and subordination conflicts. As far as individual articulations are concerned, researchers will normally be able to locate them on one of the four stages and observe movements along the two dimensions. In order to identify shifts in the general dynamics of individual border conflicts, we need to be able to make an assessment, on the basis of empirical data, of whether conflict communication is on average primarily characterised by issue-related types of communication (in which case this would be an episode conflict or an issue conflict) or whether the bulk of communication involves the identity dimension (identity conflict) or a mix of identity and violence discourses (subordination). As such, the stage model presents a useful heuristic device to distinguish between transformations of specific articulations. However, as in any such device, there is a grey zone between stages, which should be acknowledged rather than eliminated through fixing artificial boundaries between categories.

As conflicts consist of a number of simultaneously occurring conflict articulations, conflicts themselves will often be located in between conflict stages, and it is also in this sense that there are “overlapping zones”. However, our task then is to differentiate between different articulations and between the contexts they are coming from, distinguishing societal actors who act as conflict-drivers from those whose aim is to desecuritise the conflict.

On this basis, it is possible to argue that integration or association have had a positive impact on a border conflict if they have contributed to the movement of a conflict from a stage of greater conflict intensity to stages of lower intensity. When this is the case, we may observe, for instance, that the representation of the other side as an existential threat becomes confined to specific issues in both parliamentary debates and newspaper commentaries; that more actors contest securitising moves instead of readily accepting and engaging in them; or
that new editions of school books begin to stress commonalities, rather than incompatibilities, between the parties involved. Conversely, integration and association can be seen to have had a negative impact if a conflict intensifies and moves, for instance, from an issue conflict to an identity conflict.

The five case studies under scrutiny cover a range of different conflict constellations, with different directions of movement between conflict stages. While in Northern Ireland the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) succeeded in limiting previously widespread instances of inter-communal violence, which allow us to describe the conflict prior to the GFA as a conflict of subordination, it nevertheless reinforced the articulation of antagonistic unionist and republican identities. The Northern Ireland conflict has thus moved to a lower conflict stage, yet it has become ‘locked in’ at the stage of an identity conflict (Hayward 2004a; see also Hayes and McAllister 1999). A more pervasive move towards a lower stage of securitisation has been achieved in the Greek-Turkish conflict. While important conflict issues, such as the delineation of the continental shelf in the eastern Aegean or the status of some islets remain disputed between both states, the overall political, social and economic relations between Greece and Turkey have reached an unprecedented level of détente and cooperation, in which negative images of the other, let alone recourse to military means, are no longer a dominant characteristic of conflict communication in either society, which allows to see this conflict moving from the level of a subordination conflict towards an issue conflict (Vathakou 2003, Rumelili 2004a).

Arguably, a movement in the opposite direction or reproducing the status quo characterises our three other case-studies. In the Middle East, the failed Camp David summit of September 2000 preceded the outbreak of the second Intifada and the massive increase of violence by both Israelis and Palestinians. With the factual end to the Oslo peace process since 2000, the Middle East conflict has, thus, become firmly locked in at the stage of a conflict of subordination. While the demise of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, the Gaza disengagement and reforms of the Palestinian Authority (PA) might pave the way towards a resumption of this process, such a development remains far from obvious, given the massive opposition on both sides to any compromise on the various contested issues of this conflict (such as borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements). As far as EU-Russia relations are concerned, we observe that initially ‘isolated’ conflictive issues (rights of Russian minorities in new member states, degree of cross-border co-operation, status of Kaliningrad) become increasingly intermingled and woven up with identity-related ‘narratives of exclusion’, thus indicating a movement towards greater securitisation which predominates at the stage of an identity conflict (Prozorov 2005). In Cyprus, hardliners have on the one hand been voted out of the government in the Turkish-Cypriot north, while on the other hand, there is no or little movement towards desecuritisation in the Greek-Cypriot south. The conflict therefore remains at the stage of an identity conflict, and even a subordination conflict in some parts of Cypriot society (Demetriou 2004a, 2004b).

Since conflicts are about subject positions, and in their last two stages explicitly about identities, they involve the (re-) drawing of borders. Traditionally, borders have been seen as physical lines and border conflicts were, therefore, most of the time subordination conflicts, in which rules were to be extended beyond the existing geographical borderline. This characterises a good deal of border conflicts, but it is nonetheless an impoverished understanding. It focuses on states as actors in international politics, and neglects both the impact of borders for the daily life of those living in border regions and beyond, and the very construction of borders through day-to-day social practices. It does not pay sufficient
attention to the border as a symbol of and means toward demarcation, and to the multiplication of borders in towns and cities beyond the contested border, such as in the Northern Irish case. Moreover, such a perspective neglects the poly-contextual nature of different kinds of social borders, such as religious, economic, ethnic or legal borders, which do not necessarily correlate with geographically represented ethnic or national borderlines. In these contexts, borders provide specific mechanisms for inclusion and exclusion into different social realms, with citizenship as “membership” in the political community of a nation-state being the most visible one.

Borders are hence more than just physical lines. New approaches in Political Geography and International Relations have instead proposed to study borders as socially constructed institutions. A significant body of literature has since the early 1990s emphasised that borders need to be seen as social structures that are constantly communicatively reproduced, thereby pointing to the theoretical and methodological overlaps between our model of conflict stages and such a discursive understanding of borders. Yet geographically represented border conflicts are a particularly stable form of conflict because they provide a clear-cut physical distinction between two easily identifiable sides. In such conflicts, borders have a “double function” in that they provide a means of both territorial inclusion and exclusion, but in parallel also for “functional” inclusion or exclusion. There are reinforcing tendencies between borders, identities and particular social orders. Being “excluded” by a border frequently implies not only being locked out in a physical-geographical sense, but also in an economic or legal sense. The exclusion of specific ethnic groups is an interesting example in that respect. Identity and subordination conflicts are, therefore, never about identity alone, but also about access to social goods and in that sense incorporate issue conflicts, and they constitute vested interests in their prolongation.

At the same time, however, the discursive nature of borders as well as conflicts makes change an always existing possibility. We do thus observe processes of “de-bordering” pointing to possible changes not only in the drawing of specific borders, but also to the very function(s) borders serve, most radically from lines of conflict to lines of identification at which the utterance of non-conflictual discourses replaces the prior utterance of the various types of conflict communication referred to in our model of conflict stages. Conflict resolution in the sense of peaceful regulation will often leave the physical borders intact, but change their discursive construction and their symbolic place in the public debate, as well as the very appearance and symbolism of the border itself. Conflict resolution as the transformation of subject positions however will have to change the very nature of the border.

1.2.2. The impact of integration and association: Four pathways of EU impact

The project distinguished between four different pathways of EU impact in the transformation of border conflicts. These pathways relate to two dimensions: (a) whether the EU’s influence is direct or indirect – i.e. whether the impact is generated by concrete measures taken by EU actors, or as an effect of integration processes that are not directly influenced by EU actors; and (b) whether the impact is on concrete policies or more diffuse societal change. In conceptualising these four pathways of EU impact, we have made use of the work of Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall on different categories of power in international politics (Barnett and Duvall 2005). Barnett and Duvall distinguish between
direct and diffuse power, on the one hand (close to our second dimension), and power through the actions of specific actors or through social relations, on the other hand (close to our first dimension). We have also borrowed from Barnett and Duvall one of their categories of power (‘compulsory power’), but have otherwise varied the labels for our different forms of impact to provide a better fit with the specific questions the project was addressing.

**Approach by the EU**

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<tr>
<th>Target of impact</th>
<th>Actor-driven</th>
<th>Integration process</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>policy</td>
<td>(1) compulsory impact</td>
<td>(2) enabling impact</td>
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<tr>
<td>society</td>
<td>(3) connective impact</td>
<td>(4) constructive impact</td>
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**Table 1. Pathways of Impact of European Integration on Border Conflicts**

**Pathway 1 (compulsory impact)** works through ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’, compelling actors through the mechanisms of integration and association to change their policies vis-à-vis the other party towards conciliatory moves, rather than deepening securitisation (Dorussen 2001). The main carrot that the EU has at its disposal is membership (Wallace 2003; Grabbe 2006). In membership negotiations, as well as by setting conditions for the opening of membership negotiations, the EU insists on the implementation of its legal and normative framework, the *acquis communautaire*, including the resolution of border disputes (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). This path is obviously dependent on the desire of the conflict party to become an EU member: if such desire is lacking, the conflicting party will not regard membership as an incentive to change its policies. If it does follow the EU’s ‘carrot’, this does not necessarily imply that it has altered its views of the other party or its beliefs about the conflict – the change may simply reflect strategic behaviour. In that sense, while the compulsory impact is very effective in membership negotiations, its effects may be short-term and superficial. Yet, as Thomas Risse et al. have shown in their analysis of human rights and domestic reform, such strategic moves can, in the long run, and provided the right context, lead to deeper reforms through continued pressure and socialisation (Risse et al. 2001). In our case, EU membership can be considered a framework in which both pressure and socialisation are likely, thus linking compulsory impact with what we will below call constructive impact.

In comparison with membership, other EU incentives can be regarded as relatively minor in weight and importance. Association agreements do not entail all the benefits of full membership, in particular not the symbolic importance of being an EU member, as the debate about an alternative form of membership for Turkey has shown (Diez 2005a). Financial or other forms of aid or free trade agreements, part of the traditional set of diplomatic instruments to influence third parties, can be important ‘carrots’ especially outside the
geographical neighbourhood of the EU, but they are unlikely to be as attractive as membership. Likewise, the EU is short of ‘sticks’ (Smith, K. 1998; Hill 2001). While it can impose sanctions, its most important ‘stick’ consists in the withholding of ‘carrots’, in particular the threat of declining membership.

**Pathway 2 (enabling impact)** relies on specific actors within conflict parties to link their political agendas with the EU and, through reference to integration, justify desecuritising moves that may otherwise have not been considered legitimate (Buzan et al. 1998, 41-42). In conflict situations, civil society actors in favour of a peaceful resolution often fall victim to marginalisation and ridicule, or accusations of being traitors. Alternatively, in the heated atmosphere that characterises identity and particularly subordination conflicts, in which rally-around-the-flag effects drive policies, the public may push the governments and other political leaders towards further securitising moves (Adamson 2002). In either case, if EU membership or association are widely seen as an overarching goal, actors can use the legal and normative framework of the EU to substantiate their claims and delegitimise previously dominant positions. Perhaps ironically, if utilised by governments, this path relies on what is otherwise seen as a problematic feature of EU governance, its democratic deficit, in that political leaders use the EU framework to push through policies against the preferences of their electorate (Newman 1996: 189; cf. Moravcsik 2002: 612).

**Pathway 3 (connective impact)** supports contact between conflict parties, mainly through direct financial support of common activities. Such contact is not in itself, of course, a step towards desecuritisation. Sustained contact within the context of common projects may however lead to a broader societal effect in the form of social networks across conflict parties, which in turn should facilitate identity change as foreseen within the constructive impact below. Outside the EU, support for such activities largely takes the form of traditional grants (Stetter 2003). At the EU’s borders, as well as at member states borders, the Interreg programme provides funding for such cross-border cooperation. Within the EU, the PEACE programme in Northern Ireland is also an example of how structural funds, which are not part of the Interreg programme, can be used to support specifically cross-border and cross-communal projects (see Anderson and O’Dowd 1999).

**Pathway 4 (constructive impact)** is the most indirect but – if successful – also most persuasive mode of transformation, since it affects the underlying identity scripts of conflicts, thus supporting a (re-)construction of identities that permanently sustains peaceful relations between conflict parties. This pathway is based on the assumption that EU impact can put in place completely new discursive frameworks for creating novel ways of constructing and expressing identities within conflict regions, as the peaceful transformation of Western Europe since the end of the Second World War illustrates. These new identity scripts will foster desecuritisation in a virtuous circle. Ultimately, this may lead to the eventual resolution of the conflict, i.e. the disappearance of articulations of the incompatibility of subject positions. This is clearly a long-term process, but its applicability is corroborated by the claim that while there may not (yet) be a single European identity, ‘Europe’ has become an integral part of the identity/identities in each of the EU’s member states (Waever 1996). Whereas the compulsory impact is most effective at the stage of membership negotiations, constructive impact becomes most notable once membership has been achieved.

Due to its long-term character, the constructive impact is the most difficult one to trace in the framework of a three-year long research project, as indicators of change take longer time to appear. In addition, due to the nature of such slow structural change, many of
the features of the ‘old’ identity scripts are still in place and may in many cases overshadow the parallel developments in the new emerging frameworks of identification. Thus, evidence of the EU’s constructive impact has been the most evasive one in many EUBorderConf case studies, which does not however mean that it failed to take place.

While we have presented all paths as possibly leading to a reduction of securitisation, and therefore to a successful impact of integration on border conflict transformation, their influence can also be negative. Regarding the compulsory impact, this is for instance the case when new member states are required to implement certain policies to satisfy the *acquis*, which are seen as securitising moves by neighbouring states: the implementation of visa regimes on the border of Russia and the EU is an example. Likewise, integration can enable actors to pursue policies that have the effect of intensifying conflict discourse, such as in the case of Cyprus after accession, where Greek Cypriots have adopted the discourse of a ‘European solution’ to insist on the four freedoms that would have been compromised under the UN-sponsored Annan Plan for a solution in Cyprus, which had the backing of most other EU actors. EU policies can have a dis-connecting rather than a connective impact if new visa regimes make contact across the border more difficult, as is the case not only in Russia and Europe’s North, but also between Greece and Turkey. Finally, and in particular in cases of conflicts between EU member and non-member states, integration can foster the construction of a European identity in opposition to the neighbouring conflict party outside the EU. Whether or not integration does have an impact on border conflicts, and whether or not such an impact is positive or negative can therefore not be determined in the abstract, but is a matter of empirical investigation. Furthermore, the different paths do not occur in isolation from each other. Instead, we need to observe their interplay, including the reinforcing effects between them.

**1.3. The operation of pathways in border conflicts**

On the basis of the outlined pathway-model and the case studies, we specify whether and under what conditions integration and association have an impact on border conflict transformation. We argue, first, that in most cases integration and association contribute to a de-securitization of border conflicts, thereby largely confirming our hypothesis of the transformative power of integration. However, there are also cases in which EU impact has led to a further securitization of the conflict. This leads us to establish the conditions of positive and negative EU impact.

**1.3.1. Compulsory impact**

The overall pervasiveness of the compulsory impact of integration is subject to three conditions. Firstly, the compulsory impact operates most efficiently in situations of pending membership negotiations, while it loses much of its power without such a concrete offer and once membership has been attained. This pathway, secondly, crucially depends on the credibility of the membership offer. Only if a conflict party considers the carrot of membership an achievable option will it engage in de-securitizing moves. Third, the pervasiveness of the compulsory impact depends on the extent to which the legal and normative framework of integration has become ‘internalised’ by domestic actors.

Both the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom are members of the EU and therefore the Northern Ireland conflict is an internal conflict of the EU. It might thus at first sight be surprising that the compulsory impact of the EU on this conflict has been rather
limited. Yet this can be explained by the fact that during the pre-accession period in 1973, the then European Community (EC) provided no facilitating conditions for solving the conflict. The EC of the early 1970s was a different institution from the EU of the 1990s, when the linkage between a resolution of border conflicts and entry into the EU had become part of official policies. In 1973, border conflicts were considered a matter of national prerogative (Hayward 2004b).

In contrast, the compulsory impact is most obvious in the case of Greece and Turkey. Since Turkey’s EU membership candidacy, ‘policymakers [have been] careful to restrain themselves from further escalating crises, and worked towards improving bilateral relations’ (Rumelili 2004a: 7). Likewise, when Greece was a membership candidate, Greek policy-makers were careful not to undermine their prospect of membership through an intensification of the conflict with Turkey (Pridham 1991). However, in line with our set of conditions, the compulsory impact of the EU on Greece decreased after the country had joined the EC in 1981. It had also remained limited with regard to Turkey throughout most of the 1990s, when ‘Turkey did not perceive EU membership as a strong possibility (Rumelili 2004a: 9). In these periods, both Greek and Turkish policy-makers repeatedly resorted to securitising moves, at times coming to the brink of war. This illustrates how in pre-membership periods, without the constructive impact, de-securitisation is often a tactical tool for achieving EU membership, rather than an intrinsic value for policy-makers.

A similar effect can be observed in the case of Cyprus where the compulsory impact of the EU on both conflict parties was highly influential during membership negotiations with the RoC from 1997 to 2004. Yet it failed to pave the way for a long-term desecuritisation of this conflict after the RoC had joined the EU, due to the instrumental approach of Greek Cypriot policy-makers on possible concessions. The lukewarm approach by the EU, which tied ‘Cyprus’ EU accession to the negotiation process for resolution of the conflict, but disengaged it from an absolute requirement that such a resolution be reached’ did not foster the belief of Greek-Cypriot policy-makers that concessions to the other side should be made (Demetriou 2004b: 13-14; see also Brewin 2000; Diez 2002a). Thus the rejection of the Annan Plan by both the southern Cypriot government and the popular referendum in April 2004 showed the limits of the compulsory approach ‘when incentives and disincentives are not available at all stages of the conflict resolution process’ and when the value of desecuritisation has not been internalised by the political leadership and the wider society (Demetriou 2004b: 16). On the Turkish-Cypriot side, the compulsory impact was unlikely to set in because the official governmental position before 2003 had rejected EU membership under the conditions offered. Instead, the carrot of the material benefits of integration was largely aimed at society at large (Diez 2002a). Indeed, this was one factor contributing to the mass demonstrations against the regime of Rauf Denktash, although the crucial development that sparked off these demonstrations was not so much EU membership per se but a banking and general economic crisis in 2000 (Demetriou 2004b, 25-6; Diez 2005b; Lacher and Kaymak 2005).

In Europe’s North, too, the compulsory impact of the EU remained limited from the outset since the potential benefits of membership only extended to one side, central and eastern European countries, while Russia was deprived of ‘carrots’ stemming from any form of closer integration. The impact of the membership prospect in compelling hesitant governments of the Baltic States to improve the status of Russian minorities is well documented in the literature (Smith, D. 2003). However, this partial success of the compulsory impact has not been able to outweigh the increasing securitisation in EU-Russian
relations which emerged since the late 1990s in connection with the eastern enlargement of the EU and, in particular, the unilateral establishment by the EU of the Schengen border regime at its eastern external border with Russia. In protracted negotiations, which related in particular to the status of Kaliningrad, the Russian political leadership opposed fervently the proposals by the EU for a strict visa regime. However, on the European side the fear of various insecurity spill-overs from Russia into the EU prevailed and thus limited all attempts to provide for more significant integration between Russia and the EU beyond the vague concept of ‘four spaces of cooperation’ which offers little in the form of a credible commitment by the EU for greater integration (Wallace 2003). In the light of these developments, with its ‘failure to offer a ‘carrot’ of visa-free or even more relaxed visa arrangements to Russia’ the EU deprived itself of a potential impact on Russia – and hence a desecuritisation of its own conflict with Russia – that would have been possible in a situation characterised by ‘a stronger degree of integration’ and a lesser insistence on a highly securitised border regime (Prozorov 2005: 6). These developments led to the emergence rather than the disappearance of a new type of border conflict in Europe’s North, a conflict in which the EU has turned into a main conflict party. It can thus be argued that as far as Russia is concerned, the compulsory impact of the EU has been ‘generative rather than ameliorative of new conflictual dispositions between both sides’ (Prozorov 2005: 1).

In the Middle East, membership of Israel or Palestine in the EU has not been considered an option, despite isolated voices in both Europe and the Middle East which have proposed EU membership of Israel as a ‘carrot’ for obtaining Israeli concessions towards the Palestinians (Schael 2002). The compulsory impact of the EU in the region has until now remained limited to the association of both Israel and Palestine with the EU in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). However, despite its ambitious peace-building and regionalisation agenda, the EMP-setting has de facto not amounted to more than a stronger economic integration of Israel and Palestine with the EU with only a marginal impact on desecuritisation of the Middle East conflict (Stetter 2004). Thus, the entry into force of new Association Agreements with both Israel and Palestine in the late 1990s has not been able to prevent the massive violence which occurred during the Second Intifada (2000-2004). Nor has it been able to prevent a growing alienation between the Israeli government and the official EU level in this period, as a result of their divergent perceptions of the conflict in the Middle East (Peters and Dachs 2004). It would however be inaccurate to dismiss entirely any compulsory impact of the EU on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This does not primarily relate, as is often argued in the literature, to the potential ‘sticks’, such as a trade boycott, which the EU can deploy vis-à-vis Israel, but rather to the long-term effects of Israel’s close association with the EU. Thus, a report by the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office has argued that it is in Israel’s own interest to seek an internationally accepted solution to the conflict in order not to endanger its relations with the EU, which have become too important to Israel to be dismissed as irrelevant (The Guardian, 14/10/2004).

1.3.2. Enabling impact

For a pervasive impact of the EU on border conflict transformation, compulsory impact alone does not suffice. In order to successfully contribute to long-term conflict change, the carrot of integration or association must also empower a political leadership in conflict societies that is able to legitimise, through reference to the acquis, desecuritising moves within their wider domestic constituency. However, this impact and its modalities are also dependent on a
number of conditions. The first of these relates to the perceived legitimacy of references to integration for desecuritising moves and to the basis of this legitimacy, which can be limited to a narrow political elite or reach out to a wider societal base. The second condition concerns the degree to which integration or association become overarching policy goals and overshadow the powerful securitisation discourses in conflict societies.

In Northern Ireland the enabling impact of the EU on the conflict was considerable, especially on the legitimisation of desecuritising moves. This was particularly true in the 1990s, when the Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) of John Hume successfully linked its conflict resolution agenda with the issue of European integration. As ‘a model of conflict resolution’, the EU has had ‘an undoubtedly crucial influence on the ideology espoused by Hume and the SDLP over the past twenty-five years, during which time the politician and his party played a central role in redefining nationalistic policies in Ireland and in the peace process that led to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement’ (Hayward 2004b: 7; Laffan 2001). However, the emergence of the nationalistic Sinn Féin as the largest Catholic party in Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement also points to the limits of the EU’s enabling impact (cf. Cunningham 1997) due to ‘lack of popular identification with the SDLP’s pro-European ideology and with the EU in general’ (Hayward 2004b: 7). In addition, the EC/EU has also offered an institutional framework that regularly brought the heads of government of Britain and Ireland together at European Council meetings. During the 1983 European Council meeting in Brussels, for instance, ‘[Irish] Taioseach FitzGerald and [British Prime Minister] Thatcher held their first meeting in fifteen months,’ which was perceived as the major ‘turnaround in British-Irish relations at this time’ (ibid.). Council meetings provided the opportunity as well as the legitimacy to engage in such meetings, which otherwise would have been met with far greater controversy.

As far as the relations between Greece and Turkey are concerned, the literature on the gradual Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy documents well the enabling impact of the European integration (Ioakimidis 1994, Ugur 1999). Rather than using Greece’s EU membership as a tool against Turkey, which was the dominant instrumental approach throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s, Greek policy-makers increasingly began to see the Europeanisation of Turkey as a recipe for sustained desecuritisation. The very existence of the EU as a reference point for ‘peaceful relations as a natural outcome of Europeanisation … legitimises, and renders rational, that Greece should work towards bringing its main rival into the European Union’ (Rumelili 2004b: 16). In a similar way the Turkish political leadership demonstrates a ‘perception of the EU as a successful security community, which defuses interstate conflicts … and serves to legitimise the joint efforts to gain membership in the EU and to resolve the outstanding disputes with Greece’ (ibid.: 17). A key effect of this growing relevance of the enabling impact on the Greek and Turkish political leadership is reflected in the shift of balance between advocates of desecuritisation and securitisation. As Millas has argued with a view to the period of sustained rapprochement since 1999, ‘the talkers and the silent ones have changed places. There have always been both hawks and doves in the two countries. Before, the environment was hospitable to the hawks; now, it is more suited to the doves (Millas 2004: 21). There is little doubt in the literature that this hospitable environment came about mainly due to the legitimising effect of the enabling impact of integration (Rumelili 2004a).

A decisive problem with the compulsory impact in the Cyprus conflict has been the particular and selective interpretation of EU norms by the Greek Cypriot political leadership, which, despite long-lasting negotiations between 1997 and 2004, retained an instrumental
approach to European integration. In this respect, the enabling impact led to a rearticulation of securitisation rather than desecuritisation. The situation in the Turkish north of the island was however different and here we observe a considerable role of the enabling impact in fostering desecuritisation. This relates in particular to the empowerment of an alternative political agenda of the Turkish-Cypriot opposition which successfully managed to couple the issues of détente in relations with the south, the entry of northern Cyprus into the EU and replacement of the old Denktash government. This enabling impact of the EU became visible in the parliamentary elections in northern Cyprus in 2003, in which the peace-oriented opposition party, with its main election slogan being ‘Europe is within sight’, defeated the nationalistic Denktash government (Demetriou 2005a: 23).

The enabling impact of the EU has been the most pervasive pathway through which the EU has impacted the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This relates in particular to the Palestinian side, where elements of ‘socialisation of policy-makers … into a “European discourse”’ can be identified (Newman and Yacobi 2004b: 23). The enabling impact of the EU has contributed, among other factors, to the establishment of a new factor in Palestinian politics, namely a broad coalition of actors that started to push since the late 1990s for democratic elections, a real division of powers, a dual executive and the constitutionalisation of the Palestinian polity (Jamal 2001). While the emergence of this new movement has not prevented the increasing securitisation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after the failed Camp David Summit of September 2000, it has nevertheless led to significant changes in this period, which unfolded after the death of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat in November 2004, when Israeli-Palestinian relations cautiously improved. Among these changes are the enactment of a Palestinian Basic Law in 2003 and the establishment of the office of a Palestinian Prime Minister. The potential but also the limits of the enabling impact in the Middle East become especially visible when looking at how the experience of integration becomes linked to the particular conflict. Thus in both Israel and Palestine, it has become commonplace to refer to European integration as an example that conflicts between long-time foes can be overcome in a cooperative manner (Asseburg 2003). Accordingly, peace initiatives, such as the Oslo Process or the recent Geneva Initiative, are ‘associated with Europe’ even if the EU has not actively participated in the design of these peace frameworks (Newman and Yacobi 2004b: 7). However, a central shortcoming of the enabling impact by the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict closely relates to an observation which we made on some other case-studies, i.e. the limited societal reach of new discourses. In the Middle East, this has to do both with a deep-seated skepticism towards Europe in Israel and, to a lesser extent, in Palestine as well as with the remarkable embeddedness of highly securitised views on the conflict even amongst moderates in both societies (e.g. Morris 2004).

### 1.3.3. Connective impact

A successful transformation of border conflicts depends on the extent to which desecuritisation reaches out beyond the more narrow political elite and builds up a wider societal base. This serves as a rationale for the EU’s direct support of contacts between societal actors of the conflict parties, which we have labeled the connective impact of integration and association. The actual success depends, first, on the ability of the EU to support not only the already ‘convinced’, but to reach out to actors that would presumably not adopt a desecuritisation agenda without the EU’s support. Secondly, it depends on the extent
to which financial assistance of the EU is accepted in conflict societies as a legitimate tool rather than as external interference into domestic affairs.

The EU’s connective impact on the conflict in Northern Ireland is widely acknowledged in the literature (see Meehan 2000). The EU played a crucial role in ‘shaping community development in Northern Ireland and the border counties [of Ireland]’ (Hayward 2004b: 22). The main pillars on which EU support for wider societal initiatives is based are the Interreg program as well as the PEACE program, which operate under the umbrella of the structural funds of the EU. Their impact relates in particular to the development of manifold cross-border projects in Northern Ireland and adjacent regions in the Republic of Ireland (Bradley and Hamilton 1999). With both Britain and Ireland being members of the Union, the EU could make use of the cross-border component of the Single Market Program as an indirect means to desecuritise the conflict in Northern Ireland. As a ‘powerful, and neutral, economic actor or, more specifically, material benefactor … the EU has become a main stimulator for community development on both sides of the border’ (Hayward 2004b: 26). What matters for our analysis, is that this massive financial support of the EU in Northern Ireland has led, despite various institutional obstacles in the rapid implementation of funds, to a remarkable desecuritisation of inter-communal relations (see Teague 1996). This is most obvious at the Irish-British border in Northern Ireland, where strong financial support from the EU has transformed this border from being a protected line of division into an area characterised by cross-border economic and infrastructure development. It should, however, be noted that despite the noteworthy impact of the EU through its funding mechanisms, the connective pathway has been limited in its overall societal reach. Thus, as we will argue further with a view to the constructive impact, the lines of division in Northern Ireland have not disappeared but have rather moved to the micro-level of specific boroughs or streets into which the connective impact of the EU has not yet penetrated.

Large-scale direct funding of societal actors in Greece and Turkey has only begun after the bilateral rapprochement since 1999. The connective impact of the EU operates through two main grant programmes, the first one being the Greek-Turkish civic dialogue programme, which started in 2002 and has a budget of € 8 million. The second grant, established in 2004, provides € 35 million of funds for cross-border projects between Turkey and Greece under the umbrella of the Interreg III programme. With these projects the EU attempts directly to support those NGOs in the two countries which advocate a desecuritisation agenda, but also, through the Interreg programme, to widen the societal base of successful conflict transformation. The relatively late timing in the actual establishment of these funds indicates that the connective impact has not been the driving force of desecuritisation in the Greek-Turkish context. Yet, as an important underpinning of desecuritisation, its impact should not be entirely dismissed. This is particularly true for Turkey, where EU funding of wider societal organisation – in the absence of alternative domestic sources of funding – has become a crucial factor in the Turkish reform process (Belge 2004b). ‘The impact of EU funding has been strongest in cases where the EU has specifically supported local and grassroots organisations, successfully combined the objectives of Greek-Turkish cooperation and Turkish civil society development, and facilitated the formation of new partnerships between Greek and Turkish organisations’ (Rumelili 2004b: 15). Without a domestic environment that would be conducive to intensified Greek-Turkish cooperation, these funding efforts would risk to support only the already ‘convinced’ without making a larger impact on the conflict. Against this background, the pervasiveness of the connective impact can be better scrutinized once the projects for
Greek-Turkish cooperation under the Interreg III programme, which addresses a wider range of issues than a more peace-oriented civic society, will be implemented.

Through funding bicommmunal projects in the framework of the civil society programme, which the EU launched in 2003, it aims to bring together Greek and Turkish Cypriot individuals and NGOs, thus making use of opportunities offered by the opening of the Green Line by the TRNC administration in April 2003. While the impact of the projects funded under this program can not, at this stage, be assessed, the connective impact of the EU can clearly be discerned in its support, prior to 2003, of Turkish Cypriot NGOs with a de-securitization agenda, in particular the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, the main driving force in the run-up to the massive pro-EU and pro-peace demonstrations in northern Cyprus in early 2003. The Chamber was particularly aware of the ‘impact of the international isolation of the north and the possibilities that a solution [to the conflict] coupled with entry into the EU could unleash’ and due to its powerful societal role became a crucial target of EU funding (Demetriou 2004b: 23).

While in Europe’s North, the compulsory and enabling impact of the EU are severely limited and have not prevented an increasing securitization of EU-Russian relations as a result of the strict border divide between Russia and the EU’s eastern external borders, the connective impact has to some extent been able to counterbalance this development. This is particularly true for the Finnish-Russian borderland, in which the Euregio Karelia, which is part of the Interreg programme, provides for an institutional framework of cross-border cooperation on the wider societal level (Forsberg 1995). The Euregio Karelia, which was established in 2000, has been considered a noteworthy example of integrating the EU-Russian borderland, since ‘the Euregio project consists in [the] involvement of a wider array of actors, both local and regional politicians and non-governmental organisations, in the coordination of cooperative activities’ (Prozorov 2004b: 15). In addition, the Russian Republic of Karelia has throughout the 1990s been one of the main recipients of Tacis funds. The overall positive assessment in the literature of the EU’s connective impact in Europe’s North has however one important caveat, the negative impact of the Schengen border regime outlined above (Prozorov 2004a; Cronberg 2003a). This concerns not only institutional obstacles to a joint development of the border region faced by wider societal actors, but also the disruption that the new border regime has introduced to traditional cross-border cooperation in this region. Thus, an exclusive focus on ‘developing new forms of cooperation silences the question of whether … efforts in this direction might not in fact be squarely antagonistic and detrimental to antecedent cooperative practices,’ which developed in this region throughout the 1990s in the economic and cultural sector and which have come under stress since enlargement (Prozorov 2005: 4).

Like the enabling impact, the connective impact of the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is more pervasive than the compulsory pathway (Stetter 2004). The metaphor that ‘the EU is a payer but no player’ in the Middle East conflict illustrates this argument (Behrendt and Hanelt 2000). Indeed, the EU has in the 1990s become the single most important financial contributor to the peace process and supporter of the PA. Part of this funding included financial support for peace-oriented NGOs in both Israel and Palestine as well as to the development of a Palestinian civil society through the support of democracy projects and economic and infrastructure development (Stetter 2003). This has sparked harsh criticism from the hawkish sectors of society. To pick but one example, a right-wing monitor group in Israel has claimed that the EU’s support of peace-oriented projects is contributing to the promotion of NGOs with an ‘extremist “post-Zionist agenda”’ or ‘radical NGOs in the
Israeli-Arab sector, which disseminate false allegations of discrimination and Israeli human rights abuses’ (Steinberg 2004: 8-9). This delegitimisation of EU support measures as betraying the respective ‘national causes’ can only be understood as stemming from the concern that the connective impact of the EU might eventually empower an alternative agenda to the dominant securitisation discourse in both Israel and Palestine. Given the positive connotations of the reference to the ‘European integration experience’ in the Middle East, such a concern may not be entirely unwarranted. Yet the connective impact of the EU in the Middle East has had its shortcomings. Several authors have referred to the untransparent and slow implementation procedures which hampered the overall pervasiveness of EU funding in the region, thus pointing to a problem which EU funding also encountered in some of our other case-studies (Stetter 2003). Moreover, there have been accusations that EU funding was partially misused by the PA in order to support terrorist activities during the Second Intifada. While the EU admitted that ‘there had not been an adequate system of control over the use of these funds’, these accusations have had a negative impact on the EU’s role in the conflict since they underpinned a growingly skeptical attitude towards the EU in Israel over the past few years (Newman and Yacobi 2004a: 35).

1.3.4. Constructive impact

In our previous discussion of pathways we have often stressed the crucial role of the societal diffusion of desecuritisation agendas. Any long-term transformation of conflicts crucially depends on a change in identity constructions in conflict societies, to the extent that subject positions are no longer regarded as incompatible and the relevance of addressing previous conflict issues loses in attraction.

In spite of the set-backs in the Northern Ireland peace process after the Good Friday Agreement, the conflict has not reached levels of securitisation which characterised the previous decades. This has to do with the fact that integration has offered an alternative frame for identity constructions in Northern Ireland and empowered ‘previously silent sections of the population’ (Hayward 2004b: 8), particularly in the mainly Protestant southern border districts of Northern Ireland. While initially these communities were very hesitant to apply for funding under the PEACE program, over time more and more Protestant groups started applying for funding of cross-border projects, which led to a subtle reassessment of identities (Hayward 2004b: 12). In this way, the EU has initiated a redefinition of previously inimical identities in the border region (see also Meehan 2000). We do not argue that this identity change has affected all sectors of society in Northern Ireland, nor that it has permanently shifted the balance of power in favor of peace-oriented identities. Yet, it has made possible many of the cross-border projects, which would have been unthinkable only a decade earlier. Furthermore, in the Northern Ireland context the EU became an explicit source of inspiration for reconsidering identities to such an extent that cooperation with the other side, once unthinkable, has become a reality.

The significance of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement since 1999 lies not so much in the actual resolution of the various disputed issues, but rather in the societal diffusion of a sustained de-securitization agenda (see Tarikayha 2004). While prior to 1999 desecuritising moves by the political leadership often met public rejection due to widespread nationalistic readings of the conflict, this situation has crucially changed after 1999. Up to 1999, both Greece and Turkey employed references to ‘Europe’ as a means of castigating the other as non-European, thereby drawing a sharp dividing line between the countries. In Greece, it was
the acceptance of the country as a member of the Euro-Zone in 1999 which paved the way for a ‘positive identification with the EU, which manifested itself in increased willingness to use the EU as a foundation for the resolution of its disputes with Turkey according to EU norms’; whereas Turkey’s acceptance as a candidate country in 1999 ‘has accelerated the process of internalisation of EU norms in Turkey, and paved the way for the perception of EU norms and procedures as a neutral basis to build a cooperative relationship with Greece’ (Rumelili 2004a: 20). In other words, the normative framework of the EU has become internalized by a growing number of Greeks and Turks and this provided the societal basis for the aforementioned shift of balance between ‘talkers’ and ‘silent ones’ (Rumelili 2004b: 26).

The constructive impact of the EU on the Cyprus conflict is manifested most prominently in the linkage between a solution to the conflict and the idea of Europe, which has become particularly visible in the massive pro-peace demonstrations in northern Cyprus in 2002 and 2003 where many demonstrators waved EU flags. The effect was to reshuffle political allegiances, as the demonstrations ‘established a connection between Turkish- and Greek-Cypriots who supported the same cause, even without being able to have contact with each other, and thus fostered a change of identification of the civil society of the conflicting parties from ethnic (Greek/Turkish) to political (pro-solution and rejectionist)’ (Demetriou 2004b: 25-26). In southern Cyprus, the constructive impact operated in a less pervasive manner. While there are also examples of a linkage between EU membership and a pro-solution approach, what dominated in the south was an attempt to link EU membership with a more nationalist agenda. This became possible because with membership only granted to the Republic of Cyprus, the northern part of the island could be referred to as being outside Europe. This conforms to our hypothesis of a potentially negative impact of integration on border conflicts at the EU external borders.

A similar effect resulting from a strict external border regime is at play in Europe’s North. The combination of various conflictive issues in EU-Russian relations, ranging from the stringent visa regime to different interpretations of the 1999 Kosovo war by NATO or the Russian war in Chechnya, have fostered a sense of difference between the sides. Thus, the aforementioned sense of exclusion has penetrated the identity dimension of even pro-European sectors of Russian society. It ‘centres on the problematisation of the increasingly common equation of the cultural or civilisational concept of Europe with the normative and administrative apparatus of the EU, an equation which excludes Russia by definition as the only “non-European European country”’ (Prozorov 2005: 13-14). This lack of meaningful integration between the EU and Russia has contributed to a greater securitization of EU-Russian relations. Thus, contrary to the situation during the Yeltzin Presidency, when calls for greater cooperation and integration between the EU and Russia were more prominent, the subsequent years have been dominated by discourses which advocate an inherent difference between Russia and the EU on the identity dimension (Prozorov 2005: 17). The flipside of this is the representation of the new member states in central and Eastern Europe as ‘more European’ than their bigger neighbor in the East (Neumann 1998).

The constructive impact of the EU on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains limited for two reasons. On the one hand, the relatively weak integration provided for by the association of Israel and Palestine with the EU in the EMP setting constrains the pervasiveness of the EU’s constructive impact from the outset. On the other hand, a rather ambivalent attitude towards the EU on the identity level further limits the EU’s ability to become an uncontested reference point for a reconstruction of identities and sustained de-securitisation (Newman and Yacobi 2004a). This is particularly true for Israel where ‘anti-
European sentiments’ have proliferated in recent years and where due to its negative images the EU has become part of – rather than a safeguard against - securitisation discourses (Newman and Yacobi 2005: 14). As Peters and Dachs argue, the ‘negative image of Europe in the Israeli media and political arena abound and are rarely challenged … The majority of Israelis regard Europeans as caring little for Israel’s long-term security’ (Peters and Dachs 2004: 6). These negative images with regard to the role of the EU in the Middle East conflict stand however in a complex relationship with the positive endorsement which contemporary Europe, and in particular European integration, receives in Israel, where large segments of the ‘public are favourably disposed towards Europe’. This is for example reflected in the growing number of applications by Israelis for a second passport of one of the EU’s member states, but also in the results of several opinion polls which indicate that eighty-five per cent of Israelis are in favor of Israeli membership in the EU (Peters and Dachs 2004: 6). Torn between attraction to and historically and politically shaped suspicion of Europe, the ‘ambivalent relationship’ between the EU and Israel limits the capacity of the constructive pathway to become an enthusiastically endorsed reference point for a long-term reconstruction of identities in this region (Newman and Yacobi 2004a).

1.4. Conclusions

Our empirical analysis allows us to derive a number of preliminary conclusions about the impact of and interplay between the four pathways of border conflict transformation, as well as the conditions for positive or negative impact of integration and association, which we hope will be tested further in other case studies. As far as the compulsory impact is concerned, we have argued that this pathway works best within the framework of a credible membership perspective. If there is such a perspective or if negotiations are already under way, conflict parties avoid securitising moves in order not to endanger the membership perspective. This has been the case in Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, as well as Central and Eastern Europe. However, without a credible membership perspective (Turkey prior to 1999) or once membership has been achieved (Cyprus), the compulsory impact loses much of its leverage, as it does under the condition of the weak form of integration offered by association (Israel-Palestine).

These structural limitations of the compulsory impact beg the questions of the extent to which policy-makers in conflict regions have internalised the norms and values of the EU and the degree to which they are able to legitimise desecuritising moves through reference to European integration. Our analysis has shown that this enabling impact of the EU has played a major role in conflict transformation, either through a long-term socialisation of policy-makers into European normative discourses (Greece, Northern Ireland) or the empowerment of alternative desecuritisation discourses (Turkey, Northern Cyprus, Northern Ireland). However, we also have referred to instances in which reference to the EU has, for different reasons, legitimised further securitisation. Such a constellation becomes more likely if only one conflict party becomes integrated into the EU, while the other side is subject to a more or less strict external border regime (Cyprus, Europe’s North) or if both conflict parties remain outside the institutional framework of integration (Israel-Palestine). In such cases, reference to the EU is often used in order to reinscribe difference rather than promote cooperation.

The EU encourages cooperation on a wider societal level inter alia through financial support of peace-oriented actors. The pathway leading to a connective impact is a key strategy, working either through directly supporting peace-oriented groups (Cyprus, Greece-
Turkey, Israel-Palestine, Europe’s North, in particular Karelia, and Northern Ireland) or through community development which only indirectly relates to cross-border cooperation, such as economic development in border areas (Northern Ireland). We have also however pointed to the disruptive effect of a strict external border regime on antecedent forms of cross-border cooperation, impeded by partial integration of conflict parties into the EU (Europe’s North). We have furthermore emphasised that the connective impact of the EU loses in pervasiveness due to complicated funding provisions, which slow down, obstruct and therefore limit the power of this pathway (Greece-Turkey, Europe’s North, Israel-Palestine, Northern Ireland).

Corresponding to our initial observation that conflicts are constituted by an incompatibility of subject positions, the most pervasive form of conflict transformation relates to overcoming such incompatibilities. Hence our argument that the constructive impact is the most powerful, but also the most demanding pathway of EU impact. The constructive impact depends – more than all others – on a high degree of integration and internalisation of European norms of conflict resolution on a wider societal level. This is, at least to some extent, the case in those conflict societies that have for a long-time been integrated into the EU (Northern Ireland, Greece), or where at least the credible perspective of integration supports such a gradual change of scripts (Turkey). This impact is largely negligible under the condition of association (Israel-Palestine), while it operates in a conflict-enhancing manner if cross-boundary measures clash with the establishment of a strict external border regime (Europe’s North), or with particularistic interpretations of European identity (Europe’s North, Cyprus).

A second condition for negative EU impact relates to the perception of conflict parties that the EU is biased in favour of one side of the conflict, thereby reinforcing pre-existent negative images of the EU in conflict regions, in which case the EU can even become a reference point for further securitisation (Israel, Russia, Turkey before 1999).

Through the prospect of as well as the instruments offered by integration and, to a much lesser degree, association, the European Union and European integration have a significant impact on the transformation of border conflicts. However, unlike the much-cited example of the resolution of the Franco-German conflict seems to suggest, this impact is by no means automatic or unidirectional. Rather, as, for example, in the case of Europe’s North, this impact can also be negative and conflict-enhancing. Mainly, however, the above analysis has shown that a study of the EU’s influence on the transformation of border conflicts, and thus of the relationship between integration and peace in a wider sense, requires taking into account a variety of possible pathways of influence which have bearing on very different aspects of complex conflict constellations.
2. Background and objectives of the project

2.1. Background

With the 2004 and possible future enlargements, the European Union (EU) is facing an increasing number of border conflicts, both within its territory and on its own external borders. These conflicts are defined by incompatible identities and interests of states or actors aspiring to statehood on two sides of a geographic line that is either an international border or is seen by at least one of the actors as such a border, even though it may not be internationally recognised as such. These conflicts may not necessarily involve physical violence, although those that do tend to be higher on the political agenda. Some of the most contested cases in which new EU members are involved include the division of Cyprus, the future status of Kaliningrad as an enclave surrounded by EU territory, and contested borders between the Baltic states and Russia. These have been added to the already existing conflicts both within the EU (e.g. Northern Ireland) and at the EU’s borders (e.g. Turkey-Greece).

At the same time as these border conflicts persist, the EU is often seen as one of the driving factors in having transformed Western Europe from a zone of ever re-occurring war into a zone of lasting peace, and substantially downgrading and transforming many of its internal borders in this process. While the very process of integration in this sense has led to the evolution of a ‘security community’ among former long-time foes, the proliferation of cross-border co-operation in the context of the Interreg programme, which not only embraces co-operation within the EU, but also among border regions at its current outer borders, can be seen to supplement the developments in the realm of ‘high politics’ by attempts to promote integration on a micro-scale in cross-border regions.

This record suggests that the EU as a regional organisation and the process of European integration have the potential to transform border conflicts and to create and deepen a security community. Whereas there is widespread recognition of the Union’s success in this respect, however, little is known about the conditions under which Union involvement in border conflicts can be successful, i.e. the conditions under which the Union can contribute to the transformation of a border from being the source of violent conflicts to providing a focal point for the construction of common identities or disappearing. Likewise, there has been little investigation of the various instruments of the EU’s influence as well as the actual processes through which this influence occurs. Such knowledge will, however, be central to turn enlargement into a success, and to avoid it being overshadowed by the increasing number of border conflicts at the Union’s fringes and, at some point after enlargement, possibly within it. It will also help to promote the further development of civil society in those countries affected by border disputes. This development of civil society, helped by the EU, will be a crucial step to integrate the people living in regions of border conflicts in a wider, peaceful European society, and to enable them to participate actively in policy-making processes not only in their respective regions but also within the EU at large.
2.2 Objectives

The central objective of the EUBorderConf project was to establish the conditions under which and the processes through which the EU as a regional organisation can, through membership or association, help to transform the nature of borders from lines of conflict to lines of co-operation. It is important to note, however, that the effect of integration can lead to decreasing as well as to intensifying conflict at the border.

This central objective entailed the following, more specific objectives:

1) To establish the domestic and international conditions under which borders conflicts can be effectively managed or resolved through EU membership or association with the EU. This includes the analysis of the type of and therefore the specific sources of border conflicts.

2) To identify the crucial actors within border regions through which the EU can contribute to the transformation of conflictual borders.

3) To establish the political and societal processes through which EU membership or association with the EU contributes to the transformation of such borders.

4) To identify the interplay between the EU, other intergovernmental and other international non-governmental organisation in the transformation of such borders.

5) To summarise and evaluate a hitherto dispersed literature on the transformation of border conflicts within the EU.

6) To provide detailed accounts of case studies of the EU’s involvement in border conflicts under a clear comparative framework, which may be used as a basis for further empirical studies and theoretical reflection.

7) To develop a scheme that helps actors to identify early warning signs of when a border dispute is likely to turn into a violent conflict, and to relate this scheme to the conditions and processes identified as a fulfilment of O1 and O2.

8) Building on O1-O4 in particular, to provide guidance to those involved in dealing with border conflicts within the framework of the EU as to how to best contribute to the achievement of the desired outcome of a peaceful border transformation, and therefore a sustainable conflict resolution.

9) To contribute to a wider debate about the changing nature of borders in the Post-Cold War by providing a systematic analysis of the impact of a regional organisation on border conflicts.
3. Scientific description of the project results and methodology.

3.1. Theoretical Framework

3.1.1. Definitions and the model of conflict stages

Determining whether integration or association has had a positive impact on border conflict transformation requires a definition of conflict. In this project, a discursive definition of conflict as the articulation of the incompatibility of subject positions is adopted. More simply put, the existence of a conflict can be observed when an actor constructs her identity or interests in such a way that these cannot be made compatible with the identity or interests of another actor. A definition of conflict as discursively constructed implies that, on the one hand, violence is not considered a necessary element of conflict, while on the other hand, we do not regard as conflicts what the literature refers to as ‘latent’ conflicts, in which an incompatibility is deducted from ‘objective’ predispositions rather than actual communication (Efinger et al. 1988; Diez et al., 2006).

A specific mode to capture conflict communication in the border conflict cases is securitisation, which the project defined, following Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, as the representation of the other as an existential threat which justifies extraordinary measures (Buzan et al. 1998: 21, 24; Buzan and Wæver 2003: 71). Securitisation takes place when actors articulate an incompatibility by referring to an Other as an existential threat to the self. In observing securitisation, the project focused in particular on public discourse, as it is there that border conflicts gain political salience. This approach allowed us to assess degrees of securitisation, which are to do with the extent to which individual attempts to securitise (so-called ‘securitising moves’) gain acceptance by other members of the group or society, the frequency with which securitising moves occur, and the extent to which a given group or society perceives the threat of the other as ‘existential’.

Regarding the transformation of border conflicts, the project has adopted an ideal-typical model of conflict stages that formed the basis for our analysis of EU impact. Transformation then refers to the transition from one stage of conflict to another. The continuum of conflict stages is established by the following variables: (a) the intensity of securitisation and (b) the infiltration of societal life by securitisation (see also Messmer 2003). An increasing intensity of securitisation is characterised by a greater stress on the existentiality of the threat; an increased frequency of securitising moves, as well as their greater acceptance by the public. Whether securitisation is accepted by the political elites, individual societal groups or the society at large, allows us to determine the degree of infiltration of society by securitisation.

Conflict is at its weakest if the articulation of an incompatibility occurs as a one-off, isolated incidence with no reference to an existential threat, which we call a conflict episode. An issue conflict displays conflict communication that is limited to a particular issue and contains no or few securitising moves. Issue conflicts are largely about specific conflicting interests. Although identities are partly expressed through interests, at the stage of issue conflicts the parties do not explicitly invoke identities as such as part of the conflict. This, however, becomes the case in identity conflicts, where securitising moves abound and
existential threats to the ‘self’ become explicitly articulated as a clear reference to an identity dimension. The other becomes viewed as a source and the cause of conflictive issues, whose resolution is ultimately linked to the nature (and sometimes the very existence) of the ‘other’. Conflict communication begins to overshadow most spheres of societal life. In the final stage of subordination conflicts, the conflicting parties widely accept the existential threat posed by the other, as well as the need to counter this threat with extraordinary measures (including violence). Conflict communication dominates all aspects of societal life, including the interpersonal level.

Figure 1: Stages of conflict (as modified from Messmer 2003)

From an empirical perspective, these different conflict stages are not discrete, but rather overlapping zones on a continuum between conflict episodes and subordination conflicts. The purpose of distinguishing between stages is not to classify a conflict unambiguously as belonging to one or another stage, but rather to observe movements along this continuum over time. Thus, it is possible to argue that integration or association have had a positive impact on a border conflict if they have contributed to the movement of a conflict from a stage of greater conflict intensity to stages of lower intensity. When this is the case, we may observe, for instance, that the representation of the other side as an existential threat becomes confined to specific issues in both parliamentary debates and newspaper commentaries; that more actors contest securitising moves instead of readily accepting and engaging in them; or that new editions of school books begin to stress commonalities, rather than incompatibilities, between the parties involved. Conversely, integration and association can be seen to have had a negative impact if a conflict intensifies and moves, for instance, from an issue conflict to an identity conflict.
3.1.2 The impact of integration and association: Four pathways of EU impact

The project distinguished between four different pathways of EU impact in the transformation of border conflicts. These pathways relate to two dimensions: (a) whether EU’s influence is direct or indirect – i.e. whether the impact is generated by concrete measures taken by EU actors, or as an effect of integration processes that are not directly influenced by EU actors; and (b) whether the impact is on concrete policies or more diffuse societal change. In conceptualising these four pathways of EU impact, we have made use of the work of Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall on different categories of power in international politics (Barnett and Duvall 2005). Barnett and Duvall distinguish between direct and diffuse power, on the one hand (close to our second dimension), and power through the actions of specific actors or through social relations, on the other hand (close to our first dimension). Barnett and Duvall’s framework is a useful starting point because, firstly, the ‘impact’ we study signifies an effect of power, and, secondly, it allows for analysing the different forms of power in a complementary way, by observing their interplay, rather than setting different forms of power against each other. We have also borrowed from Barnett and Duvall one of their categories of power (‘compulsory power’), but have otherwise varied the labels for our different forms of impact to provide a better fit with the specific questions the project was addressing.

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<td><strong>Integration process</strong></td>
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<td>(2) enabling impact</td>
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<td>(4) constructive impact</td>
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Table 1: Pathways of Impact of European Integration on Border Conflicts

Pathway 1 (compulsory impact) works through ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’, compelling actors through the mechanisms of integration and association to change their policies vis-à-vis the other party towards conciliatory moves, rather than deepening securitisation (Dorussen 2001). The main carrot that the EU has at its disposal is membership (Wallace 2003). In membership negotiations, as well as by setting conditions for the opening of membership negotiations, the EU insists on the implementation of its legal and normative framework, the *acquis communautaire*, including the resolution of border disputes (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). This path is obviously dependent on the desire of the conflict party to become an EU member: if such desire is lacking, the conflicting party will not regard membership as an incentive to change its policies. If it does follow the EU’s ‘carrot’, this does not necessarily...
imply that it has altered its views of the other party or its beliefs about the conflict – the change may simply reflect strategic behaviour. In that sense, while the compulsory impact is very effective in membership negotiations, its effects may be short-term and superficial. Yet, as Thomas Risse et al. have shown in their analysis of human rights and domestic reform, such strategic moves can, in the long run, and provided the right context, lead to deeper reforms through continued pressure and socialisation (Risse et al. 2001). In our case, EU membership can be considered a framework in which both pressure and socialisation are likely, thus linking compulsory impact with what we will below call constructive impact.

In comparison with membership, other EU incentives can be regarded as relatively minor in weight and importance. Association agreements do not entail all the benefits of full membership, in particular not the symbolic importance of being an EU member, as the debate about an alternative form of membership for Turkey has shown (Diez 2005a). Financial or other forms of aid or free trade agreements, part of the traditional set of diplomatic instruments to influence third parties, can be important ‘carrots’ especially outside the geographical neighbourhood of the EU, but they are unlikely to be as attractive as membership. Likewise, the EU is short of ‘sticks’ (Smith, K. 1998; Hill 2001). While it can impose sanctions, its most important ‘stick’ consists in the withholding of ‘carrots’, in particular the threat of declining membership.

Pathway 2 (enabling impact) relies on specific actors within conflict parties to link their political agendas with the EU and, through reference to integration, justify desecuritising moves that may otherwise have not been considered legitimate (Buzan et al. 1998, 41-42). In conflict situations, civil society actors in favour of a peaceful resolution often fall victim to marginalisation and ridicule, or accusations of being traitors. Alternatively, in the heated atmosphere that characterises identity and particularly subordination conflicts, in which rally-around-the-flag effects drive policies, the public may push the governments and other political leaders towards further securitising moves (Adamson 2002). In either case, if EU membership or association are widely seen as an overarching goal, actors can use the legal and normative framework of the EU to substantiate their claims and delegitimise previously dominant positions. Perhaps ironically, if utilised by governments, this path relies on what is otherwise seen as a problematic feature of EU governance, its democratic deficit, in that political leaders use the EU framework to push through policies against the preferences of their electorate (Newman 1996: 189; cf. Moravcsik 2002: 612).

Pathway 3 (connective impact) supports contact between conflict parties, mainly through direct financial support of common activities. Such contact is not in itself, of course, a step towards desecuritisation. Sustained contact within the context of common projects may however lead to a broader societal effect in the form of social networks across conflict parties, which in turn should facilitate identity change as foreseen within the constructive impact below. Outside the EU, support for such activities largely takes the form of traditional grants (Stetter 2003). At the EU’s borders, as well as at member states borders, the Interreg programme provides funding for such cross-border cooperation. Within the EU, the PEACE programme in Northern Ireland is also an example of how structural funds, which are not part of the Interreg programme, can be used to support specifically cross-border and cross-communal projects (see Anderson and O’Dowd 1999).

Pathway 4 (constructive impact) is the most indirect but – if successful – also most persuasive mode of transformation, since it affects the underlying identity scripts of conflicts, thus supporting a (re-)construction of identities that permanently sustains peaceful relations.
between conflict parties. This pathway is based on the assumption that EU impact can put in place completely new discursive frameworks for creating novel ways of constructing and expressing identities within conflict regions, as the peaceful transformation of Western Europe since the end of the Second World War illustrates. These new identity scripts will foster desecuritisation in a virtuous circle. Ultimately, this may lead to the eventual resolution of the conflict, i.e. the disappearance of articulations of the incompatibility of subject positions. This is clearly a long-term process, but its applicability is corroborated by the claim that while there may not (yet) be a single European identity, ‘Europe’ has become an integral part of the identity/identities in each of the EU’s member states (Wæver 1996). Whereas the compulsory impact is most effective at the stage of membership negotiations, constructive impact becomes most notable once membership has been achieved.

Due to its long-term character, constructive impact is the most difficult one to trace in the framework of a three-year long research project, as indicators of change take longer time to appear. In addition, due to the nature of such slow structural change, many of the features of the ‘old’ identity scripts are still in place and may in many cases overshadow the parallel developments in the new emerging frameworks of identification. Thus, evidence of EU’s constructive impact has been the most evasive one in many EUBorderConf case studies, which does not however mean that it failed to take place.

There are two often-discussed influences of integration on conflict that do not seem to fit easily into the four paths as outlined above. The first of these is the essentially neofunctionalist logic that conflicts can be overcome by bringing actors to cooperate on functional matters, this process leading to a change in preferences and ultimately in individual ‘allegiances’ (Haas 1958; 2001). Yet, there are in fact two mechanisms that this logic rests upon: the facilitation of cooperation by focusing on seemingly technical matters, and the long-term shift of subject positions that this might bring with it. Both mechanisms are contained in the connective and the constructive impact, respectively.

The second possible gap in our scheme is the argument that integration leads to increased wealth and employment, and that this will take people off the streets and alter their preference structures so that violent conflict is no longer a desirable option – an argument often found in the early discussions on Northern Ireland in the European Parliament (Pace 2005a, 2005b). This possible influence can however be seen as an economic version of the constructive impact because it ultimately leads to a change of subject positions that is caused by the incentive structures within a European framework, the effect of which cannot be controlled through direct EU policies.

While we have presented all paths as possibly leading to a reduction of securitisation, and therefore to a successful impact of integration on border conflict transformation, their influence can also be negative. Regarding the compulsory impact, this is for instance the case when new member states are required to implement certain policies to satisfy the acquis, which are seen as securitising moves by the neighbouring states: the implementation of visa regimes on the border of Russia and the EU is an example. Likewise, integration can enable actors to pursue policies that have the effect of intensifying conflict discourse, such as in the case of Cyprus after accession, where Greek Cypriots have adopted the discourse of a ‘European solution’ to insist on the four freedoms that would have been compromised under the UN-sponsored Annan Plan for a solution in Cyprus, which had the backing of most other EU actors. EU policies can have a disconnective rather than a connective impact if new visa regimes make contact across the border more difficult, as is the case not only in Russia and Europe’s North, but also between Greece and Turkey. Finally, and in particular in cases of
conflicts between EU member and non-member states, integration can foster the construction of a European identity in opposition to the neighbouring conflict party outside the EU. Whether or not integration does have an impact on border conflicts, and whether or not such an impact is positive or negative can therefore not be determined in the abstract, but is a matter of empirical investigation. Furthermore, the different paths do not occur in isolation from each other. Instead, we need to observe their interplay, including the reinforcing effects between them.

3.2. Methodology

The theoretical framework described above was applied to an empirical analysis of five case studies of border conflicts – some within the EU (Northern Ireland), others at the borders of the enlarged Union (Turkey/Greece; Cyprus; Europe’s north/Russia) or beyond (Israel/Palestine) – and case study findings were then related back to the theoretical framework. The selection of case studies was based on the structural differences in the relation of the five border conflicts in question with the EU. While Northern Ireland is a border conflict involving two EU member states that have both been subjected to relatively long-term effects of integration, in other case studies these effects have been more recent and/or uneven on the parties involved. Turkey/Greece is a case of a conflict between a relatively old member state and an EU candidate country since 1999. Cyprus was a candidate country up to the 2004 round of enlargement (when an integrated north-south Cyprus solution failed to be reached) and then became an EU member state. The Europe’s north/Russia case involves three sub-case study areas with a non-member state (Russia) on one side and a well-established member state (Finland) and three recent EU members (Estonia, Lithuania and Poland) on the other. Although its impact on them is different, integration affects both existing and prospective member states. A weaker form of connection to the EU is represented by the case of Israel/Palestine, which enjoy association agreements with the EU. A sixth case study of the project comprised the analysis of EU policy-making towards border conflicts.

The case studies on which our analysis builds have systematically analysed instances of securitisation in parliamentary debates, newspaper commentaries and history school books throughout the period of EU involvement in each conflict. In-depth interviews with policymakers on all sides of a conflict, as well as the EU, were conducted to elucidate the workings of the ‘compulsory pathway’ of EU impact, and NGO/civil society representatives as well as targeted individuals were interviewed to gain a picture of the constructive pathway of influence. In addition, any available cultural material (such as books and films presenting or featuring the ‘other’ and relations between the conflict parties) has also formed part of the empirical data-set.

The case studies proceeded in four stages: firstly, a compilation of the history of each border conflict and the EU’s involvement in it in order to chart the movement of the conflict between conflict stages and establish concrete EU policies; secondly, interviews with policymakers in conflict regions to assess to what extent they reacted to EU pressures (compulsory impact), referred to the acquis to justify their policies (enabling impact) and made use of EU money to pursue policies of dialogue (connective impact); thirdly, an analysis of cultural change (including school books, interviews with local actors, museums) to assess the use of the acquis to underline political claims (enabling impact) and the degree to which identity reconstructions had taken place, and the EU is a reference point in such re-constructions.
(constructive impact); fourthly, a discourse analysis of political debates, to triangulate previous findings and provide a better foundation for diachronic comparison.

### 3.3. Case Study Analyses

#### 3.3.1. EU Policy-making towards Border Conflicts

**3.3.1.1. EU Policy Frameworks and Border Conflicts**

Although the EU does not have a policy on border conflicts per se, a number of EU policies not directly aimed at border conflicts as well as assumptions guiding EU policy-making in general clearly impact on the ways the EU addresses border conflicts. Among external policies, financial aid and trade programmes stand out, vital as they are for strengthening civil society and promoting economic development in conflict areas. In its relations with candidate countries, the EU exercises additional leverage through setting the adoption of the acquis as a precondition for membership. With regard to border conflicts, accession negotiations can be used to induce applicants to resolve any pending disputes with their neighbours. At the most general level, EU’s internal policies that have lead to unprecedented levels of economic (and, to a lesser extent, political) integration can be seen as a model for others to emulate.

Most significantly, the EU is often presented as an institutional arrangement that has helped transcend the deep-seated controversies between some of its member-states, and is thus dubbed a successful peace project. The predominant reliance on ‘soft’, persuasive power (e.g. Keohane and Nye, 1998), combined with the rhetoric of common values as a basis for sustainable peace, has contributed to constructing EU’s identity ‘as a force for good’ (Pace 2005a, 2005b), and its external influence as ‘normative power’ (Manners 2002, 2005; Diez 2005c) entitled to export the European model of peaceful relations beyond the EU’s limits. Still, despite its perceived benign character, this influence is not without controversies: the concept of ‘normative power’ and its effects are far more contested than it would appear at first sight (ibid.). At the same time, the gap between EU’s ‘normative power of attraction and its weak empirical power to do things’ (Zielonka 1998: 11) often casts the Union as powerless in situations of (border) conflicts, especially in the light of associating leadership and prestige with military power (Personal communications, Council of the European Union, 2004). The situation may change with ratification of the Constitution with its provisions for Security and Defence (ibid.), which would in turn compromise the association of the EU with ‘normative power’ (Manners 2002, 2005; Diez 2005c). Thus, the present ability of the EU to act in border conflicts is largely reduced to upholding the norms of international law as well as dialogue and negotiations with conflict parties. While extremely beneficial at most stages of conflict (Ropers 2004) – as one interviewee put it, ‘as long as they are kept talking, they cannot shoot’ (Personal communication, Council of the European Union, 2004) – these measures are clearly insufficient at the stage of subordination conflict (characterised by overt violence), in which, not being able to do much, ‘the EU often opts to do nothing’ (Personal communications, European Commission, DG Relex, 2004).

The chief focus of this project has been on the impact that the EU exercises on border conflicts through the process of European integration, on the one hand, and association

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1 This section of the report is based on research conducted and papers written by Michelle Pace
agreements, on the other. Although both integration and association move the parties in question closer to the EU, there are important differences between the two, which also affect the effectiveness of EU’s efforts at conflict transformation. As pointed out above, integration itself is often viewed as a method of conflict transformation, although the magnitude of EU’s impact varies depending on the degree of integration and seriousness of membership prospects (e.g. compulsory impact is strongest at the stage of pre-accession with firm accession guarantees in the future, while other pathways of influence display more ambiguous pattern). Integration is conducive to the gradual adoption of EU norms, which is inscribed into the process of bringing policy and legal norms into line with the acquis. A shared normative framework, by providing a common identity basis, eliminates preconditions for more serious forms of conflict, such as identity and subordination conflicts. With regard to conflicts already in place, EU membership is often viewed by both the EU and parties to conflict as a sufficient incentive to secure the commitment of candidate countries to resolving their disputes. In terms of EU policy-making, conflicts involving member states as well as mixed conflicts – when one of the parties is internal and the other external to the EU (e.g. Turkey/Greece case study in this project) – belong to the competence of CFSP.

In contrast to integration, association agreements establish somewhat weaker ties between the EU and the countries in question, without provisions for membership or access to Union’s decision-making. Consequently, the EU’s impact on conflict transformation through association, where it does not wield the ‘carrot’ of membership (or the ‘stick’ of its withdrawal), is weaker. Policies directed at conflict transformation in associated states largely fall under the external policy competence, where the EU actors draw upon its vast experience in relations with neighbouring states (Smith, M. 1996, 1998). Furthermore, albeit ‘the distinction between internal and external [policy areas], while categorical in principle, is in practice a fuzzy affair’ (Emerson et al 2005: ii), external policies of the EU expose the divergent preferences of the member states to a much higher degree than the set of policies overseeing enlargement, where the EU acts as a unitary subject (ibid.). This factor, in addition to the smaller stakes involved, contributes to a weaker impact of the EU’s discursive frameworks on associated members.

3.3.1.2. EU Institutions’ Policy-making on Border Conflicts

The complex institutional structure of the EU contributes to its internal differentiation in terms of policy instruments available as well as actual input to the transformation of border conflicts. In the case of the European Commission, certain directorate generals are playing greater role in this than others. For example, DG Regional Policy has been actively involved in Northern Ireland and Europe’s North through Interreg and Phare programmes, respectively, which opened the way for connective impact. Although there is no desk at the Commission dealing with the Cyprus conflict directly, its DG Enlargement has played an important role in attempts at conflict resolution there, exercising both compulsory and enabling impacts. The Commission’s delegations on the ground offer a unified external service of the EU and are in charge of implementing common policies through concrete projects and assistance programmes (connective impact). DG Relex is the unit responsible for managing relations between conflict parties in non-candidate countries that fall within the realm of external policy. DG Relex represents the EU in, and manages EU financial support to, the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), in particular through assistance to the Palestinian Authority (connective impact). An important role in facilitating conflict transformation in
Middle East is played by EU’s Special Representative for the MEPP – a post created in 1996 and filled by Ambassador Miguel Moratinos and his successor from July 2003, Marc Otte. The EUSR’s mandate covers, among other things, provision of active support to initiatives leading to a settlement; contribution to the implementation of international agreements reached between the parties and engaging with them in the event of non-compliance with these agreements; reporting on possibilities for EU’s successful engagement in the peace process; and facilitating cooperation on security issues.

The Commission’s weight in the making of EU policy on border conflicts is often influenced by individual member states. This is evident in the case of the Greek/Turkish dispute. The concerns raised by the Commission in its 2003 regular report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, pertaining to international law issues, echoed the Greek position which leads us to the conclusion that there is often substantial input from one conflict party into EU’s policy-making process (European Commission 2003: 57-127, 138-41). There are also cases to the contrary, for example with the Commission’s first recommendation on Cyprus (see section 3.3.5). The interests of individual member states are also evident in the Council’s decisions affecting border conflicts. In some instances, Council’s decisions, driven by the short-term political advantages, appear to thwart longer-term Commission’s considerations. As to the European Parliament, its role in initiating EU policy on border conflicts is noteworthy, and MEPs often emerge as quite entrepreneurial in this regard. Here, once again, different cases attract attention of MEPs of different member states, although their interest is not always limited to the cases ‘closer to home’: whereas Finnish MEPs are predictably vocal on Europe’s North issues, Cyprus or Greek-Turkish disputes have attracted attention of not only Greek, but also British MEPs.

3.3.1.3. EU Policy Instruments for Conflict Transformation

Understandings of conflict among EU actors appear ambivalent. One the one hand, the notion of conflict is firmly associated with violence (Personal communications, Brussels, January 2004 and February 2005), while the theoretical framework adopted in this project defines conflict broadly, as communication of incompatibilities which can vary in intensity, with violence characterising only the last (and most extensive) stage of conflict communication – ‘subordination’ conflicts (Diez et al, 2006). On the other hand, ‘milder’ stages of conflict outlined in the theoretical framework – such as conflict episodes or issue conflicts (ibid.) – correspond to EU’s concerns with not only conflicts over matters of substance, but also with troubled relations between parties, or social injustice that could potentially lead to overt forms of conflict (Personal communications, Brussels, February 2005). In any case, because EU actors have divergent images and perceptions of (border) conflicts, every instance of EU involvement is subject to internal ‘negotiations’ regarding a particular position on the conflict in question that the EU should adopt out of the repertoire available to it.

Correspondingly, the EU engages in conflict resolution efforts at all levels (see, e.g. Miall et al., 2005: 25-6): track-one diplomacy is applied when there is a need to induce political elites to more cooperative approaches; track-two efforts engage civil society actors and middle-rank leaders in order to create a leadership class with experience of dialogue with the other side (through e.g., participation in problem-solving workshops etc.) and establish more durable communication structures (Personal communications, Brussels, February 2005); whereas track-three diplomacy aims to strengthen the capacity of disadvantaged
groups to deal with the conflict and, through their empowerment, contribute to integration of divided societies.

The focus of this project on processes – the process of European integration, on the one hand, and the process of conflict transformation, on the other – commands attention to those aspects of EU policy-making that have long-term, cumulative character, e.g. EU programmes aimed at regional harmonisation (such as Euro-Mediterranean Partnership), economic and societal development, institution-building etc. Such policy instruments are expected to produce gradual harmonisation of subject-positions rather than immediate agreements on substantive issues, thus creating preconditions for eventual resolution of conflict (defined as incompatibility of subject positions). Thus, the EU prioritises measures aimed at moving conflict parties beyond single encounters, building up longer-term personal relations and creating more permanent and shared communication structures (Personal communications, Brussels, February 2005). It is believed that the experience of interaction will direct conflict parties to change their attitudes and improve their relationship that will in turn support cooperative behaviour and pave the way for conflict transformation by allowing for peaceful accommodation of different collective identities.

Such change of attitudes and dispositions from conflictive to cooperative is believed to be in line with the EU’s normative framework, which displays certain ambivalence: on the one hand, the value system EU is trying to export to conflict areas is associated with EU influence, yet on the other, it is considered a universal ultimate achievement of humankind and thus something everyone should aim to subscribe to. Through its value system, the EU creates discursive contexts which connect its actors with conflict parties, while enabling EU actors to differentiate between those who subscribe to the EU’s values and those who do not, and are thus encouraged to undergo change and approach EU’s positions and normative framework for their own benefit. The association of peacefulness and cooperation with the EU’s institutional and policy framework is sometimes conductive to setbacks in the process of conflict transformation, as political and social forces in favour of resolution are often accused by hardliners of selling out their national interests to the EU. Thus, EU’s conflict transformation efforts based on its normative framework have both enabling and constraining effects on conflict parties.

3.3.2. Turkey/Greece

3.3.2.1. The History of the Conflict and EU Involvement

Countering the association between European integration and peace, Greek-Turkish conflicts multiplied and intensified as Greece and Turkey developed closer institutional relations with the EU. However, since 1999, we observe a promising rapprochement between Turkey and Greece within the EU context (Rumelili 2003a, 2004a). How the role of the EU changed from an additional forum for Greek-Turkish rivalry to a foundation for Greek-Turkish reconciliation is a very interesting empirical question that contains valuable insights for understanding the conditions for successful EU involvement in border conflicts.

The EU has made its positive impact on Greek-Turkish relations since 1999 not necessarily through the EU’s independent, purposive agency but through the ways in which the EU, as a resource, symbol, and a model, has been put to use by political and civil society actors in Turkey and Greece. Although in the more recent instances references to the EU

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2 This section of the report is based on research conducted and papers written by Bahar Rumelili
were used to legitimise cooperative attitudes, the history of Greek-Turkish relations demonstrates that the EU can be just as effectively used to legitimise the perpetuation of conflicts at the domestic level.

The EU and, particularly, the nature of the EU’s relations with Greece and Turkey, has set the structural conditions under which domestic actors define their identities and interests, and thus shaped the domestic balances of power. Greece’s EC membership in 1981 turned the Greek-Turkish conflicts into a conflict between a member and a non-member state, and the resulting institutional asymmetry empowered the hardliners in both countries, who approached the EC/EU within the logic of alliance, and thus disabled the EU from having a positive impact. Our research demonstrates that both the deepening of European integration in the 1990s and the EU’s furthering of relations with Turkey have fundamentally altered the structural conditions set by the EU on policy-making in Turkey and Greece. The EU’s 1999 decision to grant Turkey candidacy status has unleashed various forms of positive EU impact: it has been the basis of an alternative Greek foreign policy, empowered the moderate elites in both countries, legitimised the governmental and civil society efforts directed at Greek-Turkish cooperation, and conditioned significant changes in discourse. In short, the positive impact of the EU on Greek-Turkish relations has depended on domestic actors, who are willing and able to use the EU framework as the basis for cooperation. And, in turn, those domestic actors have depended on the EU to provide the framework of incentives, ideas, and norms within which they can ground, rationalise and legitimise their policy changes. In Greek-Turkish relations, this relationship of mutual dependency between domestic and EU-level conditions has been satisfied only after Turkey’s EU membership candidacy.

By the mid-1950s, in a climate of mistrust and tension, certain differences about the maritime borders in the Aegean, which were not communicated before, began to be articulated as disputes, and securitised through a discourse which constructed the ‘other’ as expansionist. In particular, Turkey viewed the Greek positions as attempts to close off the Aegean as a ‘Greek lake’, and Greece perceived a Turkish strategy of encircling the Greek islands as a means of separating them from Greece (see Rumelili 2003b). The two states engaged in various border-defining activities to mark their territories as they defined them, which frequently escalated to the conflicts of subordination. The conflicts over Cyprus and the Aegean quickly captured other areas of societal interaction between Turkey and Greece. The Rum-Greek minority in Turkey and the Muslim-Turkish minority in Greece became targets of discriminatory practices, deportations, and acts of violence (Rumelili 2005b). The overtly ethnocentric education reproduced the stereotypes and a selective reading of history which emphasised periods of conflict and hostility. The media and civil society took nationalist stances, pressuring the governments to adopt hard-line positions, as in the Imia/Kardak crisis described above. Therefore, starting with the mid-1950s, the Greek-Turkish conflicts have fluctuated between identity conflicts and conflicts of subordination, with war between the two states becoming very likely on numerous occasions.

The dramatic changes in Greek-Turkish relations witnessed after 1999 have resulted in de-escalation to the level of issue conflict. Even though the two states have not yet arrived at a resolution of their disputes, in the positive atmosphere of evolving functional cooperation and the EU context, the Aegean disputes have, to some extent, been desecuritised, and begun to be articulated as differences that can be managed rather than as existential threats. Since 1999, the two states have signed bilateral cooperation agreements on various issues, such as tourism, fight against terrorism, removal of landmines along the border, illegal migration, incentives for trade and joint investment, environmental and health issues. In addition, as
confidence building measures within the framework of NATO, Greece and Turkey have agreed to reduce and exchange information about military exercises. Most importantly, Turkey’s EU membership has become the focal point of bilateral cooperation. Greece that persistently vetoed any advances in the relations between Turkey and the EU in the past has become the most ardent supporter of Turkey’s EU membership. Despite changes of government in Turkey (2002) and Greece (2004), the issue of bilateral relations were never politicised during the election campaigns. As a result of the improved atmosphere at the political level, transnational contacts between Turkey and Greece have multiplied, both in form and in number. In the last two years, the annual bilateral trade between the two countries has exceeded one billion U.S. dollars. Many cultural activities, festivals, concerts, youth exchanges and joint theatre productions have been organised. New organisations directed at Greek-Turkish cooperation have been established, the activities of existing organisations have been diversified, and various joint projects between Greek and Turkish NGOs initiated (Rumelili 2005a). In addition, Greece and Turkey have successfully managed to isolate their bilateral relations from the ups and downs experienced in the Cyprus problem in the wake of Cyprus’ EU membership and afterwards.

When Greece applied for full membership in the EC in 1975, the Council of Ministers communicated its concern for maintaining an equitable relationship with Greece and Turkey by explicitly assuring the Turkish government that the Greek application would not affect Turkey’s rights. In addition, in its opinion on the Greek application, the European Commission expressed its concern about importing conflicts and recommended a pre-accession period that would allow, among other things, for the settlement of Greek-Turkish disputes. However, the Commission opinion was overruled in the Council of Ministers meeting in February 1976 by extensive Greek lobbying. At that time the European Community was rather conservative about its potential role in conflict resolution, preferring to ignore disputes among member states (Stephanou and TsarDanes 1991, Meinardus 1991). Yet, when the first crisis over the Aegean continental shelf erupted with the dispatchment of Sismik 1 on 24 July 1976, the EC President of the Council of Ministers flew to Athens to dissuade the Greeks from putting into effect their threat to remove the Turkish ship by force (Tsakaloyannis 1980).

With its EC membership in 1981, Greece acquired the institutional capacity to influence EU policymaking on Greek-Turkish issues and relations with Turkey. The extent of this capacity, however, has been overrated (cf. Aksu 2001); Greek influence has been constrained by general EU norms and principles, limited by Greece’s bargaining power within the Community, and has been stronger in some EU institutions, such as the European Parliament, than in others (Ugur 1999; Pace 2005a, 2005b). In 1986, Greece vetoed the resumption of the Association relationship between Turkey and EC and the release of aid, which have been frozen in response to the 1980 military coup in Turkey (Guven 1998/99). When the Council overrode the Greek veto through a majority decision, Greece pursued the case further by bringing cases against the Council and the Commission in the European Court of Justice. In April 1987, when Turkey applied for EC membership, Greece was again the only member state that openly opposed referring the application to the Commission for an Opinion (ibid.). Meanwhile, in May 1987, the European Parliament passed a resolution which called on Greece and Turkey to refer the question of the delimitation of the Aegean Sea continental shelf to the ICJ. A subsequent European Parliament’s resolution on Cyprus in May 1998 stated that Turkey’s unlawful occupation of Northern Cyprus presents a major stumbling block to the normalisation of relations with Turkey. The European Commission’s
Opinion on Turkey’s application in 1989 stated that Turkey was not ready for membership, and pointed out that the Greek-Turkish conflict as well as the Cyprus problem constituted negative factors for Turkey’s admission. In the 1990s, Greek opposition began to create increasing problems for an EU that wanted to advance relations with Turkey within the framework of a Customs Union Agreement. In addition, the Greek bargaining power within the Community began to decline because of Greece’s divergence from its partners on a variety of foreign policy issues. In this period, the EU increasingly began to resort to the strategy of linking together progress on Cyprus’ and Turkey’s relations with the Community.

In reaction to the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis, the EU took a firmer line towards Turkey in solidarity with Greece. In February 1996, the European Parliament adopted a resolution, which stated that Greek boundaries were EU’s international boundaries, so any intervention would be viewed as an infringement upon EU’s sovereign rights (EP 1996). EU-Turkey relations hit the bottom during the Luxembourg European Council on 12-13 December 1997, where the EU did not grant Turkey candidacy status while further advancing its relations with other candidate states. By autumn 1999, the Greek objective of joining the EMU combined with the changing attitudes in EU capitals towards relations with Turkey to bring about a fundamental change in Greek policy towards Turkey, and altered the nature of EU involvement in Greek-Turkish relations. During the Helsinki European Council on 10-11 December 1999, in line with the prevailing positive spirit, Greece chose not to use its veto against the EU’s decision to grant Turkey candidacy status. In addition to granting Turkey candidacy status, the Helsinki Council decisions have established the peaceful resolution of outstanding border disputes as a community principle. With the approval of Turkey’s Accession Partnership, the European Commission introduced two forms of funding to be directed at Greek-Turkish civic cooperation. The first is the Civil Society Development Program, introduced in 2002, with a budget of 8 million euros for two years to promote Greek-Turkish civic dialogue at the grassroots and local levels, and to enhance the capacity of NGOs in Turkey. The second form of funding is the 35 million euro package to support cross-border cooperation between Greece and Turkey for 2004-6.

3.3.2.2. Compulsory Influence

The EC/EU has used the incentive of membership to prod Greece and Turkey to resolve their disputes in two periods: in the wake of Greece’s accession between 1975 and 1981, and since Turkey’s membership application in 1987. In the first of these periods, the influence directed to Greece was weak, disorganised, and uninstitutionalised. While the Commission recommended a pre-accession period which would allow Greece to settle its disputes with Turkey, this recommendation was overruled in the Council of Ministers. Therefore, the EC could not take full advantage of Greece’s membership application process to exert its compulsory influence on Greece. Nevertheless, the desire to secure EC membership led Greek policymakers to restrain themselves from escalatory policies, and pursue attempts at dialogue during this application period. Although this period coincided with the return in Greece to democratic rule, democratisation has not led to a major change in Greece’s foreign policy towards Turkey. The perception of Turkey as the primary security threat, and of the EC as a deterrence mechanism against Turkey, remained firmly in place.

Starting with Turkey’s membership application to the EC in 1987, the EC/EU’s compulsory influence has been directed to Turkey in an increasingly stronger and systematic fashion. However, the linkage between the Greek-Turkish disputes and Turkey’s membership
prospects was not accepted by Turkey and brought about only temporary or tactical policy changes until 1999. In the 1990s, several initiatives undertaken by Turkey can be linked to the EU’s compulsory influence. However, these initiatives lacked a basis in policy change, were mainly intended for international consumption, and subsequently denied or diluted in front of domestic audiences. The domestic criticism which often followed these initiatives led policymakers to counteract with conflict-enhancing communications and behaviour. In front of domestic audiences, Turkish policymakers were always careful to deny accusations that their conciliatory actions were initiated because of the EU’s pressure.

On the other hand, by granting Turkey EU candidacy status, the 1999 Helsinki European Council strengthened the inductive and persuasive elements in the EU’s interventions, which has led to a major change in Turkish policy (Rumelili 2004d): Turkey has accepted EU involvement in Greek-Turkish disputes in the form of linking the resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes to Turkey’s membership process, and prescribing a certain calendar and a conflict resolution framework. The legitimisation of reforms by referring to the prospective EU membership became common in both domestic and international discourses (cf. Aktan, 2004). However, as will be discussed in the next section, most Turkish policymakers admitted to having been ‘enabled’ rather than coerced into this policy change. The candidacy status has thus functioned both as a ‘carrot’ and as a legitimisation.

### 3.3.2.3. Enabling Influence

The EC/EU has always been a major reference point in the making of Greek and Turkish foreign policies vis-à-vis each other. However, prior to 1999, it has been used to legitimise conflict-enhancing policies. As rival states, Greece and Turkey approached their relations with the EC in a competitive way from the outset. In line with the ‘logic of alliance’, Greece perceived its membership in the EC as a provision for enhanced security and negotiating leverage in its dealings with Turkey (Valinakis 1994; Platias 2000; Tsakonas and Tournikiotis 2003). Greece pursued a policy of negative conditionality towards Turkey, blocking its relations with the EU until Turkey offered some concessions and/or agreed to the endorsement of the Greek positions by the EU (Couloumbis 1994; Yannas 1994). The institutional asymmetry created by Greece’s membership and Turkey’s non-membership in the EU rendered this policy of negative conditionality not only possible, but also successful and legitimate. At the same time, the proponents of alternative policies towards Turkey were placed on uncertain and shaky grounds. This disabling effect on the moderates in Greece can be clearly seen in the period between 1996 and 1999.

The Greek government’s volte face to support Turkey’s European orientation, as epitomized in the 1999 Helsinki Council decisions, constitutes a major ‘turning point’ in Greek foreign policy (cf. Couloumbis and Tziampiris, 2002). The EU has enabled this change in several ways. At a more fundamental level, European integration has been a ‘powerful agent for the domestication of foreign policy and for the softening and broadening of national security toward low politics and economics’ in Greece (Keridis 2001) by the late 1990s. More specific influence was exercised by the changing structural conditions at the EU level in the 1990s (Ifantis, 2005). When it became apparent in late 1990s that Greece was far from fulfilling the criteria for joining the European Monetary Union (EMU), the fear of being left behind in the EU integration provided a powerful impetus to improve relations with Turkey, so as to enhance Greece’s bargaining position within the Union.
In addition to the objective of securing membership in EMU, it was the willingness of the EU to offer Turkey a membership perspective that enabled the policy change in Greece. A ‘real’ and ‘substantive’ EU membership perspective for Turkey has been a crucial element in the logic upon which the alternative policy of supporting Turkey’s Europeanisation has been formulated and advocated in Greece. For Greece to eliminate the Turkish threat, Turkey needs to Europeanise and commit to certain principles within a European framework. For Turkey to Europeanise, the EU must be both willing and able to offer Turkey a ‘real’ membership prospect (Droutsas, 2005). By the autumn of 1999, these longer-term and more immediate enabling influences of the EU combined with a cabinet change and the mutually supportive atmosphere following the deadly earthquakes in Izmit and Athens (August and September 1999) to bring about a ‘turning point’ in Greek policy towards Turkey. The feelings of empathy and solidarity between the Greek and Turkish people brought out by the earthquakes allowed the leaders ‘to claim a popular mandate for changing policies historically supported by a large majority on both sides’ (Gundogdu 2001). After Helsinki, the continuing rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations and Turkey’s progress on the membership track enabled the consolidation of this policy at the domestic level, and generated a broad domestic coalition in support of it in Greece. The EU’s inclusive approach towards Turkey has rendered the Greek policy of negative conditionality less possible, successful, and legitimate.

Like Greece, Turkey has initially perceived the EC/EU within the logic of alliance, but as an alliance it was not a part of. Greece’s membership has created and sustained the understanding in Turkey that the EC/EU has become ‘captured’ by the hostile Greece, and therefore could not be impartial with respect to Greek-Turkish issues (Aksu 2001). In other words, the EU was perceived as just another platform through which Greece pursues its revisionist agenda with respect to Turkey. Under these perceptual conditions, alternative policies could not be legitimised by reference to the EU, because they would be automatically framed as concessions to Greece. Since 1999, the prospect of EU membership has been a reference point in triggering a process of reform and transformation in Turkey in all areas of politics, including foreign policy (Diez and Rumelili 2004). The EU’s December 1999 decision to grant Turkey candidacy status has undermined the perceptions of an unreliable EU in collaboration with the hostile Greece. As a result, Turkey had first tacitly, and then more explicitly accepted a linkage between Turkey’s EU membership process and the resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes, and actively maintained the détente with Greece through various confidence-building measures and cooperation agreements. Nothing would demonstrate the changed perceptions of Greece and the EU better than Turkey’s willingness to accept Greece’s guidance on EU matters (see Joint Declaration 2001). This foreign policy change in Turkey was facilitated by the prospect of EU membership and the concomitant positive identification with the EU. The prospect of co-membership in the EU with Greece offered to Turkish policymakers a perspective for an alternative future when the border disputes with Greece would lose their meaning. Thus, the perception of the EU as a successful security community has served to legitimise among the Turkish elite the joint efforts to gain membership in the EU and to resolve the outstanding disputes with Greece.

3.3.2.4. Connective Impact

Civil cooperation between Greece and Turkey remained weak until the late 1990s because the civil society in both countries was underdeveloped, and joint Greek-Turkish activities
particularly lacked legitimacy because of the ongoing conflicts. Societal actors constituted small, isolated minorities in both societies, and their activities were often subjected to criticism and, in a few instances, to physical attack. Although following the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis, civil society efforts intensified, although they remained vulnerable to crises at the governmental level and were easily disrupted.

Civil society cooperation between the two countries had received a boost following the deadly earthquakes that hit Izmit and Athens respectively in August and September 1999. The extent of suffering generated feelings of popular empathy, and Greek and Turkish rescue teams, doctors, and humanitarian workers got the chance to work together in a highly emotional setting. Since then, and also owing to the improved relations at the political level, transnational contacts between the two countries have multiplied both in form and in number. While this growing civil cooperation was undeniably initiated at the bilateral level through the active agency of political and civil society actors in Turkey and Greece, the EU has influenced this process in several ways. The interviews indicate that policymakers in Greece and Turkey have consciously drawn on the EU model in choosing functional cooperation as their main strategy in improving bilateral relations (Anonymous Interviewee 2005). Large-scale direct funding of societal actors in Greece and Turkey has begun after the bilateral rapprochement since 1999. The connective impact of the EU operates through two main grant programs, the first one being the Greek-Turkish civic dialogue programme, which started in 2002 and has a budget of € 8 million. The second grant, established in 2004, provides € 35 million of funds for cross-border projects between Turkey and Greece under the umbrella of the Interreg III programme. The availability of EU funding has been important especially for Turkish NGOs, local and grassroots organisations, which are more dependent on foreign funding than their counterparts in Greece (Belge 2004a), and thus contributed to the formation of new partnerships between Greek and Turkish organisations (Birden 2003). With respect to the implementation of these Programmes by the Representation of the European Commission in Ankara, civil society actors have expressed concerns regarding bureaucratic limitations and the continuing elitism.

Furthermore, with the Greek-Turkish border being an EU’s external border, the EU’s border regime shapes the nature of the EU’s influence on transnational relations between Turkey and Greece. The 1995 EU-Turkey Customs Union agreement has been a turning point in opening the Greek-Turkish border to trade and investment flows. The real rise in Greek-Turkish trade, however, has occurred after the improvement in bilateral relations, reaching 1.3 billion U.S. dollars in 2003. Yet, the Schengen border regime constitutes an important impediment to further development of cross-border links. The strict and costly visa procedures put both the Turkish businessmen and exporters doing business in Greece and the Greek tourism sector at a disadvantage.

3.3.2.5. Constructive Impact

As identity conflicts, Greek-Turkish disputes have been articulated through representations of Greek and Turkish identities as oppositional and antagonistic toward each other. Such representations are validated by a selective reading of history in the two countries, and reproduced through the nationalist educational systems. The earlier argument presented in this report was that since 1999, Greek-Turkish conflicts have de-escalated to the level of issue conflicts. It is, however, necessary to underline that such de-escalation does not and cannot amount to a rapid and total disappearance of oppositional and antagonistic identity
constructions; due to the very nature of discursive change, this process is slow, indeterminate, and ever-contested.

An analysis of the Greek media, parliamentary debates, and other relevant texts prior to 1999 reveals a prevalent construction of Turkey as inherently aggressive and provocative. Another major characteristic of the discourse on Turkey is the depiction of Turkey as monolithic and incapable of change. In this period, the constructive influence of the EU discourse manifested itself in the representations of Turkey also as inherently non-European and incapable of Europeanising (Rumelili, 2003a). A Turkey constructed as such can only be disciplined through the compulsory influence of the EU. The political debates in Greece prior to 1999 thus revolved around the question of whether Greece can convince other EU member states to direct this compulsory influence in a concerted way or whether it should resort to the veto. There was little if any discussion of the possible enabling influence of the EU on Turkey (e.g. Hellenic Parliament 1999). Prior to 1999, the question of how to relate to Turkey within the EU context was further complicated by the ambivalent approach towards Europe and the EU in Greek discourse. According to Herzfeld (1987: 7), this stems from Greece’s ‘paradoxical status in the Eurocentric ideology.’ Ascribed the identity of the living ancestors of the European civilisation, Greece has had to continuously live out the perceived imbalance between its mythical past and its present backwardness in relation to the contemporary states of Europe (Herzfeld 1987: 19). Prior to 1999, in the representations of the EU in Greek discourse, on the one hand, positively identified with the EU as the centre of civilisation that includes Greece and excludes Turkey. However, on occasions where the EU was perceived as favouring Turkey against Greece, positive identification quickly gave way to the construction of the EU as imperialist and hostile.

The de-escalation of Greek-Turkish conflicts within the EU context in the post-1999 period was made possible by and, in turn, brought out three fundamental changes in the Greek discourses on Turkey and the EU. The first was the shift from monolithic to more pluralist perceptions and representations of Turkey, while still employing the European/non-European distinction. The representation of Turkey as pluralistic and capable of changing has made possible its construction as susceptible to the EU’s enabling influence. This representation has become prevalent in Greece to such an extent that almost everything about Turkey has been made sense of within the discourse of ‘Europeanisation’. In addition, the policy change towards Turkey has been grounded in a more positive identification of Greece with Europe and the EU.

In Turkey, prior to the improvement in relations with Greece, the prevalent representation of Greece was as a ‘neighbour’ and an ‘ally’ (in name only) that ‘has made a habit of hostility towards Turkey’ (Turkish Grand National Assembly, 1996b), and ‘lives off’ of its problems with Turkey (Turkish Grand National Assembly, 1996a). The Greek policy of using the EU as a lever against Turkey has been made sense of in terms of the dominant metaphor on Greece as ‘a spoiled kid of Europe’, which implies immaturity, undeservedness, and abuse of position. Therefore, Greece was identified at best as a ‘fake-European’ (Rumelili 2003a). Thus, as in Greece, Europe served as the basic denominator of identity, reflecting the EU’s constructive influence. In Turkey, like in Greece, these constructions of Greece and the EU were rooted in an ambivalent identification with Europe and the West in general. There is a fundamental tension in Turkish discourse, emanating from the simultaneous construction of Europe as an aspiration and as a threat (Rumelili 2004c). The construction of the EU as a threat flourishes on the memories of the dismemberment of Ottoman Empire at the hands of European powers (i.e. Sevres Syndrome), while the desire to
validate Turkey’s identity as modern and European constitutes the EU as an aspiration. Within this historically-inspired discourse, many representations of Greece and the EU assumed as natural that the EU would support (Christian) Greece against (Muslim) Turkey. The improvement in Greek-Turkish relations after 1999 has brought about and, in turn, was made possible by two significant changes in the Turkish discourses on Greece and the EU. The first is the ensuing positive identification with the EU, such that the constructions of the EU as an aspiration gained prevalence over the constructions of the EU as a threat. Turkey’s new identity position as an EU candidate also facilitated the gradual internalisation of EU norms and procedures on the resolution of border disputes as requirements of European identity and a neutral basis for building a cooperative relationship with Greece. The second important discursive change is the shift towards the construction of Greece as a ‘full, mature and rational’ European state, and in a lot of ways as a ‘model’ for Turkey. Coupled with the unwavering Greek support for Turkey’s EU membership, this construction of Greek identity has facilitated the perception of Greek behaviour towards Turkey in the EU context in less hostile and conspiratorial terms.

The above analysis makes clear that the EU exercises a strong constructive influence on Greek-Turkish relations because the discourse of ‘Europe’ as a collective identity has consistently been the authoritative reference point in the construction of Greek and Turkish identities vis-à-vis each other. However, the discourse of ‘Europe’ has authorised and validated two conflicting identity discourses on self and other in Turkey and Greece. One is the conflict-enhancing discourse that differentiates the ‘European’ Greece from the ‘non-European’ Turkey, which was dominant prior to 1999, and served to legitimise the Greek threat perceptions and aggravate Turkey’s identity insecurity. The other is the conflict-diminishing discourse that positions Greece and Turkey as ‘European’ and ‘Europeanising’, which has become prevalent following Turkey’s EU candidacy and the improvement in Greek-Turkish relations. However, the nature of the EU’s relations with Turkey and Greece has structurally conditioned which of these two very conflicting identity discourses will be validated within the broader discourse of ‘Europe’. Before 1999, the EU’s exclusionary discourse on Turkey, and Turkey’s ambivalent institutional position reproduced and validated the conflict-enhancing discourse based on the European/non-European distinction. Turkey’s EU membership candidacy, on the other hand, has legitimised the construction of Greek and Turkish identities as ‘European’ and ‘Europeanising’ (Rumelili 2003a).

3.3.2.6. Conditions for EU Impact

The EU’s offer of a credible membership prospect to Turkey stands as a critical condition which has facilitated multiple forms of positive EU influence on Greek-Turkish relations. In Turkey, the credible EU membership prospect brought together a strong domestic coalition in favour of reform, and induced and legitimised wide-ranging policy changes in many areas, including Cyprus and the resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes within the EU framework. In Greece, it has been a facilitating condition for the rethinking of Greek policy towards Turkey. The advancement of institutional relations through the candidacy framework has enabled the EU to direct greater amounts of funding to Turkish civil society and to Greek-Turkish initiatives. The identity positions entailed in the candidacy status have directed Greek and Turkish discourses towards less oppositional and antagonistic identity constructions.

Given the extent of member state influence on the EU’s external relations, the policy change in Greece towards Turkey and the EU has been a second crucial condition for the
EU’s positive impact on Greek-Turkish relations. If there had not been a policy change towards supporting Turkey’s European orientation in Greece, then the EU would face institutional obstacles in furthering relations with Turkey. In addition, Greece would insist on subjecting those relations to very strict conditions, which ultimately would not be accepted by Turkey, as was the case during the 1997 Luxembourg Council.

The existence of constituencies that actively promote Greek-Turkish cooperation in the two countries has also facilitated the EU’s positive impact. The positive atmosphere that arose between the two societies following the 1999 earthquakes has been a necessary condition especially for the following connective influence of the EU. In addition, the EU’s positive impact on Greek-Turkish relations has been realised through the willingness of domestic actors to use the EU as a model, symbol, and resource. While the EU has possessed important instruments to influence the Greek-Turkish relations, it has not been able to exercise that influence independently of what the Greek and Turkish domestic actors have chosen to make out of the EU. Until the late 1990s, the EU has had a conflict-enhancing impact on Greek-Turkish relations, because certain domestic and EU-related conditions have empowered those domestic actors in Turkey and Greece who have perceived the EU within the logic of alliance and used it as an additional battleground in their ongoing rivalry. Only after 1999, the EU has begun to have a consistent conflict-diminishing impact on Greek-Turkish relations because Turkey’s EU membership candidacy has empowered the domestic actors in both Turkey and Greece who have sought to use the EU as a framework for long-term conflict transformation.

In addition, corroborating conflict resolution activities of other international institutions, such as NATO, and third-party actors, such as the United States, have facilitated the EU’s impact on the Greek-Turkish conflicts. If these other actors had taken different positions on the disputes, or engaged in activities that undermine or overtake the EU’s role, then the EU’s impact on Greek-Turkish relations would have been much smaller.

The enabling impact of the EU has been the most pervasive and manifested itself in different ways. Not only has the EU, and more specifically Turkey’s EU candidacy, been the reference point in the formulation and legitimisation of alternative foreign policies in Greece and in Turkey, it has also served as the common denominator in building strong domestic coalitions at the political and civil society level. In both Turkey and Greece, the compulsory influence of the EU on Turkey has served to “buy off” the hardliners into the domestic coalition in favour of policy change. While in Turkey, the membership ‘carrot’ has induced those actors to negotiate with Greece within the EU framework; in Greece, the availability of the EU ‘stick’ against Turkey has convinced the hardliners to support Turkey’s EU accession process. The connective influence of the EU has been thus far relatively minor and limited to certain sectors of the society. However, cross-border links and functional cooperation have been actively promoted by the Greek and Turkish governments, who have claimed to have taken the EU as a model in their endeavours. And finally, though very significant, the EU’s constructive influence on Greek-Turkish relations have thus far been ambivalent because while certain elements in EU discourse have authorised starkly oppositional identity constructions in Turkey and Greece, other elements have validated less antagonistic identity positions. Turkey’s EU membership candidacy, to the extent that it has had a transformative effect on the overall EU discourses on ‘Europe and Turkey’ and ‘Europe and its others,’ carries the potential to tilt the EU’s constructive influence to the positive, conflict-diminishing direction.
### Pathways of EU’s impact on Greek-Turkish border conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Main EU Institution</th>
<th>Main Addressee</th>
<th>Instrument of Influence</th>
<th>Condition of Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory</td>
<td>Greece N/A (at least since 1981)</td>
<td>Turkey N/A</td>
<td>Greece Government N/A</td>
<td>Greece Membership criteria N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
<td>Government and political elite</td>
<td>Pressures of integration</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constructive</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Political elite and opinion makers</td>
<td>Discourse on European identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.3.3. Israel/Palestine

3.3.3.1. Overview of the Conflict and EU Involvement

This case study departs from the other case studies of the EUBorderConf project insofar as neither of the two conflict parties, Israel and Palestine, is at least for the time being, a member of the EU. Yet, while there is no immediate integration perspective for the two conflict-parties, both Israel and Palestine have close linkages to the EU, both bilaterally and in the context of the multilateral Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), in which a framework of association between both countries and the EU has been established. This association dimension renders the Israel-Palestine case-study central to the project allows to test whether association provides for similar mechanisms in the transformation of border conflicts as integration in the other case-studies. Overall, the impact of association is constrained. Rather than gradually becoming part of the domestic political settings in Israel and Palestine, the EU on most dimensions in this conflict resembles a classical third party. In the specific case at hand, the impact of the EU is further limited by the fact that the major external actor involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the US. Due to sometimes

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3 This section of the report is based on research conducted and papers written by Haim Yacobi and David Newman
opposing interests of the US and the EU, the strong involvement of the US in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict limits the EU’s space of manoeuvring. The EU influence is therefore limited, since it has, in the absence of an integration prospect for Israel and Palestine, relatively few ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ at its disposal which it can exercise vis-à-vis the two conflict parties.

In all of its history as outlined above, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been characterised by a strong identity dimension. Territorial claims were always couched in the terminology of Jewish/Palestinian homeland and historical-religious rights, with borders (as tangible issues) being no more than a spatial and geographical expression of the core identity issues underlying the conflictive aspirations between Zionism as a national movement and Palestinian nationalism. The 1948-49 war and the subsequent period, which brought statehood to the Jewish people and the status of stateless refugees to the Palestinians, ultimately turned the conflict into a subordination conflict, characterised by high levels of violence and mutually exclusive territorial claims. Physical force has in most of this period been an acceptable means of dealing with the other side – be it through the military power of the state on the one hand, or the violent activities of guerrilla movements, on the other. The power of Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians became intricately linked with the irredentist and ethno-exclusive identity constructions of larger parts of the Israeli population. For many, identity became transformed into a politics of territory, with notions of homeland and ancestral rights determining the nature of the conflict. Territorial change may appear to be no more than a technical border modification on the ground. But in reality it gives rise to intensified forms of identity struggle, as each side continues to perceive itself existentially threatened by the existence of the other.

The EU has always been keen to influence precisely this subordination dimension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through addressing the core political and territorial issues. The EU thus takes the identity dimensions as given, namely that both Israelis and Palestinians are entitled to self-determination, security and sovereignty in separate and independent ethnically-exclusive entities. The fact that power and issue modification, by definition, will affect the way in which both peoples perceive their respective identity concerns is, perhaps, one of the deeper reasons why the EU is unable to have more than a marginal impact on the process of conflict resolution in this region.

In the course of the 1970s, as a result of an increasing antagonism between Israel and the EC and a parallel rapprochement between the EC and Arab countries, Europe became one of the leading international supporters of Palestinian self-determination. This culminated in the Venice Declaration of the European Council of 1981, in which the heads of state and government declared that they support the right of Palestinians to self-determination. Ever since, the Venice Declaration has become a symbol of European policies on the Middle East, being rejected by many Israelis as one-sided and referred to by Palestinians as a quasi-legal confirmation of their political claims. In this context of strong politicisation of the Venice Declaration, subsequent Israeli governments in the 1980s rejected any formal involvement of the EC in the regulation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This only changed, gradually, as a result of the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, which was convened after the end of the second Gulf War. While the Madrid Conference was sponsored by the US and the then-Soviet Union, the EC/EU managed to become a junior partner in the context of Madrid’s multilateral peace framework (Peters 1996a). Thus, the EC/EU successfully threw in its economic weight and was handed over the responsibility for the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG). REDWG was the most active working group in the
multilateral track of the peace process and, while it produced few effects on the ground, it nevertheless brought together Palestinians, Israelis, Jordanians and Egyptians who jointly developed ideas for several economic cooperation projects in the region (Peters 1996b). The significance of the Madrid conference, which preceded the 1993 Oslo agreement between Israel and the PLO, with regard to greater EU involvement in the region thus relates mainly to the economic dimension. However, it also had a political significance since REDWG formally marked the end of the absence of a direct European involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The economic emphasis of the EU’s new role in the Middle East in the context of REDWG also set an important precedent for future developments – a steady increase in trade relations between Israel and the EU, and the fact that the EU became by far the main external donor to the PA. Moreover, this emphasis on economic relations also shaped the association of both countries with the EU in the EMP-framework. Thus, with both Israel and the PLO, the EU has concluded Association Agreements, which contain a strong economic and a relatively weak political dimension (Stetter 2004), which has led many observers to argue that the EU is a ‘payer’ but not a ‘player’ in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Perthes 2002). However, the EU’s political stance on the conflict was also developed in this period on the basis of the Venice Declaration. This process arguably culminated in the 1999 Berlin Declaration of the European Council (Alpher 2000). This document directly calls for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and thus predates similar calls by the Bush administration following the failure of the bilateral negotiations in the Oslo years. The ‘Berlin Declaration’ opened the possibility of European recognition of an independent Palestinian state, even if this state was to be declared unilaterally. The Berlin Declaration also signalled a stronger political involvement of the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The EU’s perspective on the main issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not changed dramatically since its single foreign policy position on this matter was formulated the 1970s. The EU has been rather unified over what it sees as the only way forward for conflict resolution in Israel and Palestine. It continues to call on Israel to withdraw its military forces from the Occupied Territories and to freeze all settlement activities and the evacuation of existing settlements. It also calls for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State and the cessation of all violent and terror activities on the part of the Palestinians, as well as the recognition by Palestine and Arab states of a secure Israel in its internationally recognised boundaries.

However, behind this issue dimension looms the aforementioned complex identity relationship between the Israelis and Palestinians on one side and Europe on the other. And it is this ambivalent identity relationship, in particular in EU-Israeli relations, which still limits the impact of the EU on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, the commonly held perception in Israel – that ‘Europe’ is pro-Palestinian – is reflected in the way both Israeli policy-makers and the media construe every European statement as allegedly favouring the Palestinians. This is supplemented by a dominant perspective amongst large parts of the Israeli public that despite the ongoing integration in the area of foreign and security policy of the EU, what really matters in Europe are the policy positions of specific European countries, notably Britain, Germany and France. Moreover, they often compare Muslim fundamentalist attacks in the EU, such as in Madrid, Amsterdam or London, with Palestinian suicide bombings in Israel. The growth of the Muslim population in Europe and a rise of anti-Semitic attacks in some European countries in 2002 and 2003 as well as attempts by European civil society to impose an academic boycott on Israeli universities, have all contributed to this general feeling
inside Israel that Europe cannot be trusted (Peters and Dachs 2004). Single events such as the attempt by Belgian judicial authorities to put Ariel Sharon on trial as a war criminal, or a Norwegian discussion on a boycott of Israeli goods – are in this context seen as part of a wider anti-Israeli European policy which, it is assumed, underlies the overall EU policy with regard to the region.

3.3.3.2. Compulsory Influence

While in some cases of intervention in conflict situations the EU is able to exercise a ‘carrot and stick’ policy, most notably withholding the benefits of future membership in case of failure to resolve a conflict, this is not the case with respect to either Israel or Palestine. Although the possibility of Israel’s accession to the EU has occasionally been raised by European and Israeli politicians – such as Finance Minister (and former Prime Minister) Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement to the effect that ‘Israel would be interested in full integration’ (Maariv newspaper, 20 June 2003), or some policy papers which examine the potential for full EU membership on the part of Israel (Veit 2003) – overall, Israel’s membership in the EU is not considered a likely scenario by most observers (Tovias 2003). One of the reasons for this is that for Israel, the membership issue becomes intermingled with identity discourses. According to Avi Primor, a former Israeli Ambassador to the EU, the potential for collaboration with the EU is mainly economic. Yet, as he argues, if Israel were to become a full member of the EU, it would be required to ‘give’ to the EU in proportion to the benefits it receives. For example, Israel would have to agree to the freedom of movement, capital, goods and services with all other EU member states. Membership would enable the entrance of European migrants and European capital to Israel (Maariv newspaper, 20 June 2003).

In this context it is also important to mention the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2003, in which the linkage between economic cooperation and conflict resolution has been made an explicit objective. Thus, the ENP involves ‘a significant degree of economic integration and a deepening of political co-operation, with the aim of preventing the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours’ (Euromed Reports Nos. 77, 78 and 79). In the framework of the ENP, the EU concluded Action Plans with both Israel and Palestine. But beyond the often declaratory political statements by the EU in the context of the EMP and the ENP, there are also more stringent European positions which seek to exercise a more compulsory influence on Israel in order to resolve the conflict, including the call for economic sanctions and an arms ban against Israel as a means of breaking the impasse.

The compulsory impact of the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is thus limited to the association of both parties with the EU in the EMP framework. However, this association does not contain a strong compulsory dimension and, therefore, has had a negligible effect on the conflict. Whereas appeals for harsher measures on the part of the EU to effect policy change in Israel are generally met in Israel with little concern (due to the fact that e.g. economic sanctions would also harm the EU member states), one should not ignore the view that a deterioration of EU-Israeli relations would cause serious economic and political damage to Israel (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel 2004).
3.3.3.3. Enabling Pathway

EU attempts to exercise compulsory impact through economic incentives produced limited effect in both Palestine and Israel. Economic means have played a greater role in effecting a broader-scale political change in Palestine, since the PA depends on substantial EU assistance for its daily existence and management of its fledgling institutional structure. This financial dependence has become even more acute since the outbreak of the second Intifada, as the social and economic conditions within the PA have deteriorated to the worst situation since the beginning of Israeli occupation in 1967. The EU has been the biggest donor to the PA, which has received larger amount of assistance from the EU than any other country in the world (Stetter 2003: 57).

The enabling impact of EU aid is especially evident with regard to democratic reforms in Palestine. In cooperation with other Western states, the EU has been active in exerting pressure on the PA to undertake significant governmental and administrative reforms. This external pressure was a crucial factor in Palestinian politics since it enabled and legitimised reform-oriented Palestinian actors. This is for example true for the finance minister Dr Salam Fayyad, who was able to carry out remarkable financial and administrative reforms since 2002. While the long-term effects of these reforms on the border conflict are difficult to assess, they could have a positive indirect effect since less corruption and greater transparency are one crucial factor in overcoming the devastating economic situation in Palestine. This is not to argue that these policies do replace agreements on the political level but they are an important factor alongside bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

In June 2002, in response to domestic and international pressure, the PA adopted a wide-ranging programme of reform. A number of important measures were taken, such as the adoption and entry into force of the Basic Law or legislation on the independence of the judiciary. In February 2003, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) adopted the 2003 budget which was, for the first time, made public. During the second Intifada, EU assistance was aimed at maintaining the daily existence of the PA and, at the same time, was made conditional upon further internal economic and democratic reforms on the part of the Palestinian leadership. Through the agency of its financial assistance, the EU thus supported reforms in Palestine and pushed for the establishment of a democratically-elected and accountable Palestinian leadership. According to an IMF report, the conditionality attached to EU assistance to the PA has contributed to a transformation of “the Palestinian Authority to a level of fiscal responsibility, control, and transparency which rivals the most fiscally advanced countries in the region”.4

Many Palestinian activists would prefer the EU to take on a more direct political interventionist role, supporting the establishment of a Palestinian State and exerting pressure on Israel to end occupation rather than betting on the indirect effects of the enabling pathway. But this, in turn, fails to take into account the limited compulsory influence which the EU has on Israel. For its part, the EU is aware that it can assist the PA through a variety of economic programmes, help create better management practices through an enabling policy and, thereby, ‘persuade’ the Israeli authorities that there is a ‘partner’ on the other side to whom political power can be gradually transferred in a process of conflict resolution. Thus the enabling pathway, in the form of supporting democratic and administrative reforms in Palestine, constitutes a central form of intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and probably has a greater impact than any form of direct political intervention.

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4 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/gaza/intro
3.3.3.4. Connective Impact

The EU has a connective influence on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through its support of non-governmental agencies (NGO’s) in Israel and Palestine that engage in the promotion of peace and cooperation between the parties at the wider societal level. This financial or organisational support of peace-oriented non-governmental organisations on both sides, which has been labelled by its critics as a ‘peace industry’ – perhaps the most flourishing industry in the region – is largely financed by European and EU-related institutions (although there is also significant American support for many of these initiatives through governmental and non-governmental funding agencies). In addition to promoting grassroots activities, the support for Israeli and Palestinian NGO’s, Track II dialogue networks and joint Israeli-Palestinian research (particularly in the area of health) have helped create an important network of contacts and back-door negotiations which take on added importance at times when Track I negotiations (direct contacts between senior government officials) become stalled, as e.g. during the second Intifada. Many of these networks continued to operate in this period, thus providing one of the last anchors of regular and cooperative contact between the conflict parties. The fact that the EU sponsors these pro-peace initiatives, both at the grassroots level (such as the people-to-people programmes) and in the form of Partnership for Peace programmes, is seen by some representatives in the Israeli government and media as an expression of EU’s pro-Palestinian sentiment. For different reasons, EU funding for joint Palestinian-Israeli projects at the civil society level also has its critics among its beneficiaries, who point to the unclear agenda of the EU which brings to the fore manifold implementation problems that hamper the effectiveness of these policies. This connective network supported by the EU has no overall power to end the conflict, but it provides a stable context for those advocating greater Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and must therefore be seen as an element in conflict containment.

3.3.3.5. Constructive impact

Due to the limited effects of association, this pathway, namely the attempt to trigger a change of identity scripts on both sides of the conflict in a way that would be conducive to peace, encounters many limitations. This pathway depends on a long-term process which requires at least some economic and political stability, which is lacking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to the consistently high levels of violence throughout the existence of association agreements with the EU. The second reason for the weakness of constructive impact has to do with the sensitivities surrounding the articulations of identity on both sides, which have been central to the escalation of the conflict.

The constructive impact of the EU is hampered by the specific way in which the EU addresses Israeli and Palestinian identities in the conflict. Thus, while the establishment and expansion of the EU as a peace project is premised on the removal of ethnic and national barriers as part of a transformation into a wider, diluted, regional pan-European identity, the EU’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict rests on a different logic. The resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, by contrast, is constructed in a way which affords ethnic and national identities their ultimate expression through the establishment (not dissolution) of borders signifying territorial separation and exclusivity. In the EU’s perspective, it is at a later stage that borders may be removed and that notions of integration and cooperation may become relevant to Israelis and Palestinians.
3.3.3.6. Conditions of EU Impact

The effect of the EU assistance programs in Palestine on the overall conflict remain limited, not least because in both Israel and Palestine, references to the EU are used to mark difference (and thus antagonism) rather than cooperation. The effects of the different pathways are also conditioned by the groups at which they are targeted. Both the compulsory and the enabling pathways are aimed at governments and administrations which tend to view EU involvement, through the prism of the conflict, as an external intervention. Thus, notwithstanding the lukewarm effects of the EU’s attempts to establish a shared sense of belonging in the framework of the EMP, both Israel and Palestine perceive the EU as a third party that is met with suspicion, especially in Israel. Thus, the EU is judged – and used – by the parties on the basis of whether it is perceived as being biased ‘towards me’ or ‘against me’. In the case of the connective impact, the targeted activities are aimed at groups which, by definition, promote conflict resolution and dialogue and thus are more eager to participate in common initiatives than is the case on the wider societal level. As far as the constructive pathway is concerned, its effects are long-term and generally become perceptible after the conflict has reached a greater degree of desecuritisation – a situation which has not been achieved in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Moreover, to be effective in initiating the change of identity scripts, EU funding should reach beyond the specific Israeli-Palestinian context and address the issues of regional relations and cooperation in the entire Middle East.

The major issue to have aroused the feelings of anti-Europeanism in Israel has been the accusation that some of the EU assistance to the PA was used for the purchase of arms, which were then used in terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens. The EU denied this, although it did admit that not all the funds were used in the way intended and that there had not been an adequate system of control over the use of these funds. The matter could have been resolved had the European Commission agreed to set up a committee to examine the accusations, but this idea was turned down by the then-EU Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten. It took a formal request on the part of a large group of members of the European Parliament for this committee to be eventually set up. The fact that Patten did not succeed in endearing himself to the Israeli public by his openly indifferent (if not antagonising) stance directs attention to another important dimension of the conditions of EU impact – namely, the personality factor. Patten, for instance, by continuously refusing to visit Israel despite numerous invitations on the part of the Foreign Ministry and a number of Israeli universities has lost the vital opportunity for enhancing EU’s influence in the region by delivering a statement on, and ironing out some of the tensions in, EU-Israeli relations. Many Israelis viewed Patten as the most anti-Israeli of the EU Commissioners, contributing to the poor relations between the Israel and the EU (Pardo 2004).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Main EU Institution</th>
<th>Main Addressee</th>
<th>Nature of Influence</th>
<th>Condition of Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory</td>
<td>European Parliament Elected and Appointed Officials</td>
<td>Governments, particularly Israel Political leadership</td>
<td>Economic pressure (EMP)</td>
<td>Conflict antagonism Perception of EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enabling

| Aid agencies | Governments, particularly Palestinian Officials Local authorities | Political culture Democratization | Conflict Fiscal dependency |

Connective

| European Commission | NGOs Grassroots | Local communities Grassroots / civil society | Perception of EU Willingness of social and economic elites |

Constructive

| All | Political leadership and conflict societies | Identity scripts | Move away from subordination conflict Integration |

Table 3. Pathways of EU’s impact on Israeli-Palestinian border conflict

3.3.4. Northern Ireland

3.3.4.1. Overview of the Conflict and EU involvement

Relatively recently drawn (1920) in comparison to other European state borders, the Irish border has been at the centre of the most enduring and explicitly violent conflict situation within the European Union. The Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement of 1998 brought together the two governments and the main parties in Northern Ireland to construct an agreement for peace built on new institutional and constitutional dynamics within Northern Ireland, within the island of Ireland, and between Britain and Ireland. The Irish case study is unique in that the EU membership of both states concerned has enabled the EU both to intervene directly in the peace process (e.g. through the provision of funds for cross-community and cross-border projects) as well as to affect the context for peace-building in indirect ways. Given the focus of EUBorderConf on the study of border conflicts, it is notable that the 1998 Agreement was founded on a definition of the conflict in terms of a binary opposition between British/unionist and Irish/nationalist, with their contrasting interpretations of the legitimacy of the border. The notion of the conflict as one between British and Irish identities has also informed the EU’s approach to the situation in Northern Ireland since the early 1980s.

Partition of the island of Ireland was a product of the politicisation of differences between its north and south in the late nineteenth century (see Bardon, 1995; Coakley, 1999). The drawing of the border was considered by the British government as a temporary solution to the problem of stark unionist and nationalist opposition regarding British sovereignty in Ireland. The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 (which established Northern Ireland in the six north-east counties of the island) set provisions for the formation of a Council of Ireland to link the parliaments in Dublin and Belfast and facilitating the negotiation of an all-Ireland

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5 This section of the report is based on research conducted and papers written by Katy Hayward and Antje Wiener
settlement. However, by the time the Free State was constituted in the twenty-six southern counties in 1922, the all-island Council was suspended and with it went formal and official means of contact between the two administrations. Outside the surreptitious cooperation between governmental officials on specific matters of mutual benefit (see Kennedy 2000), the border was left as it was, steadily to take a more concrete form as a customs barrier (since 1923), political separation, cultural division (e.g. Harris 1986: 19-20; Heslinga 1971), and a security frontier. Following the partition, the general pattern of relations at all levels between north and south, unionist and nationalist, was one of growing polarisation (Kennedy 1988).

For the first fifty years of its existence, the border was essentially the subject of an issue conflict between the British and Irish governments. As communal dissent took to the streets of Northern Ireland (originally in the form of Civil Rights marches for Catholics) in the 1960s, distrust of the government spread throughout the province, galvanising support for more hard-line nationalism/republicanism and unionism/loyalism. The presence of the army and the effects of this on daily life signalled that the situation had rapidly reached the stage of a subordination conflict. The period of the so-called ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland is characterised by paramilitary activity, securitisation of daily life as well as of the border, and increasing polarisation between unionist and nationalist identities. Just as the border became more firmly entrenched as a physical and ideological barrier between north and south during the Troubles, so the division it represented became replicated within Northern Ireland. As Boal, Murray and Poole (1976) noted in the case of Belfast, the security situation meant that the ‘national conflict’ led to the creation of more barriers between the communities in Northern Ireland. Analysis of the census results of 1971, 1981 and 1991 from Northern Ireland shows that the violent conflict of subordination at this time was accompanied by a deepening physical segregation of society.

The success of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement was due to the fact that it drew together both desecuritisation and increasing politicisation of the conflict, i.e. the forum for the expression of disaccord became the democratic political sphere. Yet, although the British and Irish governments have taken a step back from a zero-sum approach to the border, the Agreement institutionalises a binary that keeps the border central to the identity of the groups concerned: unionist/north/British versus nationalist/south/Irish. This binary is replicated in the institutions of the 1998. For example, the Agreement requires Assembly members to be designated as either unionist or nationalist in order to receive full voting rights, so as to ensure a demonstrably cross-party, and thereby cross-community, basis for dealing with ‘bread and butter’ issues (Hayes and McAllister 1999: 39; Morgan 2000: 186). However, as the theoretical framework of the project indicates, the expression of difference in an identity conflict is still accusatory and hostile, albeit non-violent. A problem for the enactment of the Agreement is that the institutionalisation of the binary has led individuals to question who best represents the interests of their community, and the majority on both sides have turned to parties and leaders who are associated less with compromise and more with confidence in a staunch unionist/nationalist position.

For this reason, parties that have sought to construct an alternative approach to politics in Northern Ireland (such as the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition) have lost out to the gains of the hard-line parties on all sides since the Agreement. Five years after the Agreement, Sinn Féin and the DUP replaced the SDLP and the UUP as the largest parties in the province in the elections to the (suspended) devolved Assembly in November 2003. The dominance of the ‘hard-line’ parties was confirmed in the 2005 Westminster and local elections, leaving the two central architects of the Agreement very much on the political
margins. Whereas Sinn Féin gained by stepping into the SDLP’s shoes as a pro-Agreement yet strong voice for nationalism, the anti-Agreement DUP gained from unionist concern that the UUP had been irredeemably weakened by the compromise. The erosion of the middle ground within and between the parties is mirrored in growing physical segregation in Northern Ireland. Research suggests that segregation continued to worsen after the 1998 Agreement (Shirlow 2002). The number of ‘peace walls’ separating troublesome ‘interface’ residential areas tripled in the ten years after the 1994 paramilitary ceasefires (Wilson, 2003). The experience of Northern Ireland since the Agreement may suggest that as state borders become less a focus of distrust and disaccord, so internal boundaries can increase in potency and significance.

British-Irish relations (Strand Three):
EC/EU as a framework for intergovernmental relationship
The conflict emerged in Northern Ireland at the same time as Ireland and Britain prepared for accession to the European Economic Community. Although at the time, neither government viewed the EEC as a possible ‘third party’ in the conflict, the Irish government did see the European forum as an opportunity to put pressure on Britain to internationalise the search for a solution. For the most part, the EEC – specifically the Council – was a forum around which a positive and cooperative intergovernmental relationship was built (Arthur 2000; Meehan 2000; O’Dowd et al. 1995). Regular meetings on the fringes of EU Council summits created a context for a bilateral approach to the conflict, leading to the Anglo-Irish Agreement in November 1985. The informality, secrecy and regularity of meetings between government ministers at the European level proved to be invaluable for the development of an ‘agreed approach’ to Northern Ireland.

North-South relations (Strand Two): Cross-border cooperation
The European dimension is also central to Strand Two of the Agreement. The remits of the six all-island Implementation Bodies include areas tightly linked into EU competences (e.g. EU Programmes, fisheries) as well as those specific to the island (e.g. languages, tourism). The North-South Ministerial Council (NSMC), when in operation, is charged with ensuring the representation of all-island interests at the EU level, both informally and through the inclusion of NSMC members in Irish delegations to the Council of Ministers and its working groups. The importance of the EU for Strand Two relates both to specific Community Initiatives for interregional cooperation and to the general process of integration between member-states. First, ‘dynamic cross-border development and cooperation’ was to become an integral element of strategies for economic and social cohesion between EU regions, particularly those lagging behind in development, as the island of Ireland was (McAlinden in McCall 1998: 394). Several pre-existing cross-border structures between Northern Ireland and the Republic were thus consolidated and strengthened in the 1994-1999 round of EU Structural Funds (ADM/CPA 1999: 12). Furthermore, the number and effectiveness of cross-border networks of cooperation across the island substantially increased with the Interreg Community Initiative, particularly in its third phase (Interreg IIIA) (Laffan and Payne 2001). The introduction of EEC regulations on customs declarations in 1987 had an immediate effect on the ease with which goods could be transported across the border (MacEvoy 1988: 11; McCracken 2003: 22). Many further obstacles to cross-border trade and economic development were eroded with the creation of the Single European Market in 1992.
Within Northern Ireland (Strand One): Direct EU involvement

In addition to the support contributed through its Community-wide programmes, the European Commission directly responded to the specific needs of the province with the Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (PEACE) (established in response to the ceasefires in 1994) and its donations to the International Fund for Ireland (Logue 1999). Altogether, the Commission’s contributions have been significant not only in terms of the necessary boost they have given to the infrastructure of the province but also because they have been a means of bypassing central government (Loughlin et al. 1999: 316).

Any analysis of the EU’s role in Northern Ireland has to acknowledge that it is not a neutral player by virtue of the contrasting opinions held by nationalists and unionists regarding the involvement of external actors. The difference in nationalist and unionist support for EU involvement lies not only in their traditionally opposing conceptualisations of the Irish border but also in their affiliation to governments with different approaches to the EU (Brennan 1995: 75; Hayward 2006). Indeed, the different approach taken by nationalists and unionists to the EU reflects the centrality of national ideology in the delineation of identity in relation to Europe (Bew and Meehan 1994). The SDLP has shared the Irish government’s generally pro-integrationist vision of the EU and, under the leadership of John Hume MEP, disseminated a vision of the EU as a crucial context for redefining Irish nationalism and national identity. From an originally Eurosceptic stance, Sinn Féin’s move into mainstream politics in Northern Ireland has been accompanied by recognition of the value of the EU in internationalisation of the conflict and cross-border cooperation. This was reflected in the effort Sinn Féin put into elections to the European Parliament in 2004, in which it took the seat vacated by Hume’s resignation. In contrast, unionists have generally opposed an active role for the EU in Northern Ireland, mirroring the British government’s concern to maintain a clear distinction between national and European realms of competence. Nonetheless, the involvement of the European Union in the three ‘strands’ noted above has meant that the EU has become increasingly seen as less of an external actor than as a context enabling previously inconceivable developments for the purpose of practical gain. Whilst the DUP is overtly Eurosceptic and the UUP is suspicious of European integration in a way similar to that of the British Conservative Party, both acknowledge the benefits of EU membership for Northern Ireland.

3.3.4.2. Compulsory Impact

The EU is a major context for policy development in its member-states, but the direct ‘compulsory’ impact of the EU on elite actors has been virtually non-existent in the case of Northern Ireland. The EU’s direct compulsory influence on the political leaders had to be exercised towards the two governments. More common has been the use of special EU funds as a ‘carrot’ to encourage cooperation between parties to the peace process, exemplified in the announcement by the Commission following the IRA ceasefire in 1994 that it was increasing its contribution to the International Fund for Ireland by a third (CAIN). Yet, the ‘carrot’ of EU funding is yielded rather than wielded: the more it is used, the more it is taken for granted. Moreover, the ones who are most affected by this ‘carrot’ are neither political leaders nor paramilitaries, but community-level actors, as discussed below. Ultimately, the influence of the EU on political leaders in relation to the conflict in Northern Ireland has been most significant and effective in indirect, structural forms.
3.3.4.3. Enabling Impact

A far more significant impact of the EU, particularly for the peace process in Ireland, has been its indirect structural influence on the political leaders involved. This has occurred through the EU’s provision of a new context, model and inspiration for British-Irish and cross-border relations. The application of the EU model of multilevel cooperation is embodied in the three-stranded institutions of the Good Friday Agreement (Hume 2004). The Strand Three institutions in particular, with their mix of supranational cooperation, intergovernmental agreement and sub-national coordination, reflect the model of cross-border partnership at work in the EU (Kearney 1998). The relevance of the EU’s model is heightened by the fact that, at a broader structural level, the process of European integration has significantly altered the policy context in Ireland, north and south.

The ‘win-win’ model of the EU has helped to legitimise cross-border cooperation in Ireland, facilitating acceptance of the cross-border institutions across the political spectrum. The most explicit proponents of the EU’s role in this regard have been the Irish government and the SDLP. Membership and the model of the European Union have always fitted well with moderate Irish nationalists’ aim to internationalise the issue of Northern Ireland and to build meaningful north-south relations. Moreover, the meaning of ‘Irish unity’ itself has changed over the course of thirty years, and the Irish government no longer anticipates ‘an end to partition’ (Lemass 1962) through EU membership but simply ‘greater North/South cooperation’ (Roche 2003). The fact that this language of ‘overcoming barriers’ is not confined to nationalist discourse reflects the EU’s capacity to depoliticise cross-border cooperation and identities. Aside from the inspirational role of the EU, its context has certainly supported the primary justification for cross-border cooperation in Ireland, namely that of economic benefit. This analysis appears to have been borne out in the words of the UUP leader, who presents the new institutions as a reason to trust that cross-border cooperation ‘is no longer a strategy for creeping unification’ (Trimble 1998) but rather a pragmatic development that ‘threatens no-one and benefits everyone’ (Trimble 1999).

3.3.4.4. Connective Impact

The active direct role of the EU in Northern Ireland has been essentially conducted through its programmes for economic and regional development. Given that the most ‘clout’ the EU has is economic, it is not surprising that its most significant competence regarding societal conflict resolution lies in economic measures (Brown and Rosecrance 1999; Piening 1997). The economic boom in the Republic of Ireland – linked at least in part to ‘enthusiastic embracing of EU initiatives’ – has encouraged individuals and organisations in Northern Ireland to be increasingly open to ‘economic interaction with their island neighbours’ (Bradley and Hamilton 1999: 37; D’Arcy and Dickson 1995: xv). Politicians from all sides of the spectrum have noticed that the Republic is not only a more attractive economic partner but also an example to follow in the context of EU membership.

The funding given by the EU to community groups in Northern Ireland and the border counties is recognised as profoundly important due to its direct impact at the grassroots level and its implications for peace-building. A number of interviewees draw explicit connections between projects being funded by the EU and a decrease in the level of sectarian violence in those localities. Others trace a more indirect route for the impact of PEACE funds. For example, in projects that develop skills in individuals enabling them to become social actors themselves, first as contributors to their local community and then as lobbyists for peace.
Since direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, the Parliament has been used as a forum by MEPs from Northern Ireland to bring their concerns to wider audience. In an action signifying a new public profile for the European Parliament as well the lack of outlets for democratic expression within Northern Ireland, the family of Robert McCartney (murdered by IRA members in January 2005) brought their campaign for justice to Strasbourg. The Parliament subsequently approved a motion condemning the murder and calling for EU financial support for any future civil proceedings brought by the McCartney family against the suspects. The fact that the two Sinn Féin MEPs abstained from the vote on the grounds that it ‘politicised’ the problem epitomises the move of the EU into new territory regarding the conflict in Northern Ireland, i.e. operating not on the level of governments or even parties, but at a community level. Notably, the two unionist MEPs welcomed the intervention of the European Parliament, with DUP MEP Jim Allister going so far as to name the IRA suspects during the plenary session. This highlights a new and unique element in the European forum, namely that the pressure placed on local politicians (in this case Sinn Féin) was much more direct and immediate.

3.3.4.5. Constructive Impact

The wider consequences of the EU context for societal change point to the more obtuse ‘constructive’ impact of the EU on the conflict. Most notably for this study, the context of the European Union has both facilitated and ‘normalised’ cross-border activity. Although some level of cross-border cooperation occurred prior to the EU initiatives in this area, it was not ‘fashionable’ and bodies such as the North West Region Cross Border Group (NWRCBG) did not formalise or announce their activities. Increasing partnership is made all the more significant by the fact that the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) has encouraged ‘collaborative working across sectors… as well as across borders’ (SEUPB 2004). This has potential implications for the alignment of economic interests, territorial locality and political representation. For example, just as fishermen and farmers in Northern Ireland have been known to lobby the relevant Irish (rather than British) ministers to support their interests at the EU level, one Donegal TD (member of parliament) notes that she now receives almost as many representations from people across the border in the north as from her own constituents on the big issues (Personal Communications, 2004a). She attributes the way in which people now gravitate towards the politician who best represents their needs, regardless of the border, to the impact of the EU (ibid.).

The EU has also helped to stimulate change within community groups, areas and subject positions. For instance, a corollary of EU funding for community development is the growth in confidence of ‘previously silent section[s] of the population’ such as the Protestant community in the southern border counties (Personal Communications, 2004b). A different example of the indirect constructive impact of the EU is seen in the role played by the SDLP over the past thirty years. Even since the SDLP has been supplanted by Sinn Féin as the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland, changes to Sinn Féin’s own ideological and constitutional position in and around its engagement in the peace process point to the significant if indirect influence of Hume’s decision to ‘redefine … the battlefield as Europe’ (Todd 2001). Neither the individual member states nor other international actors were able to effect a ‘change of scripts’ in Northern Ireland to the same degree that the EU has indirectly managed to achieve, in part through Hume’s influence. Such ideological and constitutional change, however, does not necessarily entail a decreasing role for identity difference in
contemporary Europe. It is clear that the ‘reconstruction of identities’ envisaged in this pathway is not occurring along the lines of what might be termed ‘Europeanisation’.

3.3.4.6. Conditions of Impact
Part of the difficulty faced by the EU in terms of gaining recognition as an external actor arises from the fact that the EU is not a homogenous actor, but that it rather must be seen as a complex political organisation which includes a diverse set of collective actors. The EU’s identity is defined more by institutions than individuals, thus lacking the media-friendly face of US politicians. Yet, the European Union provides something that no other external actor can contribute: a democratic political context and a direct functional relevance for the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement. The EU has changed the economic and policy context for local actors and institutions, yet the influence that it has on society is mediated through these multilevel actors and institutions. Its role may be summarised as being that of context rather than player, underlying rather than high-profile, continuous rather than circumstantial, and (for the most part) circumspect rather than controversial.

The conceptual framework of the project acknowledges that the form and success of the EU’s perturbation of a conflict is influenced by the structural environment of the conflict and the relationship between the EU and actors within the conflict setting. The research on NI case study suggests that these local conditions do not merely ‘influence’ the impact of the EU but rather serve to determine it. The precedence of domestic over international conditions in this case is secured by the fact that the EU’s involvement has always been a consequence of the EU membership of the two protagonist states. In order to gain any access, let alone to have an influence, in the conflict situation, the EU had to wait for an agreement between the governments and the coalescence of the conflict parties themselves. Even with intergovernmental agreement, the EU’s direct impact on political practice in Northern Ireland is delimited by the national structures of the United Kingdom. With regard to the cross-border impact of the EU in Ireland, cross-border initiatives from the EU are enacted differently between the two jurisdictions as a consequence of differing national legislation, regulations and civil service cultures north and south, although the Special EU Programmes Body is working to ensure a more even implementation of EU cross-border initiatives (SEUPB 2004).

The lack of independence for the EU in relation to its role in the conflict is inseparable from the nature of the EU as an organisation and its relationship to the core elite actors in the conflict. The impact of the EU on the conflict is mediated in two regards: local political actors inform both (a) the EU’s image of the conflict society, and (b) the conflict society’s image of the EU. Thus, even Hume, the most ardent advocate of the EU as the leading model and context for conflict resolution in Ireland, acknowledges that its position as a transformative factor is decided not so much by neutral, transcendent European ideals, but by physical proximity and personal relations between elite actors. An upshot of this process is that local political actors are keen to gain recognition for their own role in relation to even the most direct interventions of the EU (e.g. Ahern 1999). The fact that the extension of PEACE funding was listed as a priority by all four main parties (and constituted the most specific ‘European’ policy agenda of them all) reflects the primary association of the EU with economic gain.

The conditions of EU influence mean that the EU is not so much an independent force for conflict resolution but that its main role is to build upon and facilitate further change.
within the conflict society. Describing the situation in NI as one of two ‘conflicting national identities’, the Haagerup report (1984: 7) recognised the limitations of the EU’s capacity to effect change with regard to drawing unionists and nationalists closer together, and viewed the area of EU’s contribution as promoting tolerance and rejecting ‘violence as a political instrument’. Even in the area of economic and social development (the primary operative role of the EU according to Haagerup), the report recognises that improved cross-border trade depends on British-Irish relations and the states’ own approach to the EU rather than EU innovation. Thus, the EU acknowledges that economic integration, political cooperation and legal harmonisation do not eradicate borders, not least because their symbolic power becomes even more important for nationalism in the context of Europeanisation (Anderson and Bort 2001; cf. Kockel 1991: 41). Nevertheless, what the EU can normatively contribute is to defuse the *conflictive potential* of national difference because, it assumes, as common economic needs and political interests are met through cooperation, greater understanding and toleration emerges between the member-states. Certainly, it would appear that this model of cooperation, development, and understanding has been successfully applied in British-Irish relations and, thereby, to north-south relations in Ireland. However, the matter of whether this effect can ‘filter through’ to the regional and community level depends on political conditions within Northern Ireland. Given the suspension of devolution, and with it the most likely means by which a growth in moderation within nationalism and unionism can occur, the type of cooperation that the EU can support is not between unionist and nationalist politicians but at a micro-level, between community groups and local councils.

Ultimately, it appears that it is not so much the actors or structures of the European Union but the actual process of European integration itself that has served to transform factors that would previously have contributed to the conflict into bases for cooperation across territorial borders. The unique example of the EU shows that cooperation needs to be multilevel, multi-sectoral, self-perpetuating, and change-inducing. Potential for further transformation within Northern Ireland may rest with the extension of the multilevel networks supported directly through EU funding and legitimised by the EU context. These networks offer a unique opportunity for communication and cooperation across borders and, thereby, for progress to a lasting peace.

<table>
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<th>Pathway</th>
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<th>Nature of Influence</th>
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<td>Enabling</td>
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<td>Governments and officials; Regional politicians</td>
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Table 4. Pathways of EU’s impact on the conflict in Northern Ireland

### 3.3.5. Cyprus

#### 3.3.5.1. Overview of the Conflict and EU Involvement

The decades-long history of failed attempts at resolving the ‘intractable’ conflict in Cyprus has provided the context, since the 1990s, to argue that a change in the dynamics of the resolution structures could be the answer to breaking the stalemate. The island’s entry to the European Union (EU) could in these terms be considered the most radical change to these dynamics imaginable (save war). Indeed, it is in this capacity that the EU has come to be viewed as a new dimension in discussions of the conflict (see Joseph, 1997; Diez, 2002b; Brewin, 2000; Christou, 2004 and Tocci, 2005). More often than not, the EU has been seen in these discussions as the ultimate answer to the solution of the Cyprus problem. In this sense, Cyprus tops the list of cases where the EU’s impact has for this long and with such conviction (both for and against) been seen as critical to the prospects of solving the political problem.

In terms of the typology of conflicts employed in this project, the case of Cyprus presents a difficulty in isolating ‘conflict episodes’ and ‘issue conflicts’, i.e. instances where before escalation into full-fledged violence the two sides disagree about specific issues. Instead, such ‘episodes’ and ‘issue conflicts’ became embedded in wider discourses about the conflict that mostly appeared following the eruption of inter-communal violence as ways of rationalising the identity and subordination conflicts already in place. In this sense, instances of such rationalisation could be seen as a response to attempts by mediators to lower the level of conflict but only within a general environment of pervasive identity conflict, with the separation into ‘self’ and ‘other’ as the chief form of identification. For this reason, identification shifts will be used as the chief reference points in the overview of historical developments in the Cyprus conflict.

In his introduction to a historical analysis of the development of nationalism on the island, Kızılyürek speaks of a time ‘in the near past’ when the words ‘Turk’ (Türk) and ‘Hellene’ (Helen, presumably referring to the Greek Ελλήνες which encompasses both the implications of ancient and modern Greekness) ‘were not used’ and where villagers instead distinguished each other on the basis of ‘Christian and Ottoman / Muslim’ (2002:11). With the formation of the guerrilla group EOKA, which sought the island’s unification with...

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6 This section of the report is based on the research conducted and papers written by Olga Demetriou
‘motherland’ Greece (enosis) and the TMT group, which called for the island’s partition in the interests of Turkish-Cypriots (taksim), the author also recalls policies such as the ‘compatriot speak Turkish’ campaign of the 1950s that aimed to separate the two identities (ibid:13). However idealising of the conditions of co-existence prior to the eruption of nationalist violence this view might be, the gradual segregation of villages during the first half of the 20th century, i.e. at the time when nationalist ideology began to take hold, had been recorded since the late 1970s (Attalides, 1979), and as Bryant (2004) suggests, the introduction of nationalism through the educational system at the beginning of the century did not instil hatred about the other as much as lack of interest. This gradual institutionalisation of communal separation marked the turning of the identity conflict (focused on the differentiation between self and other) into a conflict of subordination, where violence could be legitimised on the basis of a discourse of conflicting interests. The objections to the terms of the Constitution to which the Greek-Cypriot leadership had to agree upon the Republic’s Independence in 1960 can thus be seen as a sign of the entrenchment of subordination as the main characteristic of the conflict. By then, ethnic identification had become a clear sign of differentiation, the Turkish-Cypriot community acquired the status of a ‘minority’ and the rights enshrined in the Constitution that exceeded its demographic strength became key issues of conflict.

The escalation of conflict to the stage of overt violence prompted UN intervention through the set-up of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which is, forty years later, still stationed on the island. The 1974 coup, inspired and directed by the Junta regime in Athens in the name of enosis, and the intervention of the Turkish military in the name of saving Turkish Cypriots from slaughter is often seen as the culmination of this situation. In 1974, the negotiations between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaderships (conducted between Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash respectively) that sought to end the violence and return to the co-existence framework of 1960, had almost reached a final agreement weeks before the coup took place. On the basis of this the coup should be seen as distinct from the trajectory of the inter-communal conflict, because it was primarily about the conflict within the Greek-Cypriot community. In the years of relative ‘calm’ between 1964 and 1967 and 1967 and 1974, the ‘subordination conflict’ persisted, in as far as the legitimisation of violence persisted, not only as a means of attacking or defending oneself against the attacks of the perceived enemy, but more importantly as a facet of daily life. In other words, violence was not only experienced through the incidents of inter-communal violence, but as a feature of communal life as well, as the re-configuration of nationalist fighters’ units as paramilitary organisations became intertwined with the systems of governance - both Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot ones (see Droushiotis, 1996; 1998; 2002a; 2002b).

Up to this stage the EEC avoided involvement in the conflict, even despite the fact that the Republic of Cyprus concluded an Association Agreement with EEC in 1972 (entered into force since July 1973). The reason for this avoidance was that the agreement dealt almost exclusively with issues of trade and was complemented by a protocol providing the framework for EU-Cyprus relations, which was only concluded in 1987 (Gaudissart, 1996: 11-12). The Customs Union was also agreed long before the stalemate of negotiations became plainly obvious – the relevant agreement was due for completion in 1977, but was extended first to 1987 and then, with the commencement of accession negotiations, became part of the accession process. By the time the Republic applied for EEC membership in 1990 the impasse-ridden ‘status quo’ had become part of daily political rhetoric and the argument that this new affiliation would ‘act as a catalyst’ to break the deadlock was gaining ground. In
the same year the office of the European Delegation in Nicosia was opened and one year later a Joint Parliamentary Committee of European Parliamentarians (MEPs) and Cypriot Parliamentarians was formed and continued to meet twice a year up to the accession.

At that point, the counter-argument for accession was voiced by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, by now firmly grounded at the head of the a government structure in the northern side of the island that the Greek-Cypriot leadership claimed ‘illegal’ and the international community refused to recognise. The argument of this leadership rested on the ‘illegality’ of concluding such a union because it overwrites the Cypriot constitution of 1960, requiring both communities on the island to agree before the state can join any other state. To this, the Republic of Cyprus counter-argued that since the EU is not a state there is no issue of contravening the 1960 constitution. Thus, discussions regarding Cyprus’ suitability for membership began in 1993, after the Commission decided to accept the Republic’s application as one made on behalf of the island. The eligibility for membership was decided in 1995 and negotiations began in 1998. They were concluded in December 2002 and the Accession Treaty signed in April 2003. The accession of Cyprus to the EU took place in May 2004 in what was hailed as the biggest round of enlargement to date, which included nine other countries. EU accession brought with it significant developments in the politics of the conflict on Cyprus, which culminated in the referenda that took place simultaneously on 24th April 2004 in both the north and the south of the island and sought the people’s approval of the implementation of a UN-proposed plan (known as the ‘Annan-Plan’) to end the division of the island and bring on a solution to the Cyprus conflict. Even though 65% of the population in the Turkish-Cypriot north of the island approved the plan, 76% of the population in the Greek-Cypriot south rejected it, and thus it was not implemented. The timing of the referenda, which took place one week before the accession date, was explicitly decided on the presumption that had the re-unification plan been supported by majorities on both sides, Cyprus would enter the EU as a united country. In this sense, the referenda could be seen as the result of concerted efforts on the parts of the UN which brokered the agreement, the EU which repeatedly made the point that it would prefer a united Cyprus joining in 2004, the Cypriot leaderships who subscribed to the arguments for re-unification before accession (i.e. the Greek-Cypriot leadership in government during the period 1998-2003 and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership that took office in December 2003), and the governments of Greece, Turkey and the UK, which similarly supported this view of a ‘European solution to the problem’.

In this sense, the period of the most intense EU involvement in the conflict (2002-2004) is also the period that most closely adheres to the catalysis thesis. In this period, intense negotiations took place between the communal leadership, where ‘the conflict’ as a general umbrella term was broken down into its constituent ‘issue conflicts’, the Green Line that separated the two communities since 1974 became permeable to people who wanted to see ‘the other’, both in terms of people and places, bringing about a softening of the ‘identity conflict’, and the final solution plan was drafted, offering Cypriots a clear vision of what an ‘end to the conflict’ might look like. However, the failure to achieve re-unification before accession is the fact that most obviously puts this catalysis theory into question.

The argument that joining the EU would help bring about a solution to the political problem has been the main focus of debates over the future of Cyprus. Many of these debates reflected the preoccupation of the political elites of the two conflicting communities with the issue of not whether, but what kind of outcome the EU would catalyse – i.e. unification or partition. While the theories supporting the Greek-Cypriot stand presented membership as a
panacea to the various deadlocked components of the problem, the theories supporting the Turkish-Cypriot political stance warned of the dangers of accession (in terms of the act being illegal and the possibilities that it would catalyse the TRNC’s union with Turkey) (e.g. Ertekün, 1997; Mendelson, 2001). This hauling of the discourse into the identity conflict is not surprising: the catalysis thesis was, throughout its life, primarily championed by the Greek and Greek-Cypriot leaderships (it is Yiannos Kranidiotis, vice-minister until his death in 1999 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Greece, who is credited with having set down the policy that guided Cyprus’ accession process along the path of the ‘catalysis’ discourse). The catalysis discourse was inherently a biased one, unsurprisingly prompting the nationalist reactions from the ‘Turkish side’ (Gazioğlu, 1998; Moran, 1999).

Although the EU’s impact on the conflict seems to have gone through different phases of assessment in tandem with developments in the process of accession, there is one critical point (the referenda of 2004) that puts into question the entire frame of this thesis. In order to explain how membership would catalyse the solution of the Cyprus problem, in line with pre-accession rhetoric, the failure of reaching a solution prior to accession must be taken into account. In turn this also means explaining the change in the Greek-Cypriot stance with respect to the accession-solution rhetoric and the wider context of the nexus between EU norms and EU politics. The sections below outline the apparent effects of the EU’s involvement in the conflict over the last decade, up to the point of accession. On this basis it is argued that the process of accession and its relation to the eventual solution is best assessed on the basis of the use made by the leaderships of the two communities of the opportunities for solution that it offered.

3.3.5.2. Compulsory pathway

The effects of the various decisions taken by the European Council during its most high-profile meetings serve as an immediate example of the EU’s impact on conflict transformation. For Cyprus, such highpoints have been the 1997 Luxemburg meeting, the 1999 Helsinki meeting and the 2002 Copenhagen meeting. The first of these was as important for launching Cyprus’ accession process as it was for leaving Turkey out of the next enlargement round (EU General Report 1997: § 865), and was perceived as a blow to Turkish-EU relations and a victory for the Greek-Cypriot side (Christou, 2004: 78-79). This perception may be one reason why the invitation of the Greek Cypriot president to Turkish Cypriots to attend the accession negotiations was rejected by the Turkish-Cypriot side in the following year, when the Denktaş regime also banned all bi-communal activities on the island through refusing to allow crossings across the Green Line (Bertrand, 2004), which had taken place irregularly since 1989 (Chigas and Ganson, 1997: 62). As a ‘stick’ to combat Turkish intransigence, this set of decisions had a clear adverse effect on the resolution of the conflict. In contrast, the three-fold decisions of the Helsinki meeting (Helsinki European Council conclusions, 1999: § 9.a and 9.b) had a clear and long-lasting positive effect, which was reflected in interviews conducted for the present analysis as a turning point in the minds of politicians (Markides 16/12/2002). For the next four years, and until the final signing of the Accession Treaty in 2003, the two sides were engaged in intense negotiations for a final settlement, producing the most comprehensive settlement plan brokered by the UN since the start of negotiations in the 1960s.

By comparison, the effects of the Copenhagen meeting could be classified as more indirect, in the sense they produced a series of ‘carrots’ to the Cypriot communities: the
Council’s ‘strong preference for accession to the European Union by a united Cyprus’ and willingness to accommodate the terms of a settlement in the Treaty of Accession (Bulletin of the European Union, 12-2002, § 1.4.10; § 1.4.11) were confirmed and an invitation extended to the Commission to consider ways of ‘promoting economic development of the northern part of Cyprus and bringing it closer to the Union’ (ibid, § 1.4.12). That the meeting spurred huge pro-solution opposition demonstrations in northern Cyprus is an indication of their effectiveness, especially in light of the subsequent breakdown of negotiations in the Hague in February 2003, when the Turkish-Cypriot leader walked out and was accused of intransigence.

Another series of ‘compulsory pathway’ effects can be seen in the implementation of decisions by other EU bodies following the failure to meet the deadline of April 2003 for reaching a solution that would guarantee a unified Cyprus’ entry to the EU. These were the adoption of Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession signed in April 2003, which stated, to the satisfaction of the Greek-Cypriot positions, that although Cyprus would join the EU as a whole, the adoption of the _acquis communautaire_ would be suspended in those areas of the island outside the control of the authorities of the Republic (i.e. the north). It is at this time that an alternative rhetoric about a ‘European solution to the problem’, which argued that Cyprus’ prospects of solving the conflict would be better after its accession because the Greek-Cypriot side would have more bargaining power once in the EU as representative of the whole island, began to gain ground (Cleanthous 2002). In this sense, the dangers of misusing the EU’s mechanisms of impact started to become evident. However, this was yet to become an issue, since the immediately apparent effect of signing the Treaty (incorporating Protocol 10) was the opening of the Green Line to crossers from north and south, which had for the previous 30 years marked the line of non-communication.

It was only in the final phase of negotiations that the disadvantages of the EU’s previous ‘carrot and stick’ policies were made obvious. The Greek-Cypriot side, led since February 2003 by the intransigent Tassos Papadopoulos, entered negotiations from a position where the threat of ‘sticks’ from the part of the EU had been removed, accession was certain and the ‘carrots’ to be had were offered to the Turkish-Cypriot side. With the application of nationalist rhetoric in the presentation of the proposed solution to the Greek-Cypriot population, a public rejection of the solution was fostered and the Annan-Plan was rejected at the Greek-Cypriot referendum of April 24th 2004. The referendum showed the failings of the ‘compulsory’ approach when incentives and disincentives are not available for use at all stages of the conflict resolution process (Demetriou 2004a), opening up the possibilities of the abuse of instruments that might originally have been developed to promote reconciliation.

The Green Line Regulation, adopted immediately prior to Cyprus’ accession and following the referendum failure can be considered as another such instrument: while introducing the rather radical policy (from a Greek-Cypriot perspective) that non-Cypriot visa nationals could now legitimately enter the north ‘from illegal ports’ and cross to the south, its stipulations regarding trade raised Turkish-Cypriot expectations about its implementation and the prospects of achieving a level of trade activity quickly and in a way that would allow economic effects to be felt on a large scale. In the interviews collected from Turkish-Cypriot politicians there was agreement that the package of measures that the EU had proposed after the opening of the Green Line for supporting Turkish-Cypriots economically was unsatisfactory and had not been implemented in any way because of what they perceived as unwillingness on the Greek-Cypriot to actively promote such activities. Additional amendments have been made to the Regulation since, but any substantial effects on trade
were yet to be observed by April 2005. This casts such unwillingness as an example of a failure, at best, to use the opportunities offered by this EU instrument to effect positive changes with regards to the conflict.

3.3.5.3. Enabling Impact

The abuse/misuse of EU-provided instruments for conflict resolution can be seen even more clearly under the lens of the ‘enabling impact’ because it is from this viewpoint that the opportunities for policy change, as well as the failure to take them up, can best be examined. For example, the Copenhagen Council meeting, although it did not specifically aim at that, provided a context in which an agreement that could have been reached between the Greek, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish leaders could be used internally to legitimise whatever concessions each side would have been asked to make: the fact that at the end of the meeting both the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey came away with ‘points’ on their side could be used by both of them to explain such possible concessions to the domestic public. In turn, this context, and the possibilities of reaching an agreement made obvious through the local media also prompted the Turkish-Cypriot opposition forces to arrange some of the most well-attended demonstrations against the regime and in favour of a solution to the problem that would be marked by the accession of the north to the EU. The meeting thus enabled the organisation of civil society activities that were later to prove of immense importance for overturning the political status quo in the northern part of the island, providing a unique example of a ‘good use’ of EU policy instruments (Demetriou, 2003).

On the other hand, the presence of EU officials in the negotiation process that led to the referenda of April 2004 could be seen as exemplary of the EU’s willingness to use instruments in its disposal to enable positive change in a situation where these were not taken up by the Greek-Cypriot side. Although this presence had been an issue of considerable tension between the negotiating sides, primarily because the lack of trust towards the EU by the old Turkish-Cypriot leadership, the Greek-Cypriot side managed to have its demands for this presence met. The EU Commissioner for Enlargement attended the final days of the negotiation process, stating his hope that his presence would contribute to the reaching of an agreement. In parallel, European Parliament statements, issued before the referenda, urged the Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot peoples to vote in favour of the plan, stressing that the Union would accommodate the derogations from the acquis communautaire necessary to implement the final agreement. Yet, the Greek-Cypriot side chose not to employ these statements in a campaign in favour of a positive referendum vote. Instead, they were employed in the rhetoric urging to vote against the plan as a manifestation of an imperialist plot by ‘foreign powers’ (formerly referred to as the ‘large European family’ welcoming Cyprus in its bosom). On the other hand, in the reportedly repressive campaign that followed, EU instruments did provide mechanisms that enabled the pro-unification opposition in the south to expose the incompatibility of the lack of transparency that enveloped the government-led rejection campaign with EU norms and values: the main Greek-Cypriot opposition leader wrote to the EU parliament president complaining about the conduct of the government of the Republic with regard to freedom of speech and information during the pre-referendum period (Anastassiades, 2004), and received a reply indicating that the parliament would initiate proceedings with a view to relevant sanctions against the Republic for not respecting ‘the principles upon which the EU is founded’ (Cox, 2004). This however also allowed the government to build on the anti-imperialist argument and to depict the opposition as ‘traitors’
and to finally prompt the initiator of the campaign to withdraw his complaints and halt the investigation.

3.3.5.4. Connective pathway

At the same time this ‘misuse’ also affected the possibilities of strengthening the inter-communal ties offered by the Regulation as an instrument of the ‘connective impact’. On the one hand, the delegating of responsibility for goods certification in the north to the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (which also organised the pro-solution demonstrations in 2002) officialised the connection between the north and the EU. On the other hand, however, the failure of the Greek-Cypriot authorities to utilise this as a way of overcoming the stunting rhetoric of ‘recognition’ (of any official and non-official institutions based in the north) also limited the possibilities of further concerted EU attempts at maximising the connective impact.

The connective pathway has been somewhat more successful in areas beyond the direct influence of the authorities. Specific to Cyprus in this respect has been an emphasis on bi-communal projects (under the Civil Society Programme) aiming to foster connections between civil society groups in the frameworks of USAID, UNDP and Fulbright. Other EU-funded programmes (LIFE, LEONARDO DA VINCI, SOCRATES, Sixth Research Framework Programme) have had a more indirect impact on establishing such connection by calling, more or less explicitly, for Turkish-Cypriot participation. Similar calls for participation of applicants from both sides of the island have also been made in the case of EU-related job opportunities in Brussels and Cyprus. However, access of young Turkish Cypriots to the EU-related job market was somewhat hampered by the failure of the EU to make Turkish, one of the two official languages of the Republic of Cyprus, an official language of the EU – a failure that is blamed on previous Greek-Cypriot governments that overlooked this issue in the negotiation process. Responding to these criticisms, some of the Brussels-based jobs recently advertised have required that Turkish-Cypriot applicants exhibit fluency in one language less than would be the case otherwise.

In terms of funding, the greatest impact that the EU can currently visibly have in the north is expected to come with the aid of €259m, which had been pledged by the Union to help in the development of the north in the event of a solution. After the rejection of the solution plan by the Greek-Cypriot side, the European Commission decided to make these funds available to the north anyway, something to which the government in the south not only agreed, but which it also encouraged, according to its official statements. However, at the time of writing, there continues to be a problem when it comes to deciding how these funds are to reach the north, and whether their release to the Turkish Cypriot side would be linked to an agreement allowing direct trade between the north and the EU or not. The matter was debated until June 2005, when at the European Council meeting the Turkish Cypriot leadership agreed to a disengagement of the two issues, with a final decision still pending in January 2006. While the funds would undoubtedly make a positive contribution to the improvement of infrastructure and economy of the north and thus to the support of further EU initiatives and (hopefully) of the conflict resolution, the debate over their distribution seems to suggest that this ‘connective’ pathway of impact, if misused, can also potentially create further friction between the conflict parties.
3.3.5.5. Constructive pathway

Finally, if the demonstrations of the Turkish-Cypriot opposition forces of 2002 and 2003 are considered an effect of the EU’s involvement in Cyprus and if the changes they rendered possible in the political sphere are seen as a direct effect of the demonstrations, then what one is looking at is a prime example of ‘constructive’ impact, even if this is largely realised on the level on which the ‘EU’ becomes a conceptual construct rather than a concrete actor in the form of one or more of its institutions and structures. The demonstrations, through emphasising the need for solution and opposing Denktaş, established a connection between Turkish and Greek Cypriots who supported the same causes, even without being able to have contact with each other, and thus fostered a change of identification of the civil society of the conflicting parties from an ethnic (Greek vs. Turkish) to a political one (pro-solution vs. rejectionist). With the major policy shifts effected after the coming into power of these opposition forces, this impact was maximised most impressively in the fast and well-executed revision of the history books used in Turkish-Cypriot high school curricula. The aim of this revision was quite explicitly the shift from an insulated and nationalist policy of fomenting the identities of future Turkish-Cypriot citizens to a policy aiming at preparing them for a world that would be much more open and marked locally by multiculturalism (see below).

By comparison, the Greek-Cypriot side undertook a series of reluctant steps towards enabling constructive change in the spheres of education (Demetriou, 2005b) and civil society building, which were countered by official statements such as the one by the president to the effect that UNOPS- and USAID-funded projects aimed at undermining the political leadership. Still, the fruition of bi-communal activities also helped the Greek-Cypriot side in overcoming the identification based on ethnic grounds to the one based on political positioning with regard to resolution of the conflict, as can be seen in the debates over various political issues. These debates took multiple forms: e.g. media discussions centred around the concepts of ‘European values’ and the role of Cyprus in the enlarged Europe, whereas public debates, both academic and political, organised by relatively small but budding civil society groups, used these focal points to raise and discuss political issues of local significance. However, the discussion of the issues of both European and local importance took place despite, rather than due to, the government’s attempts to shift the discourse on ‘European norms and values’ back to the legalistic rhetoric that reigned through the earlier deadlocked phases of the conflict.

3.3.5.6. Conditions of EU Impact

The impact of the EU on the conflict was made evident in a series of core events preceding the island’s accession: the 2002 demonstrations in the north, the finalisation of the solution plan, the referenda, and the accession itself. While the successes and failures of EU policies to effect a resolution of the conflict at these crucial point have been discussed in the above sections, this section will focus on the causes of these variable outcomes viewed through the lens of ‘usage’. The main contention of the study is that any positive or negative outcomes ensuing from the EU’s involvement in the conflict, whether direct or indirect, foreseen or unexpected, explicitly pursued or not, depended primarily on the ways in which this involvement was utilised by political actors in Cyprus to augment or diminish possible positive effects. This utilisation was in turn intertwined with perceptions of the EU by local actors, and the ‘consumption’ of EU (Brussels-generated) policy and rhetoric within local political structures.
The various meanings attached to ‘European norms and values’ exemplify what ‘use’ was made of EU involvement in the resolution process. Whereas EU diplomats presented ‘reconciliation’ as one of the fundamental ‘European values’, which Greek Cypriots seem not to have embraced when rejecting the Annan Plan, Greek-Cypriot governmental rhetoric placed emphasis on ‘international law’ and the guarantees it offers against any moves that could be construed as recognition of the TRNC, as the primary ‘European norm’ that must be respected. As a result, the €259m the EU pledged for development of the north has been stuck in Brussels because of disputes between the government of the Republic, officials in the north and in the EU as to whether the funds should be channelled directly to the north or via the Republic’s government in the south, as well as whether their disbursement should be linked to the lifting of trade restrictions between the north and the EU. The direct channelling of funds to the north would foster Turkish-Cypriot trust in the EU and counteract growing (after the failure of the referendum) disinterest in reconciliation with the Greek-Cypriot side. The concern of the Greek Cypriot side, predictably, is that direct EU-TRNC links would be tantamount to recognising the TRNC.

This difference in the interpretation of ‘European norms and values’ does not simply rest on a difference in perceptions between Cyprus and the relevant EU institutions (primarily the Commission). More importantly, it stems from a shift in the interpretation of a ‘European solution to the Cyprus problem’ that the Republic’s government has been advocating since the lodging of its membership application. The argumentation on how this solution would be achievable was initially based on the premise that the negotiation stalemate was a result of the intransigence of the Turkish side, and that once this impediment was removed, the accession process would be catalytic to the island’s re-unification before accession. However, following the breaking of this intransigence under the pressure of the Turkish-Cypriot opposition, the Greek-Cypriot leadership that took power in 2003 argued that a European solution to the problem meant a solution that respected ‘European norms and values’ in full (that is, for the benefit of the Greek-Cypriot side), and that this could only be achieved after Cyprus became a member of the EU.

This line of argument is also well represented in a statement issued by the ‘1955-59 Fighter’s Association’ (many of whose members have held key government posts since 1960) on the occasion of the 50th anniversary since the beginning of their EOKA struggle. The statement describes the Annan Plan as offering ‘enslavement’ and as contradicting ‘the values of the UN and the European acquis’ because the plan does not provide for a complete withdrawal of Turkish troops, the cancellation of Turkey’s right of intervention, and the removal of all ‘settlers’ (immigrants from Turkey in the north) from the island (Politis, 31/3/2005: 7). In this statement, ‘European values’ are represented by the *acquis communautaire*, and presumably freedoms like those of movement and settlement that would guarantee the return of all Greek-Cypriot refugees to the north. Yet the Commission’s statements that the EU would accommodate derogations necessary to achieve a solution agreement as well as the principle of reconciliation on which the allowance of such derogations is based, are obviously not included in this definition of ‘European values’. This view would also preclude EU legislation, declarations, resolutions, and further instruments of the *acquis* that might, in application, also contradict other *acquis* provisions that are more in line with Greek-Cypriot positions.

Thus, this line of argument, while initially submerged under a discourse that prioritised the breaking of Turkish intransigence and focused on concrete efforts to arrive at a solution through the renewed negotiation impetus, later gave rise to an alternative discourse
on the use that could be made of EU institutions to further Greek-Cypriot interests. This
discursive shift points to the moment at which EU implements for conflict resolution became
subject to ab/misuse (catachresis) by Greek-Cypriot nationalist rhetoric allowing the
government of the Republic and its civil society supporters to use them as impediments to a
solution, while at the same time impeding their use by pro-solution political and civil society
forces. (The branding of the political party leader who complained to the European
Parliament is a case in point.) This catachrestic conduct comes into stark contrast with the
utilisation by the civil society in the north of the prospects of EU accession as an opportunity
to amass support for a solution and remove the intransigent leadership from power. There are
of course, other aspects to the comparative economies of these discursive uses, most notable
of which are the imagined ‘costs and benefits’ to the two communities of the implementation
of the Annan Plan. Exemplary of this is the Greek-Cypriot nationalist argument that in its
final version, the Annan Plan benefited the ‘Turkish side’ more than the ‘Greek side’ and that
the Turkish-Cypriot referendum succeeded not because the Turkish-Cypriots wanted re-
unification of the island but rather the benefits of EU membership, for the securing of which
they had previously expended no effort. This moralistic argument aside, the material costs
and benefits of implementing the solution were incorporated into the pre-referendum debate,
especially in the south. Reports supporting the view that material benefits would outweigh the
costs (Vassiliou, 2003) and the opposite (Lordos, 2004) were discussed in greater length than
detail. And this is precisely what is of concern here: that the catachresis of EU implements in
the interests of nationalist rhetoric against a solution was in fact at the heart of, and overrode,
any other of the shortcomings that these implements may have had in themselves as
instruments of positive impact on the conflict.

In the year following the accession, the policies of the Republic’s government with
regard to resolution of the conflict were guided by a catachrestic logic. Examples of this are
the Republic’s attempts to stall policies aiming at integrating Turkish Cypriots into the
Republic and into the EU in any meaningful way, even notwithstanding the fact that fostering
such integration under the banner of ‘citizenship’ has been the government’s explicit goal.
This catachrestic logic in the south has starkly contrasted with the policy changes that the
prospect of EU accession (despite its indefinite postponement following the failure of the
referendum in the south) was used to legitimise in the north. The ideological background and
the content of the revised textbooks in the north are geared towards the goal of re-unification
of the island in the conspicuous avoidance of nationalistic language. This can be taken as the
clearest example of the EU’s indirect impact on the conflict.

The revision of schoolbooks in the north compare well with the more directly EU-
induced changes in the educational policy in the south that produced, following adherence to
EU guidelines, a report by the national education committee that recommended among other
things the revision of history teaching, the revision of teaching in general to acknowledge
Turkish-Cypriots and the introduction of Turkish language teaching7. The report states that
its goal is to make recommendations that respond to the changes within Greek-Cypriot
society, which is now becoming a ‘Euro-Cypriot society’, and to review the prospects for
modernising the educational system into a pluralist framework prescribed by the EU.
However, the conclusions of the report point to a series of changes that are both substantial in
terms of the content of the material that would need to be taught as well as formalistic in
terms of the institutions that need to be put in place to oversee this process of change. These

changes are envisioned in a much longer term, whereas the changes implemented in the Turkish-Cypriot educational system concentrate on the goal of social change that might indeed take a generation to become rooted, but is envisioned to start straight away.

Far from suggesting that it was the explicit aim of all those involved in these policy changes to abuse EU instruments to impede the resolution of the conflict, the aim was to show how the process of accession provided the opportunities, at particular points in time (through events taking place both locally and EU-wide), for the discourse on the relations between Cyprus and the EU to change and for a discourse to be cultivated that was less accommodating of the wider project of ‘reconciliation’ than the previous one in which ideas of resolution had been entertained. If this is to be seen as a failure, the blame should be attributed to both local and external actors.

Thus, with the removal of obstacles to a solution in the north (i.e. the previous leadership) the EU played an indirect but yet vital role in the breaking of the deadlock. This is the clearest example of its positive impact on the conflict. At the same time, the foreshadowing of the problems of nationalism and the power dynamics within the new Greek-Cypriot leadership that it brought about put in place the conditions for the catachresis that ensued. In short, through its spectacular, albeit indirect, impact on the north, the ‘EU’, as a conceptual construct, raised expectations about its ability to solve the conflict irrespective of intransigence on the local leadership to such an extent that the limits of this ability came out of focus. And it is these raised expectations that led to disillusionment when after the referendum, accession, and the failure to deliver the imagined ‘Europe’ to the Turkish-Cypriot demonstrators the ‘EU’ was re-imagined as a bureaucratic structure, as liable to abuse as local institutions. In the words of a Greek-Cypriot politician in charge of EU affairs, the effect of the referendum outcome in the south was a denial to the EU of ‘the ability to project the Union as a conflict-solving project.’ The legacy of catachresis and failure to solve conflicts may not be new to the EU – the challenge will be to overcome both.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Main EU Institution</th>
<th>Main Addressee</th>
<th>Nature of Influence</th>
<th>Condition of Influence</th>
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<tr>
<td>Compulsory</td>
<td>Council of Ministers and Commission</td>
<td>Governments</td>
<td>Rulings, Directives, Regulations</td>
<td>Process of intense negotiations on resolution of the conflict and fundamental changes to Turkish-Cypriot official positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td>European Parliament; European Commission</td>
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<td>Resolutions, Statements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Connective</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>Local authorities; NGOs</td>
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<td>Spirit of rapprochement cultivated through previous bi-communal efforts</td>
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Table 5. *Pathways of EU’s impact on the conflict in Cyprus*

### 3.3.6. Europe’s North/Russia

#### 3.3.6.1. Overview of the Conflict and EU Involvement

The case study of Europe’s north/Russia differs from other EUBorderConf case studies in that effectively, the empirical research on it focused on three separate sub-case study areas: the Finnish-Russian border, the Estonian-Russian border and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Superficially, the relations between Russia and its EU neighbours in question do not appear particularly problematic – indeed, in the view of many EU representatives there are no grounds for referring to them as conflictual at all (e.g. Maurer, 2005). Still, although they have never reached the stage of overt violence, tensions and disagreements on various policy issues have been abundant. The focus of many of these tensions has been on borders, and although the issue of their geographical location has been off the agenda for the past decade (if it ever arose), the conflict has evolved around negotiating the particular border regimes that should govern these borders, especially in the cases of the new member-states that joined the EU in May 2004. Another important factor in this case study is that in addition to the bilateral relations (between Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland on one side and Russia on the other), the conflict has been evolving along a parallel track of EU-Russian relations, with these two tracks sometimes complementing, sometimes contradicting or overshadowing one another. As one of the few non-candidate countries (even in the remotest prospect) in EUBorderConf case study repertoire, Russia approaches the EU and its member states form a distinct position of policy interests that have little resonance with the EU’s norm-oriented rhetoric (Inozemtsev and Kuznetsova 2003). It has also been largely excluded from the beneficial effects of European integration processes, being exposed instead to the divisive consequences of EU enlargement. The ease of attributing the blame for Russia’s exclusion to the EU (in addition to its then candidate countries) has meant that the focus has been on the conceptualisation of the EU as an actor rather than on the integration processes, which limited the effects of indirect pathways of EU’s influence on the border conflicts in question.

Taking into account the not-so-distant past, the peacefulness of relations in the Baltic Sea Region (of which all the sub-case studies are part) and the degree to which the divisive effects of borders were overcome is indeed striking. Europe’s North has been rather quick in capitalising on the option of change that opened up with the end of the Cold War. Having been profoundly divided by the conflict between East and West with region-formation not even existing as an idea (with the exception of Nordic cooperation), the North has not merely caught up with the rest of Europe. It has, in fact, turned into one of the most regionalised

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8 This section of the report is based on the research conducted and papers written by Pertti Joenniemi, Andrey Makarychev, Sergei Prozorov, and Jevgenia Viktorova
parts of the continent. Borders, previously seen as lines of exclusion and defence, have changed in meaning with the emergence of a rather rich patchwork of various Euro-regions, trans-boundary arrangements, cross-border projects and contacts of twinning. Old divides and suspicions have to a large extent – with some exceptions – been replaced by building a new sense of regional community as exemplified by Baltic Sea cooperation, Barents Euro-Arctic cooperation and Arctic cooperation. In this respect, questions of security became conducive to solving a range of conflictual issues in through cooperation – in stark contrast to the patterns of the Cold War era in which ‘security’ considerations were a reason to avoid interaction.

As to the ideational underpinnings of the policies pursued, two elements need to be considered (cf. Browning and Joenniemi 2005). For the Baltic States and Poland, traditional Realpolitik concerns of alliance building against a possible resurgent Russian threat have been evident (see Emerson et al 2005: 17-19). In this respect, plugging into regional cooperation projects promoted by the Nordic countries and Germany was seen as one way of escaping the Russian sphere of influence, whilst at the same time making them eligible for future EU and NATO membership. Thus, the 1990s discourse of ‘returning to Europe’ was always understood as leaving something threatening and ‘non/less-European’ (i.e. Russia) behind (see Jæger 1997). In opposition to the construction of any unifying identities, ‘Europeanisation’ was thus understood in a rather traditional, power political and divisive manner.

We may identify two types of conflictual dispositions in EU-Russian relations that spill over beyond the narrow issues in interstate relations into the wider social space and acquire characteristics of identity conflicts. Firstly, the problematic of the ‘Schengen curtain’, related to the expansion of the Schengen visa regime for Russians in the course of EU enlargement, is capable of developing into a conflict discourse on Russia’s exclusion from Europe and jeopardising the EU’s own efforts at stimulating regional cooperation along the EU-Russian borders. The interpretation of this contradiction in the EU stance vis-à-vis Russia may be found in the dilemma between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ security projects of the EU, whereby the logic of regional integration clashes with a ‘soft-securitising’ uniform approach to borders (Browning 2003). Secondly, the widespread perception of Russia’s passive or subordinate status in cooperative regional arrangements with the EU has resulted in the efforts to reconstitute the North-western Federal District as an active political subject, encountering the EU with an autonomous development strategy for the Russian Northwest. In the extreme case, the lack of recognition of Russia as a legitimate political subject with its own interests that need not necessarily coincide with those of the EU brings forth a discourse of self-exclusion from European integration, grounded in the reaffirmed principle of state sovereignty. The Russian position therefore oscillates between two, at first glance opposed, stances of the problematisation of exclusion from the European space and the affirmative self-exclusion: the dissatisfaction with the present format of EU-Russian cooperation leads to the disillusionment with the very idea of Russia’s greater integration with the EU and the renewed valorisation of sovereign autonomy (see Prozorov 2005). Moreover, in the case of Russia there also appear to be fears of being left in a position of subordination within the order emerging in the North and the new, integration-oriented Europe.

Among the particular issues affecting bilateral relations in the region, there is the Karelian ‘question’ in Russian-Finnish relations (i.e. demands of restitution, covering territories Finland ceded to the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War II, that are occasionally raised by Finnish civil society actors), the issue of ‘contested’ borderlands on
Estonian-Russian border and the pending border treaty (due to Estonia’s insistence on mentioning the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty, entitling it to part of Russian territory, in the preamble) as well as various security aspects of the Kaliningrad ‘puzzle’, in which the Union performs the role of a classical conflict party rather than of an external perturbator.

The Karelian Republic, one of the twenty-one republics within the Russian Federation, has for its part actively contributed to a de-problematisation of the border. One of the features of Karelian policy in the 1990s has been the active establishment of international links, primarily with the bordering Finland but also through membership in the multiple regional arrangements in the North of Europe, such as Barents Euro-Arctic Region and Council of the Baltic Sea States (see Aleksandrov 2001; Shlyamin 2002). Throughout the 1990s, the leadership of the Republic of Karelia prioritised the development of cross-border cooperation with Finland at the same time as it maintained the federal line on the impossibility of raising the issue of a border revision. One might venture that the ‘anti-revisionist’ and ‘integrationist’ stances are in fact related insofar as the Republic’s ‘strategy of cooperation’ is hampered by any reconstruction of the border area as a ‘zone of conflict’, whether in the Finnish discourse of restitution or in the Russian ‘counter-discourse’ of entrenchment that gives federal-level publicity to the Republic, in which it is framed negatively as the ‘bastion’ of Russian statehood in the Northwest (see Prozorov, 2004b).

Since Finland’s entry into the EU in 1995, EU frameworks of cross-border cooperation (Interreg and Tacis, including the Tacis CBC sub-programme) have to a great extent supplanted bilateral programmes with Finland as the primary format of cooperation and deproblematisation of the border. In 1998 the Karelian government launched the proposal of establishing a Euregio Karelia as an ‘umbrella project’ utilising the opportunities of the ‘peripheral border area’ status. Officially inaugurated in 2000, Euregio Karelia comprises the Republic of Karelia and the Finnish provinces of North Ostrobothnia, Kainuu and North Karelia (Prozorov 2004b). The basic principle of the project is the formation of what the Karelian Programme of Cross-Border Cooperation refers to as ‘the culture of transparent borders’, making cross-border contacts in trade, science, culture and tourism a ‘natural activity in the everyday life’ of the border communities. This principle exemplifies the operation of the enabling and connective impacts of the EU logic of border deproblematisation: the institutional framework of the Euregio provides a new institutional platform, at which border issues may be discussed and joint policy solutions devised. The Euregio’s programme on fostering the development of a ‘cross-border civil and information society’, which envisions the intensification of cross-border contacts between both experts and citizens’ organisations, explicitly invokes the argument about the connective impact of such societal interfaces on conflict transformation: ‘[the programme will] create opportunities at the level of individual citizens and communities for interaction, changing attitudes and pursuing more in-depth co-operation in order to prevent border-related conflicts and thereby at the local level promote security between states’ (eKarelia s.a.: 12). The optimistic scenario for the Euregio is that it will also ultimately have a constructive impact on the border region, leading to the constitution of a new transnational macro-regional identity that thoroughly deproblematises the Karelian issue (cf. Cronberg 2003b).

Estonia’s return to independence in 1991 raised the question of its eastern border. The contest regarding the eastern bank of the river Narva and the Pechora/Petserimaa has a long history, and the question was already imminent in the context of Russian-Estonian relations when Estonia declared independence in 1918. The solution then consisted of Russia recognising that these two areas belong to Estonia, which was subsequently confirmed in the
Peace Treaty signed in Tartu in 1920. The agreement unravelled, however, in the context of World War II with Estonia being annexed – after German withdrawal – by the Soviet Union and the Red Army returning to the area in 1944. The two regions were then both divided, with parts of Pechora/Peterimaas ceded to the Pskov Oblast and the mainly rural district behind the Narva river to the Leningrad Oblast (Jääts 1995). When Estonia’s re-gained independence, the issue of whether it should press for a restorationist return to the borders of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 or settle for the borders of the Soviet period, arose once again. Because Estonia’s official position was that its independence was re-established (rather than simply achieved), the imperative of ensuring the continuity between the present and the inter-war Estonian state implied the insistence on the 1920 boundaries (not in the least because Tartu Peace treaty was the first international treaty signed by Estonia in recognition of its sovereignty and statehood). The existing borders were however viewed as a de facto reality both by the majority of domestic public as Russia, who claimed that the Tratu Peace Treaty was no longer in force with Estonia having been annexed to the USSR in 1944 (Aalto 2003c: 27-37). Negotiations started in 1992 only to end in a stalemate in 1994. Russia leaned in the direction of demarcating the border unilaterally on the basis of the de facto situation, while Estonia held the view that it could take a more flexible stand on the various practical issues if the relevance of the Tartu Peace Treaty was recognised. With no progress in sight, President Yeltsin gave an order in 1994 to demarcate the Estonian-Russian border without consulting the Estonian representatives.

As to the border areas themselves, life changed considerably with the kind of domestic border shifting to an inter-state one and a previous nominal border being altered into an external and contested one, with security and identity-related issues high on the agenda. The formerly functionally integrated border area became divided, with previously close ties between the communities forced to take the form of ‘cross-border interaction’ (Viktorova, 2001). Apart from practical inconvenience, the division also affected the mental boundaries and identities, with divisions into ‘us’ and ‘them’ becoming accentuated over time (Ehin and Berg 2006). Although falling into line over time, the emergence of a divisive border was initially interpreted by the local actors as an endeavour to subordinate and discipline the border regions, which also went for the ways in to which the EU’s policies were interpreted (Berg and Oras 2003: 56; Ehin and Mikenberg 2003). As a result of the emergence of divisive borders, the border regions have turned into socio-economic problem areas characterised by high unemployment, low income levels, significant out-migration and gradually also a considerable difference in living standards because of the growth experienced on the Estonian side of the border (Lunden 2002: 140; Ehin and Berg 2006). It should be noted, however, that the subject positions appear to be far more conflictual among the state actors than at various local levels, with regional, municipal and local actors representing more conciliatory and cooperative aspirations. In the past decade, various attempts to initiate cross-border cooperation have taken place, with a considerable help from NGO actors such as the Peipsi Center for Transboundary Cooperation, but also with the initiative of the local and national authorities.

In order to facilitate cooperation across the border, a simplified border-crossing regime was installed between 1991 and 2000. It stood out as an exemption from the general visa regime in force between Estonia and Russia, with residents (some 20,000 in total) being allowed to travel locally for humanitarian purposes (such as visiting close relatives, churches and cemeteries on the other side of the border) with special permits issued by local authorities. However, with EU accession in sight, pressure on Estonia to abolish this system
increased. Yet, instead of abolishing it at the time of accession, Estonia chose to implement a full Schengen-standard visa regime with Russia in 2000. In order to compensate for the loss of privileges for local residents, a new agreement between Estonia and Russia was reached to the effect that both sides can issue up to 4000 free multi-entry visas annually to those border-region residents who have a compelling need to cross the border on a regular basis. The issue has caused a lot of controversy, with Estonia being accused of using the EU as a pretext for implementing exclusionary policies in what could be viewed as an instance of disabling impact of references to the EU (Viktorova 2001; 2005a). In line with the EU’s own perspective on Kaliningrad, Estonia has favoured the establishment of firm, unambiguous borders serving as a marker of identity and an object of contentious political discourses, rather than opting for ‘fuzzy’ solutions conducive to various forms of cross-border cooperation (Ehin and Berg 2006). The complete reversal of border regimes governing Estonia’s western and eastern borders since the end of the Cold War signalled its willingness to escape the subordinated position created by Russia’s ‘near abroad’ doctrine, opting for an inclusion in the western camp in clear distinction to Russia’s sphere of influence.

With Estonia’s EU accession in May 2004, the Estonian-Russian relations have been placed in the context of the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), giving rise to hopes that the legacy of more than a decade-long period of tensions, such as double tariffs on Estonian imports to Russia, would be removed. Notably, the lack of a border treaty did not present an obstacle to Estonia’s accession to the EU and NATO, although eligibility for both these organisations is conditioned upon resolution of open border disputes. The dominant perception in the West was that the Russian party was to blame for lack of progress in border negotiations, due to its tactical linking of border issues with other problematic aspects of bilateral relations, such as NATO’s eastern enlargement and the situation of Russian-speakers in Estonia. For its own part, the EU has been trying to undo such linkages by dealing with the various issues on their own merit, urging, together with other actors, such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE, for more inclusive citizenship legislation and integration programmes for the Russian-speaking minority. In general, the placement of Estonia’s policy on Russia into the context of EU-Russia relations has taken much heat out of Estonian-Russian bilateral relations.

In contrast to other border-related issues pertaining to Europe’s North, Kaliningrad has attracted considerable international attention, occasionally breaking out into the sphere of high politics and creating explicit strain in EU-Russian relations (Joenniemi and Makarychev 2004). Yet, there has been little agreement concerning the essence of the issue. While for some authors issues of dissidence, territorial belonging, and the various military-strategic aspects – including fears of excessive military developments – have been of prime importance (see for example Lachowski 1998; Pedersen 1998; Donelly 2000; Krickus 2002), most contributions addressed Kaliningrad’s position between the EU and Russia, focusing on issues of political stability as well as on various economic and social questions that follow from the Oblast’s position as an exclave/enclave (Batt 2003; Wellmann 2003). The problem has quite often been depicted as one of relatively open borders (especially with Lithuania and Poland) Kaliningrad enjoyed since the demise of the Soviet Union (Fairlie and Sergunin 2001) turning, with EU enlargement, into lines of exclusion. Encircled by the new member-states implementing the obligatory Schengen regime, Kaliningrad has been exposed not only to stricter bordering practices but also other EU’s rules and regulations, creating something of a conceptual paradox compared to the rest of Russia (cf. Baxendale et al 2001), as an entity where various geographical and conceptual boundaries blur and overlap.
It has become difficult to distinguish clearly between the inside and the outside as Russia and the EU are increasingly entangled in the context of Kaliningrad, bringing together two somewhat different understandings of political space. While the EU has emphasised ‘opening up’ of economically depressed regions in the light of the prospects of enlargement, Russia – and the Kaliningraders themselves – fear that the consequences might boil down to even further restrictions of movement as well as impoverishment and marginalisation. Initially Russia suggested that Kaliningrad could become a ‘pilot region’ in the development of EU-Russian relations. The Russian side called, as a starting point for negotiations, for a visa-free regime operating along fixed train and bus routes, with a special permit system for travel by car. It was stressed that a lack of free communication between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad would entail a division of Russia’s sovereignty. Moreover, actors within the Kaliningrad regional administration also called for Kaliningrad’s greater internationalisation and for its partial inclusion into the EU’s economic space, in ways similar to Norway’s EEA arrangement. During the year 2002 Russia’s leadership actively exerted pressure on the EU to abandon its strict policies of bordering. Proposals that aimed at an unrestricted movement between the Oblast and the rest of Russia were aired. In August 2002, President Putin made an entirely new opening to facilitate the settlement of the dispute by advocating that the system of visas might be totally abandoned between the EU and Russia. The Kaliningrad issue was, in general, purported as one determining the future of Russia’s relations with the EU (cf. Joenniemi 2003: 50-51). Through the rhetoric that put forward, among other things, the argument that the resolution of the Kaliningrad transit issue represents as a ‘litmus test’ for the future of the EU-Russia relations, Russia endeavoured to present itself, in the context of the Kaliningrad dispute, as an advocate of human rights and freedom of movement whereas the Union was depicted as restraining this freedom, standing for restrictions and narrowing issues down to very technical measures of bordering. In other words, Russia was taken to stand for integration, inclusive solutions and doing away with barriers, while the EU was portrayed as standing for limitations and separating the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’. Instead of using openness in order to spread its peaceful norms and practices, the EU was accused of aspiring for firm borders in order to be protected from external risks and ills. While Russia purported itself as aiming to break previous conceptual constraints and to search for new departures, the Union was accused of endeavouring to stick to established concepts, seen as ‘natural’ and given, and to insist on implementing a pre-given set of policies to be imposed on Russia.

The Union thus found itself torn between, on the one hand, a promise to pay attention to Russia’s views and proposals concerning possible solutions and, on the other hand, a rather fixed understanding of the nature of the Kaliningrad issue and the appropriate solution to it. In a communiqué issued by the Commission in 2001 (European Commission 2001), the EU admitted that the problem of increased isolation was, in some of its aspects, related to the Union’s enlargement, although Kaliningrad was generally seen as an integral part of Russia with Russia responsible for the various ills bedevilling the region. The EU conceded that enlargement, although viewed as something basically positive, might in the case of Kaliningrad also entail some adverse effects. In other words, the EU agreed to position itself as a party to the dispute. If the Union’s enlargement implied problems for Kaliningrad rather than offering solutions, the EU announced its preparedness to talk things over. However, at the policy level fixed attitudes persisted, with the EU adamantly insisting that those travelling in transit would need to carry a valid international passport and furnished with a visa. The challenge in the case of the EU, it seems, was not just to achieve a satisfactory solution to the
problem of borders and border management – it also had internal aspects pertaining to the essence of the Union. In November 2002 an agreement was reached involving the use of a ‘Facilitated Transit Document’ (FTD) for ‘all the Russian citizens who travel frequently and directly between Kaliningrad and the Russian mainland’. Russia, for its part, found this basically technical solution satisfactory, and it was introduced in July 2003 (see Holtom 2005). As part of the deal, the Russian Duma ratified the Russian-Lithuanian border treaty (which had been pending like those with Estonia and Latvia) and approved a Readmission Agreement. The Union, for its part, promised to consider the dropping of visas in EU-Russia relations and cast the FTD as a ‘temporary measure’.

As to Russia, the Union has aspired to somewhat closer relations, as evidenced by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), the Common Strategy and more recently the agreement on four common spaces (on economics, external security, internal security, and research and education) concluded in May 2005. Moreover, there is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), although Russia’s participation in it is confined to the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which aims at consolidating the various border-related funding programmes to a single instrument by 2007. The objectives of the Union’s policies with regard to Russia were to promote structural economic reforms in order to contribute to the emergence of a functioning market economy; to promote flows of trade and investment; and to help bind Russia into a closer and mutually productive political relationship with the West (Gowan 2000: 21). This could also be described in terms of attempts to ‘Europeanise’ or ‘civilise’ Russia. Once drawn into the sphere of EU order, the key question is in which capacity Russia participates in it: whether it is assigned the position of a ‘semi-insider’ (a non-member, yet partially included and thereby also furnished with a legitimate voice in the EU’s internal dialogue) or a ‘close outsider’ (an entity behind the outer border that is engaged in a number of cooperative endeavours but deprived of a legitimate voice in the EU’s internal affairs) in the context of a Brussels-centred concentric Europe (cf. Aalto, 2003b).

Although its level of engagement as well as awareness about the essence of the EU could arguably have been greater, Russia has, for its part, adopted a basically positive view on the EU and the ‘shared values’ of democracy, respect for human rights and individual liberties as spelled out in a number of joint documents, and pursued constructive policies. The views on the EU’s border policies vary in a similar manner: there are hopes that the lowering of borders would energise some of Russia’s north-western regions, yet there are also fears that the Union’s enlargement will lead to political encirclement and exclusion, and consequently banishment to the fringes of Europe. Certain ambivalence can be noted with respect to Russia’s preferences concerning the EU’s policies towards it. Generally, Russia has favoured uniform policies that treat the different parts of the country in a similar fashion, and has been worried about exceptions and preferential treatment of some of its regions that could bring about internal tensions, dividing lines and dissidence. The discussion on Kaliningrad as a free trade area in the context of the four common spaces is a case in point. It appears that Russia has been pressing for a kind of centralised and state-based order, and has been hesitant about regionalising strategies that would increase the permeability of borders and bring about differentiation within Russia. Consequently, its reactions to the EU’s Northern Dimension initiative have been lukewarm – although Russia’s scepticism could also be due to the lack of substance to the initiative and too little factual regionalisation it has brought about (cf. Aalto 2002: 156; Joenniemi and Sergounin 2003: 37-41). On occasions, Russia has itself proposed localising solutions, such as developing Kaliningrad into a ‘pilot region’ for EU-Russian
cooperation that would be semi-integrated into the EU, with its borders open and porous. This approach would provide Russia with the position of a semi-insider in the Union.

Yet, the lack of clarity as to whether Russia is perceived and treated by the EU as an insider or an outsider, and abovementioned contradictions between the EU’s rhetoric and policies towards Russia have lead the latter to a profound questioning of ‘Europeanness’ and the EU’s claims to represent it. This questioning is based upon the EU’s is inclination to equate the essence of Europeanness with its own political configuration and normative framework, to which Russia (as has been repeatedly stressed in various instances of Russia-EU negotiations) does not fully conform. Yet, perceiving itself as a mature and profoundly European polity, Russia has been unable to gain acceptance of its own vision of Europeanness (based on the more traditional sovereignty-centred politics and a culturally-oriented understanding of ‘Europe’). The resulting disinclination and inability to project itself into the contemporary ‘Europe’ brought about features of self-exclusion from what came to be viewed as a ‘false’ Europe, epitomised in the neighbouring new EU member-states, above all Estonia and Latvia (Prozorov 2004a; see also Morozov, 2004).

3.3.6.2. Compulsory Impact

A broadly shared strategy in view of the Karelian ‘question’ has been to keep it off the agenda in the first place, i.e. to avoid the use – in the case of the EU – of any ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’. The task has been simple as the dispute is a latent one pertaining largely to some segments of Finnish civil society, with Finland never having raised the issue so as not to legitimise or internationalise the issue beyond the bilateral Finnish-Russian relations. Finland’s accession to the EU has solidified the ‘anti-restitutionist’ stance in Finnish politics, further marginalising the societal advocates of the ‘return of Karelia’. At the same time, the EU has foregone the possible application of a ‘carrot’ in the form of the integration of (and thus easier access to) TACIS and INTERREG funding, restricting the operation of the Euregio to economically modest projects and thereby limiting its integrative capacity.

Likewise, in the case of Estonian-Russian border, the Union’s unwillingness to play down Estonia’s membership plea because of the lack of a border treaty narrowed down the inroad for any compulsory impact. The issue has mainly been left for the countries concerned to handle bilaterally. Only recently have there been signs of the EU pushing the parties to pass the last hurdles. Apart from the border issues, the EU has exercised some compulsory impact on Estonia to resolve the issues of rights and status of its Russian-speaking minority. Unlike Russia, the EU (as well as Estonia itself) has tackled the two issues (the pending border treaty and the minority problem) separately on their own merits.

The Kaliningrad dispute deviates from the general pattern in the context of the Union’s policies vis-à-vis Europe’s North. The recognition that the EU’s enlargement may affect the exclave/enclave in a negative fashion has turned the EU into a party to the dispute. Notably, through raising the stakes by bringing the issue up to the highest level of the EU-Russia relations, by treating it as a ‘litmus test’ thereof and by drawing on the EU’s own principles, Russia has been able to gain a position of an actor capable of influencing the Union’s internal strategies. It has achieved the position of a ‘semi-insider’ at least in the context of the Kaliningrad ‘puzzle’. More generally, it has not just been the EU having a compulsory impact (in the form of a Readmission Agreement, the border treaty with Lithuania being signed, passports complying to international standards and facilitation of
consulates) by influencing Russia’s stand: the EU has also had to compromise on its categorical position regarding the requirement of visas to cross a Schengen border.

The core factor preventing the EU from having a forceful compulsory impact in Europe’s North consists of Russia not opting, and being regarded ineligible, for membership. Hence, the prospect for establishing a positive linkage between a resolution of pending border issues and Russia moving closer to the EU are limited. Initially, the EU ranked rather low in terms of Russia’s foreign policy priorities (albeit the situation has recently changed), and thus the EU’s opportunities for exercising a compulsory impact have been limited from the outset. This situation has been further aggravated by the partial incompatibility of the EU’s and Russia’s the conceptions of political space. Instead of being narrowed down to subject positions concerning single issues, disputes easily spill-over to identity conflicts – with the EU’s identity also being challenged, as in the case of the Kaliningrad ‘puzzle’ – or are interpreted by Russia as efforts to marginalise and subordinate it within the increasingly EU-influenced order emerging in northern Europe. This tends to deprive the EU of the use of the compulsory pathway, or at least downgrade its impact.

3.3.6.3. Enabling Impact

A major strategy employed by the EU has been that of deproblematisation and, in that context, framing issues differently by taking them out of the security-related context. This has most obviously been the approach applied in the case of the Karelian ‘question’ with the EU framing the Finnish-Russian border as a normal EU-Russia border void of open border problems or ‘hard’ security issues. The Euregio Karelia project, which institutionalises the existing forms of EU-Russian cooperation in the Republic of Karelia, best exemplifies the enabling impact of the EU. The Euregio serves as a new institutional platform, within which questions of cross-border cooperation can be addressed in a depoliticised manner by local and regional actors rather than state governments. The enabling pathway of the EU has thus succeeded in increasing the density of small-scale local cooperation projects across the border. Moreover, it has enhanced their coherence and synergy. But still, this pathway of perturbation is weakened by the overall context of EU-Russian relations, most notably by the problematic of the Schengen regime and the increased stringency and uniformity of visa procedures for Russians to enter the EU. Such a strict visa regime is the primary obstacle to the further development of cross-border cooperation within the framework of the Euregio. The insistence of the EU on the uniformity of the application of the Schengen rules contradicts the Union’s own logic of fostering cooperative transboundary regimes across contested borderlands. Cronberg’s (2003b) study explicitly demonstrates the paradox, whereby the EU is simultaneously the ‘condition of possibility’ of the transformation of the Finnish-Russian border into an integrated borderland of the Euregio, and the main structural constraint to this very transformation. Similarly, in Russian societal discourse, the issue of visa procedures has assumed paramount significance for EU-Russian relations. Thus, the enabling impact of the EU logic of border deproblematisation is considerably weakened by the EU’s own problematisation of the EU-Russian border as a line of exclusion.

An enabling impact has also stood out as a key pathway of perturbation in the case of the Estonian-Russian border, once the compulsory pathway has largely been blocked. Although having yielded some results, particularly in the case of the Estonian-Russian border, the approach has nonetheless been hampered for a variety of reasons. Framing border questions as practical challenges void of linkages to other issues such as those pertaining to
security and identities has been far more difficult along the Estonian-Russian border than on the Finnish-Russian one. The latter is also more established in the sense that there has been a recognised and well functioning border for quite some time already, with the parties having signed a treaty on cooperation in the border areas in 1992. Whereas a functioning Euregio exists in the Karelian case, the one encompassing Estonian, Russian and Latvian border areas (Euregio Pskov-Livonia) is not yet fully operational. In the Finnish-Russian case the capitals accept, favour and financially support various forms of cross-border cooperation, whereas in the two other cases, despite some evidence of cooperative initiatives, one may trace the wish to establish, in the first place, firm and divisive borders with smaller emphasis on the prospects of cooperation.

Kaliningrad stands out as a region that provided the EU with considerable enabling impact since it acquired shared borders with the Union with Lithuania’s and Poland’s accession to the EU. The socialising effect on Kaliningrad has been considerable, although it has also radiated to mainland Russia as a product of awareness of Union’s increasing geographical proximity. The EU itself has been inclined to use various inductive and persuasive measures (and to avoid categorical enforcement of its rules and regulations) in order to emphasise the benign consequences of it vicinity – something that has been reflected in the elite discourses in the Oblast (and, rarer, beyond).

3.3.6.4. Connective Impact
The connective impact of the Karelian Euregio project consists in its involvement of a wider array of actors, both local and regional politicians and non-governmental organisations, and in the coordination of cooperative activities. Yet, the involvement of local civil society actors does not always have the conflict-tempering effect, but may well consist in the opposite – the intensification of the conflict due to its articulation with identity-related disaccord. In the case of Euregio Karelia this negative impact is exemplified by the increasing problematisation in the regional and local media of the Republic of Karelia of the restitutionist discourse in parts of the Finnish society, and the continuing negative perception of Russia and Russians that sustains it. Furthermore, in the case of EU-Russian relations, the border deproblematisation project of the Euregio unfolds in an unfavourable political context in Russia, marked by the increasing societal disillusionment with the state of affairs in EU-Russian relations and the abandonment of ambitious integrationist designs. The project of the Euregio therefore may not have the anticipated societal support and its functioning may well be complicated by the very civil society whose development it seeks to contribute to.

In the case of Estonian-Russian border, regional and local level actors have often been in regular touch, although the impact of various networking and community development initiatives has been constrained by the frequent changes in personnel due to elections and reorganisations of administrative systems. Engaging the Russian local level has proved somewhat cumbersome, as its decision-making competence in the sphere of cross-border relations is practically nominal. Furthermore, rivalries, such as e.g. between Pskov city and regional governments, stall realisation of many cooperative projects. Formerly, one of the most crucial constraining factors has been a poor coordination of Tacis and Phare funds, but the situation improved with extension of Interreg funds onto the Russian side. Still, Russia tends to view the EU’s commitment as insufficient, pointing out that a very small part of the allocated funds actually reaches the Russian side, being mainly dispersed into EU expert salaries and subsistence costs. Furthermore, Russia would like to see the cooperation to go
beyond one-off pilot projects, and produce more tangible results, to counter the popular perception of EU projects as ‘bureaucracy tourism’ (Viktorova, 2005a).

Although civil society actors are quite prominent both in Estonian and Russia, it is questionable to what extent their efforts translate into a wider societal reconciliation. Governments’ mistrust of NGOs that was evident in Estonia up to late 1990s and that is still continuing in Russia (as exemplified by President Putin’s recent NGO-related legislation) hampers both the grand effort of societal transformation in Russia and broader participation of NGOs (unconstrained by national funding or policy goals (e.g. Slosberg 2001) in the development of cross-border cooperation. With the accession of Estonia to the EU, the once popular practice of bypassing the national level in forging direct links between local and EU-level authorities and structures has lost in profile due to greater involvement of national governments in co-operative initiatives.

In Kaliningrad, the EU has been part of devising special means to counteract various social ills, improve border management etc. Kaliningrad itself has more recently become rather active in using the various options on offer and has demonstrated increasing competence in linking up to various parts of the EU. The Oblast is part of three different Euregios – one that has already been working for a while and other two in the process of establishment.

3.3.6.5. Constructive Impact
The impact of the increased presence of the EU in Europe’s North in the form of a changing discursive context along the Union’s new northern borders has – due to a variety of reasons – been limited, although the joint EU-Russia border has undeniably been the locus of new cooperative practices. The mentalities have been slow to change as the regions in question have, for the most part, a history of being rather militarised and framed by distinctly security-oriented approaches. This goes for the Finnish-Russian border, Kaliningrad in particular, and, to some extent, the Estonian-Russian border area in the sense that it was largely viewed within the purview of the defensive parameters even if not strictly part of the East-West border as such.

In the case of the Estonian-Russian border dispute the parties have achieved discernible progress in bilateral negotiations, although the ratification of the border treaty is still on hold. One may assume that their respective conceptualisations of ‘Europeanisation’ have been similar, with Estonia’s security- and sovereignty-consciousness mirroring Russia’s approaches. Yet, domination of historical discourses based on selective readings of history has made negotiations very tense. Estonian media and politicians have consistently cultivated an image of Russia as inherently malignant and unpredictable (Viktorova 2005a), which meant that Europeanisation was mostly cast in security terms, with hard security dominating over soft security considerations (Viktorova 2005b). Russia, on its part, presented itself as undeservedly offended by Estonia’s continuous suspicions, constructing an image of Estonia as maliciously ungrateful (for all the contributions to its development during the Soviet period) and immature, hijacking the EU rhetoric and policies to pursue its own exclusionary goals (ibid.). In this sense, Estonia’s accession into the EU has brought about few changes. However, even a preliminary study of perception of the ‘other’ at the societal levels shows that they do not conform to the antagonistic state-level discourse, although not amounting to a fully fledged discourse themselves. Thus, ‘ordinary people’ (as opposed to politicians and people conscious of political discourses, e.g. academia) mostly tend to view the ‘other’ with
benevolent interest, and although differences between ‘self’ and ‘other’ are recognised, they are considered as a source of mutual benefit rather than antagonism (ibid.). Still, it is difficult to attribute this change to the EU integration: according to one interviewee, it has rather occurred following a natural dynamic whereby, having gone through a period of being focused on their own affairs, Estonian people have started opening up and looking with greater interest not only to the formerly inaccessible west, but also east (Tuubel, 2005). In Estonia, penetration of state-level discourses to the general public is less pronounced than in Russia, due to a notable alienation of the people from the government and politics in general – a disillusionment which is an aspect of the so-called ‘second Estonia’ phenomenon and gives rise to a critical view of the course of transformation that the Estonian state is undergoing (see Aalto, 2003a). This also results in a lack of interest towards larger-scale European processes and structures, with practical interests of free travel overshadowing the debate over political implications of EU membership and further enlargement (Viktorova 2005b).

At present, the more ambitious ‘change of scripts’ scenario, i.e. the emergence of Euregio Karelia as a transnational macro-regional political subject, is made impossible by both the EU procedures, which preclude a greater role for the Russian party in budgetary and decision-making matters, and by the wariness of Russian political actors in the north-western region to submit to an externally designed development project in the subordinate capacity of an ‘object’ of policy rather than its sovereign subject. Thus, the potential for a far-reaching constructive impact in the Euregio Karelia project is both conditioned by the EU’s recognition of Russia’s demand for greater intersubjectivity in designing and implementing cooperation programmes, and ultimately dependent on the compatibility of the policies of the Euregio with the more general strategic development design for the Russian Northwest.

In Kaliningrad, the socialising impact of the EU has been notable, although extensive engagement has been counterweighted with grievances regarding the regulations of the EU’s border regime. Being framed in the context of a cooperative and integrated vision, Europe has stimulated an exchange of views as to the essence of Kaliningrad with some defensive and restitutionist voices also present. In general, the preparedness to link up with a European-type discourse seems to have increased, however, as also indicated by Kaliningrad’s 750 years’ jubilee in the summer of 2005.

An important obstacle to the introduction and implementation of a ‘European’ discourse and frame of reference is presented by the fact that Europeanisation is understood in different, and sometimes even opposing, terms within the EU and in Russia. Europe and a European identity constitute a common ideal, but the Russian reading of it is quite distinct from the EU’s vision, often standing for a rather classical, sovereignty-centred Europe. It is a reading premised on clearly delineated borders, whereas the EU harbours a more pluralist and less sovereignty-geared approach. The increased contact between the EU and Russia in Europe’s north thus amounts to a contest between two to some extent different comprehensions as to what ‘Europeanisation’ entails, with the regional and local levels being drawn into the cross-fire, which severely restricts the options for the EU to approach various social actors directly in the disputed border areas.

With Russia being suspicious that the imposition of an EU-related order stands for its subordination and pushing Russia to the edges of an increasingly concentric Europe (as indicated above all by the introduction of the ENP with its emphasis on bilateral rather than multilateral relations), it is important that Russia is given the opportunity to explain normalisation and deproblematisation within the context of its own logic. In the case of
Kaliningrad, in this light, progress could be achieved by refraining from efforts of changing the underlying identity scripts and by recognising that there are various ways of being ‘European’, with Russia legitimately representing one version, and thereby also defining its interests in a manner of its own.

3.3.6.6. Conditions of EU Impact

The most prominent condition of EU impact has been the EU’s own take on the border problematique, which can be subdivided into two broad phases. The euphoria brought about by the end of the Cold War and the resulting approaches to borders and cross-border integration has brought about a depoliticisation of borders, their transformation from lines of separation laden with hard security concerns into interfaces for countering common problems. Political decisions started to be taken not with regard to the border per se (either restrictive or facilitative, e.g. the abolition of visa controls): instead, the function of borders was reconstructed in the new cooperative context. In contrast to the more ambitious – if vague – visions of ‘de-bordering’, the concept of border depoliticisation does not emphasise the irrelevance of the border, let alone its disappearance, but rather marks the change at a discursive level, whereby the political significance of the border becomes diminished and border regions become framed as zones of interaction, devoid of identity-related disaccord (see Prozorov 2004a). The border thus ceases to be the privileged marker of identity and the object of contentious political discourses, while it retains its significance in the domain of depoliticised interaction as both a recognised obstacle and a source of opportunity.

With the deepening of European integration and elimination of the divisive effects of borders within the EU, the internal openness of borders has come into contradiction with the aim of avoiding the emergence of sharp and divisive borders at the outer edges of the Union. This tension between the ‘double move’ (Walters, 2002: 561) of establishing internal freedoms on the one hand, which was made dependent on countering the political anxieties regarding the permeability of borders by various ills such as crime, illegal migration and terrorism (Geddes 1999; Andreas and Snyder 2000) on the other, characterises the second phase of EU’s approaches to borders. While the understanding of the EU as a peace project has resulted in an internal ‘postmodernisation’ of the EU, Browning (2003) contends that this is not the case regarding Union’s external relations. With the outside being seen as unstable and potentially threatening, the EU has tended to conceptualise its outer edge in rather modernist ways. The security of the insiders and those on the outside is disconnected by claiming that the outsiders have to sort out their own problems. The peace-inducing policies, in their original form, are restricted to the internal sphere and not seen applicable as such to the nearby regions. There is an inability to think in truly regional terms as the Union fails, according to Browning (2003: 551), to comprehend the people in northern Europe as equal. With the operation of a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and the consequent bordering practices, regional solutions are seen as potentially open to contamination from the Russian side, which makes uniform and unambiguous policies the only available option. In this context, the border turns into a first line of defence. Having to shore up their eastern borders with non-members, Kaliningrad – Browning notes (2003: 570) – forces open this tension in the EU’s external relations, that is between the Union’s desire to fulfil its peace mission and the negative effects of its desire for modernist exclusionary borders to protect itself from external threats (as Kaliningrad eludes, due to its position as a case in-between and as a small
Russia increasingly inside the Union, any neat approaches). Thus, according to Browning (2003: 571), ‘the consequence of this perceptual frame … may actually be to undermine peace and stability in Europe’.

It seems clear, against this background, that the EU as a peace project comes to a halt in being restricted to its internal sphere. Consequently, the Union is not able to project its peace-related identity across the new borders. This shortcoming and restraint shows itself clearly in the case of Kaliningrad, and the EU has also refrained from developing any regionalising policies in relation to the relevant Russian regions. The policies pursued in northern Europe thus tend to boil down to a redrawing of unambiguous lines, and this despite often preaching the opposite in terms of fuzzy borders.

Another important set of conditions of EU influence refers to the domestic conditions in the states involved in the border conflicts. In the case of Estonia, for instance, the predominance of hard security concerns has set a context in which European integration was interpreted, which has favoured the kinds of impact pressing for clearer separation from Russia (i.e. border-drawing practices) but not the conciliatory efforts, which were interpreted in the light of a double-edged threat to Estonian national survival from both Russia and the EU (see Kuus, 2003). In addition, because the societal reach of governmental discourses has been limited, both the conflicting rhetoric toward Russia and the generally positive stance on the EU integration have had limited resonance, being mainly restricted to the political elite and politically-conscious population groups (which do not constitute a majority) and thus limiting the constructive impact (Viktorova, 2005a). In Russia, the structure of administration has precluded greater participation of local-level actors in cooperative endeavours, and the increasingly evident perception of NGOs living off western funding (due to the lack of domestic resources) as a ‘fifth column’ has disabled the EU’s impact on the societal level. The constructive impact has been limited due to clashing interpretations of Europeanness which resulted in Russia’s growing tendency for self-exclusion (Prozorov, 2005).

The overall order of the region increasingly points in the direction of a concentric, EU-driven one, with the space available for heterogeneous approaches with a variety of voices – including those belonging to the Union’s ‘partners’ – on its way of closing down. This is exemplified by the tendency of the European Neighbourhood Programme (ENP) to promote a rather clear distinction into the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’. In general, the aim appears to be one of managing borders in Europe’s north rather than overcoming them, with the option of new memberships having been exhausted by the ‘Big Bang’ in May 2004.
4. Conclusions and policy implications

This part of the report should explain how the state of the art was advanced, highlighting the most important results that are relevant across Europe or large parts of it and explaining how the European collaborative effort has contributed to the obtained results. It should identify any future need for research effort, in particular at the European level. The text on policy implications should be an essential part of this chapter. It should, in particular, develop the transnational applicability/relevance of the results. (Maximum 30 pages)

4.1 Conclusions

4.1.1 How the state of the art was advanced

The EUBorderConf project advanced the state of the art on three main levels, with regard to (a) the linkages between conflict studies and European Union studies, (b) the specification of how integration and association affect border conflicts in Europe and at Europe’s periphery and (c) the generation of systematic and comparative knowledge within and across the five case-studies in this project. This sub-section of the final report outlines in detail how the state of the art was advanced on these three levels.

The project has advanced the state of the art with regard to the linkages between theoretical approaches in the field of conflict studies, in general, and studies on conflicts in the European Union, in particular. Previously, there had been only limited dialogue between these fields. Thus, although the field of conflict studies has produced important theoretical and empirical insights into the main dynamics of conflict emergence and conflict transformation, this literature has only had a rudimentary impact on the study of conflicts in European Union studies. As a result, most studies on conflicts in the field of EU studies fail to specify the theoretical assumptions on which their conceptualisations of conflict (and the role of the EU in such conflicts) are based. However, as the EUBorderConf project has shown, such a specification of the main conflict-theoretical assumptions is crucial for a systematic understanding of conflict dynamics not only on the theoretical but also on the empirical level. In this context, the theoretical framework of EUBorderConf brings together for the first time insights from new conflict-theoretical approaches in sociology and conflict studies as well as studies in International Relations (IR), which focus on the discursive construction of conflict dynamics in political discourse. This theoretical starting point then allows addressing the general dynamics of social conflicts (including border conflicts in Europe) rather than viewing each border conflict as a sui generis case. Moreover, they are also the basis for the systematic and comparative analysis in the EUBorderConf project on how the EU can have an impact on concrete border conflicts.

In further advancing the state of the art on the impact of the EU on border conflicts, the theoretical framework of the EUBorderConf project develops a stages model of conflicts, which provides a useful new methodological tool for systematically assessing the impact of the EU on border conflicts. The stages model is particularly helpful in that it does not conflate a mere presence of the EU (and indeed of any other actor) in a border conflict with actual impact, since it links (EU) impact to a significant change of conflict communication. As will be outlined further in the section on policy recommendations below, this shift from ‘EU involvement’ to ‘EU impact on change in conflict communication’ is a crucial contribution of the EUBorderConf project for the literature on the role of the EU in border conflicts, which often has a bias towards focusing on the efficiency (or lack thereof) of specific instruments (e.g. CFSP, negative conditionality), rather than analysing conflicts as
complex social phenomena that cannot be adequately studied without a clear conflict-theoretical framework. In more general terms, by incorporating innovative conflict theoretical insights from various social sciences disciplines into the field of EU studies, the EUBorderConf project has advanced the state of the art in the study of conflicts in EU studies. This relates in particular to the challenge which the EUBorderConf project poses to the bulk of actor-oriented and institutionalist approaches to conflicts, which dominate most of the literature on conflicts in EU studies, but which are not sufficient in addressing the complex dynamics of conflict development and conflict resolution.

The EUBorderConf project has also advanced the state of the art with regard to the specification of how integration and association relate to conflict dynamics and conflict transformation in Europe and at its fringes. On this level, the pathways model has been the central conceptual tool in specifying what has previously been a rather unsystematic approach in the literature on the patterns of EU involvement in conflict settings. Thus, the literature has, with some noteworthy exceptions, been primarily focusing on the direct ways through which the EU can impact border conflicts. Thus, the bulk of literature on the role of the EU in border conflicts (including the five case studies of the EUBorderConf project) has focused on the direct involvement of particular EU actors in border conflicts (what is referred to in our framework as the compulsory impact), thereby addressing inter alia political declarations from the Council, the Commission or the European Parliament, political measures and instruments such as regulations, Common Strategies, custom union and trade negotiations, aid, etc., potential ‘carrots’ (agreements, membership) and ‘sticks’ (sanctions), and the role of EU actors in collaboration with other outside actors (in our case studies: Good Friday Agreement, Mitchell Commission, Roadmap, Annan Plan, etc.). Alternatively, the literature has focused on EU direct financial involvement in areas of border conflict, mainly on the level of funding of cross-border projects and people-to-people projects (what in our theoretical framework is referred to as the connective impact; in our case studies exemplified by Euregio Karelia, Cooperation North in Israel/Palestine, Greek-Turkish Civic Dialogue Programme, PEACE Programme in Northern Ireland etc.). However, this focus on the direct impact of the EU on border conflicts is seldom accompanied by a careful elaboration of EU’s indirect – e.g. through the dynamics of integration and association – impact on border conflicts. Through the specification of the two indirect pathways of EU impact, namely the enabling impact and the constructive impact, the EUBorderConf project has advanced the state of the art by providing a measurement of how the ‘idea of Europe’ (which is of course often linked with direct forms of impact) affects conflict regions.

This focus on the interplay between direct and indirect forms of EU involvement advances the state of the art on two accounts. Firstly, through the systematic focus on indirect forms of EU impact, the pathway model does not risk to view direct forms of EU impact in isolation from the political and societal developments in conflict regions, which often underpin the conflation between ‘EU involvement’ and ‘EU impact’. Secondly, the focus on the interplay between direct and indirect forms of EU impact allows avoiding conceptualisations of EU impact as a mere actor-related process, which thereby downplay the impact of indirect processes that affect border conflicts. As the literature reviews on the five case studies of the EUBorderConf project have shown, such a tendency to focus primarily on direct interventions in border conflicts does indeed characterise broad segments of the literature on border conflicts. As far as developments in the conflict regions themselves are concerned, the project has specified the conditions (and limitations) of EU impact that result from local dynamics (see also below).
Another way in which EUBorderConf has advanced the state of the art is with regard to the generation of new knowledge on the five case studies, both on the level of individual case studies and, equally importantly, with regard to the development of systematic and comparative knowledge on the impact of the EU on border conflicts across a wide range of case studies. While there is a significant body of literature on the role of the EU in various border conflict regions, the research has been rather unsystematic and characterised by a rather limited dialogue between various strands of this literature. This has led to some unfavourable consequences, for example, *sui generis* generation of specific conflicts and the role of the EU in these conflicts, or the lack of theory-informed comparative analysis of the role of the EU in various border conflicts. It is quite noteworthy that these shortcomings stand in stark contrast with insights generated in the literature on EU enlargement, where individual case studies are accompanied by several theoretically-guided, comparative analyses on the impact of the EU on political developments in the former applicant states in Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, these studies have mainly focused on the role of the EU in the transformation of national legal and political structures *per se*, rather than addressing the issue of border conflicts. In contrast to these studies on the impact of integration as such, the impact of association has been studied much less systematically. While many studies on association do also address conflicts (which has to do with the prominence of conflicts e.g. in the Caucasus, the Southern Mediterranean or Russia), they have not yet systematically outlined the impact of association on border conflicts. To summarise, the EUBorderConf project has advanced the state of the art by offering an innovative comparative conceptual framework on the pathways of EU impact on border conflicts, which has been coherently applied to five different conflict cases. This comparative and theory-informed approach has then also allowed identifying the precise conditions of EU impact, and thereby generating new knowledge in the European Research Area.

In addition, the EUBorderConf project has produced new insights at the level of the five individual case studies. Thus, the research on Northern Ireland has offered a critical assessment of the ways in which EU policies, somewhat counter-intentionally, reproduce conflictive identities of the conflict parties, since the EU interprets and accordingly provides funding on the basis of the very religious identity distinctions that it holds responsible for the conflict in the first place. In the case of Cyprus, research has been carried out in a crucial period, since it coincided with the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU and the parallel failure of the referendum on the Annan Plan in the south. Through its focus on how references to the EU were used in order to propagate a further securitisation (rather than desecuritisation) of the conflict, the Cyprus case-study provides an up-to-date, theory-informed account of why the mere membership perspective has not been able to catalyse a lasting peace-agreement. In Israel-Palestine, the EUBorderConf project has advanced the state of the art by bringing into the debate an issue which is often neglected in the literature on EU Middle East policies that usually tends to focus exclusively on the direct forms of EU impact. Thus, by arguing that the indirect forms of EU involvement, in particular the enabling impact in Palestine, but also the ambivalent dynamics of the constructive impact as far as Israel is concerned, are crucial in understanding the role of the EU in the Middle East, the project was able to move beyond the somewhat shortcoming conceptualisation of the EU as a third party that dominates most of the literature. On Greece-Turkey, the EUBorderConf project has moved beyond the state of the art by outlining in detail how the EU has affected the level of identity constructions in both countries both at the elite and the wider societal levels, thereby exhibiting the dynamic ways in which indirect forms of EU impact are able to
trigger changes in long-lasting domestic interest formations, without however attributing
direct agency to the EU. Finally, in the case of Europe’s North, the project has advanced the
state of the art through its detailed studies of domestic Russian discourses on the EU, in
particular the level of domestic elites.

4.1.2 Most important results that have relevance across Europe

The most important results of the EUBorderConf project that are relevant across Europe
relate to (a) the specification of the precise conditions of EU impact, (b) the specification of
the linkages between integration/association and border conflict transformation, in particular
the problems resulting from new bordering processes in Europe, and (c) the elaboration of the
key role which local actors in conflict regions play for the way in which EU impact
ultimately materialises.

The key result of the EUBorderConf project, which is of relevance across Europe, is
the specification of the precise conditions of EU impact in border conflict areas. As far as the
compulsory impact is concerned, this pathway works best in the context of a credible
membership perspective. Thus, if there is such a perspective or if negotiations are already
under way, conflict parties usually avoid securitising moves in order not to endanger the
membership perspective. This has been the case in Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, as well as
Central and Eastern Europe (Europe’s North). However, without a credible membership
perspective (Turkey prior to 1999) or once membership has been achieved (Cyprus), the
compulsory impact loses much of its leverage, as it does under the condition of the weak
form of integration offered by association (Israel-Palestine, Russia). These structural
limitations of the compulsory impact direct attention to the extent to which policy-makers in
conflict regions have internalised the norms and values of the EU, and the degree to which
they are really able to legitimise de-securitising moves through reference to European
integration.

The EUBorderConf project has shown that the enabling impact of the EU has played
a major role in conflict transformation, either through a long-term socialisation of policy-
makers into European normative discourses (Greece, Northern Ireland) or the empowerment
of alternative de-securitisation discourses (Turkey, Northern Cyprus, Northern Ireland).
However, the EUBorderConf project has also referred to instances in which reference to the
EU has, for different reasons, legitimised further securitisation. Such a constellation becomes
more likely if only one conflict party becomes integrated into the EU, while the other side is
subject to a more or less strict external border regime (Cyprus, Europe’s North) or if both
conflict parties remain outside the institutional framework of integration (Israel-Palestine).
In such cases, reference to the EU is often used in order to re-inscribe difference rather than
promote cooperation.

The EU encourages cooperation on a wider societal level inter alia through financial
support of peace-oriented actors. The pathway leading to a connective impact is a key
strategy, working either through directly supporting peace-oriented groups (Cyprus, Greece-
Turkey, Israel-Palestine, Europe’s North, in particular Karelia, and Northern Ireland) or
through community development that only indirectly relates to cross-border cooperation,
such as economic development in border areas (Northern Ireland). The EUBorderConf
project has, however, also pointed to the disruptive effect of a strict external border regime on
antecedent forms of cross-border cooperation, impeded by partial integration of conflict
parties into the EU (Europe’s North, Greece-Turkey, probably Cyprus). Moreover, the
connective impact of the EU loses in pervasiveness due to complicated funding provisions, which slow down, obstruct and therefore limit the power of this pathway (Greece-Turkey, Europe’s North, Israel-Palestine, Northern Ireland).

According to the argument of the theoretical framework of EUBorderConf, conflicts are constituted by an incompatibility of subject positions, the most pervasive form of conflict transformation relates to overcoming such incompatibilities – hence the argument that the constructive impact is the most powerful, but also the most demanding pathway of EU impact. The constructive impact depends – more than all others – on a high degree of integration and internalisation of European norms of conflict resolution on a wider societal level. This is, at least to some extent, the case in those conflict societies that have for a long time been integrated into the EU (Northern Ireland, Greece), or where at least the credible perspective of integration supports such a gradual change of scripts (Turkey). This impact is largely negligible under the condition of association (Israel-Palestine), while it operates in a conflict-enhancing manner if cross-boundary measures clash with the establishment of a strict external border regime (Europe’s North), or with particularistic interpretations of European identity (Europe’s North, Cyprus, Greece-Turkey before 1999). A second condition for negative EU impact relates to the perception on the part of conflict parties that the EU is biased in favour of one side of the conflict. This reinforces pre-existent negative images of the EU in conflict regions. The EU can then even become a reference point for further securitisation (Israel, Russia, Republic of Cyprus, Turkey before 1999).

The previous paragraphs have already referred to a second main result of the EUBorderConf project, namely the specification of the theoretical and empirical relationship between integration and association (i.e. two major policy tools of the EU) and border conflict transformation (i.e. a major policy objective of the EU). The EUBorderConf project has shown that this relationship is not as straightforward as often assumed in political and academic discourses. While it is true that integration is a powerful tool, integration does not automatically operate in a de-securitising manner. Thus, while enlargement has generally had a positive effect on border conflict transformation, one needs to pay considerable attention to the precise conditions of EU impact through integration. This relates in particular to the observation that the membership perspective must be credible, that even after accession the socialisation of political leaders and the wider societal level is a long-term process and that new borders that result from enlargement processes must not reinforce difference, since otherwise they are highly susceptible to the (re-)emergence of conflict (e.g. Europe’s North, Cyprus). Moreover, the EUBorderConf project has also shown that association provides for a considerably more limited impact of the EU, and this relates to all four pathways. It remains to be seen whether the new European Neighbourhood Policy, which foresees detailed Action Plans with neighbouring countries, can at least to some extent increase the direct and indirect impact of the EU in border conflict areas in the context of association.

Finally, an important result of the EUBorderConf project has been its attempt to overcome a Eurocentric perspective on EU impact on border conflicts. Such a Eurocentric perspective is quite common in the literature. On the one hand, some of the literature is overtly pessimistic about the efficiency of EU policies on border conflicts without, however, adequately assessing whether other (international and local) actors are in fact more efficient. On the other hand, other strands of the literature often tend to equate mere EU activity (of which there is a lot) with EU impact. In contrast to such unidirectional approaches, all case studies of the EUBorderConf project have shown that border conflicts in Europe are complex social phenomena that require to specify the conflict-theoretical conditions which affect (and
potentially limit) the impact of all forms of direct involvement. Through its emphasis on the indirect forms of EU impact, the project has outlined the considerable leverage of local dynamics on the precise shape of EU impact.

4.1.3 How the European collaborative effort has contributed to the results

The comparative analysis in the EUBorderConf project on the impact of integration and association for the transformation of border conflicts would not have been possible without the collaborative European efforts, which were crucial for achieving these results. This relates to several key dimensions.

Firstly, the European collaborative effort has been crucial in ensuring that area-specific knowledge on all the five case studies (access to people, documents, languages) was being adequately incorporated into the analysis. The individual researchers on the five case studies as well as the researchers on the role of the EU are all experts in their respective fields and the European collaborative effort in the EUBorderConf project has allowed achieving a maximum synergy between the individual research efforts.

Secondly, the European collaborative effort has been crucial in ensuring the right balance between research on the five conflict areas and on the policy-making dynamics at European institutions in Brussels. There has thus been a steady and intense interaction between the researchers responsible for WP 7 and those researchers dealing with the five individual conflict cases in WPs 3, 4, 5 and 6 throughout the lifetime of the project.

Thirdly, the European collaborative effort has been crucial in ensuring a high quality of research both on the empirical and on the theoretical dimension, but also the synergy between them. Thus, as a result of intense discussions on the theoretical framework in the first 15 months of the project, the EUBorderConf project has been successful not only in ensuring a constant dialogue between case studies and the theoretical framework but also in providing the foundation for a coherent application of the theoretical framework in all the case studies – while ensuring at the same time that empirical results from the case studies feed back into the framework (see also Diez et al., 2006), and chapters in the edited project book which is currently being finalised). The collaborative effort has thus been essential in overcoming what often are either completely isolated research communities on individual conflict cases in Europe or rather Brussels-centred *sui generis* approaches on the role of the EU in individual or several conflicts.

While the collaborative efforts of the EUBorderConf project, which were sustained by regular meetings between some or all partners at academic conferences and internal workshops, regular email exchanges and good personal bonds, must be considered very positive, there is also a slightly more critical, albeit general point to be raised here. Thus, when studying border conflicts there is – at least with regard to some conflicts – a general problem in appointing researchers from one side of the conflict only. It must be emphasised that all researchers in this project were clearly doing sound academic research and cannot be regarded as ‘conflict-participants’. Thus, it would be inappropriate to argue that individual researchers in this project would belong to ‘one side’ of the conflict. However, it cannot be ignored that it is much more difficult to convincingly make this argument in non-academic circles, in particular in the conflict areas involved. For the EUBorderConf project this has meant that its collaborative efforts had to be pragmatically extended in one case (Israel-Palestine) in order to ensure that the results of the project fall on fertile ground in both Israel
and Palestine. In order to do so, the Israeli project partners collaborated with a Palestinian research institution (International Peace and Cooperation Centre, East-Jerusalem). This collaboration proved to be particularly helpful in not only ensuring access to Palestinian interviewees and documents that would probably not have been accessible for an Israeli researcher in this period, but also for ensuring greater legitimacy of the results of the EUBorderConf project for Palestinian academia and society.

4.1.4 Future needs for research, particularly at the European level

As a result of the research in the EUBorderConf project, five key areas have been identified in which future research, particularly at the European level, would be worthwhile.

- Firstly, application of the theoretical framework (or another comprehensive framework) to a wider range of border conflicts and border conflict changes in Europe since the end of the Second World War and today (e.g. Basque Country, South Tyrol, Catalonia, Corsica, German-Danish borderland, Germany-France, former Yugoslavia, border conflicts between Central and Eastern European member states in the 1990s, border areas in the EU that were lines of division during the Cold War, etc.) in order to study the way in which European integration has affected (or failed to affect) these conflicts.

- Secondly, future need for research can also be identified in relation to one of the key results of the EUBorderConf project, namely that integration, while often leading to a de-securitisation of relations between two parties that are both members of the EU, does also create new borders between insiders and outsiders. In order to avoid such negative effects on cross-border relations stemming from integration (which can be found in Europe’s North, Cyprus and – at least until 1999 – between Greece and Turkey) more research is needed to identify how the external borders of the EU can become lines of co-operation and peace even without a membership perspective for outsiders.

- Thirdly, further research is also needed to analyse how association could contribute more effectively to border conflict transformation. As the ‘association case study’ in the EUBorderConf project (Israel-Palestine) has clearly shown, association only has a minor impact on border conflict transformation. Therefore, more research is needed that identifies ways in which the EU can increase its direct and indirect leverage on border conflict areas that are associated with the EU – nowadays mainly in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. This relates in particular to such conflicts in the ‘association periphery’ that were not studied in the EUBorderConf project (e.g. Syria-Lebanon, Algeria-Morocco, Western Sahara, Caucasus, Transdniestria, etc.). Such research should also generate ideas of how the EU could contribute (e.g. through its connective impact) to increasing pluralism in ‘hidden’ internal conflicts in its periphery that result from the exclusion of large parts of the population in these countries from access to equal (political, civic, economic, social, religious etc.) rights – an issue which arguably underlies many conflicts in the European neighbourhood (e.g. Berbers in Morocco and Algeria, Copts in Egypt, Palestinians in Israeli, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, different ethno-religious group relations in Lebanon, Syria etc.). By doing so, it has to be ensured that any analysis of the impact of the EU (and ways to increase the impact of association) does not fall back to *sui generis* analyses of these conflicts, but rather starts from an overarching and comparative theoretical framework that allows to identify the general mechanisms and tools that operate in such cross-border and internal conflicts in the ‘association periphery’.
Fourthly, more research – both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective – should be devoted to uncover the ways in which the EU (e.g. through its funding procedures, official statements etc.) perpetuates binary divides between conflict parties rather than overcoming such distinctions. While in the EUBorderConf project this problem has been particularly emphasised in the case-study on Northern Ireland, it is arguably relevant in many other conflicts in which the EU becomes involved. Thus, as long as the sharp distinction on the identity dimension between two ‘main parties’ is not overcome, it cannot be argued that the conflict has permanently reached a low level of intensity, let alone having entirely disappeared. Thus, future research – possibly by including researchers from the field of peace studies – should identify ways and propose policy tools ensuring that the maximum is done from the outset to challenge the binary identity distinctions that underlie all strongly securitised border conflicts.

Finally, in the light of the increasing incorporation of a strong military and strategic component in EU foreign policy-making (EU military missions abroad, ESDP, security strategy, arms agency etc.) research should focus on how the merits of the ‘civilian power’ of the EU can be sustained and increased while the EU develops military capacities and geo-strategic interests. Otherwise, the EU risks losing the overall remarkable power that the European project has exerted since the 1950s on making cross-border relations on the European continent much more cooperative and, indeed, peaceful.

4.2 Policy recommendations

4.2.1 Transnational applicability of results

The transnational applicability of the results of the EUBorderConf project relate in particular to policy recommendations on three main dimensions, namely (a) conflict stages and early warning signs, (b) pathways and conditions of successful EU involvement and, finally, (c) making maximum use of the policy tools of integration and association.

4.2.1.1 Conflict stages and early warning signs

As far as the transnational applicability of results of the EUBorderConf project is concerned, identification of early warning signs of when a border dispute is likely to turn into a violent conflict is one of the crucial issues. The theoretical framework of the EUBorderConf project can be helpful in ensuring a transnational applicability of the results of the project. The following policy recommendations can be set up with regard to this issue.

Conflict definition: conflict development usually starts at a much earlier stage than the actual outbreak of violence, which is already part of the most intense conflict stage (subordination conflict). Thus, as the conflict model in the EUBorderConf project outlines, there are three other conflict stages prior to this stage (conflict episodes, issue conflicts and identity conflicts). While in theory, there can be instances in which a (violent) subordination conflict breaks out without any pre-history at another conflict level, this seems unlikely for those type of (border) conflicts studied in the EUBorderConf project. Thus, a first lesson learnt is that there should not be any normative blinders against using the term ‘conflict’ when talking about instances in which there is a cross-border incompatibility of subject positions, even if this occurs at the stage of an issue conflict. In the EUBorderConf project, such a hesitance to use the term ‘conflict’ has, for example, been obvious in interviews conducted by project partner 1 in Brussels with regard to conflicts in Europe’s North.
However, as the research carried out by project partners 1 and 5 have clearly found out, EU-Russian relations since the late 1990s are indeed characterised by a strong conflictive dimension. Ignoring this may prove detrimental in avoiding an increase of conflict intensity to higher levels. Thus, within EU policy-making circles there should be less hesitance in referring to conflicts once an incompatibility of subject positions becomes obvious – even if the EU itself turns out to be one of the conflict parties involved.

A second main policy recommendation on that dimension is that the crucial early warning sign for a possible outbreak of a violent conflict is the shift of conflict communication in conflict regions, in large parts of political and wider societal discourse, from the issue to the identity level. Thus, the EU should allocate resources (for example in the Commission Delegations, in cooperation with the EU High Representative) for the establishment of a permanent EU Conflict Observatory in conflict regions that would monitor interactions of conflict parties and analyse whether conflict language on both sides is primarily focused on the concrete issues and possible compromises or whether both sides spend considerable resources in attributing responsibility to the other side and establishing rather homogenous images of the other side (identity conflict). If such a decentralised EU Conflict Observatory identifies intensification in conflict language, this is the clearest early warning sign for the possible outbreak of violent conflict. This Observatory should apply the same methodology in all regions in which border conflict are observed. Given that the outbreak of violence occurs at a rather late stage of conflict intensification, the Observatory should also operate in all those Delegations in which allegedly minor points of disagreement between two parties at the issue-dimension can be noted.

The EU should normally avoid attributing responsibility to one side of the conflict only. Of course, there are certain conflicts in which one side clearly acts as the aggressor and the other as a victim of the aggressor. However, in most border conflicts, which have a rather long history of mutual responsibility of both parties for the continuation of the conflict, such an attribution of responsibility (even if implicit in EU language) is counterproductive since such an attribution might in itself be read as an involvement of the EU in the conflict, rather than ensuring that the EU is to the largest degree possible being kept outside of conflict communication. In the EUBorderConf project such a problematic incorporation of the EU in local conflict communication has been observed in several case studies, in particular Greece-Turkey before 1999, Cyprus and Israel-Palestine, but also Northern Ireland.

A final major policy recommendation stems from observations made in the Northern Ireland case study, namely that the EU should avoid reproducing the conflict language by viewing the conflict through the lens of a binary distinction between conflict parties. Thus, in Northern Ireland the EU often tends to reproduce conflict patterns by streamlining all its funding provisions on the basis of the religious distinction that it views as central to the conflict in the first place. The EU should thus develop means that ensure broad access to funding possibilities and to EU institutions that do not reproduce the classic conflict distinctions.

4.2.1.2 Pathways and conditions of EU impact

For transnational applicability of results of the EUBorderConf project, the model of pathways also offers useful tools better to identify the possible points of intervention by the EU on border conflicts. In the first place, this requires identifying the precise conditions of EU impact.
• Firstly, since EU impact is hampered by negative images of the EU in conflict areas, the EU should actively design measures that increase trust of conflict parties.

• Secondly, several case studies have indicated that EU funding procedures (besides the problematic aspect of sometimes reproducing rather than challenging conflict identities) are too complicated. The EU should develop mechanisms to ensure that funding can be applied for more easily, also by actors from less educated parts of society.

• Thirdly, several case studies have found out that the resources of the Commission Delegations are often insufficient in order to meet the tremendous tasks assigned to them. Thus, independently of a possible entry into force of the EU Constitution, it is paramount that Commission Delegations are strengthened by diplomatic training of all staff.

As far as the pathways of EU impact are concerned, the EU should be equally aware of its direct and indirect forms of impact on border conflicts, thereby increasing synergy between these two forms of influence.

With regard to the compulsory impact (pathway 1), the EU should be more aware of the time-horizons and conditions under which this pathway operates. This pathway seems to be particularly useful when combined with a credible membership perspective. The EU should therefore be cautious in applying carrot-and-stick policies in order to overcome border conflicts, if such a credible membership perspective is not on offer, since this might be detrimental to other pathways that could operate more effectively in such instances. At the same time, the compulsory impact decreases in its efficiency after membership has been achieved. The EU should therefore clarify, when applying the compulsory impact, whether it is really willing to link membership with the formal resolution of a border conflict or not, since otherwise it might be perceived as biased.

With regard to the connective impact (pathway 3) the EU should consider the following policy recommendations.

• Firstly, funding provisions should be as simple as possible in order to ensure maximum use being made of the funds in conflict regions, in particular by local actors that may not have the experience in professional funding applications, but who are nevertheless crucial in achieving wider societal de-securitisation.

• Secondly, in the process of enlargement the EU must avoid cutting-off established connective ties in border regions, since otherwise this might have disruptive and conflict-enhancing consequences.

• Thirdly, the EU should actively reach out to and encourage sectors of society in conflict regions to apply for funding and organisational support by the EU that are traditionally more distant to the EU. As the example of Northern Ireland has shown, the EU has been successful in reaching out to some sectors of society that are more sceptical to EU involvement and that this has had a conflict-diminishing effect. Such support might not necessarily be directly linked to conflict-related activities, but might spur cross-border cooperation in other areas.

Considerably more attention should be paid by the EU to the issue of how the two indirect pathways of EU involvement can be systematically strengthened, thereby increasing synergies with direct forms of EU involvement. With regard to the enabling impact (pathway 2), the EU must develop means to prevent local actors (from one or both sides of the conflict) from using references to the EU in order to legitimise conflict escalation. According to the results in the EUBorderConf project such a situation becomes more likely if only one side is integrated into the EU, while the other side remains outside the EU, or if neither side is
integrated into the EU. In such instances the policy recommendation is made that the EU ensures that both parties get easy access to EU markets and programmes as well as EU funding and organisational support in order to avoid sharp lines of division that could contribute to the EU being used as a reference point for justifying conflict-increasing steps.

Finally, as far as the **constructive impact** (pathway 4) is concerned, this clearly is a demanding pathway, since it relies on the long-term socialisation and internalisation of EU norms in conflict regions. A policy recommendation that results from the EUBorderConf study of this pathway is that the EU must try to prevent a situation where its external borders become subject to a stringent external border regime, which carries a risk of deepening the conflict instead of inspiring cooperation. While it is acknowledged that the underlying rationale of the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a conflict-mitigating, inclusive logic, it is less clear whether to what extent the ENP’s actual tools are supportive of it. This relates not only to the actual border-crossing provisions, but also to more dynamic cross-border interaction with regard to movement of trade, services, finance and persons as well as partial integration of third countries in concrete EU policies and programmes. The problematic aspects of ENP and suggestions for overcoming them can be summarised as follows:

- Firstly, the ENP replaces the distinction between insiders and outsiders with another clear-cut dichotomy between members and neighbours both in terms of institutional and identity relations. The problem is that although premised on the idea of borders as something fluid and mobile, the ENP inevitably brings about asymmetric neighbourhood relations in representing an attempt to gain control over policy developments in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood. In essence, the EU provides the norms and it is up to the neighbours to adopt them if they are to hope for closer relations with the Union. The alternative does not necessarily entail committing to further enlargement, which might not be enough for those neighbouring countries that continue to view integration into the EU as the only acceptable policy option. The ENP might thus not only negatively affect the image of the EU in border conflict societies (thereby limiting the effects of the enabling and constructive forms of EU impact) but also deprive the EU of leverage exerted through its compulsory impact, which works best in periods prior to membership (with a credible membership perspective for conflict societies).

- Secondly, the ENP includes no safeguards against possible attempts by a member state to adversely affect the EU’s relations with a particular neighbouring state, as a strategy in their ongoing conflicts. Though the Strategy Paper states that ‘it is of utmost importance that the Institutions and Member States act in a consistent and coherent way’ (Commission 2004) in the implementation of ENP, there is no set of general principles which will govern the member state’s relations with the EU’s neighbours.

### 4.2.1.3 Integration, association and the borders of the EU

The more general policy recommendations of the EUBorderConf project that relate to the dynamics of integration and association can be summarised as follows.

- The EU must avoid that its new external borders become lines of distinction. These borders should be open to crossing on several dimensions from both sides, in particular in the border-area itself.
- The benefits of association must be much more clearly defined in order to render association an attractive option for third countries, increasing the ties between the EU and
these regions (both on the political and wider societal level). While the ENP is a good starting point for that, the 2005 Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean meeting, at which hardly any head of state from the southern Mediterranean countries was present, shows that the power of association is still poorly developed. Greater access of third countries to EU resources should thus go hand in hand with greater access of the EU in these (often authoritarian) countries, ensuring that association is not limited to elite-level cooperation.

- Given the overall positive impact of integration on border conflict transformation, the EU must ensure that the merits of this approach do also operate in its neighbourhood. This directs attention to the foreign policy tools of the EU. While these have been traditionally been based on the ‘civilian power’ of the EU, the EU increasingly and rapidly develops a military dimension and geo-strategic approach to its external relations. The EU must ensure that in this process the merits of the civilian power (which also underlies its success story within the EU) are not lost on the way.

- Finally, within the EU itself, border conflicts are not an adequate issue for applying subsidiarity. As in the case of Northern Ireland (Strand 3), EU institutions, programmes and funds should over time become a central element in institutional structures within European border conflict areas.
5. Dissemination and/or exploitation of results

5.1. Dissemination

The dissemination of project results included the following main channels: project web site, e-mail listserv, newsletters and case-study bulletins, working papers (published on the web site) and presentations by project partners at a number workshops and conferences. Several publications have appeared as a result of the project that are of interest to both academia and policy-makers (see ‘Publications’ section below for a full list of publications and presentations). A manuscript of the book summarising the findings of the project is being finalised, to be published in 2006-2007. In addition, all project partners have been in contact with the media (both print and TV) in their respective countries and case study areas, have given numerous interviews to national and foreign journalists and appeared in TV programmes and debates.

5.1.1. Web site

The project web site www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk was set up at the beginning of the project period, in February 2003, and regularly renewed throughout the project’s duration. The web site contains all public project-related information, enabling access to the project background, methodology, theoretical framework, reports, newsletters, working papers etc. It also offers contact details of the project team members and of the electronic discussion forum, EUBorderConf e-mail listserv.

5.1.2. Listserv

As a forum for exchanging ideas and information, EUBorderConf e-mail listserv was set up at the start of the project period (March 2003). It was also used to inform the members of EUBorderConf newsletter releases and other important project news and events. The number of people subscribed to the listserv over the three years of project duration was about 350.

Both the web site and listserv were initially publicised through leaflets at the European Union Studies Association conference in Nashville, Tennessee (April 2003) and CEEISA/ISA conference in Budapest (June 2003), as well as through advertisements in UACES and BISA newsletters, and enjoyed considerable attention throughout the lifetime of the project.

5.1.3. Newsletters and Case-Study Bulletins

A decision has been made in consultation with the project scientific officer to integrate case study bulletins into the project newsletters in the form of chronologies and commentaries, and to publish them electronically on the project web site. Between 50 and 80 hard copies of each newsletter were distributed at international conferences and workshops by project team members. In addition to case-study bulletins, the newsletters contained project news section and general announcements of events unrelated to the project but broadly in line with its subject areas (European integration, borders, and conflict transformation) – e.g. calls for papers and conference announcements.
5.1.4. Working Papers

The results and findings of the project throughout its lifetime have been published in EUBorderConf Working Paper Series. The main format of the working papers is electronic and they are made available on the project web site; hard copies were published at the discretion of individual authors. All 21 papers are integrated into the list of publications produced by the project team in section 7.1.1. below.

The theoretical framework of the project was also applied to case studies beyond the EU’s immediate neighbourhood in a working paper originating outside EUBorderConf, to study the impact of development cooperation on African border conflicts, by Dr Sebastien Loisel of Sciences-Po, Paris. This testifies to wider applicability of the theoretical framework and general theoretical departures of EUBorderConf.

5.1.5. Workshops, Conferences, Presentations

The project team members have presented the project in its various stages at a number of workshops, international conferences etc. For the full list of presentations, please see the section 7.1.2. below.

The initial presentation of the project took place at BISA conference in London, December 2002, where it had a panel fully devoted to it. The first version of the theoretical framework (as envisaged in workpackage 2) was presented at the CEEISA/ISA joint conference in Budapest, 26-28 June 2003 (Stetter, Diez and Albert, ‘The European Union and the Transformation of Border Conflicts: Theorising the Impact of Integration and Association’). A revised version of the theoretical framework was presented at BISA conference in Birmingham, December 2003.

The project has further been presented to the academic community at conferences and workshops in Koli (Finland, Koli Border Forum, 14-15 February 2004), Montreal (International Studies Association, 18-20 March 2004), Uppsala (European Consortium for Political Research, 13-18 April 2004) and Liverpool (Europe in the World Centre, 2-3 July 2004).

The project co-ordinator gave a lecture at the Free University in Brussels on the eve of enlargement (30 April 2004), which was attended by a number of Commission officials. He also gave presentations at an international conference on Cyprus and the EU (Bremen, Germany, 14-15 May 2004), which involved academics, NGO representatives and policy-makers, and at a workshop with Turkish-Cypriot negotiators and policy advisors in Antalya, organised by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI, 6-7 March 2004). He gave a talk on the Cyprus case to the Warwick One World Forum (17 January 2004), presented the project to the South East European Studies Programme, University of Oxford, 4 March 2004, and to the Geography Department at the University of Joensuu, Finland, 17 February 2004. The project coordinator also took part in a workshop with Commission officials on New Dimension of Security and Conflict Resolution, in Brussels, 14 February 2003, thus communicating the research design and objectives to the potential users. Most project partners have also been in regular contact with politicians and NGOs in their respective countries.

The Birmingham project team also organised several seminars on the EU and Border Conflicts at the University of Birmingham. Project case studies were presented by Prof. David Newman in February 2004, and discussed at the workshop on the Status of Mediterranean Studies, in October 2005.
The final conference of EUBorderConf project in Brussels, in November 2005, was attended by approximately sixty participants from both academic and policy-making communities. A number of NGO representatives were also present. Case study presentations provoked lively discussion, where a number of constructive comments were made. Generally, EUBorderConf has enjoyed considerable resonance and the project team hopes that its research will be taken up by others who got acquainted with it through the various means of dissemination used.

5.1.6. Cooperation with other projects/programmes

Regular contacts have been established with such projects/networks as NEWR (co-ordinated by the University of Birmingham), IBEU (ELIAMEP, Athens), ELISE (CEPS, Brussels), EXLINEA (Free University, Berlin), EUBorderIdentities (Southampton University), INFOREC (Centre for the Study of Democracy, Bulgaria), EUROPUB (Berlin), and ESDPdemocracy.

Web links to other projects working on the issues of borders, conflict transformation and the European foreign policy have been provided on the EUBorderConf web site.

5.1.6. Case study workshops

As part of the project dissemination strategy, a series of case study workshops have been organised in the case study areas, to involve potential users more systematically into the discussion of project objectives, research and results. The workshops have been held at the following dates:

- 16-19 September 2004 – Cyprus, held in Nicosia
- 24-25 September 2004 – Northern Ireland, held in Belfast
- 22-23 October 2004 – Greece/Turkey, held in Istanbul
- 26-27 November 2004 – Europe’s North/Russia, held in Copenhagen
- 8-11 January 2005 – Israel/Palestine, held in Jerusalem

In addition, towards the end of the project, some additional case study workshops and seminars were organised, to communicate the results and conclusions of EUBorderConf research to the end user communities.

A Northern Ireland expert roundtable was held in Brussels in November 2005 in conjunction with the final project conference. The event, generously hosted by the Office of the Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels on 24 November, involved fifteen participants – academic experts, managers/directors from key organisations involved in cross-border cooperation in Ireland, and representatives from the civil service in Ireland, Northern Ireland and the European Union. The roundtable centred on a discussion of key points and recommendations made in the Final Report for the case study, published on the project website (http://www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk/publications/files/EUBorderConf%20Ireland%20final%20report.pdf), including the nature of the EU’s role in cross-border cooperation and lessons from Ireland for other cases of conflict within the EU. The roundtable constituted a rare opportunity for face to face discussion between academic experts, practitioners and policymakers from both sides of the Irish border on the subject of the EU’s impact on the transformation of border conflict. The debate was lively and produced many substantive points for consideration in future research in this area, including three core themes. First, it was evident that policymakers in the field are generally extremely positive and optimistic about the achievements – and potential – of the EU in conflict transformation in Ireland. This
is based in large part on the strong relationship between the British and Irish governments and on the momentum in cross-border activity at all levels. Secondly, the topic of identity remains controversial, particularly regarding whether it is wise or necessary for the EU to directly address ‘identification’ at the heart of conflict and its resolution. Finally, and in relation to this, the question of whether the EU is equipped to tackle the need for reconciliation (as distinct from peaceful co-existence) remains outstanding. These points, and the many others raised, will be incorporated into ongoing research by Katy Hayward (research fellow on the Ireland case study) to be conducted at University College Dublin.

The EUBorderConf project also funded a series of intensive workshops with the participation of Israeli geographers and planners to look at the scenarios for boundary demarcation between Israel and a Palestinian State. The sessions were held on four consecutive Fridays in November and December 2005, and were followed by two field trips to the course of the Green Line and the Separation Wall, one in the northern section of the West Bank and the other in the Jerusalem area. At the time of writing, a summary paper is being prepared, focusing on the major considerations for future border negotiations. The focus is on the Green Line (the border separating Israel from the West Bank) and the possibility of deviating from this line as current conditions necessitate. The objective of the workshop is not to delineate a single optimum line – as no such line exists – but to highlight those parts of the green Line which require modification and potential territorial exchanges. The findings of the project will be presented by Professor David Newman (director of the EUBorderConf project in Israel/Palestine, Ben Gurion University) and Professor Gideon Biger (Tel Aviv University) at the forthcoming Herzliya Conference to be held on 23 January 23rd. This conference is a major policy making media event and is attended by all senior Israeli government officials and foreign diplomats. An international workshop on Contested Compliance in International Policy Coordination – Bridging Research on Norms and Policy Analysis was organised in cooperation with the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at Queen’s University Belfast by Professor Antje Wiener and Dr Uwe Puetter on 17-18 December 2005 in Portaferry, Northern Ireland. The workshop discussed lessons to be drawn from policy coordination failure and the potential for binding norms in transnational governance contexts. It built on EUBorderConf highlighting the central themes of (1) the potential of cross-border cooperation in the light of conflict over fundamental norms based on contested meanings; (2) potential and limits of norm diffusion in contexts of governance beyond the state; and (3) theorising interactive norm creation. The topic will be further discussed at the International Studies Association annual meeting in 2007 and the papers are to be published in an edited volume with a major university press.

Another dissemination opportunity presented itself at a conference on Turkey’s Europeanisation process since 1999 that was held at Koc University in Istanbul under the auspices of the newly established Centre for Globalisation and Democratic Governance (GLODEM) at Koc University. The two-day conference drew a large audience including scholars and students from Turkish universities and abroad, journalists, and representatives from various civil society organisations, European consulates, and the Representation of the European Commission in Ankara. The conference was structured around five thematic panels; respectively analysing the transformation of Turkish political institutions, civil society, political economy, and the impact of EU and external dynamics on Turkey’s Europeanisation prospects, and a concluding plenary session. At the conference, Thomas Diez and Bahar Rumellili delivered a co-authored paper on how the ongoing Cyprus conflict affects Turkey’s Europeanisation prospects. Drawing on some of the main conclusions of the
EUBorderConf research, the paper argued that Europeanisation is not an automatic one-way process; it very much depends on how actors within target states interpret and choose to make use of it. Consequently, the paper contended that the ongoing Cyprus conflict risks spoiling Turkey’s Europeanisation process, both by becoming a rallying point for EU-sceptics within Turkey, and by the Greek-Cypriot attempts to conceptualise Europeanisation in such a way that it becomes an instrument to further their own cause.

5.1.7. Advisory Board

The five members of the project Advisory Board, Prof William Wallace, Dr Tarja Cronberg, Martin Pratt, Prof Yosef Lapid, and Prof Hugh Miall, have been involved as discussants or participants at various workshops and conference panels where EUBorderConf project was presented and discussed. Dr Cronberg has met the project team members at the Koli Border Forum in February 2004, and Prof. Lapid has been acting as a discussant on EUBorderConf panel at the ISA conference in Montreal, March 2004. Martin Pratt and Prof Miall have served as discussants at the project final conference. Through the Advisory Board, contact with, and feedback from, a broader academic community was ensured.

5.1.8. Book

The case study findings integrated into EUBorderConf theoretical framework will be presented in an edited volume, to be published during 2006-2007. The manuscript of the book is currently being finalised. Once published, the book will ensure an even wider access of both academics and policy-makers to the research results and its theoretical premises, providing a useful point of reference for the research conducted in the fields of European integration and border conflict transformation, and hopefully inspiring others to take up the work started by the EUBorderConf researchers.

6.2. Exploitation of Results

The results have already led to a number of publications in academic as well as policy journals (see list of publications below). The edited volume (5.1.8.) will be the core exploitation for the academic market, and individual project team members are working on additional book and journal publications. The project work has been used in the teaching of seminars and lectures by project team members in the context of European integration and International Relations modules on both undergraduate and postgraduate level. An FP6-funded project (SHUR) is making use of the findings, and there are presently first deliberations of how to expand the empirical basis of EUBorderConf and further test some of the findings and policy-recommendations made within another project under FP7.
6. Acknowledgements and References

6.1. Acknowledgements

The project team members would like to express their gratitude to the European Commission for making this research possible. We also acknowledge the additional funding provided by the British Academy through their International Network Grant scheme, which made it possible for the project team to meet more often to discuss their research. The coordinator would also like to thank the graduate student assistants in Birmingham, Apostolos Agnantopoulos and Daniela Tepe, the three EUBorderConf Interns, Frederic Martel, Lea Moubayed, and Anais Menard, as well as the EU Liaison Officer in the Universitybof Birmingham Research Enterprise Services, Xavier Rodde, all of whom made significant contributions to getting the project off the ground and completing it.

6.2. References

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7. Annexes

7.1. EUBorderConf Publications and Presentations, 2003-2005

7.1.1. Publications (articles, books and working papers)

2003


Hayward, Katy (2003), Territory and borders in Europe: the case of Ireland, Viessmann Research Centre on Europe, Wilfrid Laurier University, Working Paper.


2004


EU Border Conflicts Studies, Birmingham: Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham.


2005


Joenniemi, Perti and Christopher Browning (2004) 'Marginaalin kautta ytimeen' [To the Core via the Margin], *Ulkopolitiikka*, 1/2004: 81-82


Pace, Michelle (2005) ‘Partners or Periphery? Russia and Israel in the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy’ in Evropa, journal of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw (in Russian), issue 3


Pace, Michelle, 2005 ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership cultural initiatives: What political relevance?’, in Youngs, Richard and Haizam Amirah Fernández (eds.), The Barcelona Process Revisited, Madrid: FRIDE and Real Instituto Elcano,


7.1.2. Presentations and conference papers
2003


Kirisci, Kemal (2003) ‘Turkey’s Justice and Home Affairs Issues in EU Candidacy Process’, paper given at the conference Turkey in the Aftermath of the War in Iraq, 8 Dec, Tel Aviv University


Palestine, paper presented at the International Conference Political Geography and Geopolitics: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, Commission on the World Political Map (WPM) of the International Geographical Union, Moscow, Russia, 1-7 June 2003


The project was also presented at the following events/institutions:

- Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, 6 May 2003 (Diez)
- Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada, Viessmann Centre for European Research, 9 October 2003 (Diez, Hayward)
- Dublin European Institute, University College Dublin, September 2003 (Hayward)
- Alexandria, Egypt, Roundtable on “Culture and Community in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, 5-7 October 2003 (Pace)
- 80th Anniversary Symposium on the Compulsory Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey organized by the Foundation of Lausanne Treaty Emigrants, 7-8 November 2003 (Rumelili)
- Bogazici University European Studies Seminar Series, 15 November 2003 (Rumelili)
• Greek-Turkish Forum meeting at Bilkent University in Ankara, 17 November 2003 (Rumelili)

2004


Demetriou, Olga; Officer, David (2004), ‘The European Union and Border Conflicts. Cyprus Case Study’, presentation at the EUBorderConf case study workshop on Cyprus, Nicosia 16-19 September.


Diez, Thomas (2004), ‘The EU and Border Conflicts: The Impact of Integration and Association’, presentation at the EUBorderConf Greece/Turkey case study workshop Greece/Turkey, Istanbul 22-23 October.


Kirisci, Kemal; Rumelili, Bahar (2004), ‘The EU and Change in Greek Turkey Relations: Pathways and Conditions of Influence’, presentation at the EUBorderConf Greece/Turkey case study workshop Greece/Turkey, Istanbul 22-23 October.


Makarychev Andrey (2004) ‘Russia’s Discursive Formation of Europe and Herself: Towards New Imagery of Political Spaces’, presentation at the EUBorderConf Europe's North Case study workshop at the DIIS, Copenhagen, 26-27 November


Pace, Michelle (2004), Signifying border conflicts in EU discursive practices. Order within chaos? UACES annual conference, EUBorderConf project panel, University of Birmingham, 6-8 September 2004.

Pace, Michelle (2004), The role of the EU in the case of Europe's North. Workshop on Remaking Europe in the Margins: Northern Europe after the Enlargements, 12 June 2004, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham.


Pace, Michelle (2004), Governing border conflicts: when can the European Union be an effective mediator? International Studies Association Convention, Montreal, 17-20 March, 2004


Pace, Michelle (2004), Governing conflicts: an analysis of the EU’s policy on border conflicts in and around its periphery, paper presented at the Europe in the World Centre Workshop on Europe’s Borders, Liverpool, 2-3 July 2004.


workshop at Bogazici University, Istanbul, 22 October. Available at http://www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk/publications/presentations.htm

Pace, Michelle; Prozorov, Sergei (2004) ‘Divergent Perceptions of Border Conflicts in Russian and EU Political Discourses’. Power point presentation at the EUBorderConf Europe's North Case study workshop at the DIIS, Copenhagen, 26-27 November. Available at http://www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk/publications/presentations.htm


Prozorov, Sergei (2004), ‘European Identity in the Discourse of Russian Conservatism’, presentation at the EUBorderConf Europe's North Case study workshop at the DIIS, Copenhagen, 26-27 November


Stetter, Stephan (2004), ‘The Role of the EU in the Middle East Conflict: Direct and Indirect Impact’, Lecture at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute (Florence, October)

The project was also presented in connection with the following events:
Europa Intensive programme, University of Bielefeld, January 2004 (Stetter)
• Koli Border Forum, 14-15 February 2004 (Albert, Diez, Joenniemi, Prozorov)
• The 2004 European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Joint Sessions of Workshops in Uppsala, Sweden (Diez and Albert), 13-18 April
• University of Bremen, conference on Cyprus, 14-15 May 2004 (Diez)
• Queen’s University Belfast, May 2004 (Stetter)
• University of Liverpool, Europe in the World Centre, 1-2 July 2004 (Demetriou, Diez, Makarychev, Pace)
• Britain and Greece, 5th bilateral conference, Hydra, Greece, 8-10 October 2004 (Pace).

2005

Hayward, Katy, ‘Researching conflict transformation: lessons from the EUBorderConf project’, EU/IR Colloquium, Queen’s University Belfast, 19 April 2005

Hayward, Katy, ‘Ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty in the Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland: comparing British and Irish political discourse’, European Liaison Conference, Queen’s University Belfast, 19 May 2005
Joenniemi, Pertti, ‘Contending Conceptualisation of the North. The Story of the Jukkasjärvi Ice Hotel’, paper given at the BRIT VII conference in Jerusalem, 8-13 January 2005


Pace, Michelle, ‘Reflecting on the Impact of the 2004 EU enlargement’, paper presented at the seminar Political Economy, Size and the Impact of Enlargement of the International Academic Network supported by the Leverhulme Trust, European Research Institute, Birmingham, 28 May 2005


Pace, Michelle, ‘EMP cultural initiatives: What Political Relevance?’, paper presented at the international workshop on The Barcelona Process Revisited, organised by The Real Instituto Elcano and the Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), 13-14 May 2005, Madrid

Pace, Michelle, ‘The Politics of Ideas: Exporting the EU’s belief system to border conflict areas’, paper presented at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies (University of Birmingham) departmental annual conference, Cumberland Lodge, Windsor Great Park, 10-12 June 2005

Rumelili, Bahar, ‘EU Discourses on Turkey and Turkish Discourses on the EU’, invited lecture, Panteion University, Athens, Greece, 24 February 2005

Rumelili, Bahar, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy Making in Strategic Disputes: The Case of the Aegean Disputes with Greece’ Presentation in Turkish Security Culture and the Military Dimension of Foreign Policy-Making, Sabanci University European Studies Workshop, 25 May 2005


The project was also presented at the EUBorderConf Final Conference (Brussels 25 November 2005):
- Diez, Thomas ‘Introduction to the Project’
- Pace, Michelle ‘EU Policy-Making and Border Conflicts’
- Hayward, Katy ‘The Case of Northern Ireland’
- Demetriou, Olga ‘The Case of Cyprus’
- Makarychev, Andrey ‘The Case of Europe’s North and Russia’
- Newman, David and Jacobi, Haim ‘The Case of Israel/Palestine’
Kirisci, Kemal ‘The Case of Greece/Turkey’

### 7.2. Project deliverables

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<td>Annotated bibliography on the study of border conflicts and their transformation</td>
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<td>Integrative model of border conflict transformations and analytical scheme</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
<td>The European Union and the Transformation of Border Conflicts: Theorising the Impact of Integration and Association</td>
<td>July 2003; revised December 2003</td>
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