EU and the Cyprus Conflict

Review of the Literature

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Introduction: Aims of the Report

The current report aims to provide an overview of the perspectives on the European Union’s impact on the conflict in Cyprus as presented through the social science literature. It is the product of research undertaken on this topic over six months from July 2003 to January 2004. The research was conducted under the EUBORDERCONF project scheme, which aims to examine the role of the European Union (EU) in transforming zones of conflict into zones of cooperation. Within this scheme, the current report attempts to examine how this transformation has been viewed in the literature on Cyprus, in order to enable comparison between this case study and other case studies examined under the project (Ireland, Greece / Turkey, Israel / Palestine, and Europe’s North). At the same time it provides material for comparison of the EU’s impact on the conflict in Cyprus as appears in analyses focussing on Cyprus, with analyses that tackle the same question as part of EU-focused examination (Pace, this series).

In order to facilitate understanding of the arguments made in the literature on this issue, a brief summary is given at the beginning of the report, outlining the major stages in the Cyprus conflict over the last five decades, as well as the key events in the development of Cyprus – EU relations over the last 30 years. The overview of the literature that follows this, aims specifically to identify the particular perspectives expressed on the EU’s role in the Cyprus conflict. Within this framework the major arguments used in the literature to explain the Cyprus conflict are outlined from the perspective of critical analysis. Following this, an overview of the literature that relates the solution of the conflict to Cyprus’ accession to the EU is undertaken. A conclusion is then provided, where the arguments made in the literature with respect to the EU are summarised and evaluated and related to the overall theoretical framework of the EUBORDERCONF project. The executive summary that then follows presents the major stages of the conflict and arguments made in the report in schematic form. References are provided at the end of the report, which can be used to guide further reading on the issues raised. Attached to this is also a list of website addresses, active as at January 2004, which contain information relevant to the issues dealt with in the report.
Background to the Cyprus conflict and EU relations

Overview

Although academic analyses of the Cyprus conflict have dated its origins prior to the island’s British colonisation in 1878 [Bryant, 1998; Kızılıyurek, 1993; Kitromilides, 1994] for the purposes of this report, the start of the conflict will be taken as the first eruption of violence on the island in which the political goals of the two communities (Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot) were pitted against one another in 1955. This is because most of the analyses of the conflict focus on or mention this period extensively. The purpose of the current background is to summarise the main events presented in the literature on the conflict and on Cyprus – EU relations so as to facilitate understanding of the points raised in the literature review section. It does not purport to provide an ‘authoritative’ interpretation of these events, nor does it aim to offer a ‘true’ historical account in correction of other accounts of the conflict. An attempt is made, however, in the next section of this report to point out the connections between particular interpretations of the Cyprus conflict and official and nationalist discourses about it. Similarly, the background of Cyprus – EU relations is meant to provide a brief outline of the main historical events that marked this relationship over the last three decades.

The Cyprus conflict

1955 marked the start of the Greek-Cypriot guerrilla struggle, declared against the British colonists by the militant group EOKA, which aspired to end British rule in Cyprus and unite the island with Greece (a goal commonly referred as ‘enosis’, the Greek word for ‘union’). Shortly after the struggle began, the British colonial authorities implemented a policy of recruiting Turkish-Cypriots in their auxiliary police forces, who were often called to confront Greek-Cypriot nationalist (EOKA members and supporters demonstrating their opposition to British rule in public alike). In 1958, Turkish-Cypriot militants formed TMT as a counter-organisation to EOKA aiming at preventing the goal of enosis and advocating instead the ideal of taksim the Turkish word for ‘partition’ (indicating the partition of the island into a ‘Greek’ and a ‘Turkish’ state).

The constitution of 1960, which was agreed between the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities (then Archbishop Makarios and Dr Küçük respectively) as well as the governments of Britain, Greece and Turkey who acted as
guarantor powers, aimed at negotiating a middle position between these two extremes by establishing a bi-communal state, where Turkish-Cypriots were recognised as a political community with special rights that exceeded their demographic proportion to the Greek-Cypriot community. This left Greek-Cypriot nationalists disappointed and fiction between the two communities grew [Loizos, 1988]. On 30th November 1963 Makarios proposed amendments to the constitution that the Turkish-Cypriot members of parliament (MPs) found unacceptable and as a result, they withdrew from the parliament. Violence erupted on 21st December 1963, when a number of Turkish-Cypriots (around 200) were killed by Greek-Cypriots. The attacks were carried out by Greek-Cypriot extremist nationalist and some of the victims were also Greek-Cypriots. The UN intervened, and by the end of the month, the two communities had been physically separated—the period was thenceforth designated in Turkish as *kanlı Noel* (bloody Christmas). The Turkish-Cypriots were driven into enclaves and the Green Line consolidated. Turkish-Cypriots continued to live in the enclaves intermittently until 1974 (violence subsided between 1964 and 1967, at which point there was another crisis in the conflict, lasting until 1968).

After the withdrawal of Turkish-Cypriot representatives from the parliament and other state institutions, the Republic of Cyprus continued to function as a legal entity much in the same manner it did before, but the administration of Turkish-Cypriot affairs was now conducted by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities in the enclaves. In 1974, following a nationalist coup instigated by the junta regime in Greece at the time, which called for unification of the island with Greece and a change of the Greek-Cypriot leadership, the Turkish military intervened and took control of the northern part of the island.

Following successive failures to reach a commonly agreed solution to the problem (high-level agreements having been signed in 1977 and 1979), the Turkish-Cypriot authorities in northern Cyprus declared the region the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) in 1983. This unilateral declaration of independence has failed to achieve international recognition and as a result the TRNC has been economically dependent on Turkey (which has also kept a military force of about 40000 troops there). The Greek-Cypriot authorities of the Republic of Cyprus (in control of the southern part of the island) have refused to recognise this as a state and have been referring to it as the part of Cyprus ‘occupied by the Turkish military’, claiming that
the Republic (since 1974 staffed almost exclusively by Greek-Cypriots) legally represents the whole of the island.

The Greek- and Turkish- Cypriot leaderships have subsequently been engaged in bi-communal negotiations aiming to break the deadlock since the 1960s, primarily under the auspices of the United Nations, but have failed to reach a comprehensive agreement thus far. In recent years, two comprehensive plans for solution to the problem have been proposed by the UN, one in 1992, which was termed the ‘Gali set of Ideas’ after the then Secretary General Butros Butros Gali, and one in 2002, which has come to be known as ‘the Annan Plan’ after the current Secretary General Kofi Annan. At the time of writing the latter is still the main reference document used in the negotiations.

Cyprus –EU relations
The relations between Europe and Cyprus date since the early 1970s. An Association Agreement between the government of the Republic of Cyprus and the EEC was concluded in 1972 (at the same time as Britain was preparing for its own membership [Ayres, 1996 :39]) and entered into force on 1st July 1973. The agreement dealt almost exclusively with issues of trade and was complemented by a protocol concluded in 1987, providing the framework for EU-Cyprus relations [Gaudissart, 1996: 11-12]. Customs Union was also agreed and due for completion in 1977, but was then extended first to 1987 and with the commencement of accession negotiations became part of the accession process.

The accession of Cyprus to the European Union has been viewed by the two communal leaderships on the island in two seemingly contradictory ways: as a solution to the Cyprus conflict, that would ensure that the new status of Cyprus as EU member would override the ethnic split, and as simply ‘illegal’ because it overwrites the Cypriot constitution of 1960, that requires both communities on the island to agree before the state can join any other state. In this second view, though, union with Europe (of what is seen as ‘the southern Greek-Cypriot part of Cyprus’) would again mean a ‘solution’ because it would prompt the union of the north / TRNC with Turkey, after which point there would be no ‘Cypriot’ problem to solve.

Whatever the supporting or discrediting arguments relating to these two conceptual positions, practice has shown that the de facto division of Cyprus and the de jure unity
of it can be compatible with EU membership. The Republic of Cyprus argued that since the EU is not a state there is no issue of contravening the 1960 constitution. It thus applied for EEC membership in 1990 and in the same year the office of the European Delegation in Nicosia was opened. Since 1991, a Joint Parliamentary Committee of parliamentarians (MEPs) and Cypriot parliamentarians has been meeting twice a year. Discussions regarding Cyprus’ suitability for membership began in 1993, after the Commission decided to accept the Republic’s application as one made on behalf of the island. This suitability for membership (now of the EU) was decided in 1995 and negotiations began in 1998. They were concluded in December 2002 and the Accession Treaty signed in April 2003, with the Accession formally coming into effect as of May 2004.

Following the parliamentary elections that took place on 14th December 2003 in northern Cyprus, all of the parties involved (i.e. the Republic of Cyprus government, the new ‘TRNC’ premier, the governments of Greece and Turkey, and various EU officials) have indicated their willingness to work towards reaching a solution to the conflict before Cyprus’ accession in May (despite the fact that international actors viewed these elections as ‘illegal’, they all considered them important, and thus there was wide coverage of them by both Greek-Cypriot and international media). Whether this will be achieved, and the effects of such solution on Cyprus’ initial period as an EU member, or alternatively the effects of membership on Cyprus in the case of a solution not having been agreed before May, will be examined in the next stages of the project and form issues for analysis in later reports.
Literature Review

Overview
The present literature review focuses on the major works published in the English language on the Cyprus conflict from different social scientific perspectives. The works contained herein have been chosen because of their relevance to one or more of the major themes running through the project, namely, analyses of the Cyprus conflict, analyses relating to the relevance of the border in social, political, cultural and economic life in Cyprus and analyses of EU-Cyprus relations.

The vast majority of social scientific works on Cyprus centre on the island’s political problem. Furthermore, ‘the conflict’ is understood in most of these works as one of political position, which can only be rationalised through recourse to international law and official narratives. The impact of such narratives, or indeed the impact of the legacy of conflict on people’s daily lives, the conceptualisations of the ‘border’, or of social and cultural concepts that help shape and perpetuate ethnic divisions as well as undermine them are comparatively little explored. With respect to the three key words of this project, i.e. ‘conflict’, ‘border’ and ‘EU’ the majority of the literature of Cyprus is extremely enlightening on the first, less so on the last, and virtually non-existent on the second. Works dealing with issues falling within the purview of the latter two areas, often relate both the border and EU involvement back to the Cyprus conflict. Many of these studies have also tended to focus on normative theories, resting on legalistic argumentation, something which was in fact in line with the kind of argumentation projected by the political elites of the two conflicting communities.

It is nevertheless notable that in recent years more research has been undertaken in these latter areas than was previously the case. This also seems to relate to a shift in disciplinary focus of works on Cyprus from political science, international relations and legal perspectives to greater numbers of analyses undertaken from the perspectives of sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, and literary criticism. This ‘bottom-up’ focus on research has been conducive to the proliferation of new analytical perspectives –in fact, in parallel to this shift away from legal and top-level political analyses, an increase in alternative political scientific analyses has also been observed, e.g. from the perspectives of feminism, environmental studies, development, peace studies, and conflict resolution analysis.
**Early Studies, 1950 - 1974**

Academic analyses are in fact almost as old as the Cyprus conflict itself. In 1956, Percy Arnold, who had previously been the editor of the *Cyprus Post*, entitled his book *Cyprus Challenge* [1956]. *Bitter Lemons*, perhaps the most popular novel on Cyprus which deals extensively with political issues was published in 1957 [Durrell, 1957]. By 1959, Byford-Jones had published *Grivas and the story of EOKA* [1959] – a title that casts the struggle for *enosis* / self-determination as already a ‘historical’ event. In the 1960s, the set-up of the Republic of Cyprus and the history of the Greek-Cypriot nationalist struggle that led to it, the inter-communal violence of 1963-64 and 1967-68, the effective breakdown of the state’s bi-communal character, provided ample data for political analysis [Mayes, 1960; Foley, 1962; Argoe, 1965; Xydis, 1967; Kyriakides, 1968]. The war of 1974 and the negotiations that ensued and are still on-going made the Cyprus conflict a key reference in international relations studies, which went hand-in-hand with rising academic interest in the topic by both ‘outsider’ and ‘involved’ scholars (meaning by the latter, scholars who espoused particular national perspectives in their analyses, and especially those of the two Cypriot communities involved in the conflict, as well as those of Britain, Greece, or Turkey). This differentiation has persisted to the present, giving rise to the situation outlined in the previous subsection.

*Positioned approaches, 1975-1990*

Since the 1970s, the positionality of analyses of the Cyprus conflict has become noticeable – perhaps because at this time social scientists with Greek and Turkish relations (often Cypriot, but not exclusively) began to undertake research on the topic alongside English and American researchers. This ‘positionality’ was not manifested as much in the nationalist nature of the works, as it was in their scope. Thus, even

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1 This refers to international publications in the English language – local publications in the form of historical analyses for example, often written from nationalist perspectives would in fact constitute ‘primary sources’ since their existence is in fact implicated in the development of the conflict. A systematic review of these publications is beyond the scope of this paper and will form part of the analysis in later workpackages.

2 Note that a second edition of this item was published only two years later under a different title [Foley, 1964].
though Greek-Cypriots were concerned to explain how the problem evolved the way it did ‘objectively’ rather than from a nationalist point-of-view, their explanations were often focussed on their own community, the disputes between the left and right and later government and paramilitary forces that played a crucial role to the escalation of violence on the island. Turkish-Cypriots feature in these studies very briefly, at points when reference to them is in effect unavoidable. This is less the case with Turkish-Cypriot analyses. However, in these analyses an attempt is again made to tell the story ‘from a Turkish-Cypriot perspective’ and ‘in answer to what Greek-Cypriots say’. What is remarkable about such positionality is not that authors acknowledge the implications of their ethnic identity for their analyses in a reflexive way, but that in works that otherwise appear unconcerned with the academic debates that post-colonialism, reflexivity and subjectivity gave rise to, one’s ethnic identity is taken for granted as the basis from which one’s ‘objective’ assessment of the conflict was undertaken. It could be said here that the effect of this on the readers was to reinforce the link between objectivity and ethnic identity. Thus, ‘the other side’ would scourge such works for ‘confessions’ of ‘the enemy’ and present the events as ‘fact’ and the writer’s own side would cite what was already part of communal knowledge (and often nationalism) as a now ‘objectively proven fact’.

A widely known example of the first would be Stavrinides’ study of “The Cyprus Conflict” [1975] where his claim that the Greek-Cypriot leadership continued to have aspirations of unification of the island with Greece after the agreement for independence was signed, was cited in a number of publications espousing the nationalist Turkish-Cypriot viewpoint and caused authorities in northern Cyprus to sponsor a second publication of the book at their own initiative in 2001. Works by Bitsios [1975], and Xydis [1973], on the other hand, have been cited time and again to ‘prove’ the correctness of the official Greek-Cypriot position. The reception of Attalides’ “Cyprus, nationalism and international politics”, published in 1979, can be thought to fall into this category, yet it also presents another situation, since it is by now considered a classic study of impact on the conflict of the interrelations between superpower concerns and local nationalist aspirations. This is indeed a most illuminating work in the study of the conflict, but one that has played a key role in normalising the view that Cypriot history has evolved in a way that little could have been done at crucial points to have changed its course –a viewpoint that analysts from ‘all sides’ have espoused, and / or reiterated (e.g. Hitchens [1989] and Joseph [1985] respectively).
The other trend that is noticeable in the 1970s in Cypriot conflict historiography is that ‘the Turkish-Cypriot perspective’ has not yet began to be articulated as prominently, and that most Greek-Cypriot studies are published after 1974, that is after the war that divided the island. What they seek therefore to do above all is to explain what it was that enabled this ‘tragedy’ to befall the island and perhaps to suggest ways out of this impossible situation –notable titles are “The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic” [Markides, 1977], “Cyprus: the vulnerable Republic” [Bitsios, 1975], “Cyprus: The tragedy and the challenge” [Polyviou, 1975]. It is no less noticeable in terms of ‘positionality’ that at this point, ‘outsider’ perspectives turned to the analysis of foreign intervention on Cypriot politics –Stern’s “The wrong horse” [1977] could be said to have marked the beginning of what some call ‘superpower intervention’ and others ‘conspiracy-theory’ studies of the Cyprus conflict.

It could here also be argued that it was as UN- and British- sponsored negotiations broke down in the years following the war (with the 1977 and 1979 agreements being the closest the two sides got to solving the problem in that period) that the role of outside forces became more noticeable. The appearance of the Turkish-Cypriot viewpoint in the literature could in this sense be viewed as also symptomatic of the developments in the political and diplomatic sphere –with the exception of the outstanding analysis of the psychological impact of war on the Turkish-Cypriot society by Vamk Volkan [1979]. Most Turkish-Cypriot analyses of the conflict in fact appeared after the ‘declaration of independence’ of the state in the north in 1983 –another exception is Oberling’s “Road to Bellapais” [1972] that sought to explain the Cyprus problem by foregrounding the plight of Turkish-Cypriots. Thus, Ertekün explained in “The birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” as the inevitable outcome of “the Cyprus dispute” [1984] and Tamkoç took much the same stand building on a Hegelian philosophical argument about what a state should be in his analysis of the establishment of “The Turkish Cypriot State” [1988].

By this time, a plurality of analytic approaches to the conflict was evident in the literature. Two ethnographic monographs on Greek-Cypriot village culture and politics before and after the war had appeared [Loizos, 1975; 1981], the study of foreign intervention proliferated [Wiener, 1980; Couloumbis, 1983; Hitchens, 1984, 1989], the situated viewpoints outlined above established themselves in the literature (outstanding among them Birand’s account of the Turkish military intervention
and two of the main political actors on the island had published their own views on the Cyprus problem [Denktaş, 1982; Clerides, 1988].

Analytic plurality, 1990-2003

The proliferation of new analytic approaches continued into the 1990s and up to the current date. New disciplinary approaches entered the field of Cypriot conflict studies geared towards questions of identity as manifested through or affected by the conflict such as sociology [Mavratsas, 1999; Vassiliadou, 2002], social history [Canefè, 2003] and anthropology [Papadakis, 1994; 1998; Killoran, 1998; Bryant 2001; 2002; Scott, 1998; 2002; Sant Cassia 1999a; 1999b; Spyrou, 2002; Navaro-Yashin, 2003]. The conflict was analysed also through the perspective of environmental and resource management studies with emphases on the impact of the conflict on resource management across the dividing line [Hocknell, 1998; Nachmani, 2000] and the effects of the conflict on environmental disaster spots [Girdner, 1999]. Political science approaches turned to post-colonialism [Agathangelou and Ling, 1997], to peace research [Anastasiou, 2002] and to analyses of actors other than the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots or the British and American diplomats, such as the UN [James, 2002; Mirbagheri, 1998; Richmond, 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002]. It is not coincidental that it was in this period that the need to bring differing perspectives together in the analysis of the conflict was acknowledged, with the resulting publications of edited volumes such as Yashin [2000], Salem [1992], Kızılıyrek et al. [1990], Diez [2002], Calotychos [1998], Baier-Allen [1999].

It is also noticeable that in this period ‘positioned’ approaches took on a more propagandistic tone and no longer related exclusively to the authors’ ethnic identities. For example, Chrysochomelides’ arguments in his impressively well-researched “Study in International Law” [2000], which seems to be geared towards combating Turkish-Cypriot arguments regarding the legitimacy of the TRNC, can be related to his long-standing political involvement in Greek-Cypriot politics. This work resembles a number of analyses that aim (often in more simplistic ways) to prove that the policies followed by the Greek-Cypriot side are justifiably geared towards the best possible solution to the problem, for Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriots alike (e.g. Kyriacou [2000]). Duner’s arguments, on the other hand, seem to aim directly at the justification of official Turkish-Cypriot claims for partition of the island yet do not
appear directly linked to his own ethnic identity [1999]. Furthermore, his arguments are presented in a manner that is relatively simpler and rather cruder than those of the Turkish-Cypriot writers already mentioned. Mendelson’s report, which also appeared in this period [2001] is a statement by a lawyer and member of the British parliament which seeks to explain “Why Cyprus entry into the EU would be illegal”. It should here be noted that another UK parliamentary group had published its own arguments in support of the Turkish-Cypriot position four years earlier [Stephen, 1997]. Ioannides’ work is also interesting in this respect because it is one of the few studies of the ‘other’ (Turkish-Cypriot nationalism) that exist and that despite its presentation of original data, the analysis runs along quite propagandistic Greek-Cypriot nationalist lines [1991].

On the other hand, analyses of foreign intervention became sharper and richer – Nicolet provides a wealth of data on “US policy towards Cyprus” [2001] to prove that with respect to its goals, the US in fact failed to intervene effectively on the island’s politics in the 1970s, while O’Malley and Craig, arguing the opposite, provide their own convincing case [1999].

In this period, the Cyprus case has been compared to other international conflicts such as the Middle-East, South Africa and the Balkans [Bollens, 2001; Fouskas, 2003], Northern Ireland [Byrne, 2000; Hatay, 2001], and Sri Lanka [Breen, 1990]. In other analyses, the impact of the division on aspects of social and cultural life on the island were also analysed in way that was not exclusively focussed on the ‘conflict’. Such analysis have fore-grounded issues of gender [Killoran, 1998; Vassiliadou, nd; 2002], historical discourse [Scott, 2002; Sant Cassia, 1999b; Papadakis, 1998], political subjectivity [Navaro-Yashin, 2003], and immigrant experiences [Abraham, 2002; Robins and Aksoy, 2001; Ali, 2001]. These analyses have brought to the fore the observation that in the decades that followed the separation of the two main communities on the island, the largely ‘non-violent’ Cyprus conflict has had repercussions that came to dominate almost all aspects of social and cultural life, on both sides of the divide. They have also helped to highlight aspects of social life that previous studies have neglected (indicative of this is the attempt at a woman-centred re-reading of Cypriot history [Vassiliadou, 1997]).

Among the various points of focus of these studies, perhaps the most relevant here is the topic of the ‘border’, and the impact of its conceptualisation on Cypriot identity. It
is important to note here that the Green Line in Cyprus enjoys a disputed status, with authorities in the north viewing it as a state border, while the government in the south considers it a ceasefire line\(^3\). The issue of ‘territory’ has in fact been one of the major points of focus in successive high-level negotiations, with the idea that adjustments on the current situation should be made for the benefit of the Greek-Cypriot side, having been accepted by both sides. In his outline of what a new Cypriot constitution should look like, Theophanous refers quite extensively to the territorial adjustments that will need to be made and the arguments presented by the Greek-Cypriot side on how the border should be re-drawn [2000].

The symbolic and conceptual division between the two communities has also been treated as reflective or symptomatic of their geographic separation. Thus, current visual symbolism used to mark the border in southern Cyprus, turning it into a political tourist attraction, has constituted the basis of research into representations of suffering in Sant Cassia’s work [1999a]. From a geographical perspective, Bollens has compared the experience of fragmentation in divided cities such as Sarajevo, Johannesburg and Jerusalem to Nicosia, exploring how actors (intellectuals, local authorities, city planners, etc) view the dividing line and relate to it [2001]. In his work on Pyla, Papadakis has analysed the experience of actually living on the Green Line, through ethnographic fieldwork in a village on the Green Line, one of the few villages in Cyprus that have remained mixed after the war of 1974, and which is currently under the supervision of the UN [1997]. In this analysis, the strategies of coping with political pressures in a village which while belonging to neither governing authority on the island is under heavy surveillance by both are described. Emphasising the conceptual manifestation over the physicality of the ‘border’ Navaro-Yashin has in fact argued that the whole of the territory of northern Cyprus can be considered a ‘dead zone’ (the name also given to the Green Line) –this view leads her to explore Turkish-Cypriot political subjectivity as ‘bordered existence’ [2003].

\(^3\) It is this disputed status that Chrysostomides’ arguments underline, at the same time as he tried to prove beyond doubt the truth of the official Greek-Cypriot position [2000]. The historical background to the establishment of the Green Line as a buffer zone in 1964 is also given considerable space in James’ analysis [2002]. Violent incidents on the border are outlined in Stephen’s parliamentary report [1997].
As noted above, studies of the EU and its impact on the Cyprus conflict are significantly less than studies of the conflict per se. Yet interest in this topic has been steadily rising over the last 15 years. It is indeed a correct assessment that the EU has played a minor role in the search for a solution to the Cyprus conflict in comparison with the UN and Britain, and even the US [Pace, present series, working paper 1: 11]. Given that the crucial turning points in the conflict thus far (1955, 1960, 1963-4, 1967-8, 1974) took place when the EEC / EC has not yet constituted itself as a political actor on the international stage aspiring to affect political processes in third countries, this is not surprising. Yet the impact of the ‘EU’ on the Cyprus conflict was evident as soon as Cyprus’ prospects of membership began to materialise in 1990. It should also be stressed that it was increasingly not the EU itself, as an agglomeration of states, institutions, officials, and associated structures that impacted on the Cyprus conflict, but rather the notion of the ‘EU’. For this reason, it is important for the case of Cyprus to talk of the EU both as this sum of governance structures, and of the ‘EU’ as a conceptual construct. As such, the ‘EU’ is often related to other conceptualisations, centred on the idea of ‘progress’ such as towards ‘democracy’, ‘stability’ (economic and political), ‘rights’, and above all, ‘peace’.

Analyses of the impact of this concept of the ‘EU’ on the Cyprus conflict are not yet available, primarily because this could not be clearly assessed before 2002, when massive demonstration calling for ‘solution and EU’ were initially held in northern Cyprus [Demetriou, nd]. The next section will therefore focus on the effects of the EU (as an institution of which the Republic of Cyprus was expected to become a member) on the Cyprus conflict as presented in the literature thus far.

Perhaps a general comment to make on these conceptualisations is that unsurprisingly, they tend to follow the themes outlined above. For example, Brewin’s stand on the matter reflects somewhat the official Turkish-Cypriot perspective of viewing Cyprus’ accession to the EU as a threat to the possibility of settlement of the conflict, since it would increase Cyprus’ links to Greece and alienate Turkey [2001]. Chrysostomides on the other hand, devotes an important stand of his “Study in international Law” [Chrysostomides, 2000] on combating the claim that Cyprus’ application for EU membership is illegal (as presented in Ertekün [1997] and Mendelson [2001]) and
presenting the official Greek-Cypriot view on how beneficial EU membership would be for the eventual solution of the conflict.

Such conflicting viewpoints have also been accommodated in single publications that arose out of conferences in which policy-makers, politicians, academics, and other practitioners, had evidently been asked to present their various points of view on variations of the topic ‘Cyprus and the EU’. An example of this is Baier-Allen’s collection [1999], in which these very differing viewpoints are accommodated under sections on topics as diverse as politics, security, economy and conflict resolution. Other collections have focussed on bringing together more integrated analyses of the EU’s impact on the conflict, by theorists working on both sides of the divide and from inter-disciplinary perspectives, e.g. [Diez, 2000].

Such perspectives have helped to critically analyse the work of institutions that foster inter-communal contact on the island, during the time when the border between the two sides was closed [Constantinou and Papadakis, 2001]. In this analysis, where the EU’s impact on the Cyprus conflict is presented rather obliquely, the authors explain how such ‘bi-communal’ efforts oriented towards ‘conflict resolution’, are often stifled by actors’ internalisation of official political discourses. Other critical assessments of the impact of Cyprus’ EU accession on the conflict have focussed on the effects such integration would have on northern Cyprus, should this part of the island fail to accede at the same time as the south-controlling Republic of Cyprus [Lisaniler and Rodriguez, in Diez, 2000]. The major arguments here are that this possibility would further isolate northern Cypriot economy and that the patterns on immigration in the two parts of the island could be conducive in widening the social and cultural divide between the two sides.

A number of other publications do not directly analyse the Cyprus-EU relations but nevertheless point to possible directions of EU involvement in Cyprus. One such direction is resource management. In his analysis of how electricity, water, sewage and urban planning was affected by the partition, Hocknell explains that the differing levels of cooperation in the management of these resources across the line has left these system fragmented to different extents [1998]. Their unification, in the event or in anticipation, or even in spite of a solution to the political problem, will at some point prove necessary and it would perhaps be a profitable avenue of future EU activities on the island to direct resources and funding to such high-impact but not
explicitly political projects. The same would go for the clean-up of the Lefke copper mine area, which Girdner describes as an environmental disaster of very possibly Mediterranean-wide proportions [1999]. The importance of such environmental factors to influence the conflict is emphasised in Nachmani’s study of the relation between water conflicts in the region and the Cyprus conflict [2000]. This study provides a convincing argument for the proposal for action in these areas.

Similarly, studies on UN involvement in bi-communal negotiations [James, 2002; Mirbagheri, 1998] provide material for reflection on the EU’s possible impact on the conflict. They evidence on the one hand the fact that the major brokers of negotiations are already well-established and trusted by the conservative leaderships of both sides considerably more than the EU. On the other hand, they provide convincing analyses of such policies, which could be taken as indicative of more lucrative paths of influence available to the EU. The same would hold for US policies, as analysed by Nicolet [2001]. In this respect, Richmond noted that “while the EU may not be a catalyst for a solution in an immediate sense, its presence in the region is now indispensable” [2001]. This observation seems to still hold, and combined with his proposal of steps to be taken towards a solution, provides valuable insights for the attempt to determine future EU policies on Cyprus [Richmond, 1999].

In fact, Richmond’s analysis above also represents part of what might perhaps be the most sustained theorisation of the EU’s impact on the conflict. This was undertaken by the various contributions to the journal “Cyprus Review” through the articles published there between 1990 and the present. These articles trace the major analytical trends on the issue in the literature on Cyprus. The most important of these trends is the relative emphasis in analyses of the economic and political impacts. It is thus of great significance that until the late 1990s, it was the economic effects of membership that were mostly discussed, with impact on the political problem being theorised via the economic analysis, and in some cases not at all (e.g. in her in-depth analysis of the impact of membership on Cyprus, Odysseos focuses exclusively on the offshore sector in southern Cyprus, leaving completely aside the politics of the conflict indicating the virtually complete separation of the two economies [1997]). After 1998, which was also the year of the beginning of the accession negotiations, the economics of accession retreated to the background of analyses, and the politics was fore grounded.
In an article written in 1990, Nicolaides has argued that Cyprus’ membership of the (then) EC, entails benefits as well as disadvantages, in both the economic and the political spheres [1990]. Yet, he concludes that while the major disadvantage of such membership “is the danger of being marginalised by a loss of economic resources and policy autonomy”, it is “ironically … the loss of discretion in policy-making that makes membership politically attractive because it will eliminate a major source of tension between the Greek and Turkish communities” [ibid: 59]. This, because delegating policy decisions to the EC would diminish the suspicions that would possibly accompany one community’s consideration of policy suggestions of the other. The discussion of EC membership in this article is chiefly concerned with the impact on the economy, and the Cyprus problem is only treated as one of the factors that need to be considered in future decision-making. Revisiting his economic argument in 1999, Nicolaides argues that in view of the EU’s enlargement plans at that point, analytical emphasis should in fact be placed on the ways in which the EU itself would need to reform its economic policies in the process of its enlargement. “The challenge of the enlargement”, he thus concludes, “is not just how to accommodate new members; rather, it is how to improve the policy efficiency and financial effectiveness of a Union that will soon become European in a geographic sense.” [1999: 107].

In 1996, Ayres made a similar point when noting that “the economic argument is not the core element in the decision by the government of Cyprus to seek full membership of the EU. The motivation is mainly political, that is, it relates to the Cyprus problem. Nevertheless, the economic arguments remain important and cannot be ignored and it is also clear that they link to the political.” [1996: 57]. He thus argues that in economic terms, membership will mean that Cyprus will need to re-focus its external trade towards the EU, that certain sectors would benefit from trade liberalisation, that tourism, the most lucrative sector in Cyprus, might in fact lose out in the competition with other European regions, that the offshore and related sectors of the economy will undergo radical changes, and that foreign investment into Cyprus would increase [ibid: 59-60]. Yet, he maintains that a prospective solution to the Cyprus problem will prove the most beneficial result of EU membership, even though this will mean that re-structuring of the northern Cypriot economy will have to be undertaken before this is achieved [ibid: 60].
By comparison, in 1994, Papanicolaou’s major concern seems to be the effects of accession to the EU on the solution of the political problem by way of the economic effects that this accession would have [1994]. Therefore, he sees in the European Court of Justice’s decision of the same year to prohibit imports from the northern part of the island into the EU as an indicator of what a future of EU membership holds for Cyprus [ibid:90]. He therefore concludes that “an entry to the EU will strengthen the sovereignty, independence and unity of the country by diminishing motives to partition Cyprus” [ibid: 91].

Peristianis’ focus on the EU’s impact on the conflict focuses almost exclusively on the political implications of Cyprus’ membership with reference to the form of government that would pertain in a post-solution Cyprus within the EU. He argues that while “the Turkish-Cypriots” (presumably referring to the official position of the Denktaş leadership⁴) “treasure highly the military protection afforded to them by Turkey” [1998: 39], they “do not seem to realize…that in the post Cold-War era, ‘security has acquired a broader meaning’. ” [ibid: 40]. For this reason, he then argues that “the Turkish-Cypriot community will need all the assistance it can get to improve its economic position, to further democratization and build a stronger civil society” [ibid]. In short, what he sees as one of the EU’s major impact on the conflict is the strengthening of the Turkish-Cypriot civil society that will accompany the economic benefits that EU membership will entail. As for the “Greek-Cypriots”, he observes that although they “seem to be some of the strongest supporters of joining the European Union…they have pinned high hopes on joining the Union as a means of resolving the political problem…[and] seem to believe that the resolution of the Cyprus problem will somehow be a magical outcome of accession into the European Union” [ibid]. He then argues, using the example of Ireland, that it is “the enhancement of [mutual understanding and tolerance], which will be one of the greater benefits that will accrue to Cyprus, as a result of European Union accession” [ibid]. He thus sees in Cyprus’ EU membership the possibility of cultivating a common Cypriot European civic identity that will overcome the antagonistic ‘Greek’ and ‘Turkish’ nationalisms of current Cypriot communal identities [ibid: 41].

⁴ It should be noted here that the concept of ‘Turkish-Cypriots’ for many Greek-Cypriot as well as international observers, only became divorced from the concept of the ‘Turkish-Cypriot leadership’ after the massive opposition demonstrations in the north that began in 2000.
In the same issue, Mavratsas presents largely similar arguments, but places more emphasis on the modernisation of state institutions that will follow EU accession. He focuses his analysis on Greek-Cypriot society and interestingly notes that “[t]here is a danger…that Greek-Cypriots have given up on insisting upon the reunification of the island and are willing to ‘sell’ the northern part of the island for the price of entering the European Union – a development which will certainly benefit them both economically and in the narrow political sense that the EU will provide for their security in an already divided island” [1998: 71]. He further argues that Cyprus has a “‘European deficit’…directly related to the weakness of civil society and the dominance of nationalist ideology” [ibid: 73]. On this basis, what he sees as the EU’s major impact on the conflict is the strengthening of this civil society in such a way as to overcome the ‘over politicisation’ of Greek-Cypriot society. He concludes that the linking of the solution of the Cyprus problem to the EU without the necessary social changes, cannot positively contribute to the prospects of a solution. “The situation would be entirely different”, he goes on to argue, “if the Greek-Cypriot emphasis upon the earliest possible entry into the EU, independently of the solution of the Cyprus problem, was not motivated by nationalist axioms; and, perhaps more importantly, is the stress on Europe coexisted with a sincere and systematic attempt at building bridges of communication with the Turkish Cypriots. The latter is absolutely essential if a viable settlement on Cyprus is ever to be achieved – and if Cyprus is to embark on a substantial process of modernization and Europeanization.” [ibid: 73-74]. Thus in short, it is not in the role of the EU as an actor that he sees the greatest prospects of impacting on the problem, but in the indirect effects on the Greek-Cypriot society that EU membership will entail.

An altogether different kind of ‘indirect’ EU approach to influencing the conflict on Cyprus was outlined by Hutchence and Georgiades in 1999. In their view, the positive influence that the EU can provide in this matter is by maintaining friendly ties with Turkey and encouraging its democratization. They argue that attempts “to broker a resolution of the conflict … as part of a grand ‘political bargain’ has not been successful up to this point because of the overriding strategic considerations over Cyprus” [1999: 94]. However, they do seem to concur with Peristianis and Mavratsas that “[i]t is only under the conditions of democratic peace and stability that the problem of Cyprus could be resolved” [ibid: 95] and that the EU can provide this conditions. The difference between the two approaches seems to be the emphasis on
Turkey rather than the Greek-Cypriot side, as the party that most needs to conform to these conditions.
Conclusion

It can be concluded from the foregoing literature review on the Cyprus conflict and EU – Cyprus relations that the EU’s impact on the conflict has been increasing over the last two decades. In terms of the project’s overall theoretical framework [Stetter, this series] it can be said that this impact has been in the direction of all four identified pathways. This section will outline the points in the conflict at which each of the four pathways has been thought to have been pursued by the EU. The schematic outline that follows this section aims to further complement this outline.

Overall, it seems that while the EEC / EC / EU has played no role in the conflict up to 1972, its impact on it after this date has been steadily increasing. This increase has furthermore occurred alongside the continuing involvement of other ‘external’ actors in the conflict (Greece, Turkey, Britain, US, UN). In fact, it can be argued that the relationship between these various types of involvement has at points been complimentary, at others substitutional and yet at others confrontational. It can also be said that as Cyprus’ membership in the EU became more imminent, i.e. after 1998, the involvement of these other actors has tended to be structured around the dynamics of this evolving relationship. Thus Greece’s and Britain’s involvement became more and more subsumed under their identity as EU member states, while Turkey’s involvement has been increasingly tied to its identity as a state aspiring to EU membership. The involvement of the UN and the US on the other hand, has been characterised in recent years by an increasing willingness to act in concert with EU involvement in Cyprus. This argument is only sketchily laid out in the literature examined, but will form one of the working hypotheses of later workpackages.

As regards the identified pathways of involvement, it must be stressed that the boundaries between them are far from rigid. In many instances, the impact of the EU can be classified under more than one category. Compounding the problem is the fact that almost none of the analytical perspectives overviewed here explicitly mention these pathways. Therefore, what is presented below is a rough outline of the arguments as these might be thought to relate to the four pathways. In each case, the most suitable identification of pathway was made on the basis of what the core of the argument appeared to be. On this basis, the following observations were made:
Direct Impact – Political leadership direction (compulsory impact)
The EU’s impact on the conflict has been perceived as mostly being direct. Most analyses have concentrated on the EU’s approach to Turkey’s application for membership as examples of a ‘carrot and stick’ approach towards the Turkish leadership, whereby the consideration of this application was viewed as directly connected to Turkey’s altitude towards Cyprus [Ayres, 1996; Hutchence and Georgiades, 1999; Richmond, 1999]. The same approach was held to be pursued regarding the EU’s approach towards the Turkish-Cypriot political leadership [Papaneophytou, 1994; Mendelson, 2001; Stephen 1997]. Assessments on this approach differed, some arguing for a positive effect on the prospects of solution [Papaneophytou, 1994; Theophanous, 2000], others seeing it as a negative one [Mendelson, 2001; Stephen, 1997], while other still made predictions about both possibilities [Richmond, 1999].

Direct Impact – Societal direction (connective impact)
Although this pathway has not yet been fully analysed in the literature, there are suggestions that the EU has and should pursuit this approach in the future [Nicolaides, 19990; Mavratsas, 1998]. The analysis of this pathway in the case of other actors, however, have highlighted some of the possible pitfalls of such an approach [Constantinou and Papadakis, 2001].

Indirect Impact – Political leadership direction (enabling impact)
Considering that this approach describes the process by which the EU would be able to enable leaderships to legitimate the change in their traditional policies with respect to the conflict in question, it is expected that in situation such as Cyprus, where radical revisions policies have not yet been undertaken by the political leaderships and the slight changes that have so far been undertaken have not been theorised, this impact would form part of analyses that take critical stands on the policies in place at the time of writing. In the case of Cyprus, such criticism has mostly been focussed on Turkish policies, with arguments resting on the idea that the possibility of EU membership would enable the leadership in Turkish to legitimate its consent to an agreement on Cyprus that would otherwise be seen as ‘selling Cyprus’ [Hutchence and Georgiades, 1999]. Alternatives to this approach focus on the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, arguing that EU membership of a re-united Cyprus would enable it to legitimate its partial abandoning of the policy that places emphasis on the guarantee of security that the Turkish army currently provides [Theophanous, 1995]. Critical
stances of Greek-Cypriot policies have been more difficult to come by—in such analyses, the impact has tended to be located more widely at the societal level, as outlined below.

**Indirect Impact – Societal direction (constructive impact)**

In this respect, it has been argued that the most substantial way in which the EU will impact on the conflict will be through fostering (by the simple fact of Cyprus being a member) a more pluralistic, democratic, and tolerant society. This will entail, the argument goes, the broadening of civil society, which in itself will be conducive to bringing about the solution of the Cyprus problem [Peristianis, 1998]. The disengagement of Greek-Cypriot politics from traditional party clientalistic structures has also been identified as one of the ways in which this process can occur [Mavratsas, 1998]. Other analyses have pointed to the possibility that the expansion of civil society will also enable the formation of interest groups that will be able to form trans-cultural links on the island and trans-national ones outside it, within the context of the European Union and beyond [Agathangelou, 1997]. Yet other analysts, drawing on the effects of prospective membership thus far on Cypriot society, have argued that some hierarchical structures and the oppression that attends them within supranational states can increase with the change in economic and immigration patterns that closer ties with the EU entail [Vassiliadou, 2002].

The fact that all of the pathways have in some way been accounted for in the literature on the Cyprus conflict suggests that the EU, in its various structural, institutional and conceptual manifestations, has played, is playing and is envisioned as having to play in the future, a variety of roles with respect to the Cyprus problem. This report has evidenced the involvement of the EU in the conflict—whether intended or otherwise. It remains to be seen whether this involvement will change in the future and whether what social and political actors on the ground have to say concurs with the findings of the social science studies thus far.
### Executive Summary

**Schematic Outline**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event in Conflict</th>
<th>EU involvement</th>
<th>Involvement of other actors</th>
<th>Addressees of EU/other involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>official eruption of conflict with the start of EOKA anti-British guerrilla struggle for unification with Greece (identity conflict)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>British colonial recruitment of Turkish-Cypriot auxiliary forces against Greek-Cypriot supporters of EOKA</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots (basis of ‘divide and rule’ thesis in analyses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Cyprus (negotiation stage)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Britain, Greece and Turkey co-signed the Zurich-London agreements as guarantors of the new state</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots (seen by guarantors as ‘offspring’ communities to be protected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>attempt to amend constitution, walk-out of Turkish-Cypriot MPs, beginning of inter-communal violence (issue and identity conflict at once)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>local actors (Archbishop Makarios, Turkish-Cypriot leadership, Greek-Cypriot extremists) UN (in efforts to de-escalate the conflict)</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots (as members of own or ‘other’ community and as parties to be reconciled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1967</td>
<td>inter-communal negotiations, diminishing of inter-communal violence (de-escalation into series of issue conflicts but within framework of identity conflict)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Britain, Greece, Turkey, the UN and US as mediators</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaderships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1968</td>
<td>second eruption of inter-communal violence</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Greece and Turkey (destructive effect) Britain, UN and US as mediators</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaderships and paramilitary forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Association Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the EEC concluded</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Republic of Cyprus (relations established despite the dysfunctionality of the state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Greek-junta-inspired coup against Greek-Cypriot president and war with Turkey (occupation of northern part of the island –</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Greece and Turkey (effected the dissolution of the state and territorial integrity of Cyprus respectively) Britain, US, and UN as</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities and paramilitary forces; international community</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘Declaration of Independence’ of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</td>
<td>Refusal to recognise the TRNC as a state</td>
<td>Greece and Republic of Cyprus (condemnation of ‘TRNC’) International Community (refusal to recognise the ‘TRNC’) Turkey (recognition of the TRNC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1990 Republic of Cyprus application for EEC membership</td>
<td>European Delegation office opened in Nicosia</td>
<td>UN-sponsored negotiations between the communities continuing in parallel (but seen originally as unrelated processes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1991 Joint Parliamentary Committee of MEPs and Cypriot Parliamentarians set up</td>
<td>relations established with Republic of Cyprus (inevitably to exclusion of Turkish-Cypriots)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1992 Gali Set of Ideas proposed</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>UN-sponsored plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1993 Commission accepted Cyprus’ application for membership and talks regarding suitability began</td>
<td>sparked of debates about link between European membership and the international status of the Republic</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1995 Suitability for membership decided</td>
<td>implication of adoption of the view that the Republic of Cyprus represents the whole of the island</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1998 Negotiations for accession begun</td>
<td>Official entry into dialogue</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Turkey’s candidacy reconsidered in EU Summit</td>
<td>implied link of Turkey’s candidacy to behaviour in Cyprus</td>
<td>direct ‘stick’ approach towards Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Turkey denied candidacy status in EU Summit</td>
<td>Greece appearing to influence this denial for consideration of EU candidacy</td>
<td>direct articulations of these approaches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>End of negotiations for Cyprus’ accession</td>
<td>de-escalation of Greece-Turkey conflict</td>
<td>direct ‘carrot’ approach towards Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>End of negotiations for Cyprus’ accession</td>
<td>Greece softened stance towards Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>End of negotiations for Cyprus’ accession</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Accession Treaty signed</td>
<td>Republic of Cyprus accepted as member</td>
<td>direct and indirect approaches to civil society (e.g. measures towards Turkish-Cypriots)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Accession Treaty signed</td>
<td>Greece welcoming Cyprus’ entry to the EU (symbolic value of Treaty signing in Greece)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Entry of Cyprus into the EU</td>
<td>insistence on preference for united Cyprus to enter EU, threat of officialising Green Line border</td>
<td>indirect on leaderships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Entry of Cyprus into the EU</td>
<td>preference for united Cyprus to enter EU expressed by UK, UN and US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- **direct articulations of these approaches**
- **direct ‘stick’ approach towards Turkey**
- **direct ‘carrot’ approach towards Turkey**
- **direct approach to civil society influence for solution of the problem (pro-EU discourse in northern Cyprus gains force, expressed in anti-status-quo demonstrations)**
- **direct and indirect approaches to leaderships and civil society (e.g. measures towards Turkish-Cypriots)**
References


James, A. "Keeping the Peace in the Cyprus Crisis of 1963-64." (2001)


Relevant Website and Webpage addresses
(active as at 27/1/2004)

EU-related

EU accession treaty website

EU delegation to Cyprus website

http://www.eumap.org/library/content/196/20
EU accession monitoring programme website, with several entries for Cyprus

http://www.european-cyprus.net/cgibin/hweb?-Vcyprus_eu&-F=7=en&-Ssort_d-&dcyprus_eu_en.html
Cyprus-based NGO website pages relating to Cyprus’ EU accession

http://www.pio.gov.cy/
Official website of the Republic of Cyprus press and information office

Official website of the Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs with links to ‘Cyprus and EU’ sections

http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement_new/applicants/cyprus_home_en.htm
Cyprus profile on EU parliament website

http://www.trncpresidency.org/
Website of the TRNC president’s office with files relating to Cyprus and EU

http://www.civ-society.org/
EU Civil Society programme in Cyprus website
http://www.eic.ac.cy/
European Institute of Cyprus website

Profiles on official government sites of actors related to the conflict

Cyprus profile webpage on UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office website

http://www.britain.org.cy
Official website of the British High Commission in Cyprus

http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/cyprus/
Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs website – Cyprus section

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/default.htm
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website – Cyprus section

http://www.un.int/cyprus/
Permanent mission of Cyprus to the UN website

UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus website

http://www.americanembassy.org.cy/AnnanPlanOutline.htm
(American Embassy in Cyprus webpage on the Cyprus problem and Annan Plan)

Other organisations and independent sites

http://www.cyprus-conflict.net
independent website with sources on the Cyprus conflict

http://frida.prio.no/research/project.asp?ProsjektID=11
Website of the Peace Research Institute of Oslo, Cyprus section
http://www.tech4peace.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1
Cypriot civil society website with links to bi-communal group websites

http://www.ejc.nl/jr/emland/cyprus.html
webpage on media situation in Cyprus

http://www.ikme.org
Cypriot sociolopolitical studies Institute website, with links to bi-communal social science projects
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