The European Union’s Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict

A Review of the Literature

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I. Introduction

Despite the long history of Greece’s and Turkey’s institutional relations with the European Union (EU)\(^1\), there is a surprising scarcity in the literature of studies explicitly devoted to analysing the EU’s impact on the Greco-Turkish conflict. Even though most analyses of Greek-Turkish relations do contain insights on the role of the EU, these insights remain scattered and undertheorized in the absence of an analytical framework that considers all possible sources of EU influence and links them to the other relevant factors and conditions. To fill this gap and to serve as the basis for further study, this paper presents a theoretically informed review of these insights on the nature, means, and implications of EU involvement, which are found in the literature on Greek-Turkish relations.

In its analysis of change in Greek-Turkish relations and in its conceptualisation of EU influence, the paper follows the theoretical framework of Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2003). This framework classifies conflicts into different stages based on the nature of conflict communications; as conflict communications get increasingly securitized and come to capture a broader range of societal interaction, according to Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2003), they escalate from conflict episodes, to issue conflicts, then to identity conflicts, and finally to conflicts of subordination. Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2003) also identify four pathways through which the EU can impact or perturb border conflicts: 1) directly, by changing the cost/benefit structures facing the elites, or compulsory impact; 2) indirectly, by being a reference point at the elite level for the legitimisation of alternative policies, or enabling impact; 3) directly, by supporting civil society actors that promote conflict resolution, or connecting impact; 4) indirectly, by changing the prevalent constructions of identities and conflict at the societal level, or constructive impact.

The application of this framework contributes to the literature on Greek-Turkish relations in several ways. First, the focus on the nature of conflict communications provides a yardstick to empirically analyse the evolution of the

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\(^1\) The European Union (EU) is also used as a general term in discussions of processes and relations that transcend the historical time frames of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Community (EC).
Greco-Turkish conflict, and identify turning points and periods of meaningful change. Existing confusion in the literature about crucial turning points and about the nature and extent of change could be remedied with the specification and consistent application of such yardsticks. Second, the comprehensive framework on potential paths of EU influence corrects some important biases in the literature. The literature on Greek-Turkish relations is heavily biased towards the analysis of bilateral relations from a policy-oriented perspective, mostly discounting the autonomous influences of international institutions, the role of non-state actors, and the so-called ‘low-politics’ issue areas. As a result, to the extent that the role of the EU is discussed, direct interventions to the elite level are privileged over more indirect forms of EU influence and interventions channelled through societal actors. In addition, in the literature, most claims of EU influence remain as assertions and are not substantiated with empirical research. The Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2003) framework provides a basis to demonstrate EU influence through an empirical analysis of interviews and official statements over time.

In this paper, first, drawing on a chronology compiled from the literature, I periodize the Greco-Turkish conflict into various conflict stages, by reference to the nature of conflict communications. Because such a periodization exercise on the basis of conflict communications necessitates an empirical analysis, what I present in this paper is only a tentative periodization, which will be qualified with further research. Then, I analyse the EU influences on Greek-Turkish relations identified in the literature under the theoretical categories of compulsory impact, enabling impact, connecting impact, and constructive impact. Under each category, I evaluate the extent and effectiveness of EU influence and also discuss the various conditions identified in the literature as facilitating or hindering EU influence. After that, I review how the roles played by other actors and processes relative to the EU are discussed in the literature, and the prevailing conceptualisation of borders in the literature. The conclusion derives hypotheses from the literature and identifies avenues for further research.

II. Trajectory of the Greek-Turkish Conflict

While the typical representation of Greek-Turkish relations by outside analysts depicts a continuous feud between historical rivals, one that is managed but cannot be
transformed, the history of Greek-Turkish relations include periods of meaningful and sustained digression from this pattern. The most significant period of reconciliation lasted from 1930 to late 1950s, and included not only a normalisation of relations, but also a fundamental shift in the dominant discourses through which the other is perceived and understood. In this time period, it became commonplace for leaders of the two countries to talk about a common shared identity, and even flout ideas of a Greek-Turkish Union (Clogg, 1992; Bilge, 2000). However, as it occurred before the establishment of the EEC, this period is beyond the focus of this study.

When both Greece and Turkey applied for association with the EEC in 1959, the relations between the two states had already begun to sour over Cyprus. While the elites initially continued to emphasise the importance of the Greek-Turkish alliance and shared identity within NATO, their rhetoric was soon overtaken by the public discourse in both countries mobilising around nationalist symbols and selective historical memories (for a comparison of these two discourses in Turkey, see Rumelili, 2002). So in the late 1950s, while conflict communications among the elites initially had the characteristics of an issue conflict limited to argumentation over Cyprus, the conflict communications at the societal level in Greece and in Turkey became personalised through the construction of a homogenised other as opposing self’s identity. Because conflict communications have a tendency to escalate (Diez, Stetter, and Albert, 2003) and because of the domestic political pressures the Greek and Turkish elites faced (Adamson, 2001a), discourses of issue conflict quickly gave way to discourses of identity conflict.

In the course of the institutional relationships of Greece and Turkey with the EEC/EC/EU (Greece signed Association Agreement in 1961, Turkey in 1963, Greece became a member in 1981, Turkey became a candidate in 1999), until 1999, Greek-Turkish conflicts have fluctuated between identity conflicts and conflicts of subordination in terms of the nature of conflict communications at the elite and societal level. War between the two states became very likely on numerous occasions, during the 1963 and 1967 outbreaks of intercommunal violence in Cyprus, during the 1974 Turkish military operation in Cyprus, which put approximately 1/3 of the island under Turkish control, during the 1976 and 1987 crises over the Aegean continental shelf, and finally during the 1996 crisis over the Imia islets in the Aegean sea.
These military crises were usually followed by short-lived attempts at normalisation of relations, where threat communications subsided. For example, after the 1976 crisis over the continental shelf, Greece and Turkey signed the Berne Declaration, where they undertook to discuss the issues of flight control and the delimitation of the continental shelf and refrain from unilateral actions that may impede the resolution of their bilateral problems. Similarly, the 1987 crisis over the Aegean continental shelf was followed by meetings between Greek and Turkish premiers and foreign ministers, where they agreed to promote cooperation in trade, tourism, and communications, and signed a Memorandum of Understanding where they pledged to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 1996 crisis over the Imia islets has also been, according to many analysts, a ‘blessing in disguise’ (Athanassopoulou, 1997) as it paved the way for the 1997 Madrid Declaration where the two states committed themselves not to use violence and undertake unilateral actions. However, during all these short-lived periods of improvement, conflict communications remained personalised, and based on the construction of a homogeneous Other, which made it all too easy to revert to threat communications at the first sign of a tension. Also following the 1997 Madrid Declaration, threat communications between Greece and Turkey quickly re-gained prevalence first with the tension over the placement of S-300 missiles in Cyprus and later with the crisis unleashed when the Kurdish rebel leader Ocalan was captured inside the Greek embassy in Kenya.

A more dramatic change in Greek-Turkish relations has occurred after 1999, manifesting itself in the de-escalation of some sectors of elite and societal communication to the issue conflict level. The significant bilateral cooperation witnessed in this period in various secondary issues, such as tourism, energy, illegal migration, and culture has been marked by communications that recognise the other as like self. Despite the fact that there is yet to be concrete action in the resolution of the Aegean border disputes, there are clear indications that issues that would have easily escalated into serious crises in the past are now carefully contained by the elites as

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2 While some scholars trace the change in Greek-Turkish relations back to 1996 (Heraclides, 2002; Athanassapoulou 1997), my focus on the nature of conflict communications leads me to identify 1999 as the turning point. Even though governmental and non-governmental peace initiatives accelerated following the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis, their effects on prevalent modes
disagreements. During the recent outbreak of the ‘airspace violations’ issue in July 2003, for example, even though the communications adopted by the General Staff in Turkey and by the Defence Ministry in Greece were still largely structured by threat communications, especially the two countries’ premiers and foreign ministers carefully restrained themselves from personalising the dispute, and ‘Othering’ the other side (Rumelili, 2003c).

In short, the trajectory of Greek-Turkish conflicts indicates that the extent and effectiveness of EU influence needs to be evaluated at two junctures: First, in facilitating the several short-term shifts from conflicts of subordination to identity conflicts in the 1959-1999 period. And second, in facilitating the more fundamental transformation to issue conflict after 1999.

**III. EU Influence**

The trajectory of Greek-Turkish relations presents us with a two-sided puzzle in terms of the EU’s potential impact. The literature is mostly in agreement that the EU failed to exercise a significant positive influence on the course of Greek-Turkish relations until 1999. The relations between the two states remained conflictual in spite of their close association with the EU. The EU failed to have a positive impact on the conflicts, and it was often abused as a forum for continued rivalry. Even its role in the short-term shifts from conflicts of subordination to conflicts of identity has been limited. However, the literature also points to the positive impact of the EU after mid 1990s, where we observe a promising Greco-Turkish rapprochement founded on the principles and procedures of the EU. The 1999 Helsinki European Council decisions have linked progress on Turkey’s membership in the EU with the resolution of its border disputes with Greece, and put in place a calendar and a framework around which the parties are to carry out their conflict resolution efforts. In the discussion below, I present the forms of EU influence on Greek-Turkish relations that are identified in the literature as grouped under the theoretical categories of Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2003). In order to address both sides of the Greek-Turkish puzzle, I point to the EU-level and domestic conditions that have disabled the EU from having a positive impact in the pre-1999 phase but enabled it thereafter.

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of conflict communication did not materialize until the 1999 earthquakes in Izmit and Athens. For a detailed elaboration of this argument, see Vathakou (2003).
a. Compulsory impact:

One source of influence at EU’s disposal to impact border conflicts is its power to force or entice states into resolving their disputes by offering membership or threatening sanctions to this status. On the Greek-Turkish conflict, the impact of such carrot/stick policies has been temporary and limited until 1999, but much stronger recently. It can be inferred from the literature that when either Greece or Turkey had a pending membership application with the EEC/EC/EU, its policymakers were careful to restrain themselves from further escalating crises, and worked towards improving bilateral relations. Couloumbis and Yannas (1994) argue that how the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis chose to handle Greek-Turkish relations following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 reflected “the deep impact that the prospect of EU accession exercised on post-1974 Greek foreign policy.” The awareness that a protracted conflict with Turkey would hamper Greece’s membership of the EEC led Karamanlis to settle for a policy of deterrence against Turkey. Similarly, when the 1976 Aegean continental shelf crisis erupted right after the filing of the Greek application for membership in the EEC in June 1975, Karamanlis chose to deal with the crisis by taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council and the International Court of Justice, rather than by military means (Arvanitopoulos, 1994; Tsakaloyannis, 1980). In addition, the period from Greece’s application in 1975 to its membership in 1981 was marked by several attempts at dialogue, which were mainly driven, according to Pridham (1991), by Karamanlis’ desire to secure Greek membership of the EEC. In 1976, Greece and Turkey signed the Bern Declaration, where they agreed to refrain from unilateral actions regarding the Aegean continental shelf. In 1978, Karamanlis met with Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit in Montreux and in Washington, to discuss a possible non-aggression pact and the Aegean corridors issue.

After the 1974 crisis, that protracted conflict with Turkey would endanger Greek application to the EEC was conveyed to Greece and others, albeit indirectly, by various communications from the EEC organs. Immediately following the Greek application, the EC Council of Ministers communicated its concern for maintaining an equitable relationship with Greece and Turkey by explicitly assuring the Turkish government that the Greek application would not affect Turkey’s rights. In addition, in its opinion on the Greek application, the European Commission expressed its
concern about importing conflicts and recommended a pre-accession period that would allow, among other things, for the settlement of Greek-Turkish disputes. Although the Commission opinion was overruled in the Council of Ministers meeting in February 1976 by extensive Greek lobbying, the possibility that Greek-Turkish disputes may derail the Greek application to the EEC had thus been clearly communicated (Stephanou and Tsardanides, 1991; Tsakaloyannis, 1980).

A similar process can be observed during Turkey’s application for EC membership in 1987. According to Pridham (1991), Turkey’s reaction to the second crisis over the continental shelf in 1987 was restrained as it occurred right before Turkey filed its application for membership in the EC. Aware that improved relations with Greece were necessary to prevent a Greek veto and to strengthen Turkey’s membership prospects in the EC, Turkey’s Prime Minister Ozal adroitly defused the crisis and actively pursued dialogue with Greece (Birand, 1991; Pridham, 1991). Ozal’s meeting with the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu at the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Summit in Davos in January 1988 started a period of short-lived rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations, commonly referred to in the literature as the ‘Davos Process.’ However, these last minute attempts were not adequate, and Greek-Turkish disputes still proved to be a stumbling block in Turkey’s membership quest. Greece openly opposed referring Turkey’s application to the Commission for an Opinion. In May 1988, the European Parliament’s resolution on Cyprus stated that Turkey’s unlawful occupation of Northern Cyprus presents a major stumbling block to the normalisation of relations with Turkey. The European Commission’s Opinion on Turkey’s application, released in 1989 stated that Turkey is not ready for membership, and pointed out that the Greek-Turkish conflict as well as the Cyprus problem constitute negative factors for Turkey’s admission.

In the 1990s, as Turkey sought to develop closer institutional relations with the EU first through a Customs Union agreement, and later by seeking candidacy, the EU repeatedly reminded Turkey that strengthening of its links with the EU depended on the resolution of its disputes with Greece. In addition, as a stick mechanism, the

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3 See, for example, the 18 January 1996 European Parliament Resolution on the Situation in Turkey, the 15 July 1996 European Union Statement, the 16 October 1996 Presidency Statement on the Recent Killings in Cyprus, the 30 October 1996 European Commission Report on Developments in Relations with Turkey, the 29 April 1997 EC-Turkey Association
release of the EU financial assistance to Turkey that was part of the Customs Union Agreement was blocked after the 1996 Imia crisis. Most of these EU interventions in Greek-Turkish disputes, however, took place overtly under Greek initiative and pressure. I have not encountered in the literature an explicit analysis of the impact of such EU communications and sanctions on Turkish foreign policy thinking and calculations in this time period. However, the course of Greek-Turkish relations until 1999 suggests that these warnings were not effective in forcing Turkey to seek resolution of its disputes with Greece. To the contrary, in this period, Turkey did not refrain from securitizing moves, threatening to annex Northern Cyprus if Cyprus becomes a member of the EU prior to a solution on the island, threatening to go to war against Greece if it extends its territorial waters to 12 nms, and escalating the Imia crisis in 1996.

Therefore, we see that until 1999, except for temporary and tactical improvements in bilateral relations, the EU’s carrot/stick instrument of granting/withholding membership status failed to bring about a resolution of the Greco-Turkish conflicts. Two reasons are offered in the literature. One is that Greece’s and Turkey’s applications for membership came at a time when the European Community was rather conservative about its potential role in conflict resolution. It preferred to ignore disputes between member states concerning national matters (Stephanou and Tsardanides, 1991). With respect to Greece and Turkey, the European Community was more concerned about keeping both states anchored to the West and managing their rivalry than facilitating a resolution of their disputes. Thus, initially, the EC has quite effectively kept out of Greek-Turkish disputes, leaving Western interventions either to NATO, the United States or to the isolated diplomatic activities of some of its member countries (Meinardus, 1991). When the EU did begin to take a pro-active stance on Greek-Turkish disputes in the 1990s, the membership carrot was no longer available and effective as an instrument: Greece was already a member, and following the 1989 Commission Opinion on Turkey’s application until 1999, Turkey did not perceive membership in the EU as a strong possibility.

A second reason offered in the literature, and one especially preferred by Turkish analysts, is that the EC has failed to bring about a resolution of Greco-Turkish

disputes because by granting Greece membership in 1981, it has lost its ability to apply any pressure on Greece (Guvenc, 1998/99). Instead, it is argued, the EC has become ‘captured’ by Greece on Cyprus and Greek-Turkish issues. This argument is commonly referred in the literature as the ‘Greek factor’ thesis. That Greece has quite successfully used the EC as a diplomatic lever against Turkey is a claim also shared by Greek scholars (e.g. Couloumbis, 1994; Yannas, 1994). However, while it is true that with Greece’s membership, the EC has technically lost its ‘third party’ capacity in Greek-Turkish disputes (Stephanou and Tsardanides, 1991), the argument that it became ‘captured’ by Greece elides three important points. First of all, it neglects the fact that the ability of Greece to use the EU as a lever against Turkey has remained dependent on Greece’s bargaining power inside the Community. According to Ugur (1999), Greece has not really been able to impede the development of EU-Turkey relations after 1986. And it was obliged to soften its stance on Turkey as its uncooperative attitude on the FYROM name recognition issue damaged its bargaining position within the Community (Yannas, 1994). Secondly, the ‘Greek factor’ thesis bypasses the question of whether the Community institutions would have responded differently to Greek-Turkish issues in the absence of Greek membership (Stephanou and Tsardanides, 1991). And finally, it does not take into account the process of Europeanisation that Greek foreign policy has gone through (Ioakimidis, 1994), manifesting itself, for example, in the renunciation of Enosis (Cyprus’ union with Greece) as a foreign policy goal (Ugur, 1999).

In contrast, the carrot and stick instruments of the EU are helping to sustain the more fundamental change in Greek-Turkish relations that we are observing after 1999 (Kozyris, 2001). In addition to granting Turkey candidacy status, the 1999 Helsinki Council decisions have established the peaceful resolution of outstanding border disputes as a community principle and urged candidate states “to make every effort” to resolve any outstanding disputes, and if these efforts fail, to bring the disputes before the International Court of Justice. The European Council has also set the end of 2004 as the latest date by which it will review the situation relating to outstanding disputes and their repercussions on the accession process. Incorporated

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4 At this point, I am only able to establish the temporal correlation between improved relations between Greece and Turkey and the EU’s employment of carrot/stick. In order to
into the Turkey’s Accession Partnership Agreement and National Programme –albeit with some ambiguity (Tsakonas, 2001) - the Helsinki Council decisions have linked progress on Turkey’s membership with the resolution of its border conflicts with Greece.

Why is it that the EU’s carrot and stick instruments were not very effective prior to 1999, and then they became the basis of a successful rapprochement process after 1999? One fundamental change, of course, is that the membership carrot regained its credibility and thus its power to influence Turkey, with the declaration of Turkey’s candidacy. However, as I will discuss in the following sections of this paper, the membership carrot would not have sufficed and the sustained rapprochement between Greece and Turkey would not have been possible in the absence of other simultaneously occurring processes: the legitimisation of alternative policies at the elite level, the activities of civil society, and the promulgation of alternative discourses. I will discuss, in turn, how the literature evaluates the nature and extent of EU influence in each of these processes.

b. Enabling impact:

In addition to forcing or enticing conflict parties with sanctions and rewards, the EU can also have an impact on border conflicts through affecting the policymakers’ definitions of national or group interest. In this section, I discuss whether and how, according to the existing literature, the EU has helped legitimate the pursuit of alternative, conflict-diminishing, policies in Greece and in Turkey. According to the literature, such enabling impact of the EU has been limited until mid-1990s, and afterwards, has been more pronounced in Greece than in Turkey.

Following Turkey’s military operation in Cyprus in 1974, a foreign policy consensus has emerged in Greece that emphasised that the major threat to Greece’s security is not from the Soviet Union but from Turkey (Coufoudakis, 1991). Within the policy community, Turkey was generally perceived as pursuing a calculated revisionist policy in the Aegean, Thrace, and Cyprus, marked by a steady increase in Turkish claims and the refusal to comply with international law (Triantaphyllou, 2001). To contain Turkey’s perceived revisionism, Greek national strategy
emphasised the necessity for deterrence both through increasing the country’s military capabilities and developing external alliances (Platias, 2000). According to Heraclides (2001), this perception of the Turkish threat has increasingly acquired a cultural and existential dimension in Greece.

This foreign policy consensus with respect to Turkey was not challenged with Greece’s EC membership, at least until the late 1990s. If anything, the literature indicates, the EC membership was perceived as and valued for having provided Greece with bargaining advantage and negotiating leverage in its dealings with Turkey (Ioakimidis, 1994). Support for the EC was driven by the belief that European integration would ultimately result in a common foreign and defence policy, which would strengthen and protect Athens in relation to Ankara (Valinakis, 1994). Even the initially anti-integrationist Pan Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) gradually came to support the EC as it realised the bargaining power Greece gained with respect to Turkey (Ioakimidis, 1994; Featherstone, 1994a). Hence, within the EC, the established Greek foreign policy with respect to Turkey found new means of implementation. Greece pursued a policy of conditionality towards Turkey threatening to block its relations with the EU until Turkey reverted from its positions in Cyprus and Greek-Turkish disputes. Even as the policy of deterrence towards Turkey took its toll on Greek economy and debilitated Greece in its efforts to conform to EU economic criteria, the alternative policy of positively encouraging Turkey’s Europeanisation by supporting Turkey’s EU vocation was not heeded, until the late 1990s. According to Veremis (2001), the use of the EU lever as a short-term instrument of pressure against Turkey seemed attractive and also politically less risky and more rewarding.

Instead of mounting a direct challenge to the existing foreign policy approach of Greece with respect to Turkey, the EU is argued to have had its impact through the longer-term modernisation of the Greek political system and culture (Keridis, 2001; Keridis and Triantaphyllou, 2001). According to Keridis (2001), European integration has been a “powerful agent for the domestication of foreign policy and for the softening and broadening of national security toward low politics and economics” in Greece. Many others contend, however, that even this underlying impact has been ambiguous and taken too long to matriculate. According to Ioakimidis (1994) and Diamandouros (1997), the process of Europeanisation has produced a dualistic system
in Greek society, where a modern European section coexists with a Hellenocentric and traditional section. In the early 1990s, after more than 10 years of membership, Greece became the subject of severe criticism from its European partners for being a drag on the European economy, for its incapacity to behave in a communitaire fashion, and for the policy positions it adopted outside the general EU consensus, as in the unilateral trade embargo it imposed against the FYROM (Coufoudakis, 1996; Pettifer, 1994; Featherstone, 1994b).

The reasons given in the literature as to why Greece’s Europeanisation process took so long are mostly essentializing of certain characteristics as Greek culture. Ioakimidis (1994) argues that Greece suffers from the syndrome of the ‘underdog culture’ – the notion that the West despises Greece because of its glorious historical tradition-, which restrains Greece from consistently aligning its foreign policy with EU foreign policy objectives and choices. Also the fact that historically Greece has been the object of foreign intervention and foreign protection is argued to have left a pervasive legacy, and a syndrome of protection seeking (Ioakimidis, 1994). Kurop (1998) argues that Greece’s insecurity over its dual European and Balkan identity has bred a defensive attitude and an ‘illegitimate child’ attitude within the EU. My position is that, instead of simply positing these essentialist cultural characteristics as determinants of late and imperfect Europeanisation in Greece, it is necessary to study the social and discursive conditions, including those provided by the European integration, that have reproduced such attitudes and beliefs in Greece as well as their stereotypical representations as elements of Greek culture in Europe.

In Greece, further integration with the EU became a reference point to legitimise the pursuit of alternative policies with respect to Turkey, when it became apparent in late 1990s that Greece was far from fulfilling the conditions to join the European Monetary Union (EMU). After 1996, accession to the Eurozone came to be represented as a national goal in Greece, upon whose realisation the prestige of the country and its national pride depended. In this discursive environment, to avoid the political defeat and stigma that would come from being considered responsible for the non-entrance of Greece into the EMU, policymakers were compelled to abandon the economic excesses of the previous period, including the costly arms-race with Turkey (Moschonas, 2001). In the literature, the election of Simitis to head PASOK in 1996 is generally considered to be a turning point in the Europeanisation of Greek economic
and foreign policy (Diamandouros, 1997; Keridis, 2001; Kurop, 1998). With respect to relations with Turkey, Simitis advocated the supplementing of the policy of deterrence against the Turkish threat with a policy of engagement that supported the European orientation of Turkey. However, Simitis’ new policies, including his fresh approach to Turkey, faced severe opposition both from within and outside of PASOK. In this domestic context, the necessity of further integration with the EU and the danger of being left behind were frequently articulated and provided Simitis with the legitimacy to press ahead with his reforms and convince his critics (Athanassapoulou, 1997).

Demonstrating this policy change towards Turkey from negative conditionality to positive reinforcement, Greece has chosen not to use its veto against Turkey’s candidacy at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. According to Keridis (2001: 14), this policy change has also been accompanied by a changed pluralistic perception of Turkey not as “a monolith but a complicated and rapidly changing reality with a variety of constituencies.” While in the past, the dominant representation of Turkey was as non-European, now it has become ‘inadequately European’ (Rumelili, 2003a). It is interesting how, after 1999, Greece changed from being Turkey’s fiercest opponent to being its strongest advocate in EU, even at the expense of diverging from its European partners (Rumelili, 2003b). Some prominent Greek scholars have gone so far as to proclaim 1999 as ‘the end of history for Greece’ (Couloumbis and Tziampiris, 2002).

At least until very recently, Turkey’s institutional relationship with the EU has not helped legitimise the pursuit of conflict-diminishing policies with respect to Greece. In fact, it can be argued that the EU has helped delegitimise alternative policies because of the perception of the EU as captured by Greece. The prevailing perception among Turkish policymakers is that Greece is pursuing a revisionist policy against Turkey, inspired by Megali Idea, and has been continually expanding its territory at the expense of Turkey since the 1830s (Gunduz, 2001; for an elaboration of this position, see Bilge, 2000). In response to this policy, Turkey pursues a policy centred on deterrence (Ayman, 1998), and not leaving Greece alone in international organisations (Birand, 2000). Greece’s membership has created and sustained the understanding in Turkey that the EU cannot be impartial with respect to Greek-Turkish issues. According to Aksu (2001), the fact that Turkey is not a full member of
the EU enables Greece to exert pressure on Turkey, thus taking full advantage of its position as a full member. In other words, the EU is perceived as just another platform through which Greece pursues its revisionist agenda with respect to Turkey. Under these perceptual conditions, alternative policies could not be legitimised by reference to the EU, because then their critics would automatically frame them as concessions to Greece.

In addition to the perception of the EU as captured by Greece, the perceived ambivalence of the EU to Turkish membership has also hindered the potential enabling impact of the EU on Turkish policy. The threats that the Cyprus problem and Greek-Turkish disputes would affect EU-Turkey relations were negatively interpreted as reflections of a European reluctance to take Turkey into Europe (Ugur, 1999). In addition to EU’s actions, the perception of the EU as reluctant to admit Turkey was also bred by and, in turn, fuelled a dominant conviction in Turkish political culture, aptly called ‘the Sevres syndrome.’ Flourishing on the memories of the Ottoman Empire’s dismemberment by European powers after WW1, the Sevres syndrome conviction holds that the external world (i.e. the West) is conspiring to weaken and carve up Turkey (Kirisci and Carkoglu, 2003). This conviction has naturally hindered the EU’s enabling impact and created a special sensitivity in Turkey with respect to equal treatment and uncompromised recognition as a Western country. The implication of this from the point of Greek-Turkish relations, according to Kramer (1991), is that because Turkey is well aware that Greece, unlike itself, is regarded as a natural part of the West and of Europe, it became an issue of utmost importance for Turkey not to be discriminated against in favour of Greece.

Another dominant explanation offered in the literature as to why Turkey’s long association relationship with the EU has not enabled a policy change towards Greece is the lack of full democracy in Turkey. Focusing on Greek-Turkish rivalry within NATO, Moustakis (2003) and Savvides (1999) both contend that Turkey’s flawed adoption of democracy is the key reason why joint membership in NATO failed to promote a sense of collective identity and security community between Greece and Turkey. Savvides (1999) especially cites the predominance of the military as an institution in Turkey, the acute legitimisation and identity crisis that Turkey has been going through, and the negative cultural match between the liberal democratic
principles and the Kemalist ideology and institutions. These factors can be directly inferred to have had similar effects in EU-Turkey relations as well.

There are differing views in the literature about the extent to which Turkey’s foreign policy approach towards Greece has changed (or can be expected to change). I have argued elsewhere that the Helsinki European Council decision to grant Turkey candidacy status is promoting a growing recognition that a European identity will entail for Turkey a different kind of relationship with Greece (Rumelili, 2003a), and has paved the way for the perception of EU norms and procedures as a neutral basis to build a cooperative relationship with Greece (Rumelili, 2003b). Others have noted that even after the declaration of Turkey’s EU candidacy in 1999, which was accompanied and made possible by a noticeable change in Greek foreign policy towards Turkey, and the progressing rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, there has not yet been an equivalent fundamental re-thinking of Turkish foreign policy identity. Onis (2003), for example, has argued that the incentives created by the prospect of full membership in the EU are not going to be adequate to legitimise the adoption of solution proposed by Greece or the EU. However, Tsakonas’ (2001) dire prediction that the Helsinki summit will lead Turkey into a difficult and problematic democratisation process, which may easily translate into diversionary, if not, aggressive policies with respect to Greece and the Cyprus issue has not come true.

c. Connecting impact:

A third possible way in which the EU can help transform border conflicts is by selectively strengthening those civil society actors, which support the pursuit of conflict-diminishing policies. In this section, I review the role played by civil society actors in Greek-Turkish relations, as discussed in the literature. I also discuss some recent activities of the EU directed towards civil society development, even though they have not yet been analysed in the literature.

The literature on Greek-Turkish relations is mostly in agreement that the civil society and public opinion in both countries have been impediments to elites wanting to engage in conflict-diminishing gestures, until recently. This constraining effect has been demonstrated empirically in three periods. Adamson (2001a) argues that in the Cyprus crisis, Turkish political elites have been hampered, rather than helped, in their pursuit of diplomatic solutions by the press, parliament, and public opinion. Similarly,
a primary reason for the failure of the ‘Davos process’ in 1988 is cited as the uncooperative attitude of the public opinion and the press (Birand, 1991). Lack of societal support has left both Ozal and Papandreou under severe attack from the opposition for abandoning the so-called ‘national causes’ (Coufoudakis, 1991; Pridham, 1991; Kirisci and Carkoglu, 2003). And finally, the press in both countries are largely credited with almost having ‘created’ a war during the 1996 Imia crisis, with their chauvinistic rhetoric and irresponsibly escalatory actions –as with the planting of the Turkish flag on the islet by Turkish journalists (Lenkova, 1997 and Ozgunes and Terzis, 2000). According to Lenkova (1997), ‘it took a few days of media activity for the two governments to find themselves in a position from which they could hardly back away from as the two publics were expecting their governments to “save the nation’s pride” by keeping their flag on the islet.’

This conflict enhancing impact of public opinion and civil society in Greece and Turkey is puzzling especially in light of liberal approaches and the democratic peace thesis. In Greece, the civil society has remained fragile because it has been permeated by party politics, and further weakened by the policies of a clientelistic state (Diamandouros, 1997; Sotiropoulos, 1997). In Turkey, the state has traditionally distrusted civil society as a source of disunity. Especially with the 1982 constitution instituted after the 1980 military coup, civil society activity has been put under severe restrictions regarding organisation, funding, transnational activities, and most importantly, the freedom of expression (Kubicek, 2002). In addition to these institutional limitations on independent civil society activity, the existing scripts of conflict and dominant representations of the other have severely constrained the range of alternative ideas, identities, and discourses that can be adopted by civil society actors in relation to Greek-Turkish relations. Due to the capturing of a wide range of societal interaction by conflict, transnational contacts and cooperation have been very limited and tenuous in business, science, culture, etc. An extreme example would be, when after the Ocalan crisis with Greece in 1999, Istanbul University announced that it will halt all forms of scientific cooperation with Greek institutions. Transnational contacts were maintained and Greek Turkish reconciliation was supported only by a few courageous individuals.

Civil society actors gradually began to play an independent critical role in Greek-Turkish relations during the late 1990s. Heraclides (2002) identifies the 1996
Imia crisis to be a turning point, after which various NGOs comprised of leading intellectuals, retired ambassadors, veteran politicians, and journalists sprung up in Greece; existing NGOs were revitalised, and joint Greek-Turkish NGOs appeared. However, the tipping point in the role of civil society actors in Greek-Turkish relations was crossed with the devastating earthquakes suffered by Turkey and Greece, respectively in August and September 1999. The extent of loss and suffering stirred emotions, the collaborating Greek and Turkish rescuers cultivated trust, the media in both countries published headlines in each other’s language, and called onto the leaders to change past policies (Vathakou, 2003). So, for the first time in Greek-Turkish relations, the impetus for change came from the societal level. Underlining the role of civil society actors and changing public opinion, the following cooperation initiatives of Cem and Papandreou, Turkish and Greek foreign ministers, have been aptly referred to as ‘earthquake diplomacy’ or ‘seismic diplomacy’ (Siegl, 2002). According to Gundogdu (2001), the earthquakes allowed both leaders ‘to claim a popular mandate for changing policies historically supported by a large majority on both sides.’

While the non-governmental Greek-Turkish cooperation emerged certainly as a bilateral initiative, it built on the long-term development of democracy and civil society in both countries. Thus, it is possible to discuss the EU’s connecting impact on Greek-Turkish relations at two levels. First, the EU has had a longer-term, indirect, impact through promoting democratisation and civil society activity in Greece and in Turkey. According to Muftuler-Bac (2000), the EU pressure on Turkey –exerted through various statements, declarations and reports, the carrots of Customs Union and membership, and the stick of freezing financial aid and association- has been crucial in ensuring a swift return to civilian rule after the 1980 military coup and the progressive lifting of various political restrictions on the freedoms of expression and association. Similarly, in Greece, the EU is credited for consolidating the transition to democracy after 1974 and forcing Greece into a modernisation process whose logic dictated the transformation of political, economic, and social structures (Diamandouros, 1997).

Secondly, the EU has begun to have a more direct connecting role through the Civil Society Development Program (CSDP) initiated by the Representation of the European Commission to Turkey. In addition to promoting local civil initiatives and
enhancing the capacity of Turkish NGOs by providing technical support, the CSDP has a special Turkish-Greek Civic Dialogue component, where the aim is to strengthen dialogue, networking, and partnerships specifically between civil society initiatives in Greece and in Turkey. While the EU cannot be credited for having initiated the Greek-Turkish civil society initiatives, the CSDP will certainly play a very important role in consolidating and building on the gains already made.

d. Constructive impact:

A fourth way in which the EU can help transform border conflicts is by changing the prevalent constructions of identities through which the conflict parties perceive each other, make sense of each other’s actions, and in turn of their conflict. Especially, the EU’s community-building discourse of a collective European identity can be a reference point in changing these dominant constructions. In this section, I discuss how the literature on Greek-Turkish relations evaluates the role played by the EU in this regard.

In explaining the causes of conflict, nearly every study of Greek-Turkish relations emphasises the role of negative perceptions and representations of the other and historical memory. Stereotypical representations of the other and selective readings of history are reproduced and maintained through education, media, and literature, and thereby naturalised as fact. They constitute the social and cultural base of conflict communications, pervade nearly all spheres of societal interaction and serve to delegitimise the pursuit of conflict-diminishing policies by elite and societal actors. For example, the perception of threat from Turkey in Greece is sustained by the prevailing representation of the Turks as Asiatic, barbaric, and power-hungry, and by memories of oppression suffered during Ottoman rule (Heraclides, 2001). Similarly, the perception of threat from Greece in Turkey is sustained by the association of Greeks with Byzantine intrigue and diplomatic tricks as well as by the memories of Greek invasion of Turkish territories after the First World War (Millas, 1989).

Starting with the mid-1990s, there have been collaborative efforts among historians in Greece and in Turkey to purge the schoolbooks of chauvinistic content and demonising references. Critical Greek, Turkish and other Southeast European historians have come together several times in symposia and workshops organised by
Bogazici University, the History Foundation, and the Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe. In addition, several critical have been studies published that aim to expose and deconstruct dominant images of Greeks and Turks in the literature, media, and popular discourse (Millas, 1989; Millas 1998; Millas, 2000).

In these local academic efforts directed at the rewriting of dominant scripts at the societal level, the constructive impact of the EU has been limited, in that Europe has mostly not been the reference point for the construction of alternative identities and discourses of history. Studies in the literature that explore the relation between the discourse of ‘Europe’ vis-à-vis the constructions of Greek and Turkish national identities suggest possible reasons why the discourse of Europe may not be the favourite alternative.

For example, it is argued in the literature that Greece has a problematic identity relationship with the EU. Part of this stemmed from Greece’s “paradoxical status in the Eurocentric ideology” (Herzfeld, 1987:7) Ascribed the identity of the living ancestors of the European civilisation, Greece has had to continuously live out the perceived imbalance and tension between its mythical past and its present backwardness in relation to the contemporary states of Europe (Herzfeld, 1987: 19). This tension and imbalance has resurfaced in the course of European integration. According to Frangoudaki (1995), many Greeks have sought to avoid and deny the ‘backward’ and ‘Levantine’ image that has been reflected on the EU mirror and this identity crisis explains the oppositional and inconsistent policies that Greek governments have pursued in relation to the EU. Though Greece sought within the EU the ultimate confirmation of the 'Europeanness' of its identity, it saw itself demoted to a peripheral status within the EU economically, culturally, as well as geographically. These positioned Greece in a marginal and insecure identity position in relation to the EU and have resulted in its at best partial and ambivalent identification with the EU.

Similarly, it is argued that Europe is constructed both as an aspiration and a threat for Turkey in the Turkish nationalist discourse (Kadioglu, 1996). The construction of Europe as a threat flourishes on the memories of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire at the hands of European states after WW1, while the desire to

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5 It is necessary to note that this literature is not essentializing, and thereby differs from the cultural explanations of Greece’s slow and limited Europeanisation, which I referred to in the section on the EU’s enabling impact.
gain recognition as a European state constitutes Europe as an aspiration. This tension has produced a paradoxical orientation in Turkey especially with respect to the EU’s conditions for membership (Rumelili, 2004). As Europe is constituted as an aspiration, the implementations of the conditions are justified as requirements of European identity. However, with the simultaneous constitution of Europe as a threat, the conditions get to be also represented as factors that would pave the ground for the disintegration of Turkey. In addition, the perceived ambivalence of the EU to Turkey’s membership lends credibility to constructions of Europe as a threat, and helps aggravate Turkey’s identity insecurity with respect to Europe.

I have previously studied the implications of these complex identity relationships for the EU’s potential constructive impact on Greek-Turkish relations. I have sought to demonstrate that because Turkey and Greece are situated in such liminal/precarious positions with respect to the discourse of ‘Europe’, the community-building discourse of the EU has ended up reinforcing and legitimising in the two states representations of their identities as different from and also as threatening to each other (Rumelili, 2003a). In order to validate its identity as a part of Europe, Greece sought to sharply distinguish itself from the ‘non-European’ Turkey, by underscoring Turkey’s differences from Greece, and in turn from Europe. Similarly in Turkey, I showed how the traditional rival Greece played the role of the expedient scapegoat as Turkey sought validation of its European identity in the context of European discourses that constructed it as an ‘outsider.’

Also in a recent paper, I have analysed whether these identity positions of Greece and Turkey have changed after 1999 (in Greece, mainly as a result of entering the EMU, and in Turkey of being declared a candidate), and if so, how these changed identity positions have affected the constructive impact of the EU (Rumelili, 2003b). I argued that its new identity position as a ‘Eurozone member’ has promoted in Greece a more positive identification with the EU, which manifested itself in increased willingness to use the EU as a foundation for the resolution of its disputes with Turkey according to EU norms. In Turkey, in addition to altering the dominant perceptions and representations of ‘Europe’ and ‘Greece, I have argued that candidacy has accelerated the process of internalisation of EU norms in Turkey, and paved the way for the perception of EU norms and procedures as a neutral basis to build a cooperative relationship with Greece.
IV. Other actors and processes

In the literature, other actors and processes that are discussed as having influenced the course of Greek-Turkish relations include NATO, the United States, domestic factors in Greece and in Turkey, and broader changes in the international system. Based on the literature, one can safely conclude that neither other third parties, such as NATO or the US, nor international systemic conditions have been influential in Greco-Turkish conflicts to a degree that would warrant the discussion of the role of the EU as derivative. If anything, their influences have also been impeded by the same perceptual, institutional, and conflict related factors that have also hindered the EU’s influence. On the other hand, while domestic political changes in Greece and in Turkey are discussed in the literature as primarily important, the European integration process is also cited as the driving and consolidating force of these changes. This points to the need for further research in both the theoretical conceptualisation and the empirical analysis of how EU influences interact with domestic conditions.

In terms of judging the EU’s relative impact, a comparison with NATO would be the most pertinent. The Greek-Turkish rivalry within NATO has been the subject of a few theoretically minded studies on the effects of international institutions. In a well-known study, Krebs (1999) argues that the conflicts between Greece and Turkey actually intensified after their joint membership in the NATO alliance because ‘rather than treat the multiple issue areas the alliance has brought together as an opportunity to exchange concessions, Greece and Turkey have, in their quest for bargaining leverage, sought to manipulate these linkages to their political and strategic advantage.’ In response to the two states’ efforts to use the organisation as a lever against the other, NATO has adopted a neutral policy, intended to protect the alliance’s impartiality and encourage both states to settle their own disputes (Moustakis, 2003). However, also according to Moustakis (2003), NATO’s neutral policy has paradoxically fostered the belief in both Turkey and Greece that NATO is not impartial and tilts in favour of the other. For example, protesting NATO’s failure to take any action in response to Turkey’s invasion of Northern Cyprus, and perceiving the organisation as tilted towards Turkey, Greece withdrew from NATO in August 1974 and remained out until 1980.
NATO has recently engaged in a few successful interventions in Greek-Turkish disputes. In 1996, NATO Secretary General stated NATO’s readiness to mediate in Greek-Turkish disputes and proposed a moratorium on military exercises in the Aegean and the monitoring of military flights over the Aegean as confidence measures. In addition to adopting these proposals, Greece and Turkey also signed the Madrid Declaration (actually a brainchild of the US State Department) in July 1997 during a NATO meeting, where they committed to not use violence and refrain from unilateral actions. Also in October 2000 and November 2001, Greece and Turkey agreed to new sets of confidence-building measures (CBMs) within the NATO framework, which involved, among other things, reductions in the number of military exercises and the invitation of observers from the other country.

A comparison between NATO and the EU with respect to the processes and conditions of their influence on Greek-Turkish relations yields important insights. First, the literature indicates that NATO has been similarly vulnerable to ‘capture’ by Greek-Turkish disputes, just as the EU has been. Secondly, such a comparison also shows that joint membership of the conflict parties— as has been the case in NATO—does not increase the institution’s effectiveness in conflict resolution. However, while comparing NATO with the EU, it is also important to highlight that, much more than NATO, the EU is a community-building institution, with constitutive effects on the identities of member and affiliated states. Therefore, even though NATO may have comparable compulsory power, the enabling, connecting, and constructive impacts of the EU are bound to be greater.

The United States has directly intervened in Greek-Turkish conflicts, on several occasions, especially when the two states came dangerously close to war, the most recent being during the 1996 Imia crisis. However, while the US has been effective in preventing the outbreak of hostilities on such occasions, according to the literature, the US’ ability to influence Greek-Turkish disputes has similarly being compromised by the perception of the US as partial towards the other. Especially in Greece, the prevailing belief has been that because of strategic considerations, neither NATO nor the US is neutral in Greek-Turkish disputes, and that both actually support Turkey’s revisionist objectives (Coufoudakis, 1991). According to Arvanitopoulos (1994), it was this belief that Greece is in a largely asymmetrical relationship with the US that led Greece to seek integration with the EC.
In terms of the effects of changing systemic conditions, there is also agreement in the literature that the end of the Cold War brought no substantial change to the policies of both countries, even leading partly to the hardening of their positions (Siegl, 2002). Ayman (2001) also expects that the evolution of the international system towards unipolarity will aggravate the rivalry between Greece and Turkey and complicate their relations, while, on the other hand, making direct military confrontation much less likely. Another effect of the end of the Cold War, according to the literature, has been the fluctuations in the strategic value of Turkey to the West. As a result, it is argued that the EU became less wary of Greek attempts to use the EU as a potential shield against Turkey, and digressed from its previous policy of balance towards Greece and Turkey (Guvenc, 1998/99).

Finally, domestic political factors are discussed in the literature as having played a significant role both in the perpetuation of hostilities prior to 1999, and in facilitating the Greek-Turkish rapprochement after 1999. For example, Adamson (2001b) argues that in the context of Turkey’s weakly institutionalised democracy, elites have frequently resorted to diversionary policies in Cyprus and Greek-Turkish issues. Domestic political considerations have regularly forced elites interested in pursuing conflict-diminishing policies to quickly revert back from their positions, and these reversions have weakened their credibility in the eyes of their counterparts in the other state. In this vein, Coufoudakis (1991) discusses the domestic political pressures faced by Papandreou during the 1988 Davos Process, and Athanassapoulou (1997) discusses those faced by Simitis in 1996. Similarly, in Turkey, the tension between military and political elites have often resulted in inconsistent policies and contradictory statements towards Greece. However, as I discussed earlier, in explaining the changing Greek policy towards Turkey after 1996 and the post-1999 rapprochement, the literature also credits democratisation and modernisation as being the driving forces (Keridis, 2001; Keridis and Triantaphyllou, 2001).

V. Borders

A general characteristic of the literature on Greek-Turkish relations is that it is almost exclusively centred around high politics, focusing on state actors, and mainly on security issues. Consequently, the dominant understanding of the Greek-Turkish border is as a physical line of territorial demarcation, and the ‘border disputes’
between Greece and Turkey are understood in the narrow sense of the term, as disputes over where the physical lines should be drawn. Therefore, a more complex, functional understanding of borders, as maintained, reshaped, and possibly subverted by the representations and practices of people living in border regions, would have a lot to contribute to the literature on Greek-Turkish relations. Research involving a more complex understanding of borders and border management would also bring to the fore new avenues of conflict resolution involving cross-border cooperation and highlight the influences of the EU in that regard.

Pursuing this line of thinking, Chircop (2000) criticises the exclusive focus of the literature on maritime delimitation in the Aegean. Arguing that demarcation is neither necessary nor sufficient for cooperative relations in the Aegean, Chircop (2000) emphasises the importance of functional cooperation and post-boundary relationships. In addition, Della Mea (2000) identifies fisheries as an issue area where functional cooperation between Greek and Turkish public and private institutions and may further develop. Katsepontes (2000) suggests that Greece and Turkey pursue joint development of the Aegean hydrocarbon resources as a flexible solution to their continental shelf dispute, and stresses that delimitation will not necessarily resolve all disputes over offshore resources. Additional research is needed to identify the ways in which the EU can influence Greek-Turkish relations by promoting functional cooperation in the joint development of Aegean resources.

Another issue area, which highlights the changing meaning of the Greco-Turkish border, is illegal migration. Between 1998 and 2002, almost two-thirds of the incidents associated with the trafficking or transport of illegal migrants in the Mediterranean Basin were between Turkey and Greece, involving more than 45 per cent of apprehended irregular migrants (Icduygu, forthcoming). Stemming illegal migration into Europe is a primary concern of the EU; accordingly, the EU-initiated Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe has instituted mechanisms for combating organised crime and strengthening police and border cooperation, and the Seville European Council has made readmission agreements a necessary condition for all countries entering into cooperation agreements with the EU. Reflecting the severity of the situation and also external concerns coming from the EU, illegal migration was one the very first issues that Greece and Turkey have chosen to initiate their post-1999 bilateral cooperation on (Icduygu, forthcoming). Again, additional research is
needed to analyse how the EU’s migration and asylum policies are shaping the nature, function, and meaning of the Greco-Turkish border, and, in turn, affecting the Greco-Turkish border disputes.

**VI. Conclusion**

While the literature on Greek-Turkish relations contains many valuable insights on the forms and conditions of EU influence, these insights are not presented in a coherent theoretical framework. In addition to presenting these insights in such a framework, this review paper has also derived hypotheses that need to be demonstrated with empirical research. The primary hypothesis is that after 1999, the conflict communications in Greek-Turkish relations have mostly de-escalated to the issue conflict level, indicating a fundamental transformation in the conflict. Prior to late 1990s, the EU failed to have a positive impact on Greek-Turkish relations because a) until the 1990s, the EU chose to keep out of Greek-Turkish disputes; b) after the 1990s, Greece was already a member, and the membership carrot for Turkey lacked credibility; c) Turkey perceived the EU as ‘captured’ by Greece; d) Greece perceived the EU as an attractive lever to be used against Turkey; e) the characteristics of Greek and Turkish political cultures impeded Europeanisation of policymaking; f) weakly institutionalised democracy and insufficient civil society development in Turkey and Greece hindered the formulation of alternative perspectives on disputes; g) problematic identity relations of Greece and Turkey with ‘Europe’ led to imperfect and ambivalent internalisation of European identity and norms.

On the other hand, in late 1990s, several EU and domestic-level developments have enabled the EU to play a positive role in Greek-Turkish relations. First of all, with the 1999 Helsinki Council decisions, the EU membership carrot regained its credibility for Turkey. Secondly, the democratisation and civil society development processes in Greece and in Turkey, long supported by the EU, have matriculated. And finally, Greece’s wish to join the EMU and the 1999 Helsinki Council decisions granting Turkey candidacy status have been the catalysts for the legitimisation of alternative, conflict-diminishing, policies in the two states.
References:


