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The EU and the Cyprus Conflict

The View of Political Actors in Cyprus

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Introduction: Aims of the Report

The current report aims at providing an overview of the perspectives of officials and civil society representatives on the European Union’s impact on the conflict in Cyprus, as presented mainly through interviews and media reports. It is the product of research undertaken on this topic over six months, from February to July 2004. This report is the second prepared for the Cyprus case study under the EUBORDERCONF project scheme, which aims to examine the role of the European Union (EU) in transforming zones of conflict into zones of cooperation. Within this scheme, the current report attempts to examine how this transformation has been viewed by individuals in Cyprus, in order to enable comparison between this case study and other case studies examined under the project (Northern Ireland, Greece / Turkey, Israel / Palestine, and Europe’s North). At the same time it provides material for comparison of the EU’s impact on the conflict in Cyprus as appears in analyses of officials in Cyprus, with analyses of the same impact by EU-based officials (Pace, 2004).

This report follows on from the analysis of the EU’s impact on the Cyprus conflict as presented in the social science literature, which is available in working paper no.5 of the first EUBORDERCONF working paper series (Demetriou, 2004a). An outline of the major stages in the Cyprus conflict and major events in the development of Cyprus – EU relations over the last 30 years is to be found in that paper and will not therefore be repeated here. However, a summary of the events that took place over the past year will be given in the introduction of this report. This was deemed necessary because the period between January and July 2004 was one in which major developments in the conflict took place. Furthermore, these developments were primarily related to Cyprus’ accession to the EU in May 2004, and will therefore be used as examples of EU impact on the conflict in the analysis that follows. Other examples will of course also be drawn from a wider timeframe.

The analytical framework within which EU impact is assessed is based on the identification of four possible pathways of impact on the conflict, as developed by Stetter, Diez and Albert (2004). This framework is employed in order to facilitate comparisons with the EU’s impact on other conflicts examined by the project and, as it has been found by project partners to be the most appropriate for the analysis carried out, it has therefore been adopted here as such.
Background to recent events and EU relations

Overview

The accession of Cyprus to the EU took place on May 1\textsuperscript{st} 2004 in what was hailed as the biggest round of enlargement to date, which included another nine countries. In this context the particularity of the case of Cyprus lies in the fact that EU accession brought about significant developments in the politics of the conflict. These developments culminated in the referenda that took place on 24\textsuperscript{th} April 2004, simultaneously in the north and the south parts of the island and which sought the people’s approval for the implementation of a UN-proposed plan to end the division of the island and bring on a solution to the Cyprus conflict. Even though 65% of the population in the north of the island approved the plan, 76% of the population in the south rejected it, and thus it was not implemented\textsuperscript{1}.

The relation of Cyprus’ EU membership to this culmination of efforts to re-unite the island was explicitly stated at various points in time. The timing of the referenda, which took place one week before the accession date, was explicitly decided on the presumption that had the re-unification plan been supported by majorities on both sides, Cyprus would enter the EU as a united country. In this sense, the referenda could be seen to provide an example of possible EU impact on border conflicts and it is in this way that references to them will be analysed in the present report.

Other events relating to the referenda and the accession will also be mentioned in this context. These include the decision to finalise the negotiation process, which was taken by the Greek- and Turkish- Cypriot leaders in February 2004, the final round of negotiations which ended in March 2004, events occurring during the pre-referenda campaigning period, the adoption of special measures by the EU in relation to Cyprus after the referenda, and events around the EU parliamentary elections of June 2004. As these events are recent, they have not yet been the subject of published academic analysis. For this reason, reference to them will be made in relation to analyses of individuals interviewed, or publicised through electronic media and the press\textsuperscript{2}.

\textsuperscript{1} Further details about the events in Cyprus around the period of the referenda and a commentary on the results can be found in the EUBORDERCONF Newsletter No. 7 published in June 2004 (http://www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk/publications/files/issue7.pdf).

\textsuperscript{2} For reasons of brevity, detailed background information about the various events mentioned here is not included, but is available in the chronologies on Cyprus published on the EUBORDERCONF website (http://www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk/publications/newsletter.htm).
Past Analyses in Light of Recent Events

Cyprus’ EU membership has from the outset been explicitly tied to the solution of the Cyprus problem (Nicolaides, 1990; Papaneophytou, 1994). In the previous case study working paper, the various ways in which this relation has been thought to be shaped were outlined (Demetriou, 2004a). In terms of the current project’s analytical framework, this relation was found to progress, to a greater or lesser extent, along all four identified pathways. In particular, it was pointed out that the EU’s impact on the conflict has been increasing over the last two decades and that while the EEC / EC / EU played no role in the conflict up to 1972, its impact on it after this date has been steadily increasing alongside the continuing involvement of other ‘external’ actors such as Greece, Turkey, Britain, the US, and the UN. It was further argued that the relationship between these various types of involvement has at some points been complimentary, at others substitutional and yet at others confrontational and that as Cyprus’ membership in the EU became more imminent, i.e. after 1998, the involvement of these other actors has tended to be structured around the dynamics of this evolving relationship. Thus Greece’s and Britain’s involvement became more and more subsumed under their identity as EU member states, while Turkey’s involvement has been increasingly tied to its identity as a state aspiring to EU membership. The involvement of the UN and the US, it was argued, has been characterised in recent years by an increasing willingness to act in concert with EU involvement in Cyprus.

These conclusions led me to argue that the EU’s impact on the conflict has been perceived in the social science literature as mostly being direct, even though the analytical perspectives reviewed often explicitly traced more than one pathways of involvement. Most analyses employing the ‘carrot and stick’ approach related Cyprus’ membership to the solution of the problem, via Turkey’s application for membership (Ayres, 1996; Hutchence and Georgiades, 1999; Richmond, 1999). Others saw it as more relevant to the EU’s approach towards the Turkish-Cypriot political leadership (Papaneophytou, 1994; Mendelson, 2001; Stephen 1997). Assessments as to whether this direct impact would have overall positive effects on the resolution of the conflict were positive (Papaneophytou, 1994; Theophanous, 2000), negative (Mendelson, 2001; Stephen, 1997), or cautious, outlining both possibilities (Richmond, 1999). Yet other analyses emphasised the connective impact as the most fruitful for attaining positive results (Nicolaides, 1990; Mavratsas, 1998).
The enabling impact was found to be the least well analysed, with applications of it concentrating on its utilisation by the ‘other side’ depending on the analyst’s stance (mostly Greek-Cypriot-supporting), e.g. arguing that EU membership would enable the leadership in Turkish to legitimate its consent to an agreement on Cyprus, which would otherwise be seen as ‘selling Cyprus’ (Hutchence and Georgiades, 1999) or that EU membership of a re-united Cyprus would enable the Turkish-Cypriot leadership to legitimate its partial abandoning of the policy that places emphasis on the guarantee of security that the Turkish army currently provides (Theophanous, 1995). Finally, the constructive pathway was found to have been viewed as the most substantial way in which the EU would impact on the conflict, because this would foster a more pluralistic, democratic and tolerant society, through the broadening of civil society, which will in itself be conducive to bringing about a solution to the Cyprus problem (Peristianis, 1998). The disengagement of Greek-Cypriot politics from traditional party clientelistic structures has also been identified as one of the ways in which this process can occur (Mavratsas, 1998). The expansion of civil society was also seen as a vehicle enabling the formation of interest groups that would be able to form trans-cultural links on the island and trans-national ones outside it, within the context of the European Union and beyond (Agathangelou, 1997). Yet other analysts, drawing on the effects of prospective membership on Cypriot society thus far, have argued that some hierarchical structures, and the oppression that attends them within supra-national states, can increase due to the change in economic and immigration patterns that closer ties with the EU entail (Vassiliadou, 2002).

With Cyprus’ EU membership now a fact, some of these analyses might appear trite or simply wrong. Yet others still remain relevant to the analysis of both the relation between the negotiating sides and those between the two sides and the EU. Perhaps the key point to make about these past analyses, in light of the current events, is that the EU’s involvement in the conflict was generally seen to be on the Greek-Cypriot side. This was, inevitably perhaps, so because it was with the internationally recognised Greek-Cypriot government that the EU conducted the accession negotiations. The events of the past year, however, have shown that Turkish-Cypriots, both in terms of civil society and, as from December 2003, leadership, are equally interested in the stakes they have in the island’s EU membership. Especially after the reconfiguration process that the division of the island underwent following the opening of the borders in April 2003, the north’s relations with the EU have been changing, and this is a factor that future analyses should take better account of.
Cyprus – EU relations at present

The Republic of Cyprus applied for EEC membership in 1990. The problem of the island’s division had from the outset been pointed out as the EU’s primary concern in its consideration of Cyprus’ suitability for membership. In this context, the Republic argued that membership would act as a catalyst in bringing about a solution to the political problem, a view that was eventually adopted by the Commission3. These discussions were carried out at a historical juncture in which the government of Greece was campaigning against the naming of a country to its north as Macedonia (Danforth, 1995; Karakasidou, 1997; Roudometof, 2002). Nationalist government rhetoric was at its peak and brought the country to loggerheads with many of its EU partners. At the peak of this crisis, Greece had threatened to veto all future memberships if Cyprus’s application was rejected or if official negotiations with the Turkish-Cypriots were opened (Bideleux and Jeffries, 1998: 634). In 1993 the Commission decided to accept the Republic’s application as one made on behalf of the island and discussions regarding its suitability began. Nevertheless, a concern for the problem created by the absence of Turkish-Cypriot representation persisted, and in 1998 the Republic asked the Turkish-Cypriot community to appoint representatives for the accession negotiations. This invitation was rejected by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, which argued that in order to take up such a position, the representatives would have to do it under the 1960 Constitution. This effectively meant that they would have to renounce the political status of the north, which was still an issue for discussion in the negotiations4.

Cyprus’ suitability for membership (now of the EU) was thus decided in 1995 and negotiations began in 1998. The decision to open negotiations was taken at the European Council meeting in Luxemburg in 1997. In Helsinki two years later, the European Council stressed its preference for a solution of the conflict to be reached before accession and for Cyprus to be a united country by that time. On the Greek-Cypriot side, this was hailed as a great achievement and Cyprus’ membership was, from then on, viewed as a certainty. The second important decision taken at the Helsinki meeting was to consider Turkey’s membership, which was viewed as counterbalancing the ‘point’ scored by the ‘Greek side’. The significance of this

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4 See http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/cyphome/govhome.nsf/Maingrk?OpenFrameSet
decision from the perspective of the Greco-Turkish conflict is examined in the relevant working paper in this series (Rumelili, 2004)\(^5\).

The Helsinki decision ushered in a new era in the search for a solution. Alvaro De Soto, who had in 1990 and 1991 helped broker the peace agreements in El Salvador, was appointed Special Adviser on Cyprus to the UN Secretary General in November 1999. Meetings with the leaderships north and south of the island became more frequent and in 1999 a new round of negotiations began. These negotiations proceeded through proximity talks, high-level meetings abroad and highly publicised social and working meetings in Nicosia. The old Nicosia airport, which had been rendered inoperative since the war of 1974 and had been under UN supervision inside the buffer zone was refurbished and prepared as a meeting complex, where leaders of the two communities began having UN-supervised direct and proximity talks. In October 2002, two technical committees with members from both sides were set-up, one on Common State Laws and one on Treaties. Their purpose was to meet and examine post-1974 legislation on the two sides and harmonise this legislation both with each other and with EU requirements. The media on both sides presented themes signs of an impending solution, the shape of which was, however, not clear. A deadline for an agreement had initially been set for December 2002, when the EU would conclude its negotiation on Cyprus’ accession and reach a final decision about the island’s membership in the meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen. NGOs in the north began lobbying for re-unification and entry of the north into the EU together with the south with this deadline in mind, and in the winter of 2002-2003 a series of massive demonstrations were held in northern Nicosia, attracting more than half of the population of northern Cyprus\(^6\). These caused officials on all sides to take note of these ‘protest voices’ and to seriously consider the possibility of reaching a final solution at the end of the negotiation process. High-level meetings between Cypriot, Greek, Turkish, EU and UN representatives were held at the Copenhagen European Council, but a solution was not reached. Instead, the deadline for arriving at a final agreement was extended to April 2003, when Cyprus would be expected to sign the Act of Accession to the EU. Another final round of high-level meetings, which took place in February 2003 in the Hague, in the presence of the UN Secretary

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\(^5\) See also Rumelili (2003).

\(^6\) Demonstrations had also taken place during the 2000 banking crisis and these could be said, as I have done elsewhere, to have formed the basis for the formation of an opposition platform (Demetriou, 2003a). However, because the process this mobilisation of the opposition is rather complex, I have chosen here to concentrate on the explicit ‘reunification and EU’ call as formed in the latter stages of this mobilisation.
General, also failed. The Turkish-Cypriot leader’s uncompromising stance was found to be the cause of this failure\(^7\).

Following this failure, the Republic of Cyprus signed the Accession Treaty on 16\(^{th}\) April 2003 at the informal European Council meeting in Athens. A week later, in an unprecedented move, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership decided to open up the crossing points on the Green Line, one in Nicosia and one in the Pyla/Pile area, which up to that point had remained closed to almost all traffic, to Cypriots living on either side of the divide. A second crossing point was opened up in Nicosia soon after this and the government in the south responded by announcing a series of ‘measures in support of Turkish-Cypriots’, designed to effectively enable them to take up rights in the south that had been denied to them since 1974 and which, despite the division, they should have had individually as citizens of the Republic. Many of these rights, it should be noted, are rights the denial of which would contravene EU law and for which the Republic of Cyprus could be liable to the European Court of Human Rights (e.g. to take part in elections, to have access to health care in the Republic). It is not accidental that substantial change in legislation regarding the rights of Turkish-Cypriots, and particularly electoral rights and the right to marry, occurred after the filing of suits against the Republic in the ECHR by Turkish-Cypriots living in the south. It can therefore be argued that this package of measures was designed to effectively regulate the legal problems, especially relating to citizenship rights, that the authorities of the Republic might encounter as a consequence of the arrival of Turkish-Cypriots to the south either to take up work or to apply for identification documents and therefore gain access to state and EU benefits. This mass move of Turkish-Cypriots from the north to the south had in fact been expected even before the opening of the borders but was perhaps envisioned by the Greek-Cypriot authorities to take place in a slightly different way than it did.

In December 2003 a new leadership, headed by the up to then oppositionist left-wing party leader, Mehmet Ali Talat was elected in the north. The negotiation process was revived and in February 2004 a new timeframe, according to which a final agreement would be reached by March and put to a popular vote on both sides of the island simultaneously before Cyprus’ accession to the EU, was agreed upon. After the rejection of the re-unification plan in the south, special measures were adopted by the

\(^7\) The UNSG’s press release of 11\(^{th}\) March 2003 on this failure is available at (http://1cyprus.net/article.php?sid=104).
EU regulating its relations with the north, starting with the policing of the Green line and extending to trade, funding, and official representation. It is against this background that the data presented below was collected.
Analysis of the pathways of EU involvement in the Cyprus conflict

Overview
The process of EU accession has undeniably had an impact on the Cyprus conflict. The introduction above has sought to outline the connections between the process of accession on the one hand and the negotiations seeking to solve the conflict on the other. Even though at present the conflict remains unresolved, the impact of these events on future prospects for resolution of the conflict is indeed great. The following analysis will seek to categorise this impact in terms of the four pathways identified in the project’s theoretical framework. Because of the importance of recent events relating to both the Cyprus problem and Cyprus’ relations with the EU, the bulk of the material collected over the last six months and presented in this report refers largely to these events. However, in addition to this material, I will also attempt a more diachronic analysis of this impact, by making reference to earlier events.

The analysis presented below is based on oral and written material collected largely in Cyprus in the period between January and July 2004. This material includes interviews with politicians, civil society and IGO representatives carried out on both sides of the island as well as in the buffer zone. The interviews ranged in style from formal to semi-formal and informal, depending on the interviewee’s preferences. For this reason, the names of the interviewees are provided here only for the cases of formal interviews. The interviews were carried out in Greek and English, although in some cases Turkish was also used. Some of the interviews were taped, while in others, where the interviewee preferred for the interview not to be taped, handwritten notes were taken. The interviews were based on a common set of questions geared towards elicitation of the interviewee’s view of the EU’s impact on the Cyprus problem. However, this common set of questions was supplemented by questions on current local events and questions relating to the interviewee’s specific position.

The material that fed the analysis also includes media reports, which have been collected through media monitoring carried out on a daily basis over the last year. This comprised a daily monitoring of the Cypriot press and televised news, as well as a selection of televised political programmes. This monitoring was carried out in Greek, English and Turkish. The depth to which reports were read and analysed
varied because of time constraints between the different publications and particular historical junctures.

In addition to this material, school textbooks were reviewed using discourse analysis. This analysis was based, primarily, on textbooks on history but also utilised textbooks on literature, geography and citizenship education. These subjects have been chosen because their content is most prone to nationalist interpretation by teachers and therefore they would most usefully provide hints as to how the changing geo-political dynamics brought about by EU membership might impact on the conflicting sides’ secondary school education.

It should be pointed out that while the discourse analysis based on media reports and school textbooks provided useful information for the preparation of the present report, the data that is mostly reflected here is the data obtained through interviews. This because the workpackages for the latter two are still on-going and therefore will be more fully presented in later reports.

**Compulsory Pathway of Involvement**

This section will overview and evaluate some examples of the impact that Cyprus’ EU membership process has had on the conflict. The analysis here will focus on how effective the ‘carrot and stick’ approach has been in resolving the conflict in Cyprus. According to the project’s theoretical framework, this approach constitutes a ‘compulsory’ pathway of involvement and has a direct impact on the leadership level. The examples in this section will therefore focus on decisions taken by the EU regarding Cyprus’ membership. Three important historical points will be at the centre of the analysis. Firstly, decisions taken at meetings of the European Council in the late 1990s, regarding both Cyprus’ and Turkey’s prospects of membership, will be reviewed. The importance of these decisions was indeed pointed out by many of the interviewees I met during the data-gathering period. Secondly, the provisions in the Protocol to the Act of Accession that Cyprus signed in 2003 will be analysed as another example of implementing the ‘carrot and stick’ approach. Finally, the Green Line Regulation will be analysed, with attention focusing on the ways in which this regulation reflects a shift in the relations between Cyprus and the EU.

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8 Further details on the data collection process can be found in Diez (2004).
The accession process for Cyprus was launched at the European Council meeting, which took place in Luxemburg, on 12th and 13th December 1997 (EU General Report 1997: § 865). At the same time, Turkey was left out of the accession round, even though its eligibility for accession was confirmed. This was seen as a blow to Turkish-EU relations and a victory for the Greek-Cypriot side, since the absence of Turkish-Cypriot representatives was not deemed a hindrance to that particular stage in the process of Cyprus’ accession. Nevertheless, at the request of the EU, the President of the Republic presented on 12th March 1998 to the European Council Presidency an official invitation to Turkish-Cypriots to take part in the negotiations for accession – an invitation which was not taken up. The effect on the conflict was almost immediate, with the Denktaş regime in the north, which argued that the application for membership by the Republic was illegal (Ertekün, 1997; Mendelson, 2001), banning all bi-communal activities on the island through refusing to allow crossings across the Green Line (Bertrand, 2004). Such crossings had taken place irregularly since 1989 and were the basis upon which the bi-communal movement for rapprochement between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots was built (Chigas and Ganson, 1997: 62). In this sense, the application of ‘sticks’ towards Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership had an adverse impact on the conflict because it had rendered civilan efforts for reconciliation all the more difficult.

Two years later, at the European Council meeting held in Helsinki, on 10th and 11th December 1999, Turkey was recognised as a candidate country for membership, while with regard to Cyprus, the Council welcomed the “launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York” and, crucially, underlined that “a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union”. It further decided that “[i]f no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this, the Council will take account of all relevant factors.” (Helsinki European Council conclusions, 1999: § 9 (a) and (b)). This last reference to ‘relevant factors’ has since then generally been interpreted as a precondition that this decision would hold, provided that the failure of negotiations was not due to the stance of the Greek-Cypriot side. In effect, this statement tied Cyprus’ EU accession to the negotiation process for resolution of the conflict, but disengaged it from an absolute requirement that such a resolution be

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reached. A number of Greek-Cypriot politicians, interviewed in 2004, interpreted this article as a sign of recognition by the EU of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership’s intransigent stance during negotiations and of its resolve for the Greek-Cypriot side ‘not to be penalised’ for this intransigence by being denied membership, if negotiations to solve the conflict failed. In other words, this statement seems to have been read as a ‘carrot’, encouraging the Greek-Cypriot side to pursue a positive stance in the ensuing negotiations.

Indeed, the impact of this ‘carrot’ has been extremely positive over the long-term, since for the next four years, and until the final signing of the Accession Treaty in 2003, the Greek-Cypriot side appeared to be very willing to see negotiations for a final settlement to the end. Furthermore, this round of negotiations, which lasted from 1999 to 2004, produced the most comprehensive settlement plan brokered by the UN since the start of negotiations in the 1960s. A high point in this negotiation process was the European Council meeting of 12th and 13th December 2002 that took place in Copenhagen. In its conclusions related to enlargement, the Council confirmed “its strong preference for accession to the European Union by a united Cyprus” and “welcome[d] the commitment of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots to continue to negotiate with the objective of concluding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem by 28 February 2003 on the basis of the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG)'s proposals”, urging “the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to seize this opportunity” (Bulletin of the European Union, 12-2002, § I.4.10). In addition, it repeated its willingness to accommodate the terms of a settlement in the Treaty of Accession (ibid, § I.4.11). Finally, it decided that “in the absence of a settlement, the application of the acquis to the northern part of the island shall be suspended, until the Council decides unanimously otherwise, on the basis of a proposal by the Commission”. Meanwhile, the Council invited the Commission, in consultation with the Government of Cyprus, “to consider ways of promoting economic development of the northern part of Cyprus and bringing it closer to the Union” (ibid, § I.4.12). In these conclusions what can be observed is a series of ‘carrots’ being offered to the opposing sides in the conflict. On the one hand, the Greek-Cypriot side was encouraged to continue negotiating in search of an agreement, in the knowledge that the key concerns it had up to then raised about the fairness of an agreement would be addressed by its soon-to-be European partners. On the other hand, Turkish-Cypriots were encouraged to continue to support Cyprus’ EU

membership prospects because that would secure economic benefits for them as well. It is important to remember that this meeting took place at a time when opposition voices were growing strong in the north and when Turkish-Cypriot demonstrators asked for a solution and EU membership. In this sense, the last article can also be read as a ‘carrot’ towards this section of Turkish-Cypriot civil society. This reading however, also implies acknowledgement of an attempt to bypass the Turkish-Cypriot leadership that had up to then appeared disinterested in any offers the EU had to make. This also implies that such bypassing would constitute a ‘stick’ to the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. If this reading is followed through, a theoretical question arises, regarding the precise identity of ‘conflict parties’ in situations where internal political opposition is so radical and so strong, as well as regarding the identity of the addresses of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ on the official level. This is a point I will return to below, in the analyses of constructive and connective impacts. The effectiveness of these conclusions in positively impacting on the conflict is difficult to assess in isolation. On the one hand, as the continuation of the strategy developed by the Helsinki decisions, these conclusions indeed contributed to keeping up the impetus of the negotiation process—in the introduction, the Copenhagen meeting had also been used by the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish delegations as a forum for quite intense negotiations. However, when the Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot sides met again in the Hague in February 2003, the Turkish-Cypriot leader walked out and the negotiations broke down. Greek-Cypriot ministerial and government representatives interviewed maintained that the failure of the Copenhagen meeting to yield an agreement was due to Turkish reluctance to put pressure on Denktaş to accept such an agreement.

This drawback led to the adoption of Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession, signed in Athens in 16th April 2003, which stated that although Cyprus would join the EU as a whole, the application of the *acquis communautaire* would be suspended in those areas of the island outside the control of the authorities of the Republic (i.e. the north). This effectively finalised the Cypriot entry to the EU, despite the lack of a solution, and recognised the Greek-Cypriot presence as representing the whole of the island. On the other hand, it made the accession of the northern part of the island automatic upon solution of the problem. Thus, the protocol satisfied completely Greek-Cypriot positions with respect to the link between EU membership and the conflict. According to these positions (which were only partly officially articulated) Cyprus’ prospects of solving the conflict would be better after its accession because the Greek-Cypriot side
would have more bargaining power once in the EU as representative of the whole island. Yet, at the same time Protocol 10 also offered the ‘carrot’ of membership to the Turkish-Cypriot side (primarily the opposition) as an incentive to cooperate for an agreement. At a time when the Green Line was still closed to traffic, however, this was also a quite effective ‘stick’, since it denied the actual benefits of membership when making them appear otherwise so reachable. It is in order to enable these benefits to reach individual Turkish-Cypriots as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus that, according to official statements, the leadership in the north proceeded to allow movement across the Green Line as from 23rd April 2003, a week after the signing of the Act of Accession. In this respect, the finalisation of membership had a great positive impact on the conflict, since it (perhaps among other events) prompted the most radical change up to that point. This impact is the study of recent research on Cypriot politics and society (Constantinou, 2004; Demetriou, 2004b; Dikomitis, 2004).

With the opening of the Green Line, a series of events took place that effectively changed the nature of the conflict in Cyprus. The Greek-Cypriot government began to pursue a more conciliatory rhetoric with respect to Turkish-Cypriots, even though this was seldom put in practice. The Turkish-Cypriot opposition gained even more power and in the parliamentary elections of December 14th the left-wing opposition leader Mehmet Ali Talat was voted into office. Negotiations then resumed and in February the process of reaching an agreement by May was agreed by the two sides. It is in this last phase of negotiations that the disadvantages of the EU’s previous ‘carrot and stick’ policies were made obvious. The Greek-Cypriot side, led since February 2003 by the intransigent Tassos Papadopoulos, entered negotiations from a position where the threat of ‘sticks’ from the part of the EU had been removed, accession was certain and the ‘carrots’ to be had were offered to the Turkish-Cypriot side. With the application of nationalist rhetoric in the presentation of the proposed solution to the Greek-Cypriot populace, a public rejection of the solution was fostered and the UN-proposed final plan was rejected at the Greek-Cypriot referendum of April 24th 2004. In this sense, it could be argued that the referendum showed the failings of the ‘compulsory’ approach when incentives and disincentives are not available for use at all stages of the conflict resolution process (Demetriou 2004c).

It was perhaps upon this realisation that the EU, in agreement with the Republic’s authorities, adopted the Green Line Regulation on April 30th. The Regulation is
directly linked to Protocol 10 and is mainly concerned with the movement of persons and goods across the Green Line as well as with the determination of the authorities responsible for supervising such movement. The most important stipulation of the Regulation is that the legitimacy of movement across the Line is not biased in terms of direction: for example non-visa nationals are allowed to cross both ways, even if they have, in the Republic’s government’s discourse, ‘entered through an illegal port’ (i.e. from the north). Secondly, the Regulation allows for the movement of goods apart from livestock across the Line, which is presumably a measure designed to facilitate trade with the north. Thirdly, the certifying authority for these goods is primarily the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, with the Commission having overseeing powers over the process and the Republic agreeing. This stipulation effectively sets up a relationship between the Commission and the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce which did not officially exist before, and although it provides for the possibility that the Republic raises specific disagreements at any stage, it also implies that such disagreements could create problems in the relations between the Republic and the Commission. From this perspective, the Regulation could be seen as an attempt to create a ‘stick’ mechanism against the Republic, should it prove unwilling to cooperate, and a ‘carrot’ one for the north, showing that relations with the EU can be established even if the division remains (Demetriou 2004d). Such relations are indeed something that Turkish-Cypriot politicians and civil society leaders have been asking for the last few years, and especially since the opening of the Green Line. In the interviews collected there was agreement among them that the package of measures that the EU had proposed after the opening of the Green Line for supporting Turkish-Cypriots economically was unsatisfactory and had not been implemented in any way. Even though up to the point of writing there have not been official reports of goods actually crossing the Line on a regular basis or of substantial trade taking place in this way, the Regulation at least sets the ground for implementing ‘carrots’ in a more successful way than has been the case thus far.

**Enabling Pathway of Involvement**

Taking the ‘enabling’ pathway to refer to the effect of EU policies on the conflict on the official level where the link between the two is indirect, this section will outline some of the ways in which the EU has attempted to effect positive changes in the resolution of the conflict in Cyprus through its various institutions. Since this analysis focuses on the official level, there is considerable overlap in these examples with what
has been outlined in the previous section. In the first part of this section, I will present those examples for which overlap is greatest. These are the Copenhagen Council meeting of 2002 and the pre-referendum negotiations. I will then analyse the implementation of special measures with relation to the north, before and after accession, which have also been mentioned in the previous section. Lastly, I will outline the connection between these measures and recent political changes and Cyprus-related rulings of the European Court of Human Rights, which, even though not an EU institution, issues decisions that have considerable bearing on the relations between the EU and candidate states - as Cyprus has been until very recently.

As pointed out above, the meeting at Copenhagen in December 2002, although not specifically aiming for that purpose, functioned as a forum for discussing the resolution of the conflict in Cyprus among the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish delegates. In this sense, it could be seen as an ‘enabling’ mechanism through which the EU impacted on the conflict because the effect was indirect, in the sense that negotiations took place but without them being officially sponsored by the EU. The meeting in effect provided a context which could be used to legitimise internally whatever concessions each side would have been asked to make, had an agreement been reached. In other words, the fact that, at the end of the meeting, both the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey came out with ‘points’ on their side could be used to justify possible concessions for a solution. The Copenhagen meeting was important in terms of its ‘enabling’ impact in one other respect as well. This is because around it - primarily in view of the negotiations that were expected to take place there - the Turkish-Cypriot opposition forces organised some of the most well-attended demonstrations against the regime and in favour of a solution to the problem and EU accession of the north. In this sense, the meeting also enabled the organisation of civil society activities that were later proven to be of immense importance to the overturning of the political status quo in the northern part of the island (Demetriou, 2003a). As an indirect impact of the EU on the conflict, this could of course also be considered part of the ‘connective’ pathway of influence, and this is a point that I will return to later.

Another example of ‘enabling’ impact was the presence of EU officials in the negotiation process that led to the referenda of April 2004. This presence had been an issue of considerable discussion in the negotiations in New York earlier in the year, when the procedure leading to the referenda was agreed. The Greek-Cypriot side demanded that EU observers be present at the final stage of negotiations, while the
Turkish-Cypriot leadership opposed such a prospect. The latter, finally, agreed, partly perhaps because the new representative, Talat, did not share Denktaş’ view of the EU as a hostile party, which was completely on the side of Greek-Cypriots. The EU Commissioner for Enlargement did indeed attend the final days of the negotiation process and the presentation of the final version of the agreement plan, and stated that he hoped that his presence would contribute to the reaching of an agreement. Therefore, it could be said that the aim of EU policies at this stage was to enable the sides to argue in favour of the agreement internally, with reference to EU – Cyprus relations. In parallel, the statements of the European Parliament issued in the period before the referenda, which effectively urged the Turkish- and Greek- Cypriot peoples to vote in favour of the plan, by stressing the point that the Union would be prepared to accommodate the derogations from the *acquis communautaire* that the implementation of the final agreement would entail could be said to have aimed at enabling concessions to be argued with reference to EU principles. And it is on precisely this basis of principles that the EU parliament sought its ‘sticks’, when, later, the Greek-Cypriot leadership made public its intention to encourage a rejection vote in the south of the island. At that point, the Commissioner for Enlargement made a widely publicised speech where he was accusing the Greek-Cypriot leadership of having “cheated” him when appearing willing to see the process of negotiation of a final solution to the end and thus to allow a united Cyprus to join the EU. Similarly, when the Greek-Cypriot opposition leader wrote to the President of the European Parliament, complaining about the conduct of the government of the Republic with regard to freedom of speech and information during the pre-referendum period, the reply letter indicated that the Parliament would initiate proceedings, with a view to impose relevant sanctions against the Republic for not respecting ‘the principles upon which the EU is founded’. Thus, it seems that the objective of these statements was to enable the opposition in the south to argue strongly in favour of accepting the plan. This however also allowed the government of the Republic to build into its rhetoric of rejection the anti-imperialist argument - which has thus far been used in public and academic discourse to depict the Cyprus problem as one based on the disingenuous intentions of high powers (Demetriou, 2004a), and to accuse the opposition as ‘traitor’.

Perhaps the clearest examples of the adoption of the ‘enabling’ pathway by the EU with respect to the conflict are the actions relating to the opening of the Green Line in April 2003, particularly the adoption of measures in support of the Turkish-Cypriots,
which had originally been proposed by the government of the Republic and later by the EU. As mentioned in the introduction, the first package of measures was primarily concerned with citizenship rights, confirming those that Turkish-Cypriots already had under the 1960 constitution. However, the rhetoric that surrounded their presentation could be considered an outcome of the pursuit of the ‘enabling’ pathway by the EU, since it was founded upon a reconciliatory discourse that identified Turkish-Cypriots as ‘compatriots’, and therefore enabled (or forced) the government of the Republic to articulate a discourse that it had not used until then. A representative of the Republic’s Ministry of Interior, interviewed in December 2003, stated that the drafting of this package of measures had been undertaken after the EU urged the government of the Republic to do so. At the same time, however, it also enabled it to appear determined to solve the conflict, while not actually implementing the most radical of these measures in practice (as for example the regulation of the movement of goods across the Line and the setting up of an office dealing exclusively with Turkish-Cypriot concerns). It is these failures, and especially those related to trade, that Turkish-Cypriot interviewees pointed to, when stating that these measures had minimal impact in the north in general and in facilitating a solution to the political problem in particular. Furthermore, they stated that the EU package of measures that focussed more on economic impact had been almost useless, since none of the measures had been implemented. Furthermore, they pointed to the government of the Republic as responsible for the non-implementation of the measures because, they argued, it used legalistic arguments to impede any substantial benefits from the implementation of the measures from reaching the north. Overall then, it could be said that in the case of Cyprus, the extent to which the pursuit of the ‘enabling’ pathway in conflict mediation has been successful is indicative of the major disadvantage of this pathway. Namely, such success rests on the willingness of both sides to cooperate and therefore make use of the possibilities for resolution that are enabled. Where such willingness is not present, this pathway can only have a positive impact if coupled, indirectly, with the ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ of the ‘compulsory’ pathway. As the examples above show, however, this can also result in a situation where a certain type of discourse is adopted, but the actual substance of the relation between the conflict parties on the official level remains static. Recent attempts by the government of the Republic and its partners in coalition to present at the island’s Greek-speaking media, Mehmet Ali Talat as the new Denktash in order to legitimise the failure to implement these measures by recourse to the argument that the Turkish-Cypriot leadership cannot be
trusted, could be said to mark a reversal of the conciliatory rhetoric mentioned above, which did not reflect their political positions from the beginning.

An example where the outcome of the coupling between the indirect impact of the ‘enabling’ pathway and the direct approach of the ‘compulsory’ one was substantial and positive is the series of Cyprus-related cases presented to the European Court of Human Rights (Demetriou 2003b). For example, the case of Ahmet An, who successfully sued Turkey because it impeded his freedom of movement within Cyprus (by keeping the Green Line closed) has been cited as one of the considerations that led to the decision to open the Green Line in April 2003. Perhaps a clearer example is the case of Titina Loizidou, who won a suit against Turkey for not allowing her access and enjoyment of her property, which she was forced to abandon in the north during the war of 1974. The outcome of this case, which ordered Turkey to pay more than €1.12m in compensation, was a reference point in the way the UN-proposed plan was negotiated and in the debate on refugee property rights that took place before the referendum. Even though the ECHR is an institution of the Council of Europe and not of the EU, its rulings against states are considered by the EU as important indicators of the human rights situation in the country. In this sense, Turkey’s convictions in these two cases can be said to have indirectly influenced its stance on particular aspects of the conflict resolution negotiations because of their implications on its relations with the EU. The convictions against the Republic of Cyprus in a further two cases involving Turkish-Cypriots living in the south seem to have functioned in a similar way as regards the Greek-Cypriot positions. In the first of these cases, Kemal Selim sued the Republic for not allowing him to marry because the law permitting civil marriages to take place, which was passed in the early 1990s, only referred to the Greek-Cypriot community since under the 1960 Constitution marriage law had come under the jurisdiction of the Communal Chambers and the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber had been disbanded since 1963. The civil marriage law was made applicable to Turkish-Cypriots and the case was settled through an amicable agreement. In the second case, Ibrahim Aziz sued the Republic for impeding his right to take part in elections because the government had after 1963 kept the division in the electoral rolls between the Greek- and Turkish- Cypriot voters but had effectively cancelled the

12 For the full text of the judgment see (http://www.cyprusaction.org/humanrights/freedomofmovement/ahmetan/fulljudgement.html).
13 The full text of the judgment can be downloaded from (http://www.hr-action.org/archive4/eurocourt1.html).
14 For the full text of the judgment see (http://www.cyprusaction.org/humanrights/echr/selimechr/judgement.html).
latter. With the measures proposed by the Government after the opening of the Green Line, the right to take part in elections has been extended to Turkish-Cypriots and its implementation came with the EU parliamentary elections of June 2004, when one Turkish-Cypriot candidate ran as independent and around 500 Turkish-Cypriots were registered to vote. In this sense, compliance with European principles regarding human rights, which the EU endorses, seems to have been the key concern that caused the Greek-Cypriot side to take legislative steps that restored the rights of Turkish-Cypriots as citizens of the Republic. In one of the interviews collected, one of the members of parliament of the Republic who proposed the change in the marriage law to the Greek-Cypriot parliament said that it was primarily the concern to have a law ‘in line with European standards’ that led them to propose the change. At the same time however, Turkish-Cypriot politicians, activists and lawyers pointed out in interviews that the confirmation of this status of citizenship in the Republic before a final agreement on what the solution to the conflict would look like, entailed potential threats for the prospects of resolution. They argued for example, that the issue of voting could be used by the government of the Republic to retract its acceptance of the communal political rights of Turkish-Cypriots that it had previously agreed to.

**Connective Pathway of Involvement**

In this section I will analyse and assess the impact of the EU’s pursuit of the ‘constructive’ pathway of involvement in the Cyprus conflict. As with the ‘enabling’ pathway reviewed above, examples of ‘connective’ impact on the conflict overlap with some of the examples presented under the ‘compulsory’ pathway analysis. This is so mainly because the ‘connective’ pathway involves direct impact of the EU, as does the ‘compulsory’ one, yet, it focuses on the societal level. For the purposes of this project, ‘societal’ has in this case been defined as represented by civil society groups active and visible in the public domain. As mentioned above in the case of Cyprus, and in particular the north, such groups have played a key role in radically changing the internal political status quo. In this context, they have represented the pro-EU forces and for this reason they have been the key actors that the EU has pursued contacts with in that part of the island. With the voting into office of the opposition leader in the December 2003 elections, some of these ‘civil society representatives’ have become the current ‘leadership’. Thus, their association with the EU and the impact of that association on the resolution of the conflict can be said to have passed from the domain of the ‘connective’ pathway of influence to that of the
‘compulsory’. In what follows, I will firstly outline the process of development of civil society mobilisation in the north and focus specifically on the role played by the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce in this mobilisation. Then, I will briefly review other examples of ‘connective’ impact, such as the funding of bi-communal projects and of school textbooks. These examples also overlap to a great extent with the ‘constructive’ pathway, since they both refer to impact on the societal level. These overlaps, however, will be more thoroughly analysed in the next section.

The consideration of the ‘connective’ pathway brings up the question of who the actors analysed as representative of ‘society’ ultimately are. As far as Turkish-Cypriot civil society is concerned, the example of the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce is perhaps the first to be evoked because of the key role it has played during the demonstrations of 2002 and 2003. Interviewed on the topic, a representative of the Chamber explained that the main opposition activities during that time were organised by this body because it was this section of the society that most clearly saw the impact of the international isolation of the north and the possibilities that a solution coupled with entry into the EU could unleash. Like other activists and opposition politicians interviewed, he stated that organising the opposition on the mass scale that they did was difficult at the beginning, because articulating a pro-EU political discourse publicly was at points dangerous. The series of demonstrations and the change in the leadership, as well as the opening of the Green Line, were considered great achievements of the civil mobilisation in which the Chamber had played a key role. But he also criticised the Greek-Cypriot government and the EU for not taking full advantage of the political changes in the north and for not encouraging trade-related initiatives, which would contribute to the building of a final solution by. He argued that the measures proposed by the Republic and the EU did not go far enough in achieving the goals of re-unification but were also not satisfactorily implemented by either side. Similar criticisms were also expressed during my interviews with other Turkish-Cypriot lawyers, activists and politicians. In this sense, it seems that the links that the EU, has set up with civil society representatives in the north, through its representation in Cyprus or at the level of the Commission for Enlargement, have had a positive effect. They have contributed to the mobilisation of the northern civil

15 Note that all references to these packages of measures in this report include the packages announced in the summer of 2003. On 30 July 2004, the government of the Republic announced another package of measures designed to aid confidence building between the two sides and to offer economic support to the north. As the report was in preparation when this announcement came and the extent of its implementation has not to date been judged, no reference is made to this package in the present report.
society towards the goals of a solution and EU membership and continue to be constructive in providing the vision for future possibilities in which the two communities come (or are forced to come) together –one step in this direction might be the drawing up of the Green Line Regulation analysed in the first section. It is indeed not accidental that the Chamber is specifically designated in the Regulation as the authority responsible for certifying goods leaving the north. But the lack of implementation of these possibilities in a concrete manner also threatens to create disillusionment something that other Turkish-Cypriot activists have claimed has already began to happen.

Another example of the connective role that the EU has tried to play in Cyprus is through funding. Thus far, this funding has mostly been in the form of bicomunal projects undertaken under the Civil Society Programme\(^\text{16}\). Other EU-funded programmes have also called for Turkish-Cypriot participation, although this was more explicitly stated in some than in others. Such programmes focus on the environment (LIFE), investment partnerships, and education (LEONARDO DA VINCI, SOCRATES, Fifth Framework). Similar calls for participation of applicants from both sides of the island have also been made in the case of EU-related job opportunities in Brussels and Cyprus. Yet Turkish-Cypriot politicians have claimed that the failure of the EU to make Turkish, which is one of the two official languages of the Republic of Cyprus, an official language of the EU has hampered the access of young Turkish-Cypriots to the EU-related job market. Responding to these criticisms, some of the Brussels-based jobs recently advertised have required from Turkish-Cypriot applicants to exhibit fluency in one language less than would otherwise be the case. Through these efforts, the EU seems to be successfully following a ‘connective’ path in its intervention in the conflict by actively providing solution to problems that might otherwise be treated as legalistic puzzles (in the Greek-Cypriot side’s pursuit of preventing recognition of the north as a state at all costs) and left unsolved to exemplify the Republic’s government’s ‘benign neglect’, as Herzfeld terms such policies (1992: 12), towards Turkish-Cypriots.

In terms of funding, the greatest impact that the EU can currently have in the north is expected to come with the aid of €259m, which had been pledged by the Union to help in the development of the north in the event of a solution. After the rejection of

\(^{16}\) The outcomes of these projects, launched in 2003, have not as yet been publicised – for the initial call for applications see the programme’s website (http://www.civ-society.org).
the solution plan by the Greek-Cypriot side, the EU decided to make these funds available to the north anyway. According to its official statements, the government in the south not only agreed, but also encouraged this prospect. However, there currently seems to be a problem when it comes to deciding how these funds should reach the north. While the government of the Republic would like to receive the money and channel it to the north itself, it appears that the EU is reluctant to follow this route, and that the Turkish-Cypriot leadership opposes this prospect strongly. In this sense, while the funds are undoubtedly a positively contributing factor to the improvement of the infrastructure and economy of the north and thus to the continuation of support for further EU initiatives and resolution of the conflict, the debate over their distribution seems to suggest that the pathway of ‘connective’ impact could also create further friction between the conflict parties.

**Constructive Impact**

It could be said that, in this case study the “constructive pathway, which refers to EU’s indirect impact at the societal level, constitutes an effective type of EU involvement. This is largely because of reasons already mentioned above, that relate to the definition of ‘civil society’ and its development particularly in the north. In this section I will review some of the examples already mentioned above from the point of view of the ‘constructive’ pathway. The first example of this impact is the mobilisation of civil society during the demonstrations of recent years. Following this, the mobilisation of opposition forces in the south will be analysed along similar lines. Finally, some secondary effects of what might be considered ‘constructive impact’ will also be mentioned.

As mentioned in a previous presentation (Demetriou 2003a), if the demonstrations of the Turkish-Cypriot opposition forces of 2002 and 2003 are considered an effect of the EU’s involvement in Cyprus (considering the fact that their main call was for a solution to the conflict and EU membership) and if the changes they rendered possible in the political sphere are seen as a direct effect of the demonstrations, then what one is looking at is a prime example of the EU’s indirect effect on conflict resolution on the societal level, i.e. an example of ‘constructive’ impact. The demonstrations, through asking for solution and opposing Denktash, established a connection between Turkish- and Greek- Cypriots who supported the same causes, even without being able to have contact with each other, and thus fostered a change of identification of
the civil society of the conflicting parties from ethnic (Greek / Turkish) to political (pro-solution and rejectionists). Yet this example also shows that such ‘constructive’ impact is realised largely at the level where the ‘EU’ becomes a conceptual construct rather than a concrete actor in the form of one or more of its institutions and structures. In this sense, similar examples of ‘constructive’ impact can be seen where the concept of the ‘EU’ or ‘Europe’ is related to other concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘values’, ‘rights’, ‘peace’ or ‘principles’. In this sense, it could be argued that such concepts appear vital in the pursuit of other pathways, such as the compulsory or enabling ones. Examples of this are the various statements by EU parliamentary or Commission representatives mentioned above. What appears to be different here, however, is that these concepts are taken on and articulated at the societal level, without the explicit involvement of particular EU institutions. This is why the civil society actions that take place within the context of a rhetoric that utilises these concepts can be said to represent the EU’s ‘constructive’ impact.

In the south, during the period before and after the referendum, recourse to such rhetoric has been sought by both the government and the opposition. Following various discussions regarding the government’s actions on the issue of free speech - as for example their alleged involvement in cancelling a national television broadcast of an interview with Commissioner Verheugen, in ‘advising’ that UN special adviser De Soto is not asked for interviews by local media, and in preventing a programme where a member of the Greek-Cypriot negotiation team analysed and explained the provisions of the UN-proposed plan from being repeated on the national TV channel - a highly heated debate between the government and the opposition about the state of ‘democracy’ in the southern part of the island has been taking place. At the time of writing, the major issues on which the two sides disagree are being fought using the concept of ‘democracy’, where, importantly, this is understood and often articulated as one of the cornerstones of European values. Indeed, the investigation initiated by the European Parliament regarding these allegations began with a view to invoking sanctions against the Republic, by making reference to these European values. Having in mind that the main issue of these internal Greek-Cypriot debates is in fact each side’s stance with respect to the UN-proposed solution plan in the recent referendum, it could be argued that they establish in effect a relationship between the European values they invoke and the solution of the political problem. Thus, in an indirect way, the invocation of these concepts also speaks to the issue of the relations between the two sides in the Cyprus conflict, both on the official, as well as the societal level.
Indicative of this is the fact that the main opposition party’s attempt to strengthen its relationship with the Turkish-Cypriot parties and political leadership, is being presented to the Greek-Cypriot public as part and parcel of that party’s stance with respect to the political problem. This stance, which also constitutes its main source of disagreement with the government, is therefore legitimated through this discourse of ‘European values and standards’, mainly relating to freedom and democracy, and is combated by the government’s side by recourse to a legalistic rhetoric that also evokes ‘European law and principles’. It is in this sense that the EU can be said to provide the frame within which connections between the two conflicting sides can be sought and through these connections a change of identification could take place. Yet as the example shows, it can at the same time also provide the basis for a discourse that retains nationalist identification. It can thus be said that as for the ‘enabling’ pathway, the success of the constructive one in positively impacting on the conflict is determined by the willingness of each side to make use of the tools that this pathway can provide.

It should, however, be noted that the impact of the pursuit of this pathway of influence, is still to be judged, as more schemes employing this pathway seem to be developing in Cyprus. For example, the local EU Commission representation has in the last year cooperated with the Republic’s Ministry of Education to produce schoolbooks on the European Union. Such initiatives could indeed be important in bringing about the change of identities that the ‘constructive’ impact implies, with focus on identification shifting from ethnicity and difference to a pan-European one in which similarities (even of difference) are stressed. Detailed analysis of this possibility is currently under study and will be further explored in the next working paper.
Assessment of Impact on Conflict Development

The analysis above has shown that the pathways of involvement in the Cyprus conflict that the EU has thus far pursued can be categorised into all four types identified in the project’s theoretical framework. In this part of the report, I will try to summarise the ways in which the four identified pathways apply to the case of Cyprus and its relations with the EU with respect to the conflict. As each of the examples so far mentioned has been assessed above, my chief aim here is not to repeat these assessments but to outline what appear to be the most effective ways in which the EU has had a positive impact on the conflict.

Overall, it seems that all of the four identified pathways have at times been successfully and unsuccessfully implemented. The compulsory approach can be said to have yielded the most obvious results. The offer of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ has played a great part in the reconfiguration of Turkey’s relationship to Cyprus, and this, in turn, enabled the political changes outlined above to take place in the north. With respect to the south the ‘carrot’ of membership has been the chief driver for the Greek-Cypriot side to negotiate a solution, at least in public rhetoric, yet, at the same time this membership has always been depicted as pursued in the search of a solution to the political problem ‘within Europe’. The positive stance exhibited in negotiations by the Greek-Cypriot side until recently, and the fact that pro-solution forces secured a 25% vote of confidence in the Greek-Cypriot referendum, could in large part be said to result from this offer of a ‘carrot’ by the EU. Yet, the absence of effective ‘sticks’ to counteract the reversal of this stance towards the end of the negotiation process has proven a major disadvantage in the effectiveness of this approach. The pursuit of the enabling pathway has also been successful at some points and perhaps not in others, but this success has rested on the willingness of the various actors to realise the possibilities of policy change offered by the EU. For this reason it could be argued that without parallel implementation of the compulsory pathway of impact the effectiveness of this pathway has been rather limited. As far as the connective approach is concerned, some important results have been yielded from this approach, especially in the north. The same holds true for the constructive pathway. Yet, for both of these approaches to have a substantial impact on the resolution of the conflict, the fostering of an equally independent and vocal civil society in the south as that in the north is necessary.
Some Comments on the Evolutionary Dimension of Impact

According to the project’s theoretical framework, a conflict can be seen to develop or regress across four types. At one end of the spectrum, where the conflict has its least intensity, are ‘conflict episodes’, which are isolated incidents of disagreement. These could develop into ‘issue conflicts’ when they impact on securitisation. When the focus of the conflict becomes the differentiation into self and other identities, the conflict can be said to be of an ‘identity conflict’ type. Finally, at the other end of the spectrum is ‘subordination conflict’, where violence becomes legitimised.

According to this scheme, the Cyprus conflict can be categorised as subordination or issue conflict, provided that one is speaking about the official positions of the leaderships of the two sides. Keeping in mind the high level of militarisation of the island, the compulsory military service requirements on males of both sides, and the level to which each side’s nationalist celebrations involve victories against each other, it could be argued that the legitimisation of violence is an ever-present condition on the island. Yet the small numbers of casualties arising from inter-communal violence over the last thirty years could also point away from such identification of the conflict, towards the identity conflict category. It could be said in this context that the process of EU accession has also been overall conducive to a slight lowering of the intensity of the conflict. The last inter-communal killings took place in 1996, shortly before accession negotiations began. Since then nationalist rhetoric has in very broad terms slightly shifted to milder tones and since the opening of the Green Line there have been various official statements hailing the lack of inter-communal violent incidents. The recent killing of a Turkish-Cypriot boy by a Greek-Cypriot on the other hand, was immediately condemned by Greek-Cypriot authorities and dismissed as the act of a mentally disturbed person rather than a significant episode of ethnic violence (the accuracy of which would require research beyond the scope of this paper). The concern of the EU to import a volatile conflict into the Union might have been a factor contributing to this lowering of intensity.

With the compilation of the UN-proposed solution plan, it could also be said that an attempt was made to shift the conflict from the identity stage to a series of issue conflicts by forcing the parties to negotiate openly on particular issues. This seems to have thus far failed but with future efforts, which the EU has indicated it will support, if and when they happen, this shift may still be possible to achieve.
Conditions of Change

The analysis of the various examples by which the EU has directly or indirectly influenced the conflict in Cyprus shows that a number of factors may contribute to the change between conflict stages. The compulsory pathway has been pursued from the beginning and can still be said to be implemented through the various decisions that the EU reaches with respect to Cyprus, and to a lesser extent, Turkey as well. It has also been argued that this pathway can most effectively influence the conflict when willingness is produced on the leadership level, so that the enabling pathway is also utilised alongside it. Thus, such willingness can be said to constitute one condition for change between conflict stages. Regarding the connective and constructive pathways, the difference between the political stances of the majority of the population north and south of the line has shown that the major precondition for change to be effected is the existence of vocal civil society organisations.

In this sense, it could overall be argued that conditions of change are both internal and external. For example, pressure groups that will support the resolution of the conflict must be present inside and outside each community involved in the conflict and, most importantly, they must be present in both communities. Equally, change can be brought about both by direct and indirect approaches. However, when there is a combination between actor-driven and structural approaches, the impact on the conflict can more easily be predicted. For example, when some of the initiatives the EU has proposed in the case of Cyprus to support the north after the referenda were unwelcome by the Greek-Cypriot side, this disagreement was expressed through argumentation that invoked law. This shows that the lack of sync between specific policies that need to be implemented in order to achieve short-term results and the structures to which recourse can be invoked by an unwilling side can result in the weakening of the implements through which the EU can positively influence conflict resolution. Thus, it might be argued that one other condition for change is the presence of structures that will enable decisions regarding singular policies to be implemented.
Conclusion

In conclusion, it seems that the EU has had a considerable influence thus far on the development of the conflict in recent years. This has overall been positive and has in one sense, as the literature reviewed in the previous working paper on the Cyprus case predicted, a ‘catalytic’ effect on the prospects of resolution (Demetriou, 2004a). This was so because the compulsory pathway of involvement was effectively deployed. The EU has acted in a complimentary way to the UN efforts of brokering an agreement between the two sides. In addition, it provided the framework within which actors, such as Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom whose involvement in the conflict has in the past had a negative effect on it, have been able to shift their positions under their identity in relation to the EU.

In the present time, the fact that the conflict remains unresolved while Cyprus is a member state of the EU could prove problematic, both for the EU and the two sides of the island. For this reason, it seems that a great amount of effort is being undertaken by all parties to diminish the conflict level. However, it also seems that not all parties agree that a final resolution in the very near future would be to the benefit of all. This situation calls for further options of involvement to be considered. It could be argued that over time, the EU has changed its role in the conflict from observer to what can arguably been described as increasing involvement in mediation. Thus, while in the beginning of accession negotiations its direct involvement in the conflict and the negotiation efforts was minimal it has in recent years become more central to the formation of final proposals regarding the specific solution to be achieved. With the entry of Cyprus as a divided island in the EU, the latter is increasingly called upon to devise ways in which the riddle of having Cyprus as one country in the EU, yet, as two separate areas with separate administrative structures on the ground, can be solved. In this sense, the package of measures for the north can be said to exemplify the EU’s response to this new role. At the same time, the failure of implementation of the measures thus far has also provided an example of how this pathway of involvement can cause additional issues of conflict, thus pushing the EU more and more into the role of mediator of the conflict. Retaining the expectation that a final solution to the conflict be reached in the very near future might perhaps be a way of avoiding this role. In order to realise this possibility the implementation of the more indirect pathways of influence might at this point prove crucial.
Executive Summary

Overview

This report has sought to present and analyse examples of some of the ways in which the EU has had an impact on the Cyprus conflict. Following on from the previous working paper on the Cyprus case, where this impact was analysed with reference to the social science literature published to date, in this paper, data collected over the last six months arising mainly from interviews with politicians, NGO and IGO representatives and other targeted individuals, relevant to the analysis of how EU impact is conceptualised on the ground level, has been presented.

In the first part of the report, a summary of the events that took place over the past six months was presented in order to explore the impact that the process of accession, which was finalised in this period, had on the conflict. The second part of the report attempted to isolate particular events within this process of accession where EU impact can most clearly be seen and to analyse this impact according to the project’s theoretical framework. This is based on the identification of four possible pathways of impact on the conflict, and was employed after consultation between the developers of the framework and other project partners to facilitate the comparison of the EU’s impact on the other conflicts examined by the project. In the third part of the report, the overall impact of the pursuit of these pathways was assessed. This was followed by an overview of the evolutionary dimension of the impact that was analysed in previous sections. Finally, the conditions of change at the level of the conflict were outlined. The overall results were summarised in the conclusion section.

Thus, the EU’s involvement with Cyprus might be said to have impacted on the conflict in the following ways:

1. Through linking of EU membership to the solution of the problem, which also provided a context in which negotiations to solve the political problem proceeded in parallel with EU accession negotiations. This is made clear through the various documents relating to Cyprus’ and Turkey’s EU accession published by the EU. The fact that, at each stage, progress in negotiations for a solution was considered important for the continuation of accession negotiations can be said to constitute the ‘compulsory’ impact of this pathway.
2. Through the provision of a discursive context within which a shift in political rhetoric that focussed on the conflict could be undertaken and concessions reached for the sake of a solution within the EU could be articulated. This ‘enabling’ pathway appears to have been very successful in the north, and even though less so in the south not altogether useless, since this shift has indeed been adopted by opposition parties and on the rhetorical level by some government representatives as well.

3. Through seeking and establishing links with civil society representatives among the communities. This boosted bi-communal activities that have for years been undertaken with the support of UNOPS or the US-based Fulbright foundation, thus strengthening the connections between the two sides of the conflict on the level of civil society. More importantly, it also allowed channels of communication to be developed and thus strategies that catered specifically to the needs of this section of society to be adopted. This could be said to constitute the ‘connective’ impact of EU involvement.

4. Through providing a context in which the connections established with civil society representatives mentioned above could best be utilised, and the power of this section of the society strengthened. This happened most spectacularly in the north of the island, where Turkish-Cypriot civil society groups were able to articulate their support for a final solution to the problem, despite the concessions the Turkish-Cypriot side might be asked to make for the sake of EU membership, on the better prospects for the future that that membership would entail.

A more detailed outline of the impact of the various examples of EU involvement in the Cyprus conflict cited in this report is provided in the following schematic outline. Where more than one pathway apply to the event, the most relevant is mentioned first and the same applies to the assessment of positive and negative overall impact (where in the presence of both temporal considerations are usually involved).
### Schematic Outline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event in Conflict</th>
<th>Pathway of EU Involvement</th>
<th>Assessment of Effects on Conflict</th>
<th>Addressees of EU / other Involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Luxemburg meeting: launch of accession process with Cyprus</td>
<td>compulsory</td>
<td>negative (bi-communal meetings stopped)</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriots; Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Helsinki meeting: prospect of Cyprus becoming a member even if divided affirmed</td>
<td>compulsory enabling</td>
<td>positive (negotiations launched) negative (rejection of final solution enabled)</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriots; Turkish-Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-</td>
<td>Bi-communal project funding</td>
<td>connective</td>
<td>positive</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriots; Turkish-Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Copenhagen meeting: finalisation of negotiation process regarding membership</td>
<td>compulsory</td>
<td>positive (negotiations intensified) negative (lifting of possibility of sanctions on Republic if responsible for final rejection)</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriots; Turkish-Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>Turkish-Cypriot demonstrations</td>
<td>constructive connective</td>
<td>positive</td>
<td>EU; Greek-Cypriots; Turkish-Cypriot leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>ECHR decisions</td>
<td>enabling</td>
<td>positive</td>
<td>Turkish and Greek-Cypriot governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Athens meeting: Act of Accession signed and Protocol 10 adopted</td>
<td>compulsory</td>
<td>positive</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriots; Turkish-Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Opening of Green Line</td>
<td>enabling</td>
<td>positive</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Announcement of package of measures in support of Turkish-Cypriots</td>
<td>enabling</td>
<td>negative (minimal implementation) positive (prospects of future implementation)</td>
<td>Turkish-Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Elections in north: Talat voted into office</td>
<td>enabling</td>
<td>positive</td>
<td>Turkish-Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-</td>
<td>EU-related job opportunities to both communities</td>
<td>connective</td>
<td>positive</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriots; Turkish-Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Affected Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Final negotiation stage and referenda</td>
<td>enabling</td>
<td>positive (proposed solution plan finalised) negative (plan rejected in Greek-Cypriot referendum)</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriots Turkish-Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Launch of school books on EU</td>
<td>constructive</td>
<td>positive</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>EU parliamentary decision regarding Cyprus, Verheugen’s speech, investigation of allegations regarding curtailment of free speech</td>
<td>compulsory constructive</td>
<td>negative (enabled rhetoric of ‘victimisation’ and nationalism by Greek-Cypriot leadership) positive (prospect of sanctions shown)</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriots Turkish-Cypriots Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaderships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Green Line Regulation adopted</td>
<td>compulsory</td>
<td>positive</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriot leadership; Turkish-Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Economic aid package approved</td>
<td>connective compulsory</td>
<td>positive</td>
<td>Turkish-Cypriots</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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