The indirect impact of the EU on border conflicts:
Assessing the enabling and constructive impact of the EU in parliamentary debates and party programmes in border conflict regions

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1. Introduction

This paper addresses the indirect impact of the EU on border conflicts. Conceptually, it draws in particular from an analysis of the indirect pathways of EU impact on border conflicts, as developed by Diez, Stetter and Albert (2006). More specifically, this paper looks at the enabling and compulsory impact of the EU in four selected border conflicts, namely Cyprus, Greece/Turkey, Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland. Empirically, it mainly looks at data from parliamentary debates and party manifestos in these respective countries. The overall objectives of this analysis are twofold. Firstly, to outline to what extent the EU has over time become a point of reference in the political debates amongst conflict parties in each of the aforementioned conflict-cases and to specify the ways in which these references serve as a legitimisation or de-legitimisation of de-securitising policies. This analysis will be helpful in determining the degree to which the enabling impact of the EU, i.e. the indirect, structural impact of the EU on the level of local policies operates in the four conflict-cases. The second dimension, namely the study of the way in which references to the EU have become part-and-parcel of domestic political discourses and the specific value-dimension to which these discourses become linked, allows to draw conclusions on the constructive impact of the EU, i.e. the indirect, structural impact of the EU on the wider societal level.

The paper is divided into three main sections. The following section (2) focuses on the enabling impact of the EU, thereby presenting the empirical data on the role of the EU in domestic parliamentary debates and party manifestos for each of the four conflict regions. Section 3 then assesses on the basis of an analysis of the way in which the value-dimensions becomes interlinked with EU-discourses in the four conflict regions to what extent the EU has had a constructive impact on these four border conflicts. While sections 2 and 3 will discuss the four case-studies individually, Section 4 will shortly summarise the main results of this study from a comparative perspective.

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1 The data on these four conflict cases has been selected and analysed by the respective researchers who study these conflicts in the EUBORDERCONF project. Bahar Rumelili has looked at political debates in Greece and Turkey from 1995 to 2005 by analysing parliamentary debates and newspaper articles, Olga Demetriou has compiled data on parliamentary debates in the Republic of Cyprus since the 1960s, Katy Hayward has focused on party manifestos in the recent 2005 elections for the House of Commons and parliamentary debates in Northern Ireland and the European Parliament from 1998 until 2005 while Haim Yacobi uses data from interviews with policy-makers in Israel and Palestine.
2. The enabling impact of the EU

Northern Ireland

The enabling impact of the EU in Northern Ireland on cross-border cooperation and reconciliation crucially depended on the linkage between EU-discourses and the legitimisation of conflict-diminishing moves on two levels: (a) by the British and, to a lesser degree, the Irish governments and (b) by politicians in the local conflicting parties. The EU had been effectively prohibited from establishing an independent and direct role in relation to Northern Ireland until the 1990s, when such activity was eventually made possible by the new (and formalised) dispensation of the British government towards external involvement and the emerging multilevel character of European integration. In response to the growing activity of the EU at a local level, political parties in Northern Ireland developed more comprehensive policy positions on European integration, to such a degree that policy towards the EU has become a point of distinction among as well as between unionist and nationalist parties. Thus, political discourse in Northern Ireland on the subject of the EU reflects both the influence of the EU on local politics and the use of the EU as a campaign issue by local politicians.

The importance of the EU for cross-border cooperation is reflected in the degree to which the EU arises as a feature around the subject of the North/South Ministerial Council (NSMC) during debates in the Northern Ireland Assembly.² In a phrase that resonates with the EU, the fundamental aim when deciding the shape and competences of the NSMC was to create a Council ‘which is of mutual benefit to the people in Ireland, North and South’.³ The idea of mutual benefit is accepted by unionist as well as nationalist politicians as the rationale for cross-border cooperation, as it is legitimised by the paths already laid by the EU in this area. For example, when asked about the work of the Ministers for Education through the NSMC to harmonise teaching qualifications between

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² The devolved Northern Ireland Assembly was established in accordance with the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. It met first in July 1998, and was temporarily suspended on four occasions due to a stand-off between the political parties, the last occasion being October 2002. At the time of writing (November 2005) it has not been reinstated.
³ Seamus Mallon, SDLP MLA and Deputy First Minister, Northern Ireland Assembly, 14 September 1998, emphasis added.
north and south, Martin McGuinness responded, ‘Under European Union Directives we have already gone a long way towards the mutual recognition of teaching qualifications’. Even unionist ministers (with the exception of the DUP, which would not take part in NSMC meetings), used the EU context to legitimate the development of further north-south cooperation. Reg Empey, UUP MLA and then Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Investment in the Northern Ireland Executive, reported back to the Assembly discussions held with his southern counterparts on a paper on the creation of a ‘Digital Island’. Empey emphasises the ‘European Union dimension to extended collaboration in this area’, and notes that the NSMC, ‘discussed the potential for enhanced North/South co-operation in science and technology through a variety of EU programmes [and] a pan-European network’.

Another dimension to formalised cross-border cooperation in Ireland has been the north/south Implementation Bodies. The inclusion of the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) as one of the six bodies dealing with matters of common interest on an all-island basis indicates the importance of the EU for cross-border cooperation. Moreover, according to the SDLP’s Mark Durkan, speaking as Minister for Finance in the Northern Ireland Executive, the SEUPB serves:

‘as a tangible, further reflection of the support and solidarity that has been shown by the European Union in seeking to advance reconciliation and peace and of its commitment to the new dispensation heralded by the Good Friday Agreement.’

Indeed, the North/South Ministerial Council frequently underlines, ‘the important contribution to peace, reconciliation, regional development and cross-border co-operation made by European Union programmes’. Mark Durkan’s predecessor as leader of the SDLP, John Hume, has led the way in viewing the EU as a ‘transferable model for

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5 Reg Empey, UUP MLA and Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Investment, Northern Ireland Assembly, 9 September 2002.
6 Mark Durkan, SDLP MLA and Minister for Finance, Northern Ireland Assembly, 26 June 2000.
7 Durkan, 26 June 2000, *ibid.*
conflict resolution’. Hume draws direct parallels between the EU model and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, stating that ‘the structures of the EU are clearly reflected in our new political institutions’.

Other Irish and nationalist politicians are more cautious in attributing a direct correlation between the model of the EU and of the 1998 Agreement, preferring to refer to the ‘inspiration’ of the European Union. For example, the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Bertie Ahern, tells an audience in Cyprus (then a prospective EU member-state as well as case of border conflict):

‘we in Ireland have found inspiration in the European experience throughout the peace process… in the European Union we see one of the best examples of conflict resolution in the world, one which holds lessons for us all.’

Even British political discourse credits the EU with being an inspiration. The then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, acknowledged this in her address to the European Parliament following the Good Friday Agreement. She said, ‘we look to the European Union for inspiration’, as a place ‘where old enmities have been put aside’ and where ‘boundaries and divisions are overcome… where a sense of belonging exists beyond national boundaries’. Mowlam goes so far as to say that the Agreement ‘may never have been accomplished’ without ‘our many friends, in the European Parliament, in the Commission, and among the Member States’.

The limits of the EU’s enabling impact can, however, be seen when looking at election manifestos of the main Northern Ireland parties, as for example those of the May 2005 election campaign for the UK Parliament. Statements on the EU in these manifestos reflect unionist parties’ perception of a potential threat to the sovereignty of the United

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9 John Hume, Speech by the Leader of the SDLP, Newcastle, Co. Down, 10 November 2001.
11 Mo Mowlam, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Address to the European Parliament, 29 April 1998.
Kingdom, both within Northern Ireland and by the European Union. As a consequence, they oppose ‘unnecessary constitutional change’ within the UK and the EU, the European constitution being ‘yet another attempt to create a European super-state, giving the EU rather than the United Kingdom Parliament control of key issues’. The centrality of the national parliament is reflected in the DUP’s assertion that its MPs have been active in ‘campaigning against the further encroachment of Europe in our national affairs’. Yet the DUP does not hold a simplistically centrist vision of contemporary politics. It is notable that the DUP’s manifesto sets out an image of the DUP as an actively multilevel party, working for the community, ‘At every level, whether it is for Westminster, Europe, the Assembly or Local Government’.

The concept of multilevel, ‘joined-up’ governance is taken to a new degree in the manifestos of the SDLP and Sinn Féin, both of which make far more reference to the EU than any other party manifesto in Ireland or the UK. As well as detailed sections on EU affairs, both manifestos make reference to the EU context in virtually every other sector, including ‘job creation, growth and competitiveness’, ‘community and voluntary’, ‘farming and rural development’, ‘regional development’ and ‘education’. Similarly, both parties also make reference to the all-Ireland context in virtually all sections, making a point of extending their policy remit beyond Northern Ireland to the rest of the island and the EU. The SDLP – perhaps the most consistently and vocally pro-European party in Ireland and Britain – sees the EU model and context as facilitating effective transcendence of the border. For example, according to its 2005 election manifesto, it seeks the close integration of Northern Ireland into ‘Trans-European Networks’ and views the multilevel EU model as one to imitate in governmental reform.

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12 DUP Election Manifesto, May 2005, 16.
15 DUP Election Manifesto, May 2005, 13. See also: ‘We are working at Local, National, and European level for the interests of the Northern Ireland farming community.’ (p.20) and, ‘At every level, in every constituency, the DUP serves the community and helps people with their problems.’ (p.15).
16 Quotations taken from subheadings in SDLP Election Manifesto and Sinn Féin Election Manifesto, May 2005.
17 For example, the delivery of public services could be improved by inviting ‘LSPs, Councils, voluntary bodies or new partnerships… to bid for central government funds to deliver services locally, similar to EU funding models’ (SDLP Election Manifesto, May 2005, 10).
whose move towards ‘constructive engagement’ with the EU has developed in parallel with its move into mainstream politics, sees the EU as a means to an end. Under a section titled ‘Ireland is moving towards unity and independence’, the manifesto says that Sinn Féin has led the way in ‘Campaigning in Europe and in Ireland for an increase in INTERREG and Peace funding’. This indicates a clear association of EU measures with an ‘island-wide approach’ by nationalist parties. Yet, although nationalist and unionist politicians have entirely different perceptions as to the goals of cross-border cooperation, reference to the EU has served to legitimise functional cross-border cooperation on all sides.

**Israel and Palestine**

The situation in Israel and Palestine is, of course, different to the case of Northern Ireland since neither of the two conflict-parties is a member of the EU. However, both parties are associated with the EU in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and have both concluded Action Plans for intensified association with the EU in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Due to their different type of relationship with the EU, there is a basic difference in terms of the type of intervention and influence which the EU can exercise over Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). In respect to Israel, the EU has to deal with a sovereign state and can, at the very most, increase or decrease the extent to which it promotes cultural, economic and sporting ties. The potential influence of the EU is far greater with respect to the PA which depends on substantial EU assistance for the daily existence and management of its fledgling institutional structure. While EU relations with Israel are mainly based on trade cooperation between two highly developed first world and modern economies (Ahiram and Tovias 1995), its relations with the PA are mainly based on the provision of significant financial assistance and aid packages. This, according to Stetter (2003), is an attempt to stabilise the weak economic and political structures of this nascent state. This policy is expressed by the fact that the EU has been the biggest donor to the PA, and there is no other country in the world which has received as large an amount of assistance from the EU as Palestine (Stetter 2003: 57). For example, in 2001 and 2002 the EU provided 10 million Euro per month in

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direct budgetary assistance to the PA. The support is directed towards the budget of the PA helping to secure expenditures such as public service salaries, as well as social, educational and health services. An additional 10 million Euro have been allocated to the World Bank Emergency Services Support Programme to support operational costs in the health sector; and a further 10 million Euro was implemented in a special programme to support services at the level of the municipalities (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations). The EU also transferred 29 million Euro to the PA for humanitarian reasons (Haaretz, 28.10.2002). These major determinants also affect the difference in the way in which the enabling impact of the EU operates with regard to the two conflict parties.

As part of the enabling pathway EU aid for the Palestinian takes place in a number of areas such as (see also Newman and Yacobi 2004b). Firstly, the EU has been active in exerting pressure on the PA to undertake significant governmental and administrative reforms (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/gaza/intro). In June 2002, the PA, in response to domestic and international pressure, adopted a wide-ranging programme of reform with the EU becoming a reference point for these reforms and, more indirectly, for the need to lower the intensity of the conflict since otherwise domestic reforms could not be achieved. A number of important measures were taken, such as the adoption and entry into force of the Basic Law as well as legislation on the independence of the judiciary. In February 2003, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) adopted the 2003 budget which was, for the first time, made public and posted on the Internet. Significant progress has been made with regard to the management of the PA’s public finances, and, in particular the strengthening of financial control.

During the Second Intifada, EU assistance was aimed at maintaining the daily existence of the PA and, at the same time, using these aid packages to demand internal economic and democratic reform on the part of the Palestinian leadership. Often in the face of sharp criticism at home and abroad, the EU supported the PA with direct budgetary assistance at a time when its revenues were withheld by the government of Israel. According to Chris Patten, the former External Relations Commissioner of the EU, without the EU
assistance ‘there would have been no Palestinian interlocutor for the negotiations now under way’ and he also added that ‘at every step, the EU’s help was made conditional on reforms that would make a viable Palestinian state a reality one day and in the short term make the Palestinian territories a better, safer neighbour for Israel’ (The Financial Times, 17.7.2003).

EU efforts in support of these reforms are mainly via financial assistance, although it was also actively involved in the preparation of the Palestinian presidential elections which were held in January 2005 following the death of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat. Reform conditions have been attached to EU assistance to the PA from the outset. As recognised by the international community at the last Ad Hoc Liaison Committee in Rome in December 2003, ‘EU budgetary support and its conditions as well as US support, has over the past years been successful in advancing key reform measures such as financial accountability’, thereby providing local actors that support these policies with crucial backing. According to an IMF report, the conditionality attached to EU assistance to the PA have contributed to a transformation of ‘the Palestinian Authority to a level of fiscal responsibility, control, and transparency which rivals the most fiscally advanced countries in the region’ (http://www.eu-del.org.il/newsletter/english/default.asp?edt_id=16&id=220).

In order to strengthen the rule of law in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the European Commission supports the modernisation of the Palestinian judicial system with a programme launched at the end of 2003. The 7 million Euro judiciary programme seeks to reinforce the judicial institutions created in the Basic Law, provides training to judges and prosecutors, and funds the refurbishment of selected courts. The EU also provides extensive support to the preparation of Palestinian elections as it did in 1996. In addition to these programmes specifically addressing reform issues, the Commission ensures that part of the financial assistance programmes are devoted to capacity-building for the beneficiaries (e.g. private sector institutions, civil society, municipalities).
Another area in which the enabling impact of the EU in the Middle East can be seen are in the educational sectors of both countries, in which the EU aims at promoting ‘reconciliation and peace, both in Israeli and Palestinian society’ (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations). This is of particular importance given the generalised and ongoing Israeli critique that the PA has not done enough to change the structural conditions of socialisation through which Palestinian children are taught about Israel and Judaism in their schools (Brown 2001, 2002; IPCRI 2004a and 2004b). Although the European Commission has not recently committed funding for education ‘it is fully supportive of individual EU Member State and other donor efforts to develop a modern system of Palestinian education’ (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/faq/):education’.

‘This is one of the essential building blocks of a future democratic Palestinian state living in peace with Israel. Rather than ignoring Palestinian education, international donors should be encouraged to support these efforts and do all it can to generate a culture of tolerance and mutual understanding between peoples. Withdrawal of donor support to the Education sector would have severe repercussions on these early efforts of the Palestinian Authority to introduce a more balanced education curriculum’. (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/faq/).

While not recently contributing financially to educational reform, the European Commission has nevertheless called on the PA to speak out against incitement to hatred and violence, particularly in schools. In this context the Commission was encouraged by the PA’s 100-day plan of 25 June 2002 in which it declared its intention to ‘renounce fanaticism in the educational curricula and spread the spirit of democracy, enlightenment and openness on a wide scale’ (http://www.edume.org/about/about1.htm).

These measures by the EU also shape the way in which Palestinians refer to the EU and the extent to which the EU becomes a reference point in political debates in Palestine. Samih Shbeid, an academic at Birzeit University, highlights the interrelation between the EU and the Palestinians stating that ‘the stronger we are the better European support
we’ll get’. Also he argues that ‘the Arab attitude is also important for us and can help in a better European attitude and support.’ (interview, 22.05.2004). This point of view is further expressed by Ahmed Majdalani, another Palestinian academic:

‘The EU intervention in this conflict is always needed and always good. It is wanted and positive. Europe is a historical partner of the Arab world and we share with Europe the Mediterranean Sea, so we have with Europe much more in common than we do with the USA. There are also commercial and economic relationships with Europe, and this supports our relationship with it... Europe has an effective role; it has been the main partner for the PA as well as the main “fund supporter” for the Palestinians so it can play a more effective role when there is will.’ (interview, 15.5.2004)

There are, of course, some other voices which question this way in which reference to the EU really legitimises conflict-diminishing moves in Palestinian politics. Thus, Samir Hazboun from Al-Quds University and Executive Director at DATA, a research and consulting institution in Bethlehem (interview, 19.7.2004) criticised this over-reliance of Palestinians on the EU arguing that ‘what we want from the EU is to be more Palestinian than we are, to resist the occupation and get us a state! We should recognize that the EU is an ally of the PA not a replacement’, thus rather pointing to ways in which the EU could potentially become a factor that enables conflict-increasing moves in Palestinian political discourse.

Nevertheless, the EU enabling pathway is a central form of intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, mainly in the case of Palestinian political discourse.19 The above mentioned programmes reflect the way in which this pathway operates and highlight the efforts of the EU to influence the socialisation of policy-makers in conflict regions into a ‘European’ discourse, thus overall having a de-securitising effect on the conflict.

19 It has been shown elsewhere, that in Israeli politics reference to the EU in contrast often functions to legitimise securitizing moves due to the ambivalent identity relations of Israelis with the EU (see Dachs and Peters 2004). See also section on the EU’s constructive impact further below.
Since the early 1980s, Greek-Cypriot parliamentary debates became more and more concerned with the EU’s impact. This concern intensified and became more explicit the closer the Republic got to accession, thereby underlining the relevance of the enabling impact in Cypriot politics.

While parliamentary discussions were for most of this period centred on the ‘conflict’ as the primary referent of discussion about the EU, in the period since the year 2000, prior to accession, the focus of these discussion became more mechanistic and concentrated on institutional procedures of harmonisation (see also analysis on Cyprus in the subsequent section).

It can thus be argued that by this point, the EU, that had been viewed as a player that could catalyse changes in the progress towards a solution in the intervening years, has become to be seen as an issue quite separate from internal changes in this respect.

When studying the enabling impact of the EU in plenary debates in the parliament of the Republic of Cyprus it is useful to differentiate between four different periods, which correspond to different periods of EU-Cyprus relations, namely 1960-63, 1963-90; 1990-2002 and 2002-04.

Debates during the first two periods are not directly related to the EU but relate to the conflict. It could in fact be argued that a closer mirroring of the conflict history could be presented in this context by inserting 1974 and 1983 as further reference points. However, since at this point parliamentary discussions did not really involve references to the EC/EU in relation to the conflict, they did not provide fertile ground for tracing instances of enabling impact. The separation into these four periods, however, of what can otherwise be considered a single ‘pre-EU’ period in parliamentary discussions, has been deemed necessary because 1963 marked a fundamental change to the work of the Republic of Cyprus parliament, as this was the period during which the parliament held joint sessions, i.e. included Turkish-Cypriot parliamentarians. With the start of post-
independence inter-communal violence, the parliament lost its bi-communal character and was in practice henceforth a Greek-Cypriot institution with observers from the three recognized ‘smaller communities’ of the island: Armenians, Maronites and Latins.

On the other hand, the period between 1990 and 2002 was the most relevant in researching the relation between EU and the conflict in parliamentary debates. This is so because 1990 was the year of the Republic’s application for accession and in the period that followed this some of the most heated debates and opinions about this link were to be witnessed in parliamentary discussions. One year in particular stands out in relation to this, namely 1992, the year when the Gali Set of Ideas was tabled, which was a framework for an agreement on the solution of the problem but which was much more sketchy than later UN documents, such as the various versions of the Annan Plan, but a substantial part of it was in fact incorporated into them. This was the time when a breakthrough to the conflict appeared imminent. This prospect, which was indirectly related to the prospect of EU accession, was the focus of a large amount of the parliament’s plenary session work.

The final period, 2002 to 2004 is set apart because of the point made earlier, namely that this was the period when discussions on the EU in the Republic of Cyprus Parliament focused more on the harmonization procedures, i.e. the passing of laws and revision of already existing laws in line with the requirements of EU legislation. Discussions of the conflict did not dissipate but were much less integrally tied to discussion of the EU than was the case in the previous period. This was most starkly to be observed in the sessions held around the time of the opening of the border in 2003, which will be referred to in greater detail in the following section.

_Greece and Turkey_
In the political debates on Greek-Turkish relations in Greece and Turkey since 1995, the EU has occupied a very prominent and visible position, reflecting, in a lot of ways, the increased involvement of the EU in Greek-Turkish relations in this period. However, the analysis of the political debates reveals that the EU has not figured in these debates in a
consistent fashion, thereby revealing a mixed balance-sheet when it comes to the enabling impact of the EU. Greek and Turkish politicians and opinion-makers have elicited from the EU multiple, and quite often conflicting, symbols, reference points, and identity discourses. How the EU figures in Greek and Turkish political debates has been affected by a number of factors, including the state of Greek-Turkish conflicts, the nature of the EU’s relations with the two countries, and how the two countries identify with the EU. The post-1999 improvement in Greek-Turkish relations, Turkey’s EU candidacy, Greece’s joining of the EMU, and the resulting positive identification with the EU in Turkey and Greece have all contributed to a change in how the EU figures in Greek and Turkish political debates. Prior to 1999, the EU, and accordingly ‘Europe’, were invoked as a marker of difference and justification for threat perceptions between Greece and Turkey as well as a reference point for the continuation of conflict-enhancing policies. Afterwards, however, the EU began to figure in political debates as a reference point for conflict-diminishing perceptions and policies.

In this perceptual environment, the EU’s various interventions in Greek-Turkish disputes had become reference points in legitimising the continuation of non-compromising positions with respect to Greece. For example, in a follow-up debate on the Luxembourg Council decisions in the TGNA (Turkish Great National Assembly), MPs from various political parties were united in characterising the EU as ‘an organization that implements Greek policy’, and ‘strongly condemning the EU’s tendency to see itself as [an impartial] party in Greek-Turkish disputes’, warning of the ‘dangerous consequences of this imprudent tendency’ (TGNA 1998). Even though Turkish policymakers were compelled to undertake certain initiatives as a result of EU pressure, they were always careful to deny accusations that they acted because of EU pressure in front of domestic audiences.

The improvement in Greek-Turkish relations after 1999 has brought out and, in turn, was made possible by two significant changes in the Turkish political discourses on Greece and the EU. The first is the ensuing positive identification with the EU in political circles, such that the constructions of the EU as an aspiration gained prevalence over the constructions of the EU as a threat. Turkey’s new identity position as an EU candidate
also facilitated the gradual internalisation of EU norms and procedures on the resolution of border disputes as requirements of European identity and a neutral basis to build a cooperative relationship with Greece. Turenc argued in the Turkish daily Hurriyet that ‘seeing the benefits of sharing common values and interests will bring the two countries closer to each other with every passing day. No one can believe that Turkey and Greece, who have come together in the same family, will remain foes from now on.’ (Turenc 1999)

The second important discursive change in political circles is the shift towards the construction of Greece as a ‘full, mature, and rational’ European state, and in a lot of ways as a ‘model’ for Turkey. Kohen argued in the Turkish daily Milliyet that ‘it is also difficult not to admire Greece’s current position within the Union… just a few years ago certain EU circles harshly criticized its weak economy and uncooperative attitude… Let’s admit that the pragmatic, progressive policies of the Simitis administration have played an important role in Greece’s successful rise within the EU ranks.’ (Kohen 2003)

Coupled with the unwavering Greek support for Turkey’s EU membership, this construction of Greek identity has facilitated the perception of Greek behaviour towards Turkey in the EU context in less hostile and conspiratorial terms.

3. The constructive impact of the EU

Northern Ireland

An example of the constructive influence of the EU in the Northern Ireland conflict in an embryonic form is reflected in political discourse in which the EU is presented as a ‘partner’ and the creator of ‘partnerships’ in the peace process. The following quotation from a speech by the Irish Taoiseach to a northern audience embodies the importance of this principle:

‘The essence and core of the Agreement is partnership. It is about accepting that partnership is the only way forward. …if we are to consolidate peace and have
stable politics that delivers good governance for the people of Northern Ireland, there must be full and inclusive partnership.\textsuperscript{20}

This is affirmed by his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Brian Cowen, who describes the aim of the 1998 Agreement as being to create ‘the politics of inclusive partnership’, and warns that, ‘no side can any longer escape the requirements of partnership’. To show that this new dispensation is possible, he points to Ireland’s membership of the EU which, he claims, has demonstrated that ‘making a real impact requires a collective effort with partners united in values and purpose’.\textsuperscript{21} It is quite usual for Irish and nationalist politicians to emphasise the European origins of the principle of partnership. John Hume, former SDLP MEP, gives the greatest credit to the ‘framework and ethos’ of the EU, whose, ‘values of partnership, equality, tolerance, respect for difference and inclusion, are the values that provided the inspiration for our Agreement’.\textsuperscript{22}

According to the structure of the Agreement, partnership has to work at three core levels, ‘between Nationalists and Republicans, Unionists and Loyalists’,\textsuperscript{23} ‘between both parts of Ireland’,\textsuperscript{24} and between Britain and Ireland. The EU has been crucial in developing a strong and active partnership between the two governments. Through participation in the European Council, they ‘have become used to seeing one another as partners with many shared interests and objectives’\textsuperscript{25} and ‘[w]orking together as equal partners removed any remaining imbalance that existed between [them]’.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, the support received by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20}Bertie Ahern, ‘Partnership as the only way forward’, Speech by the Taoiseach at the University of Ulster, Coleraine, 19 February 2004.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Brian Cowen, ‘Clarity; Courage; Change’, Annual John Hume Lecture delivered by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, MacGill Summer School, 20 July 2003.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Hume, 16 April 2003, \textit{ibid}.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Republicanism and loyalism are considered to be more hardline versions of nationalism and unionism respectively, and are for that reason these terms are often used to refer to groups with paramilitary connections.
\item Quotation from Mark Durkan, Speech by the SDLP Leader in Dublin, 27 February 2003.
\item \textsuperscript{24} John Hume, Speech by SDLP Leader at the SDLP Annual Party Conference, Belfast, 6 November 1999.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Bertie Ahern, Speech by An Taoiseach at the Founders’ Dinner, Institute of European Affairs, 29 March 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Brian Cowen, Remarks by the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs at a Conference on the Future of Europe after Enlargement, Derry, N.Ireland, 11 October 2002.
\end{itemize}
the governments from ‘our partners in the European Union’\(^{27}\) during the peace process is seen as continuing through their efforts to implement the Agreement in full.\(^{28}\) For Irish, British and nationalist politicians, this means realising the transformative ‘potential of new partnerships in the North’ at all levels.\(^{29}\) At the local level, for example, the aptly-named District Partnerships (created to overseeing distribution of community-level funding) see, ‘[p]eople from all sides working together in a positive and constructive way’.\(^{30}\) At a regional level, ‘[p]artnership and consensus are at the heart of Northern Ireland’s new government’.\(^{31}\) At an all-island level, cross-border projects are ‘based on agreement between equal partners[,] grounded on a sound practical basis[,] and deliver mutual benefits’.\(^{32}\) The EU is seen not only as a model but as a partner in this process.\(^{33}\) Thus, in order to ‘ensure that the new politics of partnership are fully harnessed’ in Ireland, Brian Cowen confirms that the two governments will work ‘in partnership with the European Union’.\(^{34}\)

Yet, although the British Prime Minister seeks in the Agreement, ‘a real partnership between governments and peoples, which will engage our societies at every level’,\(^{35}\) the absence of any unionist discourse on ‘partnership’ indicates a fundamental weakness in any constructive influence for the EU in political discourse in Northern Ireland. Precisely because of the potential of ‘new lines of partnership across the island’ in the EU context, nationalist and unionist politicians have contrary approaches to this concept.\(^{36}\) This means that constructive discourse based on ‘European’ ideals cannot be conceived to be

\(^{27}\) David Andrews, Address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Exchange of Notifications ceremony, Dublin, 2 December 1999.
\(^{28}\) Cowen, 11 October 2002, \textit{ibid}.
\(^{30}\) Mowlam 29 April 1998, \textit{ibid}.
\(^{31}\) Peter Mandelson, Address by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland at the Exchange of Notifications Ceremony, Dublin, 2 December 1999.
\(^{32}\) Liz O’Donnell, ‘EU Cross-Border Co-operation after the Good Friday Agreement’, Address by Minister of State at the Department of Foreign Affairs, 10 May 2001.
\(^{33}\) Dick Roche, ‘The North/South Dimension in Ireland’s Future Relationship with Europe’, Address by the Irish Minister of State for Europe, Armagh, N.Ireland, 8 September 2003.
\(^{34}\) Cowen, 20 July 2003, \textit{ibid}.
\(^{35}\) Tony Blair, Speech by the British Prime Minister to the Oireachtas (Irish Houses of Parliament), Dublin, 26 November 1998.
neutral. The desire of one section of the population to preserve the border and by another to transcend it means that, simply put, the EU will always be viewed more with suspicion by unionists and with idealism by nationalists.

Even in their approach to European integration, unionist and nationalist parties in Northern Ireland broadly reflect the approaches of the British and Irish governments respectively. If unionists see Britain as having to defend its interests in Europe, nationalists see Ireland as needing to pursue its interests in Europe. Thus, nationalist parties have placed a much greater emphasis on the significance of the EU than their unionist counterparts. This difference is reflected in the profile the EU is given in local political campaigns. For instance, in their manifestos for the general election to Westminster in May 2005, the nationalist Sinn Féin and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) dedicated whole sections to setting out their policies on European affairs. In contrast, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) made few and fleeting references to the EU in their Westminster manifestos. Even more interesting is the fact that the most specific references to the EU (setting out opposition to the Euro, for example) in the unionist manifestos come within sections on the parties’ role at national level, under the headings: ‘A role in the affairs of the nation’ (DUP) and ‘The People for a strong and secure nation’ (UUP). This encapsulates unionist belief that EU affairs are very much a national concern.

Israel and Palestine

When assessing the EU’s constructive impact on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it has to be assessed whether there is a wider societal impact of the EU on political debates in both countries. However, the overall constructive impact of the EU has been rather small. This is because of two main reasons. The first is the fact that this pathway depends on a long-term process which is sustained by some economic and political stability, which is absent in the Israeli-Palestinian context. The second reason has to do with the sensitive notion of identity on both sides which is so central to the escalation of the conflict.
Attempts by the EU to indirectly impact identity constructions in Israel and Palestine, have been referred to by Jean Breteche, a former EU representative in East Jerusalem:

’It's very clear. You have a policy, which may be simplistic, but it is very clear for us. We consider that what we want in this region, or what we would like to see in this region, which is neighboring on Europe, is peace. Not only between Israel and Palestine, but also with Lebanon and Syria and, it's done more or less with Jordan, Egypt… Without this state of Palestine, side by side with Israel, without that peace couldn't be achieved. So if we want to do that… we need a state. So if we need a state, we need a strong transparent, well managed, peaceful state’ (interview, 28.4.2004).

However, the constructive impact of the EU on the overall conflict continues to be restricted mainly because of the weak integration of both parties with the EU, which only foresees association in the context of the EMP and other initiatives. Additionally, there also is a sceptical view of the EU, in particular in Israel, which limits the EU’s ability to become an acceptable reference point for the re-enactment of identities and the sustained de-securitization

Cyprus
When the Gali Set of Ideas was tabled in 1992, discussions of it only occasionally referred to the EC as an alternative identity-frame for promoting Greek-Cypriot positions (VI.I. [7/5/1992]: 2505, 2552). The bulk of them focused on expressing nationalist objections to accepting that solution framework.

At the same time, there were references in those meetings to European examples as models in terms of which the conflict could be viewed. Thus, Germany, Austria and Switzerland, along side the US and Australia were cited by one MP as examples of successful federal systems that proved that Cyprus should not be ‘ashamed’ of adopting one (VI.I. [8/5/1992]: 2664). In the same meeting another reference was also made to
national decisions about the goal of a prospective solution that likened them to the Maastricht Treaty (VI.I. [8/5/1992]: 2680).

By 2002 the focus had shifted to issues of accession and the passing of laws that would allow the negotiations with the EU to run smoothly. These matters were almost automatically ‘declared urgent’ (VIII. II. [12/9/2002]) and in most instances the relevant laws were approved with minimal discussion.

This is in stark contrast to the meetings held after the opening of the border, where matters relating to regulating the crossing of Turkish-Cypriots from the north (e.g. regarding driving licences) were not only hotly debated, but also debated in terms of both process and content with decisions repeatedly postponed (VIII.II. [8/5/2003]: 48). In this sense, these ‘debates on the debate’ (when the issue should be discussed and in what detail), can be said to represent a failure to make the most of the constructive impact that became possible to utilise after the opening of the border.

In short, it could be argued that there was in fact a difference between the perceived changes in the Cyprus conflict towards a solution that the EU was expected to catalyse and the actual changes that took place in the final stages of accession and for which the Greek-Cypriot political leadership appeared not to have been prepared.

**Greece and Turkey**

An analysis of the Greek political debates prior to 1999 reveals a prevalent construction of Turkey as *inherently* aggressive and provocative. For example, in a debate in the Greek Parliament on 6 November 1997, Karamanlis explained as the leader of the main opposition party New Democracy that ‘Turkey has a very clear policy… in breach of international law, aggressive, provocative, dangerous, consistent, and timeless. It advances its own objectives… chooses the time…’ (HP 1997: 1250). Another major characteristic of the discourse on Turkey is the depiction of Turkey as monolithic and unable to change. During the same debate, Karamanlis also added that ‘there is a systematic policy from the other side which everyone pursues’ (HP 1997: 1250) and
Tsouvolas, leader of the opposition party Democratic and Social Movement (DIKKI) noted that the ‘Turkish political system and the Turkish economy do not allow for a different type of relations… This system can never become democratic’ (HP 1997: 1269)

In this period, the constructive influence of the EU discourse manifested itself in the representations of Turkey also as inherently non-European and unable to Europeanise (Rumelili, 2003). It was argued, for example, in the Greek daily *Ta Nea* that ‘Turkey’s Europeanness stems from geo-political and geo-strategic factors… In actuality, Turks are closer to Asia by civilization, thinking, language, and instinct’ (Dountas, 1995). A Turkey constructed as such can only be disciplined through the compulsory influence of the EU. The political debates in Greece prior to 1999 thus revolved around the question of whether Greece can convince other EU member states to direct this compulsory influence in a concerted way or it should resort to the veto. There was little if any discussion of the possible enabling influence of the EU on Turkey (i.e. HP 1999a).

Prior to 1999, the question of how to relate to Turkey within the EU context was further complicated by the ambivalent approach towards Europe and the EU in Greek discourse. According to Herzfeld (1987: 7), this stems from Greece’s ‘paradoxical status in the Eurocentric ideology.’ Ascribed the identity of the living ancestors of the European civilization, Greece has had to continuously live out the perceived imbalance between its mythical past and its present backwardness in relation to the contemporary states of Europe (Herzfeld 1987: 19). Prior to 1999, in the representations of the EU in Greek discourse, on the one hand, positively identified with the EU as the centre of civilization that includes Greece and excludes Turkey. However, on occasions where the EU was perceived as favouring Turkey against Greece, positive identification quickly gave way to the construction of the EU as imperialist and hostile. For example, the Athens daily *Niki* characterized the EU’s conclusion of the Customs Union Agreement with Turkey as an ‘unethical policy’: ‘The Europeans, who bear responsibility for the Turkish barbarism against the Greeks and Armenians at the turn of the century, have returned back to their imperialist roots’ (‘New Important Task’).
The de-escalation of Greek-Turkish conflicts within the EU context in the post-1999 period was made possible by and, in turn, brought out three fundamental changes in the Greek discourses on Turkey and the EU. The first was the shift from monolithic to more pluralist perceptions and representations of Turkey, while still employing the European/non-European distinction. Zoulas argues in the Greek daily *Kathimerini*: ‘Greece’s Foreign Minister is deeply convinced that there are two Turkeys. One is the Turkey of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan: pro-European, moderate, and flexible. The other is that of Turkish Chief of Staff Gen. Hilmi Ozkok: typically Eastern, intransigent and aggressive.’(Zoulas 2003) The pluralistic perception of Turkey has also triggered the realization of common identities and interests that cut across national lines: “People who are pro-Europe in Greece are probably more like people who are pro-Europe in Turkey than they are with their compatriots who might subscribe to some outlandish beliefs or conspiracy theories” (Konstandaras, 2002).

Secondly, the representation of Turkey as pluralistic and able to change has made possible its construction as susceptible to the EU’s enabling influence. This representation has become prevalent in Greece to such an extent that almost everything about Turkey has been made sense of within the discourse of ‘Europeanisation’. To justify the policy change towards Turkey, Prime Minister Simitis argued in Greek Parliament on 15 December 1999 that ‘We have opened the door to Turkey because we believe that the Europeanisation of Turkey would favour everyone’ (HP 1999b: 2364). Similarly, the political turmoil in Turkey and even conflict-enhancing behaviour towards Greece is represented as a ‘Europeanisation crisis.’ (Ioakimidis 2002)

Thirdly, the policy change towards Turkey has been grounded in a more positive identification with Europe and the EU. The sense of confidence that arose from fulfilling the conditions necessary to join the EMU initiated a process of redefining Greece’s identity as a ‘central’ European state. This new identity position is reflected in the frequent self-references to Greece as a “Eurozone member” instead of merely as an “EU member”(‘European Challenge’). In Greece, this change in self-identification came with new norms governing state behaviour, such that the deviant behaviours of a marginal
state were delegitimised and the responsibilities of a ‘central’ European state emphasised. Across party lines, the foreign policy vision of Greece was articulated as “acting as a catalyst for peace and economic development in the enlarging Europe” (Papandreou, 2002) and “becom[ing] EU’s anchor of stability in the Balkans” as the only EU member, and the most democratically stable and economically affluent country in the region. (Karamanlis, 2000). Reflecting a complete identification, the Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman Koumoutsakos reportedly said during the December 2004 Brussels European Council that ‘whatever is European is also Greek and whatever is Greek is also European.’ (Bourdaras 2004) Similarly, the Greek daily Kathimerini commended the Greek Prime Minister for attempting ‘to behave like a European leader, and not a Balkan leader’ during his visit to the US in January 2002’ (‘Greece Pursues Rapprochement’). Greek policymakers have repeatedly justified their policy change towards Turkey by reference to European norms. In fact, the Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou explained the policy change in December 2002 as: ‘Our experience in Europe has taught us that the stability of our neighbour gives us strength.’ (Papandreou 2002)

In Turkey, prior to the improvement in relations with Greece, the prevalent representation of Greece was as a ‘neighbour’ and an ‘ally’ (in name only) that ‘has made a habit of hostility towards Turkey’ (TGNA 1996b), and ‘lives off’ (TGNA 1996a) of its problems with Turkey. The Greek policy of using the EU as a lever against Turkey has been made sense of in terms of the dominant metaphor on Greece as ‘the spoiled kid of Europe’, which implies immaturity, undeservedness, and abuse of position. Therefore, Greece was identified at best as a ‘fake-European’ (Rumelili 2003). Thus, as in Greece, Europe served as the basic denominator of identity, reflecting the EU’s constructive influence.

Also in Turkey as was in Greece, these constructions of Greece and the EU were rooted in an ambivalent identification with Europe and the West in general. There is a fundamental tension in Turkish discourse, emanating from the simultaneous construction of Europe as an aspiration and as a threat (Rumelili 2004). The construction of the EU as a threat flourishes on the memories of the dismemberment of Ottoman Empire at the hands of European powers (i.e. Sevres Syndrome), while the desire to validate Turkey’s
identity as modern and European constitutes the EU as an aspiration. The deteriorating state of Turkey’s relations with Greece and the EU prior to 1999 have legitimated and reproduced the constructions of the EU as a threat and the related historical analogies. For example, during a debate in the Turkish Parliament on 20 April 1996, in opposing the referral of the Greek-Turkish disputes to the ICJ, Dincer made an analogy with how Mousul was ‘taken away… by international institutions… even though Turkey was right’ (TGNA 1996a). Within this historically-inspired discourse, many representations of Greece and the EU assumed as natural that the EU would support [Christian] Greece in relation to [Muslim] Turkey. Kislali argued in the Turkish daily Cumhuriyet: ‘We have to accept that whether due to efforts of the Greek lobby in the US, or stemming from a close culture like in the EU, the West favours the Greek side’ (Kislali 1999).

4. Conclusion: Differences between conflict parties and effect on EU impact

The analysis of this paper on parliamentary debates and political discourses in the four conflict regions on the EU allows us to draw some conclusions on the indirect ways in which the EU is able to influence the patterns of border conflicts. As far as the enabling impact is concerned, this paper has referred to both positive and negative conditions of the EU’s enabling impact. Thus, the conditions that underpin a conflict-diminishing impact on the enabling dimension can in particular be found in those instances in which the EU serves as a model for concrete structures for cross-border cooperation, as in the Northern Ireland case. This model-character of the EU can operate on two separate dimensions, either with the EU being a justification for conflict-diminishing moves (e.g. in Palestinian domestic reforms) or as an inspiration for a more peaceful future (e.g. in Greece and Turkey). Moreover, as the Cyprus-example shows the enabling impact of the EU is particularly strong if it is coupled with a concrete accession perspective, because the final years of membership negotiation require from local actors to invest a significant amount of political resources on harmonisation issues related to the acquis – thus leading to a (temporary) increase of political issues that are not directly linked to the conflict. Yet, the Cyprus-case also illustrates the limits of the enabling impact, since if a conflict is not solved with accession, the reference to the EU risks to become a marker of difference rather than a model for more cooperation. This experience has also been made in
Turkish-Greek relations prior to 1999. Moreover, the enabling impact is structurally limited if the EU is perceived by one of the two conflict-parties as a threat (e.g. by unionists in Northern Ireland or in Israel) and, thus, always risks to be perceived as being one-sided.

As has been referred to above with regard to Israel/Palestine, the constructive impact is, if successful, the most pervasive one but it is also the most demanding pathway, since it requires a reconstruction of entrenched conflict-identities. Clearly, this is a long-term process which is subject to certain constraining conditions, such as perceptions of EU-bias with regard to the respective other conflict party (e.g. Israel, unionists, Turks before 1999). Often these negative perceptions of the EU go hand in hand with negative historical experiences with ‘Europe’, such as in Israel (but also Palestine), Turkey (but also Greece) and Cyprus. Moreover, the EU is often perceived as a threat since it challenges the very identity constructions that are constitutive to conflict societies. However, if successful, the constructive impact becomes a powerful tool in a sustained transformation of conflict patterns and there are two different processes related to that. Firstly, the reference to the EU as a model on a wider societal level can bring to the fore new partnership discourses that link cross-border cooperation with what is perceived as the ‘European way’ of cross-border cooperation, as this has been the case in Northern Ireland or Greece and Turkey. Secondly, the constructive impact of the EU can put in place a virtuous circle, with the reconstruction of identities allowing to de-construct previously homogenous constructions of the respective Other. Once such a process has started, it becomes more likely that discourses that advocate that the Other is susceptible to change gain more prominence. Such horizons of possible change to long-lasting conflict patterns can finally lead to a reconstruction of self-perceptions, thereby leading to more cooperative and even friendly identity relations between former foes. That such processes are not limited to the often cited French-German example has been amply illustrated above with regard to Greek-Turkish relations – although it has to be emphasised that discourses of securitisation have not entirely vanished in this, let alone the other conflicts under consideration. However, this paper has not attempted to argue that the indirect pathways of EU impact have led to a disappearance of conflict.
discourses. What it does, however, claim is that the indirect forms of EU impact are a crucial factor in the transformation of border conflicts and that a mere analysis of direct ways of EU involvement would hardly be able to detect the subtle ways in which conflicts and conflict societies are often indirectly affected by the EU.
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Appendix on the Cyprus data [by Olga Demetriou]

The data on which the observations on the Cyprus-case are made is based on transcripts of parliamentary sessions in the parliament of the Republic of Cyprus. These documents were collected through research in the archive library of the Parliament during a series of visits in the winter of 2004-2005. The assistance of staff there has been of major importance to this research, and specifically of its librarian, Androulla Lakes.

The transcripts that formed the focus of this research, were those of the plenary meetings of the parliament, although some of the reports available from parliamentary groups committees, especially those of the Committees of European Affairs and Human Rights, were also of interest and examined.

Transcripts of parliamentary debates were collected from the Parliamentary library of the Republic of Cyprus. Transcripts from the TRNC parliament were not available. Debates were collected from various meetings of the parliament in the period between the late 1980s and 2004, with increasing emphasis on the later years, when the debates around the EU and the conflict intensified in parallel to the intensification of accession negotiations. These transcripts are as follows:

Πρακτικά της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων: Δ’ Βουλευτική Περίοδος – Σύνοδος Γ¹: Συνεδρίαση 17ος Νοεμβρίου 1983 (Ώρα έναρξης 5.42 μ.μ.) (Αρ. 9) [Transcripts of the House of Representatives: Parliamentary Period IV – Summit III: 17th November 1983 Meeting (start time 5:42 p.m.), (No. 9)]


Πρακτικά της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων: ΣΤ’ Βουλευτική Περίοδος – Σύνοδος Α’: Έκτακτη Συνεδρίαση 8ης Μαΐου 1992 (Ώρα έναρξης 4.30 μ.μ.) (Αρ. 40) [Transcripts of the House of Representatives: Parliamentary Period VI – Summit I: 8th May 1992 Urgent Meeting (start time 4:30 p.m.), (No. 40)]


37 In this list I provide the full details of the documents consulted. Thus, the titles are first given in full in the Greek original and translated in square brackets. However, in subsequent references these texts are referenced in their abbreviated form based on the English translation. This is done by citing the Period number, followed by the Summit number, the two being separated by a full stop. The numerals used for these numbers follow the Greek numerical sequence in the original. However, since this would have caused unnecessary confusion, I have converted these to Roman numerals, in order to aid the non-Greek-counting reader. Thus, in this example, the specific document would be referenced as IV.III [17/9/1983]. The insertion of the date in square brackets serves the purpose of identifying the specific meeting, since in the Parliament’s filing system, both ‘periods’ and ‘summits’ can run well over one year.
Πρακτικά της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων: ΣΤ’ Βουλευτική Περίοδος – Σύνοδος Α’: Έκτακτη Συνεδρίαση 16η Ιουλίου 1992 (Ωρα έναρξης 4.10 μ.μ.) (Αρ. 51) [Transcripts of the House of Representatives: Parliamentary Period VI – Urgent Summit: 16th July 1992 Urgent Meeting (start time 4:10 p.m.), (No. 51)]

Πρακτικά της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων: ΣΤ’ Βουλευτική Περίοδος – Έκτακτη Σύνοδος: Συνεδρίαση 9ης Σεπτεμβρίου 1992 (Ωρα έναρξης 4.16 μ.μ.) (Αρ. 1) [Transcripts of the House of Representatives: Parliamentary Period VI – Urgent Summit: 9th September 1992 Meeting (start time 4:16 p.m.), (No. 1)]

Πρακτικά της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων: ΣΤ’ Βουλευτική Περίοδος – Έκτακτη Σύνοδος: Συνεδρίαση 23ης Σεπτεμβρίου 1992 (Ωρα έναρξης 5.09 μ.μ.) (Αρ. 2) [Transcripts of the House of Representatives: Parliamentary Period VI – Urgent Summit: 23rd September 1992 Meeting (start time 5:09 p.m.), (No. 2)]

Πρακτικά της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων: ΣΤ’ Βουλευτική Περίοδος – Έκτακτη Σύνοδος: Συνεδρίαση 25ης Σεπτεμβρίου 1992 (Ωρα έναρξης 4.13 μ.μ.) (Αρ. 4) [Transcripts of the House of Representatives: Parliamentary Period VI – Urgent Summit: 25th September 1992 Meeting (start time 4:13 p.m.), (No. 4)]

Πρακτικά της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων: Η’ Βουλευτική Περίοδος – Σύνοδος Β’: Συνεδρίαση 8ης Μαΐου 2003 (Ωρα έναρξης 5.38 μ.μ.) (Αρ. 27) [Transcripts of the House of Representatives: Parliamentary Period VII – Summit II: 8th May 2003 Meeting (start time 5:38 p.m.), (No. 27)]

Πρακτικά της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων: Η’ Βουλευτική Περίοδος – Σύνοδος Β’: Συνεδρίαση 29ης Μαΐου 2003 (Ωρα έναρξης 4.19 μ.μ.) (Αρ. 30) [Transcripts of the House of Representatives: Parliamentary Period VII – Summit II: 29th May 2003 Meeting (start time 4:19 p.m.), (No. 30)]

Πρακτικά της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων: Η’ Βουλευτική Περίοδος – Σύνοδος Β’: Συνεδρίαση 5ης Ιουνίου 2003 (Ωρα έναρξης 4.08 μ.μ.) (Αρ. 31) [Transcripts of the House of Representatives: Parliamentary Period VII – Summit II: 5th June 2003 Meeting (start time 4:08 p.m.), (No. 31)]

Πρακτικά της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων: Η’ Βουλευτική Περίοδος – Σύνοδος Β’: Συνεδρίαση 19ης Ιουνίου 2003 (Ωρα έναρξης 4.15 μ.μ.) (Αρ. 33) [Transcripts of the House of Representatives: Parliamentary Period VII – Summit II: 15th June 2003 Meeting (start time 4:15 p.m.), (No. 33)]

Πρακτικά της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων: Η’ Βουλευτική Περίοδος – Σύνοδος Β’: Συνεδρίαση 3ης Ιουλίου 2003 (Ωρα έναρξης 4.10 μ.μ.) (Αρ. 35) [Transcripts of the House of Representatives: Parliamentary Period VII – Summit II: 3rd July 2003 Meeting (start time 4:10 p.m.), (No. 35)]

Πρακτικά της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων: Η’ Βουλευτική Περίοδος – Σύνοδος Β’: Συνεδρίαση 10ης Ιουλίου 2003 (Ωρα έναρξης 10.20 π.μ.) (Αρ. 36) [Transcripts of the House of Representatives: Parliamentary Period VII – Summit II: 10th July 2003 Meeting (start time 10:20 a.m.), (No. 36)]

Πρακτικά της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων: Η’ Βουλευτική Περίοδος – Σύνοδος Β’: Ειδική Συνεδρίαση 14ης Ιουλίου 2003 (Ωρα έναρξης 10.05 π.μ.) (Αρ. 37) [Transcripts of the House of
Representatives: Parliamentary Period VII – Summit II: 14th July 2003 Special Meeting (start time 10:05 a.m.), (No. 37)]

Πρακτικά της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων: Η’ Βουλευτική Περίοδος – Σύνοδος Β’: Συνεδρίαση 14νης Ιουλίου 2003 (Ώρα έναρξης 11.05 π.μ.) (Αρ. 37) [Transcripts of the House of Representatives: Parliamentary Period VII – Summit II: 15th July 2003 Meeting (start time 11:05 a.m.), (No. 38)]