Beyond the Paradox: Religion, Family and Modernity in Contemporary Bangladesh

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Religions and Development
Research Programme

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- How do religious values and beliefs and religious organisations influence the relationships between states and societies?
- In what ways do faith communities interact with development actors and what are the outcomes with respect to the achievement of development goals?

The research aims to provide knowledge and tools to enable dialogue between development partners and contribute to the achievement of development goals. We believe that our role as researchers is not to make judgements about the truth or desirability of particular values or beliefs, nor is it to urge a greater or lesser role for religion in achieving development objectives. Instead, our aim is to produce systematic and reliable knowledge and better understanding of the social world.

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- University of Bath, UK: Centre for Development Studies.
- Indian Institute of Dalit Studies, New Delhi.
- University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
- Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan.

In addition to the research partners, links have been forged with non-academic and non-government bodies, including Islamic Relief.

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Summary

This paper reflects on how people talk about religion and the family to explore the apparent paradox of a contemporary Bangladesh that is both ‘more modern’ and ‘more Islamic’. While questions of religion and politics have tended to dominate observers’ agendas, in the everyday it is changes in the family (and the gender and generational orders that it embodies) that are a more central focus of anxiety and contestation over the place of religion.

The paper begins with theory: how the paradox is framed by classical social science expectations of religious decline and how it has been addressed by some contemporary writers. It then notes how changes in the structure and ideology of family offer parallels to the shifts observed in religion and how these have a common basis in modernist constructions of ‘public’ vs ‘private’ spheres. This is followed by introducing the religious context of Bangladesh, the centrality of the family and some of the major challenges that modernization is presenting to its established structures. Drawing on wider research, including a series of in-depth interviews, the main section considers how notions of the family and especially the gender order are mobilized in rhetorical conflicts between ‘religion’ and ‘development’ and in moves to capture the moral order and harness it to a particular religious – or political - vision. It examines how people make sense of what happens, in terms of their own efforts, fate, or providence; how changes in gender and generational relations provoke profound anxiety about social status, material security and the broader moral order; and how recent symbolic confrontations between fundamentalist religion and development or women’s organizations call on different understandings of religion. Ways in which reformist Islam is attempting to use the family to capture and re-shape the social or political order are illustrated by a comparison of the political party, Jamaat-e-Islami, and the pietist movement, the Tablighi Jamaat.

For some people then, the answer to the moral crisis lies in ‘more religion,’ and some use religion to articulate new narratives of the family. The paper argues, however, that to see the issue as fundamentally ‘religious’ is a category error. Instead, the changing place of religion and the changing uses that people seek to make of it are part of a much broader process of moral questioning and social realignment. As social and economic change challenges people’s sense of the underlying moral order, so it simultaneously reshapes both the character of religion, and the ways that it can be drawn on to marshal that order more broadly. The paper makes clear that religion is not ‘just politics’, but offers a grounding to a moral universe that governs the everyday. Paradoxically, perhaps, it also shows that religion is not ‘just religious’, if religion is understood as referring to a separately
demarcated sphere of life. While people in Bangladesh do talk about religion in this limited sense, as a particular set of practices and beliefs, they also use religious references much more broadly, to mark what is important to them, to say things about themselves. The paper comments that in the Bangladesh context there seems no obvious reason why being identified as ‘religious’ should either qualify or disqualify actors from engagement with development objectives and activities. Instead, it argues, organizations and the work that they are doing should be judged in social, economic and political terms, with their religious identity considered only if it impacts on development objectives, for example by enabling access or promoting exclusion. In closing, the paper returns to theory, suggesting that the importance of the private and personal in late modernity as a site for governance and the production of identity may constitute an important factor underlying the apparent paradox of religion’s ongoing significance.
1 Introduction

‘The family itself is a religion for us.’ (shongshartaei to amader ekta dharma)

RA - 40a Mm

For most of its history Bangladesh has been a by-word for poverty and (under)development. Recently, however, this has changed. The ‘litany of grim statistics’ (Arthur and McNicoll, 1978) of Bangladesh’s twentieth century profile is giving way to a cautious heralding as a development success. In 2006-7 annual growth in GDP was recorded as 6.5 per cent (BBS, 2007). Dhaka has been transformed from a sleepy backwater in the mid-1980s to a megalopolis of some 7 million souls (BBS, 2007), with the characteristic extremes of slums and shopping malls, traffic jams and pollution, dust-filled factories and high rise universities. New roads, electrification and mobile phones connect once remote villages into the nation state and global market. Brick kilns are everywhere, producing the hardcore on which construction depends in a country built on Himalayan silt. Soldiers and armed police mark the fragility of a democratic settlement that has never seen the military far from the centre of power.

In classical social science such transformations in economy and society are expected to accompany the decline of religion. In fact, however, the predominantly Muslim identity which has been used to score the territorial boundaries of what is now Bangladesh is receiving renewed emphasis. Muslims now make up almost 90 per cent of the population (Bangladesh Census, 2001).1 Although the Constitution of Bangladesh when it was newly liberated in 1971 asserted the separation of religion and politics, within a few years Islam re-emerged as part of the political lexicon. Labour migration to the Arabian Gulf is increasingly common, bringing new money and new cultural influences in its wake. City and village landscapes are peppered with more, and more elaborate, mosques; official schedules give way to accommodate prayer and fasting; more people are adopting more comprehensive forms of Islamic dress. From an overwhelming stress on the economy, there is therefore a new register amongst commentators on Bangladesh: a focus on religion, and especially its more fundamentalist forms, addressed primarily as an issue of politics (e.g. Seabrook, 2002; Riaz, 2004, 2008; Karlekar, 2005; Datta, 2008).

This paper interrogates the sense of paradox evoked by a contemporary Bangladesh that is both ‘more modern’ and ‘more Islamic’. In place of public politics, however, it locates this question in discussion of the family. The focus on family is not random, but reflects its centrality to the social order, and thus to people’s expressed anxieties about social change. Family in Bangladesh is the
core institution for the delivery of welfare and social control, as well as the performance of gender and age-based roles and responsibilities; it stands as a microcosm for the wellbeing of society as a whole. As such it plays a central part in the construction of the moral order, which is also commonly expressed in religious terms. This ties religion and the family closely together: since both ground and symbolise the moral order, changes in either will have implications for the other. As we argue below, these relations are also emphasized and re-cast by the contradictory dynamics of modernization, which are re-structuring both family and religion in contemporary Bangladesh.

The paper begins with theory. This has two aspects. First, I trace how the ‘paradox’ is framed by dynamics of modernization in Europe and how it has been critiqued by some contemporary scholars of Islamic societies. Second, I note how changes in the structure and ideology of family offer parallels to the shifts observed in religion and how these have a common basis in modernist constructions of ‘public’ versus ‘private’ spheres. I then introduce the cultural context of Bangladesh, with the patriarchal family at the centre of an ‘enchanted’ world. Religion does not appear something set apart, but an everyday point of reference in discussion of family, which people use to conjure a moral universe, to mark what is important to them, to say things about themselves. This does not mean, however, that meanings are settled or the ‘traditional’ order uncontested. The next section points out some of the major challenges that modernization is presenting to the established structures. These open space for notions of the family and especially the gender order to be mobilized in rhetorical conflicts between ‘religion’ and ‘development’ and in moves to capture the moral order and harness it to a particular religious – or political – vision. The following two sections present differing examples of this. The final section brings this empirical discussion back to the theoretical, arguing that the primacy of the personal within modernity offers a further dimension of why the supposed ‘paradox’ of a religious modernity is not paradoxical after all.

The research on which this paper draws took place in 2006 in two villages, one in Dinajpur district in north-west Bangladesh and one in Manikganj district, near Dhaka in central Bangladesh. The interviews did not ask specifically about religion, but rather sought to explore more broadly changing patterns in the construction of marriage, family and identity. In most cases the paper therefore draws on religious references which arose naturally in the course of conversation, rather than in response to a specific prompt. The interviews involved 70 respondents, comprising a cross-section of Muslims.
and Hindus of different wealth categories and a small minority of non-Bengali Adivasis (tribal people). I have assigned a classification code to each individual, identifying them in very basic terms by sex, religion, and a very basic economic distinction – ‘rich’, ‘middle’, poor.
2 Dismantling the paradox

The sense of paradox surrounding states like Bangladesh that are characterized at the same time by advancing globalized capitalism and the increased visibility of Islam derives from the European path to modernity. The first aspect of this is secularization. From the Enlightenment into the drive towards industrialization came a massive increase in the complexity of the division of labour, establishing, for example, separate professions, academic disciplines, and institutions of law, market and state. Religious institutions similarly became more specialized and more removed from the centres of power to their own separate - and more peripheral - sphere. While some countries have established the state as strictly secular, in many there remains some role for religious actors and institutions in the public sphere. Even there, however, the sphere of influence has been re-defined. Religion has become a ‘matter of conscience’, concerned with issues of values and beliefs, something associated predominantly with the personal rather than public sphere. Early theorists of modernity thus famously expected that religion would disappear altogether, part of the ‘childhood of humankind’, an ‘enchanted’ worldview overtaken by an evolutionary process of scientific progress and bureaucratic rationalization. Against such expectations, the current prominence of religion, particularly in some forms of nationalist politics, appears paradoxical: a riddle that some scholars suggest is explained by the moral emptiness of modernity, which people turn to religion to fill (see, for example, Thomas, 2004).

The second aspect of the framing of this ‘paradox’ relates to Islam in particular and the way it has been rendered as the ‘other’ of modernity. Evident in gross forms such as Huntington’s (1993) ‘clash of civilizations’ theory, this process of ‘othering’ is an essential part of the constitution of the modern. Grossberg (1996, p. 93) puts it like this:

The modern constitutes its own identity by differentiating itself from an-other (usually tradition as a temporal other or spatial others transformed into temporal others).

As Said (1985) has shown in Orientalism, Islam and Islamic societies offer a paradigmatic case of this ‘other’, being associated with the exotic, erotic, quixotic and barbaric. This has cast a long shadow, particularly for those forms of Islam that are seen as politically hostile to the West. Thus Lara Deeb (2006, p. 15) argues:

Despite a plethora of literature about Islamism and modern(ities), less has been written about how Islamists and pious Muslims themselves grapple with what it means to be modern, without assuming the nature of the links between modern-ness and the West. Instead, much of this work has held Islamism to be either a cultural resistance to a
Western modernity, or only selectively modern. Both these perspectives generally work from that historicist understanding of modernity as based in the West, with Islamists either written outside that universalizing project or allowed within its technological, but not its cultural, spaces.

Reacting to similar issues, Mahmood (2005, p. 25) argues that Islamism and liberal secularity are closely interwoven, through “historically shifting, ambiguous, and unpredictable encounters.” Deeb slices through the supposed oppositions as she describes “an enchanted modern” amongst the Islamists she studied in Shi’a Lebanon, proposing that

... rather than view[ing] Islamists as necessarily engaged in a struggle with modernity, we can instead view spiritual progress as a potential aspect of the modern (Deeb, 2006, p. 18).

A final thread that unravels the ‘paradox’ is drawn from within the European experience itself. The secularization that shifted religious institutions in Europe from the centre stage was associated not simply with a move from one category to another, but rather with the constitution of public/private difference as a key organizing principle of modern society (Edholm et al, 1977). Critical to this construction of the ‘private sphere,’ of course, is its identification with the family. While this positioning of the family has become so foundational that it appears ‘natural’, it is important to remember that it is anything but. As any anthropological textbook will show, in pre-modern society family – or ‘kinship’ - typically provides the accepted basis for wide-reaching structures of social, economic and political organization. Feminist scholarship has also pointed out the important articulations between public ‘production’ and private ‘reproduction’ (e.g. Edholm et al, 1977).

With the constitution of the private sphere come new narratives of the person, which offer new discursive resources with respect to religion and family and the way relations between them are conceived. For the family, changes in the material structures of living together are accompanied by shifts in ideologies of love and care. Evidence from around the world suggests that (more individualist) discourses of love, passion, choice and romance are increasingly challenging earlier narratives of (social or collective) duty, obligation and honour (see, for example, Abu Lughod, 1990, on Bedouin people in Egypt; Kendall, 1996, on Korea; Collier, 1997, on Andalucia, Spain; Joseph, 1999, on the Lebanon; Ahearn, 2001, on Nepal; and the Osellas, 2008, on Kerala, India). Similar discourses of individual responsibility and choice re-calibrate the orientation of religion from the collective and taken
for granted to a matter of reflective cultivation; from inherited affiliation to chosen identity and personal conviction.

If the public sphere is the realm of power, being located in the private might mean exclusion from political influence on the one hand, or liberation from political control on the other. Such arguments have been applied to both religion and the family. Two considerations, however, suggest that this needs reconsidering. In the first place, the politics of identity have brought supposedly ‘private’ attributes (such as gender or sexuality) into the grammar of public claims-making (see, for example, Fraser, 1997). Secondly, following Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* (1981) the private sphere has been analysed not as an arena of personal freedom, but rather as itself a site for the ever more invasive extension of power and governance. Modernity, in this reading, has not brought sexual liberation, but rather has constructed sexuality as a site of power, in which a “polymorphous incitement to discourse” requires individuals to construct ever more detailed narratives of the self. Nikolas Rose (1990) pursues this line further as he seeks to explore power not, as commonly imagined, as a constraint on subjectivity, but rather how it constitutes subjectivity and individuals “free to choose”. Individuals are encouraged to take responsibility for their own wellbeing, seeking for their personal fulfilment the goals or activities that are institutionally or socially valued (*ibid*, p. 208). For Rose, as a result, “life has become a skilled performance” (p. 238), in which the promise of perfectibility through technical control comes at the cost that “the self becomes the target of a reflexive objectifying gaze” – with each person his or her own sternest critic (p. 239). Although secular in tone, this phrase has strong resonance with Saba Mahmood’s (2005) description of the goal of the Islamist mosque movement in Egypt as the cultivation of the “pious self.” A word of caution is in order here. To point out similarity is not to imply that it is identical. The religious idiom of submission is very different to that of technical control. Also there are many forms in which modern selves may appear, bearing the marks of the cultural resources on which they draw as well as the social and political context in which they emerge (see Haniffa, 2008). Drawing attention to the ‘politics of the personal’ in this way, however, clearly suggests that the articulation of religion in the public sphere may not be as surprising as some commentators would lead us to believe.
3 The moral order and the family

Having introduced the theoretical context, I now turn to research data from Bangladesh. A sense of moral order and one’s relationship to it pervades all of the interviews drawn on in this analysis, across gender, class, age, ethnic and religious differences. Views differ on how far what *is* tallies with what *should be* and the details of how it should work in practice, but at the heart of the moral order is the notion of right relationships. In expressing this sense of order, people at times make an explicit religious reference and at times do not. In contrast to the modernist identification of religion with a distinct area of life, for most of our respondents this sense of order is simply part of what is taken for granted, the everyday, not something privatized or set apart. In classic Weberian terms, this is an ‘enchanted’ worldview. Geography is marked by sacred or dangerous places, the graveyard that must be walked around or the forest where spirits live. Most famous, of course, are the notions of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ that govern women’s mobility and scope for activity in the purdah (seclusion) idiom shared – though with some differences in practice – between Muslim and Hindu. Time too – the rhythm of days, of the seasons, of the years, and the cycle of an individual life – is elaborated in sacred as well as practical ways. The moral order is seen to be written in nature, society and religion. Thus to get married is at once a good thing, a fulfilment of nature, a social responsibility and a religious duty. To get children married well is a primary responsibility of parental guardianship and the focus of major personal and cultural anxiety. The arrangement and celebration of marriage is a collective enterprise, in which Allah or the gods are honoured and bonds of kinship and community are animated and extended, well beyond the individual couple involved.

As introduced above, family is at the heart of the moral order in Bangladesh. Structurally, it is the core social institution, fundamental to the broader organization of economics, politics and society. It provides the pattern for an individual life, in which to be married, raise a family and get one’s children married constitute the core duties and arenas of fulfilment. The family household is the primary unit through which basic needs are met and governance is delivered, on which are built both community (*samaj*) and administrative and government structures. The male head is ‘guardian’, responsible to the *samaj* for the behaviour of his household, his honour and social status dependent on their compliance. By extension, the elders of the *samaj* are seen as guardians of the community.

Family roles are strongly normative – for most people they constitute the foundational moral relationships, not only in the sense that the family is where children learn how to relate to others, but
also in offering templates of relationship which are then enacted in widely differing contexts. Kinship terminology offers an extensive structure of relationships, ranking people by gender, birth order, generation, and maternal or paternal line, and providing a rubric of practical rights and responsibilities, expectations and claims. Understandings of kinship also shape relationships beyond the family proper, such that employers are frequently termed ‘uncle’ and school teachers ‘elder sister’. Both symbolically and materially, the family thus constitutes the basic unit in which the moral order is instantiated in its primary form: a pattern of hierarchical relationality, animated by concepts of status and honour, awarding priority to older over younger, male over female, within an idiom of guardianship. In this it provides a classic case of microcosm for the moral order, as Douglas and Ney (1998, p. 32-3) define it:

The idea of microcosm provides a mode of abstraction from the smaller to the greater and back again. At the same time it gives the principles for prescribing good behaviour and provides the principles for theory-like predictions about the interactions between humans and the natural world.

In daily living religious references are interwoven within this broader sense of the moral order. Lakshmi, the Hindu goddess of wealth, for example, personifies the integration of gender in the moral order, the infinite in the everyday. Associated with thrift, order, wealth and fertility Lakshmi offers Hindus and Muslims alike an idealization of wifehood and celebration of women’s place in the home. She was therefore referenced a number of times by women bemoaning the current practice of women working ‘outside’:

Women are the Lakshmi of the home. If they go outside, there will be no Lakshmi in the home.  
(RA - 4a Mp)

Ideal women are also advanced in Islamic terms, as in the following example:

The ideal mother will raise the children according to the tenets of Islam, and she won’t give value to what outside people say. The ideal mother should be kept busy with the children, family, cooking and general cleaning in the house. The ideal mother won’t go outside to gossip. Nowadays, mothers are going out to work because of shortage, this isn’t anything bad… but they have to maintain purdah. This is an Islamic rule.  
(SA -12b Mm)
For most women, some sense of ritual responsibility for the family goes along with this more general conformity to the proper order. Observance of religious practice is part of one’s everyday duties:

As a wife I do the work in my husband’s household. I cook food, sweep house, read the Holy Qur’an and pray, rear hens and ducks and grow vegetables. I never join in gossip or tell tales about others. I never act like a spy. I serve my husband. All these are my duties as a wife. I follow my husband’s command. (AB - 12a Mm)

In ideal terms at least, conformity with the moral order extends even to the level of emotions. At a discursive level, if not necessarily at the level of actual experience, what ‘is’ thus elides with what ‘should be’. Statements like the following are common:

Parents love all their children equally. This is the command of God as well. (SA -17b Mm)

The love of husband for a wife is unique, as is women’s love for their husbands. All women feel tenderness for their husbands. This has come from God, it cannot be questioned. (LN - 08a Mr)

Where things do not just come naturally, however, religion may be brought in with society to ensure proper behaviour:

It is also in religion that a girl has to obey her husband as the guardian…. All sacrifices have to be made for the husband. The girl whose husband is not happy with her will not get people’s appreciation nor anything in the life after death. (SA 17b Mm)

Both Hindus and Muslims re-iterated the common saying that “heaven lies under the feet of the husband”, although some remarked that the Qur’anic verse in fact states that “heaven lies under the feet of the mother.” Even women in very unhappy marriages affirm that the primacy of the husband is the proper order of things.

The proper ordering of relationships relates not only to the here and now, but critically to transitions from this life to the next. To die well, you should not die alone, but have family around you to celebrate the funeral rites and ensure you pass on in ways that set your soul free. Sons in particular are important in this but it can extend over generations. A poor Muslim woman shows how such ritual concerns are vitally intertwined with affect and concerns for material welfare:
I was most happy at the time of my first child’s birth because sons in the future work and earn money to feed their mother, and even if they don’t feed her from their earnings, they can at least take her to be buried. My son’s children will pray for me to Allah. My daughter’s children will first wash, eat and then pray for me at my grave. My son’s grandchildren will first pray at my grave and then wash and eat. (RA - 4a Mp)

The understanding of an external reference for ‘this life’ is fundamental to people’s framing of the temporal order, setting a sense of scale and providing an overall context within which people negotiate their own lives and interpret the actions of others. This offers a considerable challenge to the preoccupations of development projects, which are expected to produce measurable results against an annual or five year planning cycle.

For some, awareness of judgement is very strong, and they draw an explicit link between the way their lives will be assessed and their faithfulness in observance of religious practice:

Just being good when one is alive is not enough. One has to be in a good state when one is dead. To live well whilst alive assets are needed, a house is needed, a wife and children are needed and income is required. In order to be happy after death, one has to pray and fast, so that nothing bad happens after death. These things really have to be maintained because one is only alive for two days, but the life after death is eternal. (OA - 4b Mp)

For most, however, proper religious observance was something they (said they) wanted but failed to achieve, usually because they had too much work to do. Along with higher levels of religious practice amongst women than men, it was older people in particular who were more observant, and this was indeed seen as something of an entitlement of old age. They explained it not as a mark of their being more tradition-minded, but rather to do with their life circumstances: they had more time on their hands because the younger generation had taken over the major household responsibilities; and they were closer to death, and therefore more concerned about the judgement that was to come.

As well as using religious language and imagery to indicate the overall moral order, people employ them in much more personal ways. References to prayer and rituals offer a way of signalling what really matters – health, having children, a good marriage, the children’s future. Petitioning Allah or seeking spiritual help also mark deep desire or times of trouble. General statements about the way things are offer a means for people to say things about themselves. In the following section I explore
some dimensions of this, through considering what constitutes a classical indicator of modernity: how people make sense of what happens, in terms of their own efforts, fate, or providence.

### 3.1 Fate, God, effort, achievement

In her study of the different ways that Muslims in Bangladesh follow their faith, Banu (1992, p. 58-9) uses people's reliance on fate or confidence in their own agency as an indicator of how modernized or traditional they are. While I recognize the logic of this, I found that there was a general acceptance, across Hindu and Muslim, rich and poor, men and women, of the need to make an effort oneself, within the context of an overall moral order, in which outcomes were ultimately within the scope of God's final authority or gift. The strongest version of this was stated by a middle class male Hindu, who while modernist in outlook was also very serious about his religion:

> Your actions determine your fate (*kormo bhaggo niyontron kore*). (SKS - 01b Hm).

An older Muslim woman unable to work through ill health put it more bitterly:

> Will I get anything for just calling God's name? (M 011a - Mm)

Although our numbers are small, this was one area where a clear division could be seen by class. It was predominantly the poor who saw what happened as due to fate. The middle class were most likely to refer instead to effort. The much smaller number who attributed outcomes to choice or reasoning was exclusively drawn from the middle class or rich. While one might read this in terms of wealthier people being more modern, it is perhaps more directly explained by a capability approach, which would see the different perspectives as reflecting real differences by wealth in people's ability to influence what happens to them.

In addition to differences in who says what, there are clear differences in the contexts in which people speak. The mix of material and spiritual, own action and trust in God as ultimate power, is very evident in areas of high anxiety. In relation to infertility, for example, as elsewhere in the globe, people reported trying an eclectic mix of all the remedies available: formal and folk medicines, spiritual healers, religious offerings, prayer, and rituals (see, for example, Inhorn, 2003). After long stories of trial, trauma and expense, in the end people put the outcome down to God. This is true whatever the
outcome: if they got a child, “God gave God’s gift” (A – 06a Mp), if not, “We await the grace of God” (TP - 3a Mm).

A number of things may be going on here. At one level people are signalling real limits to their control. With respect to infertility, there is of course an established discourse of children being God’s gift. In addition, even with the best infertility treatment available, there is a randomness to the results, and a high rate of failure, which leaves space for an extra-scientific explanation of its results. This is all the more the case with the level of treatment to which the people involved in this research could gain access. Medical treatment generally in Bangladesh is an uncertain affair, reinforcing the tendency to turn to spiritual sources of help in crisis that is found the world over. In either case, people seeking treatment typically suffer a serious deficit of information and are making decisions on the basis of far from perfect knowledge. At another level, however, they are signalling their humility and conformity with the moral order. Through statements that Allah is holding all, or that they are in God’s hands, people identify themselves as satisfied, or at least accepting and having made their peace with their situation:

The way God keeps me, it is good. (B - 012a Mp)

However one might strive to improve one’s situation – and there is the clear sense that this is the correct thing to do – ultimately this attitude of acceptance of what is given is seen in Bangladesh as a critical indicator of maturity and virtue.

There is an interesting pattern here with references to fate. The import of references to God or fate is very similar – they signal acceptance of one’s situation. But all the references to fate relate to a negative situation, those to God (also) to a positive one. Sometimes this shift is even made within the same statement. LN - 08a Mr thus attributes to fate the fact that she never had a son. She then talks about how unhappy she was with her mother-in-law’s regime, and how much happier she is now that she is in charge of cooking and can use a big pot, which enables her to be generous. The positive change she attributes to God, saying that she is thankful and happy now with God’s blessings.¹⁰

Stating one’s reliance on God is also a way that people indicate the absence of support from anyone else and a general sense of insecurity. Widows are particularly vulnerable to this:
Whenever she feels alone or needs anything she goes to her brother’s or sister’s house to talk to them and tell them what she needs. She feels very uncertain since her husband died and prays to God for everything to be OK. Everything depends on God now.

(AB - 015a Mp)

Religious references can thus offer a legitimate means for a lament or even a complaint, in a discursive context which discourages drawing direct attention to oneself and valorises acceptance and adjustment (see, for example, Wilce, 1998). This avoidance of talking directly of oneself is evident in many of the ways people talk in Bangladesh. Engaging the listener with rhetorical questions is one example, in which speakers render ‘common knowledge’ what they want to say. Another is to make a general or even proverbial comment – “a woman’s life!” - in a way that refers to but does not explicitly describe one’s own situation. Das (2000, p. 220) describes for Punjab how this may be rendered even more indirect by being apparently addressed to no-one, but deliberately set up so that it may be “overheard”. Indeed, the structure of Bengali itself favours indirect constructions of speech, with the passive voice used frequently where an active construction would be used in English. While indirect speech is not limited to women, this discursive avoidance of claiming direct attention is clearly highly gendered. Wilce (1998, p. 4), for example, notes how wandering about, talking too much, using the grammatically unnecessary first person and singing can be taken as indices of female madness: “All of these, taken together, are viewed as a deviant attraction of attention to self.” The added value of religious references is clear – one shields oneself with pious conformity at the same time as one exposes oneself in complaint.

3.2 Changes in the family

Most of the data presented so far demonstrate continuity with a conception of family relations and the moral order that has endured for many generations. Given social science preoccupations with the new, it is not a bad thing to recognize that many cultural features are remarkably resilient to change. However, it is clearly the case that modernity is bringing to Bangladesh considerable challenge to the established order by gender and generation, in both material arrangements and social norms of authority, respect, deference, or proper behaviour between older and younger, men and women. As elsewhere, these reflect a whole range of factors: new technologies, greater integration into market and state, migration and urbanization, more education and increased diversity of employment, especially for women.
The cultural norm of a joint family household, in which married sons and their families live together in their father’s house, has now become relatively rare, with more separate (‘nuclear’) households becoming the norm. This continues a long term trend that reflects underlying changes in the economic structure. Narratives here concern a growing emphasis on the marital relationship; the increasing involvement of young people themselves in choosing their own marriage partners; and material anxieties about care and support in old age. These in turn refer back to the more general anxiety about the breakdown of the moral order: the rise of action motivated by personal desire rather than conformity with social rules; an increase in ‘greed’ or selfishness; and claims of rising interpersonal conflict. The aspect of ‘moral panic’ attending these issues may exaggerate the extent of change: the figure of ‘love marriage’, for example, appears as a kind of folk devil standing for disorder incarnate, but in the families of our respondents such marriages are actually relatively rare. This notwithstanding, it is clear that marriages are taking place later than they were, and social acceptance seems to have now shifted to ‘dekha-dekhi’ (look-see) marriage, rather than the previous model of sight unseen. There is difference in the detail of what people consider the form of ‘right relationships’ – whether the roles of husbands and wives should be more or less differentiated, or the significance of romantic love in marriage. However, the area of sharpest disjuncture concerns elderly parents, who feel that they can no longer depend on their children to look after them in old age. Where the family still supplies the majority of welfare, this constitutes a serious threat to elderly people’s material wellbeing. The loss of expected relationship and the way things should be presents a judgement on the way things are that, in some cases at least, combines to produce a profound sense of grief, isolation and alienation. It is interesting to note, however, that even though some elderly people expressed doubts about whether their children would care for them in old age, it was still absolutely taken for granted that they would fulfil their ritual obligations. This perhaps suggests some tendency towards narrowing of the explicitly ‘religious’ into a separate sphere within the moral order.

Changes in gender and generational relations provoke profound anxiety about social status, material security and the broader moral order. While changes must be negotiated at the personal level and within the everyday, they also provide fertile ground for local and national struggles for religious and political dominance. The following two sections describe some dimensions of this. The first discusses how gender is used to draw a set of symbolic oppositions between ‘religion’ and ‘development’. The second considers the central place of gender and family within one influential Islamic piety movement.
3.3 Symbolic oppositions

The 1990s saw a series of major public symbolic conflicts in the shape of ‘fundamentalist’ attacks on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and fatwas, mostly against ‘immorality,’ especially of poor women, and some against the gender work of NGOs. Both sides extracted maximum value from these events, posing them as confrontations between, on the one hand, obscurantist religion and ‘the mullahs’ against the NGOs as women’s advocates and harbingers of modernity; and on the other hand, religion as upholder of morality and authenticity against the NGOs as agents of imperialism.

High profile events hotly debated in the national press were only the most prominent examples of a whole series of more minor disputes that ricocheted across the country. Ainoon Naher (2005, p. 151) states that in the area she studied “one of the most significant accusations” against the NGOs was that they were seeking to break up the traditional family order through targeting women in their development programmes, dominant amongst which is the supply of microcredit. Thus in a large annual religious meeting (waz) it was claimed that the Grameen Bank, a major provider of loans to village women in Bangladesh, taught women to chant:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Shami boro na sir}^{15} & \text{ boro?} & \text{Is husband greater, or “sir” greater?} \\
\text{Sir boro, sir boro.} & \text{“Sir” is greater, “Sir” is greater.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(Naher, 2005, p. 152, my translation)

This same allegation, extended to NGOs in general, was reported by a focus group of elderly men in our research. While there is little doubt that its substance is false, it is interesting to muse on its structure. The alleged chant does not run: “Who is greater, husband or wife?” The perceived issue is not therefore the empowerment of women, but the replacement of domestic patriarchy by development patriarchy – or the local by the global; or the (Islamic) universal by the (Western? modern? secular?) particular, depending on one’s point of view. A second chant reported by Naher reinforces this:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Shamir kotha shunbo na} & \text{ We won’t listen to what our husbands’ say} \\
\text{Grameen Bank charbo na} & \text{ We won’t leave the Grameen Bank} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(Naher, 2005, p. 152, my translation)

In our research, the second chant reported took a rather different line, widening the sense of a shift in the moral order:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Shami boro na taka boro?} & \text{ Is husband greater, or money greater?} \\
\end{align*}
\]
This links into a broader set of associations over the increased centrality of money and its challenge to the moral order that were a recurrent theme in group discussions, especially amongst older men. These include a rise in demand for consumer consumption, the paradigmatic case of which takes a feminised form – sarees and cosmetics. The responsibility of husbands and fathers to provide for their families is seen to be strained by increasing expectations of both quantity and quality from wives and children, who a generation ago would have been happy with whatever a husband or father brought home. They also include competition between husband and wife over control over money, and marital tension and conflict when loans have to be repaid. There is also a class aspect: since it is mainly poorer people who rely on NGO loans, there is a paternalistic concern that they will be led into debt and ultimately left even poorer than before. The moral ambiguity of the NGOs which present the most evident material form of the alien forces that underlie such changes is encapsulated in the following description:

NGOs never listen to any defaulter. They will take tin off the roof or seize a cow if the client fails to pay. They know only money. This is nothing but an interest business.

(elderly male focus group)

In a rural Muslim context, terming NGOs ‘interest businesses’ places them triply outside the moral community: first for taking interest which is seen as haram, unclean by Islamic law; second for being a business when they make claims to being a humanitarian or social welfare organisation; and third for conducting a relationship on de-personalized terms, under which a loan must be repaid whatever hardship this causes to the borrower, so violating any notion of a moral economy.

Such highly moralized terms are not, however, the only way that NGOs and their loans appear in local narratives. In marked contrast to the focus group discussions, the individual interviews depict NGO credit in much more pragmatic terms, as providing one option amongst the many that people mobilize to make ends meet in difficult times. Here, instead of undermining ‘the family’, loans appear instead as an important means that families use to get by. People therefore talked of taking NGO loans to help them run the family; to pay a bribe to get a son a job; to pay dowries; to pay for a house; being wasted by a husband; being shared with sons; enabling a widow to support herself; and to buy clothes for Eid. What is striking in these accounts is how very much within the everyday are the options the NGOs provide and how seamless is the articulation between the ‘moral community’ of personalized lending amongst family and neighbours and the loans taken from NGOs, such that one is frequently used alongside or to repay the other.
These differences no doubt in some part reflect simply grumbling between different groups and the mix in the everyday of pragmatic action versus symbolic reflection. In amongst the posturing of ‘religion’ versus ‘development’, however, one can see the opportunities for play between modernist understandings of religion as a particular area of life with prescribed orthodoxies of belief and practice and more traditional notions of religion as woven into the fabric of the moral order.

### 3.4 Politics of religion

This play between different understandings of religion is very evident in the moves of reformist Islam to use the family to capture and re-shape the social or political order. Here I consider two main forms of reformist Islam in Bangladesh: the political party, Jamaat-e-Islami, and the pietist movement, the Tablighi Jamaat. The data so far have been presented in quite a generalised way, individual statements of many different individuals drawn together to present a composite image of continuities and change. This section concentrates instead on one individual, Amma Huzur (AH - 50aMm) a middle aged, lower middle class rural woman, who is closely associated with the Tablighi Jamaat, and leader of a talim (religious instruction) group that she began around fifteen years ago. Concentrating the focus in this way allows us to explore in a little more depth both what she says about gender and Islam and how this translates into practical terms in her life. I have chosen to focus on her specifically because, of all our respondents, it was she who came closest to Mahmood’s notion of someone dedicated to cultivating the ‘pious self,’ and thus at the heart of the theoretical paradox this paper seeks to address.

Just as the figure of Lakshmi places women at the heart of the family and the home, so the Tabligh and the Jamaat share a view that women’s religiosity is critical to the spiritual wellbeing of the family. Despite a considerable degree of shared theology, however, their styles and approaches are very different, so that there is considerable conflict between them. In simple terms, the Tabligh feel the Jamaat have sold out religion to politics; and the Jamaat feel the Tabligh are self-centred, self-indulgent, unwilling to take on the social responsibility of ordering society. While this opposition between them is keenly felt, there is nonetheless recognition that ultimately their efforts may pull in the same direction.
This general picture is reflected in the local context of our research. Amma Huzur’s hostility to the Jamaat-e-Islami is keen, not least because she has been personally attacked by them for moving around too freely, and because they have frequently tried to colonize her work for more directly political ends. Despite this, she grudgingly admits that “both of us are working on the same road”:

The Jamaat-i-Islami people are trying to establish law of Qu’ran as state law. They want to see honest people as social leader. We do not have any argument with that vision.

A Jamaati activist concurred with this. Having expressed his distaste for the Tabligh, and the major criticisms he has of them, he went on to say:

But in other ways, it helps us a lot for the national election. They are trying to spread Islamic values in every ladder of the society and not participating in the national politics. When the election time comes, we will take the benefit of their activity. Village people or town people if they become more and more pious, it is better for Islam. People will think about us before they give their votes.

The Jamaat do not, however, rely solely on the Tabligh to lay their foundations in society, they also work directly to mobilize an Islamist community. Maimuna Huq (2008, p. 461) describes one instance of this: reading sessions of the Jamaat-affiliated female students’ organization, the Bangladesh Islamic Chattri Sangstha (BICSa) which offers:

…a practice-oriented Islam – where deliberation amid participants, facilitated by the wide circulation of sermons on tape cassette and unfolding against a background of shared moral sensibilities, is integral to the cultivation of an everyday, embodied subjection to orthodox Islamic norms.

This would seem an almost textbook example of what Foucault or Rose describes: a modernist, even liberational idiom of learning and open discussion, which enables the enrolment of the students within particular structures of power.

As Foucault himself would caution, however, it is a mistake to assume that power runs only one way. Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi (b 1903), the founder of Jamaat-i-Islam, propounded a heavily patriarchal reading of the moral order, in which women should remain strictly within the home and at all times under male authority. Practical politics have made this a difficult line to hold. Jamaat was the first organisation to grant membership to women as individuals on the basis of the Qur’an and Hadith,
obliging them to preach its ideology to their families and even disobey their male guardians if they commanded women to sin against Allah (Ahmad, 2008, p. 10). From a position of limiting women’s political participation to the right to vote, Maududi even supported a female candidate\(^9\) in Pakistan’s January 1965 presidential elections as a lesser evil than Ayub Khan’s martial law regime (Shehabuddin, 2008a, p. 586). This pre-figures the Bangladeshi Jamaat’s participation in the Bangladesh National Party government headed by Begum Zia – again, a woman leader there by virtue of her dynastic credentials. Shehabuddin (2008b, p. 600-601) notes that in Bangladesh the Jaamat’s interest in women voters means that:

Saidi [a popular Jamaat speaker] goes to great lengths to reassure women that Islam is supportive of their rights, that Islam has made women winners, not losers.

In common with the Islamic piety movement more broadly, Amma Huzur’s speech is quite different from that of other respondents, involving frequent use of specifically Islamic (Arabic) terms in place of alternative Bengali ones (see also Haniffa, 2008). She is steeped in Islamic texts, having learnt several religious instruction manuals off by heart, and her discourse is suffused both with explicit religious references and with the mission she sees “to make the disorderly society ordered”. Amma Huzur holds weekly meetings with village women to “remind them about religion” and organizes larger meetings on a monthly and annual basis. She also travels to lead meetings in other villages when she is invited. She has established a talim house in the village, where women can meet regularly for prayer and religious instruction. Gender and family relations constitute a recurring theme in her preaching and instruction:

Generally, village women do not follow the rule of Islam in their lives. They have become the member of the Union Parishad (local government). They are going to the district court house alone. They do not think why unhappiness has occurred in the world. They do not know the right way to live. They do not bend their heads in front of their husbands. They do not keep purdah. In the past amongst Muslims, husband feared the wife and the wife feared the husband. They had mutual respect for each other. Nowadays, wives are quarrelling with their husbands face to face. Doing such deeds is strictly forbidden in Islam. Through doing these things wives are ruining their akherat (life after death) entirely.

On first impressions, her line is conventional and strongly patriarchal. Women are offending by engaging in politics and the law, and in doing so unaccompanied, and in not observing purdah. In the later part of the above passage, however, it is interesting how she emphasizes disharmony and loss
of respect, rather than an offence against gender hierarchy. What is lost is married couples’ *mutual* fear and respect and the ability to handle differences courteously. For Amma Huzur, the way to restore the moral order is to re-kindle piety and orthodox religious practice. Women hold the key to this:

> If we can make a mother pious then she will be able to raise her children accordingly. A mother is the centre of a family and the first teacher of the children.

Even if a husband is bad, through her piety she may be able to reform him and bring him back to Islam. She also suggests that piety will bring husband and wife closer together:

> A husband cannot beat a pious wife so easily…. When a wife starts praying *namaz*, it softens her husband’s mind towards her.

There is of course nothing new in placing the burden for either family virtue or family piety on women. Looking more deeply into her *practice*, however, Amma Huzur’s overall profile is rather more ambiguous than her words suggest. In the face of marital unhappiness, Amma Huzur has found in holding *talim* meetings not only personal fulfilment, but also a legitimate way to spend time away from home. While not being able to effect complete reform, she has brought her husband to the Tabligh and managed to curb some of his worst excesses of lasciviousness, rudeness and violence. After a previous broken marriage, Islam has offered a means of social rehabilitation. Her piety, coupled with her hard work in improving the economic situation of the family, has earned her the reputation of a good wife and mother. The meetings seem also at times to constitute a site of resistance, where women gather to share information that their men would rather keep at home, and even the basis for collective action to defend a member’s interests. While Amma Huzur positions herself as the voice of tradition, therefore, she seems in many ways to be a thoroughly modern figure, autonomous and entrepreneurial, self-cultivating in identity, and evangelical in her project of rectifying the self.
4 Conclusion

This paper focuses on discussions of the family in Bangladesh to explore what is seen by many Western commentators as a paradox: the increased visibility of religion with globalized modernity. These discussions make clear that religion is not ‘just politics’, but offers grounding to a moral universe that animates the everyday. Paradoxically, perhaps, they also show that religion is not ‘just religious’, if religion is understood as referring to a separately demarcated sphere of life. While people in Bangladesh do talk about religion in this limited sense as a particular set of practices and beliefs, they also draw extensively on a broader understanding of religion as the ground of moral order. This offers a framework of meaning that provides general rules for life (‘everyone should get married’) and specific norms for conduct (‘women belong in the house’), as well as justifying a patriarchal order within which religious observance is part of one’s gendered duties - whether or not these in practice get done. Clear class differences were evident in the way people understood the reasons for what happens – middle class and richer people were far more likely than the poor to attribute outcomes to their own agency. Beyond this, however, people used religious references to make more personal statements about themselves and their own situations. Some people positioned themselves as thankful, or at least in a state of (socially sanctioned) adjustment to or acceptance of the way things are. People also used religion to signal the limits to their own power, sometimes indicating humility, but at other times hopelessness, alienation or complaint.

For actors within international development wondering how they should relate to religion, this suggests a number of things. First, religion is very much a part of everyday life, interwoven with people’s day-to-day concerns. It is a part of life which needs to be respected, in the same way as cultural preferences in food or dress. Second, religion in this sense is a lot bigger than development. Development is only a small part of most people’s lives, while religion constitutes the ground of the moral order. It thus behaves development to be rather more modest than it is sometimes wont to be. Thirdly, however, much of this ‘religion’ is not particularly ‘religious’. Religious references offer a way for people to say things that are important to them. It is important that development actors listen to the specifics of what is being said or shown and do not jump to conclusions when they hear or see ‘religion’. Thus Islamic dress may be simply fashionable (Farzana Haniffa, pers.comm), going on pilgrimage may simply be an outing with friends. In particular, apparently ‘the same’ behaviour may have very different meanings and outcomes according to the context in which it takes place.
Despite considerable continuity in cultures of family and religion, Bangladesh is without doubt experiencing major economic, social and political change. The billions of dollars of aid it has received notwithstanding, this is more a result of globalization than of self-conscious ‘development’ activities. Nevertheless, within this situation of flux, notions of ‘religion’ and ‘development’ offer registers for political struggle, in which family, and particularly gender relations, constitute a frequent site of contestation. This is evident both in the rearguard action against some NGO programmes and in the moves by reformist Islam to occupy social and political space. What is intriguing, however, is the way that some changes have not attracted a specifically religious condemnation. The employment of women in garment factories has arguably constituted a more fundamental challenge to purdah norms and the gender division of labour than has NGO-based credit, which is frequently passed on to household men (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996). There is certainly a lot of grumbling about the garment factories, and women who work there face criticism on grounds of morality. However, they have not attracted the fatwas and religion-identified attacks that the NGOs have done. There may be a number of reasons for this. Most of the garment factories are nationally owned, by ‘big men’ at considerable remove from the village context. Some of the NGOs courted confrontation, especially on gender grounds, and some were quite openly allied with a particular political party. NGOs, even those led and staffed by Muslims, were also attacked for seeking to convert people to Christianity. This attack seems intelligible only as a means of stressing their ‘outsider’ status, with ambivalence regarding the West playing an aggravating part. As many commentators have said, these symbolic clashes also served as a means of settling more local and more personal scores. Reviewing all these factors, once more little of this seems to have anything to do with ‘religion’ as it is commonly imagined in the West. One way to deal with these changes in the context of development is to set the issue of religious identification to one side. There seems no obvious reason why being identified as religious should either qualify or disqualify actors from engagement with development objectives and activities. Instead, arguably judgements should be made on the character of organizations and the work that they are doing in purely social, economic and political terms, with their religious identity considered only if it impacts on development objectives, for example by enabling access or promoting exclusion.

As we saw in the case of Amma Huzur, however, for some people in Bangladesh the answer to social change does lie in ‘more religion,’ and some use religion to articulate new narratives of the family. Here again, however, I would argue that to see the issue as fundamentally ‘religious’ is a category
error. Instead, the changing place of religion and the changing uses that people seek to make of it are part of a much broader process of moral questioning and social realignment. As social and economic change challenges people’s sense of the underlying moral order, so it simultaneously reshapes both the character of religion and the ways that it can be drawn on to marshal that order more broadly.

What then does all this say to the larger questions of social science, about the relations between religion and modernity, the apparent paradox of a renewed emphasis on religion in politics, and where the family fits in? As noted above, classical studies of religion and modernization see structural changes in the economy and society as bringing with them a dynamic towards secularization, which displaces religious institutions from the undisputed centre of social and political organization. While this by no means removes religion from the public sphere, it does re-define its sphere of influence, to identify it as primarily a personal matter, associated with life-cycle events and the cognitive/affective area of beliefs, emotions and values. So far, so familiar. What is less commonly recognized, however, is that just as modernity reassigns religion to the personal sphere, so it also constitutes ‘the personal’ as a primary arena of governance, discipline, and satisfaction. The shift in structures of family life, including the ways people are investing different meaning in their relationships, is another dimension of this. What appears from one point of view the marginalization of religion thus brings with it simultaneously a re-discovery of and re-emphasis upon it, along with other aspects of the person and the self. From being a taken-for-granted part of the way things are, religion thus becomes a focus in itself, something that must be known, studied, disputed, cultivated and – for some at least – struggled for politically.
Notes

1 The 2001 figures are Muslim 89.6 per cent; Hindu 9.4 per cent; Christian 0.3 per cent; Buddhist 0.6 per cent; Others 0.15 per cent. In the 1981 Census Muslims were 86.7 per cent, Hindus 12.1 per cent.

2 The closeness of these ties is underlined by the fact that ‘dharma’, the term derived from Sanskrit which is commonly translated as ‘religion’ in Bangladesh and northern India, is also used to describe the cultural grounding of this moral order, providing a foundational logic that structures the family along with all other social institutions, including, but not limited to, those identified more particularly as ‘religious’. For more explanation see a companion paper, ‘Religion, politics and the moral order in Bangladesh,’ (Devine and White, 2009).

3 The logic behind this selection of villages was to capture a contrast in distance from the hub of development/modernity in Bangladesh: the capital city, Dhaka. This was relevant to the larger study within which the data presented in this paper were gathered, but no clear patterns by site could be identified in the much more limited sample and focus of attention here.

4 This research was conducted under the ESRC Research Group Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WeD), University of Bath, 2002-2007. The support of the ESRC is gratefully acknowledged. Analysis of this data has been carried out under the Religions and Development Research Programme led by the University of Birmingham, 2005-10. The support of the UK Department of International Development is gratefully acknowledged. The interviews were conducted by members of the WeD Bangladesh team, following profiles which I designed. Particular thanks are due to M. Hasan Ashraf, Nasrin Sultana, Suborna Camelia, Taifur Rahman, and Tahmina Ahmed.

5 In all there were 58 interviews with couples in which husband and wife were interviewed separately; ten single elderly life histories; and two that focused on religion and family life. All the interviewees were drawn from the wider WeD sample and thus had already completed a general household questionnaire. In the sub-project, most people were interviewed once, but the researchers returned to twenty of the couple informants with a further more targeted set of questions.

6 The case studies are coded as follows. The number after the initials of the name shows the district and couple number. The small letter shows sex – a for female, b for male. The next capital letter shows religion, ‘M’ for Muslim or ‘H’ for Hindu. The final letter provides a very rough economic categorisation: ‘r’ for rich, ‘m’ for middle, ‘p’ for poor, based on a mix of occupational and asset status, and self-classification. The case study respondent profile is as follows: Manikganj total 33: 7 Hindu 26 Muslim; 7 rich 11 middle, 15 poor; Dinajpur: total 35: 4 Hindu, 29 Muslim, 2 Santal (Adivasi); 4 rich, 22 middle, 9 poor. The sample was chosen using a range of criteria, and was not intended to be representative of the villages as a whole, either by wealth or religion.

7 This resonance is not coincidental, of course: Mahmood (2005) draws heavily on Foucauldian analysis in presenting her study.

8 Usually father’s brother – the more hierarchical relationship – but sometimes also the more conventionally supportive mother’s brother.

9 As Banu (1992, p. 59) states, in Bangladesh this is usually expressed through the concepts of tadbir (planning) and takdir (fate).

10 I am not sure why this might be – it could be in part that the emotion of thankfulness requires a personal object.

11 Thus love ‘strikes’ one (maya lage) and sickness ‘happens’ to one (osukh hoyecche).

12 Between January 1993 and December 1996 more than 60 fatwas were recorded in Bangladesh (Ain O Salish Kendro, 1997 in Shehabuddin, 1999). In a great victory for feminist organization, the highest court in Bangladesh declared all fatwas illegal in 2001 (Karim, 2004, p. 303).

13 See Naher (2005) and Shehabuddin (1999, 2008a) for further discussion.

‘Sir’ refers to a Grameen Bank worker.

16 The Jamaat-e-Islami is the main Islamist political party in Bangladesh. Out of favour after liberation for having supported Pakistan, Jamaat-e-Islami re-entered politics as an active and visible participant in 1990, forming a ruling coalition with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party after the 1991 election.

17 The Tablighi Jamaat is a worldwide pietist movement of religious revival, typically stated to have begun in 1927. At its core is a call to revival of the inner life and personal purification, which is often delivered through missionary tours undertaken by its members. See Metcalf (1998, 2003) for more information.

18 Amma Huzur is an honorific title. The quotes given here are drawn from two extended interviews that took place in her home.

19 The candidate was Fatimah Jinnah, sister of Muhammed Ali Jinnah, the most prominent leader of the movement for Pakistan.
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