Migration and integration

A local and experiential perspective

Gary Craig

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Abstract

This working paper was originally produced for the KING programme, an interdisciplinary and international programme of research funded by the EU, exploring the factors facilitating or impeding the integration of migrants. This paper seeks to reflect the experience of migrants themselves in four key domains acknowledged to be critical – health provision, education, housing and the labour market.

It is contextualised by a brief discussion of the history of migration across EU member states, differing understandings of the meaning of citizenship, and reflections on both how integration is defined and how integration policy has emerged across the EU. It concludes by addressing the issue of whether integration works, summarising the factors most significant in promoting integration; a narrow focus on the economic aspects of integration and the continuing racism experienced by migrants are seen as key barriers to effective integration. Additionally, there needs to be a focus on the process of integration alongside seeing it as a goal.

Keywords
Integration; migrant; racism; citizenship; welfare

Citation

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## Contents

Acknowledgements 5  
Introduction and context 6  
The history of migration 10  
The meaning of citizenship 18  
   Immigration and domestic policies towards migrants 20  
How is integration defined? 21  
   Theorising integration 22  
The development of integration policy 25  
Testing integration in practice at a local level 28  
   Education 29  
   Health 34  
   Housing 42  
   Labour market/employment 47  
Does integration work? 58  
Conclusion 63  
References 65
Acknowledgements

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**Introduction and context**

The aim of this working paper is to explore the factors which facilitate or impede the integration of migrants in relation to the country and specifically the local communities or neighbourhoods to which they have moved.¹ The paper initially provides a discussion of the European and national context for local integration, without which it is not possible to understand local integration policy and practice. We therefore examine the history of migration to European member states and its changing patterns, particularly in recent years; the meaning of citizenship and the impacts of racism; the meaning of the term 'integration' in theory; and, centrally, how integration works or could be made to work in practice in relation to four highly important areas of migrants’ lives: education, health, housing and the labour market. The paper concludes by reviewing some of the key literature seeking to evaluate how integration programmes are working in practice, which adds further insights into how differing factors affect local integration attempts.

This is not, incidentally, to say that other domains or contexts – such as an understanding of law (Kubal 2013), the process of family reunion, freedom from discrimination, the existence of a sizeable co-ethnic community, the presence of faith-based institutions, political or community participation, or a grasp of traditional national cultural norms - are less important,² but that these four domains have been consistently identified as critical at local level to ensuring the possibility of integration. To make this paper manageable, in the light of the huge volume of literature now available, illustrative country examples have been used as appropriate. The paper is part of a larger project aiming to elaborate a more comprehensive account of immigrant integration in Europe through an interdisciplinary approach, in order better to provide future options for policy-making supported by an evidence-based analysis. As will become clear, there is already an extensive if fragmented literature on this subject, and this paper attempts to bring it together as much as possible in the context of the project as a whole. It is one of 20 working papers produced in late 2013 for the KING Advisory Board.

Given the long history of migration to, and between, EU member states, particularly since the 1950s, it is hardly surprising that attention has increasingly turned during the last 10 years to the question of the conditions under which those migrants who choose to settle permanently or even for sustained periods of time, might best be integrated into the host society’s structures, living and working arrangements. There are at present around 33 million non-nationals (people who are not citizens of the country in which they are residing) within the EU and this number is growing – 20 million are third country nationals and the remainder EU nationals living elsewhere than their country of citizenship³ (ECA 2012). Reflecting this concern, the IoM’s 2010 World Migration Report identifies integration as one of the six major challenges facing national governments in managing migration

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¹ We take the local or neighbourhood level to be housing areas which are generally locally defined by unique names and form part of larger units of governance, typically towns or cities. It is at this level, in domestic, community or workplace settings, that most face-to-face contact between host country nationals (HCNs) and immigrants of one kind or another is likely to occur.

² Indeed a recent report focuses on what it calls everyday integration issues such as childcare, patterns of consumption, leisure and supplementary education (Cherti and McNeil 2012). Ironically another report points out that access to leisure is usually circumscribed for migrants by the fact that they work long hours for poor wages (Spencer et al. 2007).

³ Countries with the largest numbers of third country nationals are, in descending order of numbers, Germany (4.5%), Italy, France, UK and Spain (3.5%); those with the largest numbers relative to their population are Latvia (at 17%), Estonia, Spain, Greece and Austria (almost 7%).
(IOM 2010a). This is driven in part also by the fact that of the 25 million unemployed within the EU borders, migrants, especially refugee, women and young people, are disproportionately represented.

In preparing this paper, growing concerns about the question of integration were apparent; in a relatively short period of time, it was possible to accumulate more than 300 literature sources directly concerned with the issue of migrant integration, from a wide range of contexts including international organisations (the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, World Health Organisation, European Union, Organisation for International Cooperation and Development, International Organisation for Migration) and their sponsored programmes, individual member state governments, local government, NGOs, think tanks, other policy makers within specific sectors (such as housing, the labour market, health and education), from migrant community organisations themselves (although few and far between) and from academic sources. Clearly a relatively short piece of work such as this cannot do justice to the range of material available; thus we aim to identify the key issues.

There are limitations to this paper: one is that the material sourced was all in English, although a significant proportion of it – particularly in international journals and from international policy organisations – was also available in other languages. Another is that the timescale for production, and the general logistics of the project, made it impossible to source more than a fraction of the material available from NGOs: what is generally referred to as the ‘grey literature’. The latter is important since much of the work actually done on the ground to support and manage the process of integration, and to cope with the tensions and difficulties it throws up for migrants and host country nationals (HCNs), has been done by very local NGOs and community organisations, including, for example refugee community organisations (RCOs) (e.g. Zetter et al. 2005; Cooke and Spencer 2006; Griffiths et al. 2006; Phillimore et al. 2007; Holgate et al. 2012). Many of these RCOs were funded by the state using national funds or through hypothecated funding streams such as the European Refugee Fund from 2000, specifically to promote integration, although they have suffered, perhaps disproportionately, from cuts in public expenditure in recent years.

A further material limitation is that the voice of migrants themselves is rarely present in much of the literature, other than in terms of occasional direct quotes from respondents to research studies. This is in part because, as noted, the ‘grey’ literature produced by NGOs, which is much more likely to have been generated in collaboration with migrants, has barely been accessed here. Also, in many countries representative organisations for migrants are only just beginning to emerge and voice their own perspectives. Much of the commentary is thus essentially ‘top-down’ from researchers and policy-makers and this is a huge gap which needs to be filled over the coming years. The history of policy-making suggests it is much more effective if it is grounded in the experience and views of those at whom policy is directed. Most particularly, the voice of migrant women tends to be missing from policy and research literature (Goodson and Phillimore 2008) and this gender dimension is a

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4 ‘Refugees’ are those seeking asylum whose application for refugee status has been granted in-country or who have arrived with formal refugee status under special programmes (e.g. UNHCR Gateway). ‘Asylum seekers’ are those seeking refugee status but not yet given it. In many countries, asylum seekers are denied the right to work, hence would not appear in unemployment figures or benefit from integration measures.

5 For example through specific programmes such as the European Refugee Fund, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, and the European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals.
serious deficit. Women refugees, for example, may feel more isolated and yet have greater responsibilities because of traditional culturally-ascribed roles; some of the literature is beginning to take note of this and to acknowledge that there needs to be an explicit gender dimension to research and policy-making which looks at the specific factors which exclude women, such as lack of female-only provision in areas like language training and child care. Too often integration processes take place in the context of organisations and groups which are dominated by men.

It is also important to note that the issue of integration, which has only fairly recently appeared on the policy agenda in these terms, needs to be seen in the context of the particular group of migrants being examined. Thus, looking at political integration for example, in many countries Members of Parliament and government ministers include individuals from former migrant communities which have been settled long enough to achieve significant political status, and who themselves may be third or fourth generation; the same can be said of civil society bodies such as trades unions, and of the business sector. The present heightened concern with integration can thus be seen as a reflection of the significantly increased volume, variety and speed of migration in the past 10 to 15 years, particularly economic migrants from within the European Economic Area and beyond, and refugees and asylum seekers, and the emphasis on trying to ensure migrants of whatever kind are economically productive as quickly as possible. In general, different groups of migrants have different trajectories and outcomes, whether with regard to voting, settlement patterns or types of employment; thus measures of integration need to be sensitive to these differences both between and within distinct ethnic groups and across genders as well as across time. For example, Somalis have high unemployment rates, Iranians relatively high self-employment rates, but African Caribbean men lower employment rates than co-ethnic women (Rutter et al. 2008). Many indicators – such as language aptitude, employment rates and health status (all interlinked of course) – improve over time (Cebulla et al. 2010) but the baseline from which they start also varies considerably depending on a range of factors such as country of origin and educational attainment in country of origin (Daniel et al. 2010). As Saggar et al. argue (2012: 19) ‘key indicators point to big, aggregate differences. Incisive analysis of immigrant integration needs to disaggregate migrants according to factors which may influence their integration outcomes – in particular their origin country, length of residency and skill level.’

It might also be noted that whereas most discourse implies that integration is a good thing and is supported both by host country nationals (with the exception of the xenophobic right) and by most migrants themselves (again with exceptions who wish to remain enclosed within their own ‘community’), there remain, particularly amongst new migrants, some who have at best a sense of ambivalence about the process of integration (Vathi and King 2013) and many who do not see their migration as generating a long-term status. This is particularly the case for East and Central European migrants since 2004.

There are of course groups for whom the notion of integration is particularly problematic: for example, people trafficked for the purposes of sexual or labour exploitation. These people are often deeply traumatised by their experience. As they are victims of criminal activity, a further layer of complexity is introduced into the process of integration. Harsh immigration regimes often lead to

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6 The issue of illegal/undocumented/irregular migrants is not treated here in detail in relation to government policy since, as they do not officially exist, their integration is of no concern to states. However, there is a growing literature about their status and conditions of existence, some of which has been accessed for this paper.
victims’ accounts being disbelieved, with victims facing deportation and possibly retrafficking (ATMG 2012). For these people, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE 2002) regards the process of integration as being dynamic and two-way, long-term and multi-dimensional (echoing the European Council’s Common Basic Principles on Integration: EC 2004; and Ager and Strang’s 2004 framework) with victims requiring the same array of indicators (housing, healthcare etc.) but over, typically, a much longer period of time and with greater levels of personal support. Clearly, in this instance, government’s role is – or should be – correspondingly greater (IoM 2013). Despite these differences, and the range of migrants for whom integration strategies have been devised (largely, it has to be said, for some economic migrants, most refugees and others located at the bottom end of the income scale) some are now arguing that it is time to move from what have historically effectively been refugee integration strategies to migrant integration strategies. They recognise that even if some migrants are relatively well off in terms of skill level and income when they arrive in a host country (with some countries increasingly aiming to attract highly skilled migrants), we should not assume that ‘those at the top have no integration-related needs’ (Gidley and Jayaweera 2010: 11).

A further very marginal group with enormous difficulties in integrating into the host country are those migrants who have previously been held in prisons or detention centres. These people may feel doubly isolated and traumatised (as well as suspicious of official help) and have no real means of connecting with local communities. They will need substantial and probably continuing levels of individual support (Klein and Williams 2012).

It is also important to note that the concept of integration as a policy goal usually is set within a challenging context. Migrants and refugees in particular tend to be amongst the poorest in every EU country, doing the work no one else wants to do and living in poor housing and neighbourhoods. The typical migrant faces continuing competition for resources (housing, employment, health care and so on) with the indigenous poor (Hudson et al. 2007), a competition which may actually be illusory in some cases but which right wing media and political groups are quick to exaggerate and exploit.

Finally, in any particular country the relationship between the welfare state, economic and social policy, and immigration policy is of significance. Within the EU there are a range of different welfare models with varying degrees of development, generosity and sophistication, and with different structures, responsibilities, and levels of delivery arrangements as between for example, central government, provincial or local government and civil society organisations (Alcock and Craig 2011). These arrangements are significant when we come to discuss the process of integration at local level since the four areas examined are the responsibility of differing organisations. Thus labour market intervention or insertion, and social protection policies are generally the responsibility of central government (Andersen and Jensen 2002), the delivery of social services and housing the responsibility of local/provincial government and possibly NGOs, and the delivery of health services reflecting a rather more mixed picture, including a more prominent role for the private sector; although in all cases national governments tend to set some sort of overarching policy framework either directly or indirectly. Thus local integration policies might require the collaboration or partnership of many different organisations. In Austria, integration is a joint responsibility of federal and regional governments; the Danish approach to integration also involves partnership across a number of levels of governance. Many countries are tightening their immigration policy so as to limit immediate or longer-term access to welfare, in the context of fairly toxic and often wildly inaccurate
debates about whether migrants are a drain on welfare provision (Dustman and Frattini 2013). We should also note that there are countries where integration is not yet an important public issue: many East and Central European countries such as Poland (discussed later, because of low levels of largely temporary immigration\(^7\)); Cyprus, where the government has recently witnessed a significant growth in immigration but integration has not yet reached the policy agenda (also discussed below), or Finland, where the proportion of foreign workers in the country is very low, at less than one per cent. In this case, the explanation lies in the fact that national economic policy, together with a highly organised labour movement, reduces the number of low level jobs (Bartram 2007) which is where migrants usually end up.

A paper for the European Union, prior to the adoption of the Stockholm EU Framework on Integration\(^8\) (which led to the present KING programme), has explored the potential for partnership working between regional and local authorities to promote the integration of ‘immigrants’, pointing out that effective working is sometimes in collision with the principle of subsidiarity (Carrera 2009: see also CLIP 2006 for a discussion of the role actually played by local and regional authorities, arguing that the trends towards convergence at national levels, despite differing national experiences of immigration, should facilitate the emergence of an effective European framework).

**The history of migration**

Two other significant contexts have to be acknowledged in thinking about integration work across the EU. One is that the history of migration to every EU member state varies for a number of reasons; the minority ethnic composition of each European state has thus developed as a result of differing combinations of elements (EMN 2006). First, many countries have significant indigenous ethnic minorities, such as the Saami of northern Scandinavia, the Roma of East and Central Europe, and the Basque of northern Spain and southern France; most of these minorities appear to experience discrimination and victimisation no less than immigrant minorities and this shapes the context into which new migrants arrive. However, immigration of comparatively recent date is the route by which most minorities have become established. This immigration has been shaped by a number of factors, the most obvious of which is the imperial or colonial history of the state. Thus over the past 50 years or more, the UK (from Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, much of sub-Saharan Africa, Malaysia, Singapore and most of the Caribbean), the Netherlands (Netherlands Antilles, Surinam and Indonesia), Belgium (Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi), France (West, Central and North Africa, Guyana, and parts of SE Asia), Portugal (Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique) and, to a lesser extent, Italy, Spain and Germany, have each experienced substantial immigration from former colonial territories.

Some of this immigration was facilitated initially by notions of shared citizenship, but from the beginning of this period much was promoted for economic reasons. Labour shortages after the Second World War, in particular in poorly-paid sectors of reconstructing European economies, led to significant immigration from former colonies (as well as from eastern Europe to western Europe).

\(^7\) Where of course the issue is largely about the integration of Polish migrants in other countries.

\(^8\) The Stockholm Programme states that the successful integration of legally-resident third country nationals remains the key to maximising the benefits of immigration and calls for the development of core indicators in a limited number of relevant policy areas for monitoring the results of integration policies.
Many of these colonies were very poor relative to the former imperial powers; thus there were strong ‘push’ factors at work. As demand for labour weakened, and domestic political pressure to prevent immigration strengthened, often stirred up by racist formulations, movement slowed considerably and was increasingly limited to allowing wives and children of those already resident in the ‘host country’ to enter. Indeed, in some countries, such as the UK and France, there were attempts – resisted politically from the left – to seek the repatriation of immigrants when western economies came under pressure from the 1970s OPEC ‘oil shocks’ (Weill 1997). Many commentators have argued that increasingly restrictive immigration policy, whilst appearing to have a rational basis (such as the UK’s points system9), has itself contributed to racism (discrimination against people of differing ethnicities on either an individual or a systematic basis) and racial violence (Craig 2007).

After the immediate post-war period, however, demand for labour was not met solely by supply from former colonies. In many cases, labour was supplied from countries which were either physically close (for example, migration from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey into Greece and Austria), or which had, by western European standards, underdeveloped economies and low wage structures. The migration of Greek and Turkish men to German car factories was typical of this phenomenon. As some of these formerly ‘underdeveloped’ economies have themselves ‘developed’, they have in turn become ‘receiving’ as opposed to (or as well as) ‘sending’ countries: thus Italy, in the period after the war, lost many of its young men to more northern European labour markets but, in the last 20 years, has gained men from North Africa (Tunisia and Libya) and women from Latin America. Italy has until recently admitted between 50,000 to 80,000 immigrants each year, mostly Latin American women employed as domestic workers and North African men self-employed or as construction workers.10 In some countries, too, former emigrants have returned to their country of origin. In EU member states with a substantial foreign population, two-thirds (or more in some cases) came from (mainly) the former Yugoslavia, Turkey, East and Central Europe. The numbers and proportions of those from East and Central Europe have increased substantially since the EU Accession of eight countries in 2004, two in 2007 and another in 2013. The UK and France were notable exceptions to this pattern, for historical reasons, but some countries, particularly the UK and Ireland (which did not have transitional immigration controls in 2004) have experienced a huge level of migration from East and Central Europe since 2004.11 In recent years, as East and Central Europe has become the eastern borderland of the enlarged EU, these countries themselves have experienced inward migration from countries further to the east, for example from the Ukraine and from Moldova.

Over the last 50 years, the two major sources of economic migration to most EU member states have thus been the earlier migration from former colonial territories outside the EU (third country nationals, the main focus of this paper), and the more recent migration from countries which may have earlier been outside the EU but are now within it. Of course, many of the latter have been ‘sending’ countries as much as, or more than, they have been ‘receiving’ countries (with the A8

9 For an explanation of the twists and turns of the UK’s points system and immigration policy more generally see Sales (2007).

10 A pattern which has been challenging to Italy’s ‘pro-family’ social policy.

11 A further complicating factor is the issue of specific historical links between countries or parts of their populations and other countries, for example the ethnic German Aussiedler of the Soviet Union who migrated to Germany after 1989, or Romanians whose country has historic cultural connections with Italy and France (Seidlova and Urban 2008).
countries for example sending as many as one million migrant workers to the UK from 2004 onwards). Some EU countries have very small minority ethnic populations - Greece (but see above), Spain, Italy, Portugal and Finland are examples.

A number of commentators including Jean-Pierre Chevènement, a former French Interior Minister (Guardian, 20.07.00, cited in Craig 2002: 64), have argued, contra the increasing political trend for limiting it, that Western European countries may need to increase in-migration to cope with the effects of demographic change, quite apart from economic reasons. The UN Population Division estimates that the population of the 15 ‘older’ EU countries and those more recently admitted to membership would fall by about 15% to 628 million in the next 50 years, leaving a labour deficit. Some EU member states have relaxed immigration controls to permit entry of skilled professionals to certain identified professions. However, given the structural position of most immigrants in local labour markets and despite particular local features (for example Germany has argued for the immigration of 20,000 IT specialists from India, and Ireland suggested it needed up to 200,000 skilled workers to meet booming labour demand during the late 2000s) it is highly probable that the great proportion of these in-migrating workers will continue, as they do now, to find employment in less skilled, low paid and insecure sectors of these economies.

A final important and relatively recent migration phenomenon has been the recent growth in numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers (facilitated in many cases by relative ease of travel compared with 50 years ago) seeking political sanctuary in European states from the civil wars and violence which have characterised several parts of Africa, Asia and the eastern margins of Europe itself. The flow of refugees to particular national destinations may in part have been shaped by colonial links, i.e. the fact that citizens of former colonies are likely to speak the language of the former colonial power and may well have friends or relatives already living there. However, it appears also to be influenced by opportunity, by the perceived ‘generosity’ of the host national regime towards immigrants, or at least familiarity with institutional and legal structures and policies, and by the refugees’ (and their ‘brokers’ - the criminal syndicates which have developed to facilitate illegal immigration, often under appalling and murderous conditions) sense of the ease with which differing countries may be entered. This responsiveness may be perceived in differing ways.

Thus, right-wing media (and politicians) in many countries (particularly the UK, Germany, France, Denmark and the Netherlands), portray their countries as relatively easy for refugees to enter and, once there, relatively easy to remain in (either because of lax national rules, or tacit acceptance into citizenship, or the ease with which people can ‘disappear’ from official surveillance), which they see as something that needs to change. Alternatively, some, particularly the Scandinavian countries, are seen as having been politically and economically more generous in their attitudes to refugees in the past, although these attitudes are also changing under the pressure of increasing migration numbers. These latter states have fairly diverse minority populations with little past connection with the host state and thus no historic entitlement to citizenship.

Local attitudes towards the civil, political and social citizenship rights of minority ethnic groups in general and migrants in particular12 - and their specific rights within the labour market - are shaped

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12 It is important to distinguish between minority ethnic people in general – many of whom (currently 43% of those in the UK) will be second or third generation minorities, born and raised in the country – and migrants, who comprise a subset of
by a combination of these factors, most of all by the history of the establishment of these populations, their past connection with the host country, their size relative to the ‘host’ population and the manner of their arrival, as much as by any formal legal status they have. This latter status depends on local political culture, whether, as in the UK or the Netherlands, an approach of multiculturalism or, as in France, what Heckmann (1999) describes as a ‘culturally unifying, universal model’. Whilst formal civil and political rights for minorities – such as the right to vote – are in theory relatively uniform across the EU, within labour market mechanisms in particular but also in relation to housing, health and education provision, discrimination and racism are becoming more apparent, a result of the complex interplay of local factors (Rudiger and Spencer 2003). Further, as Soysal (2000) argues, the two main components of citizenship, rights and identities, have steadily been uncoupled for migrants. In a period of increasing globalisation of economic activity, of communication and of political responses, it is apparent that local, including local state, responses are increasingly shaped by global trends, of which growing racism is perhaps the most dismal, and by the imperatives of global competitiveness (Craig 2002; Knox 2011; Craig et al. 2012; for a general discussion of the impact of globalisation on migration see e.g. Keeley 2009).

There is not space here for a detailed discussion of the question of identity and how this may be affected by questions of citizenship or cohesion and integration policies, but in the context of multiculturalism it seems clear that many people who have migrated to EU nations or have been born to previous generations of migrants see no difficulty with having a range of identities: Amin (2003: 462) for example argues that ‘many people are not confused about their identities and values as cultural hybrids’, from which we might deduce that ethnic identities in themselves are not divisive and that it is not as important for migrants to associate themselves with the host country’s national identity as broadly to accept its basic values. Clearly a migrant’s (possibly multiple) identities might become problematic when the values underpinning one or more of these identities are in fundamental conflict with the values of the host society: thus differing dress codes might be (largely) acceptable in most western Judaeo-Christian countries but female genital mutilation (which contravenes the human right of a woman to own her own body), would not be. We have to distinguish here between what are more fundamental cultural norms and values and those which are less so, and also recognise that a migrant’s adaptation from former cultural norms to those of the host country may take varying but often quite long periods of time. One obvious example would be the shift from a patriarchal attitude to one of gender equality, a shift which many migrants are finding extremely difficult to make. The process of integration of course is precisely about, in part, ensuring that migrants have the opportunity to understand and develop empathy with the norms of their host country.

A wide-ranging study across 29 European states suggests that naturalisation policies, leading to citizenship, are critical to integration policy whereas exclusive naturalisation policies ‘signal the lack of an inclusive immigration integration agenda’ (Huddleston and Vink 2013: 5; see also Baubock et al. 2010). Thus whilst the day-to-day business of facilitating integration may occur at a local level, the national legal and political context is critical in ensuring that this work has meaning. Equally significant is that a number of European states, including the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and France, have both made ‘integration a condition of civic inclusion [by requiring certain minorities in any one country. Clearly migrants may become part of the minority ethnic population over time, depending on how this is defined.
responsibilities of migrants such as language competence] rather than an outcome of it’ (Ponzo et al. 2013) and have also increasingly securitised their immigration policies, particularly since the series of terrorist attacks from 2001 onwards (Carmel 2011), often leading to an inappropriate emphasis on surveillance over migrant and settled Muslim populations (Ramalingam 2013).

Periods of economic recession across the EU during the last 20 years, and the particular economic difficulties facing many EU member states in the past five years, have led, as noted, to growing calls for controls on immigration and for repatriation of existing ‘foreigners’, lending support to xenophobic campaigns in populist media and to racist violence against religious, ethnic and cultural minorities in countries as different in their culture and history of immigration as the UK (Craig 2007), Germany, France, Hungary and the Netherlands. The growth of racist violence in many countries (including the later pre-2004 accession countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal) makes the position of migrants precarious in relation both to the labour market (because minority ethnic groups and recent migrants tend to occupy jobs within the service sector which make them more physically exposed), and to housing and other welfare provision, where they are increasingly portrayed as competing against host country nationals. Equally, they face difficulties in accessing social protection systems which might sustain them when they are out of work. Because of increasingly harsh immigration regimes, driven by populist politicians and the right wing media, many migrants occupy places on the fringes of illegality or in very precarious situations (Standing 2011), including forced labour (Geddes et al. 2013).

In most EU member states, there has been a general increase in racist and xenophobic language and to varying degrees. Many countries which had been pursuing multiculturalist policies have now pulled back from this to some degree, often blaming immigrants for their country’s economic difficulties and withdrawing funding from schemes specifically designed to support minorities in general and migrants in particular (Craig 2013). This of course has impacted on the possibilities of pursuing effective integration strategies (Gregoriou 2008). Firm evidence has challenged this association of migrants with social and economic difficulties (see e.g. Gott and Johnston 2002; Lucchino et al. 2012; Dustmann and Frattini 2013) and the myths which have been propagated by the media about the impacts of migration (such as benefit tourism: Corrigan 2010) but facts have often been the victim in a war of words over the impacts of migration.

For example, much of the public discourse about migrants suggest they are simply seeking to access benefits, however small, of established welfare states and thus undermining the solidaristic attitudes towards welfare provision which led originally to welfare systems being established. Detailed research in OECD countries, including many EU member states, demonstrates in fact that there is only a very weak negative correlation between ethnic diversity and public social expenditure (Mau and Burkhardt 2009), a finding echoing that of Kymlicka and his colleagues from research across many countries, including, again, EU member states that growing diversity only very weakly affects the strength of solidarity across welfare systems (Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Kymlicka 2008). At a very local level, research also suggests that many migrant workers make no, or very limited use of public services (KnowFife 2007; Adamson et al. 2009), which also challenges the notion of using

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13 The most common of which include ‘the flood of immigrants is unsustainable’; ‘they come here for our generous welfare system’, ‘they take our jobs’, ‘they drain public services’.

14 For a counter view that diversity undermines solidarity see Goodhart (2004).
welfare services such as housing, education and healthcare as vehicles for integration. The media’s role, often mimicked by government, in analysing the impacts of immigration is of course critical: most of all, the media tend to problematise immigration, seeing migrants as necessarily creating difficulties and incurring costs for nation states (Robinson and Reeve 2006) and their residents rather than seeing them as presenting potential opportunities and benefits (Schrover and Schinkel 2013). Interestingly, a detailed study of attitudes across a number of countries suggests that more permissive integration policies were of significant importance in shaping and improving HCNs’ attitudes towards immigrants (Schlueter et al. 2013).

In summary, all EU members states have a unique mix of migrant populations, some settled for many years and part of the general minority ethnic population within that country, others more recent economic migrants, many of whom intend, at least on arrival, to return fairly quickly to their country of origin, and a variety of refugees, some seeking asylum, some, as in the UNHCR Gateway programme, with refugee status already granted (Huddleston 2010). Additionally, each country has a substantial number of irregular migrants, which is hard to determine precisely for obvious reasons. Despite these differing early histories, most countries now have a very diverse mix of immigration patterns, with some (particularly in the east of Europe) experiencing a mix of immigration, transit and emigration.

Also strongly shaping this experience is the paradox of free movement within the EU alongside a growing tendency towards what is called the ‘Fortress Europe’ mentality, whereby borders are harshly policed to keep out what are regarded as ‘undesirable’ migrants. Attempts to sidestep EU border controls have led to thousands drowning in trying to cross the Mediterranean in small boats, or freezing to death in lorries crossing the Channel or other heavily policed borders.

As we shall see, the specific needs and rights (see e.g. Morrell 2009) of these various migrant groups differ although all generally suffer the impacts of increasing racism (Stevens et al. 2012; Craig et al. 2012) (and a greater likelihood of being in poverty and socially excluded for example: Arnica 2011; Bloch et al. 2009, 2014; Lewis et al. 2013). Ironically, the Roma, as one specific group of migrants in recent years, left East and Central European countries hoping to get away from the persistent racist treatment they faced in those countries, only to find that discrimination and racism had followed them, albeit sometimes in more subtle ways. Drydakis (2012) finds for example that Roma women working in Athens receive substantially lower wages than other women and that

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15 In fact the actual situation in most countries is far more complicated. In the UK for example, there are 14 different forms of immigration, including students, Ministers of Religion, au pairs, artists and returning UK nationals. However, the broad categorisation of economic, humanitarian and other (including both legal and illegal migrants) is the most useful for general purposes. The 200,000 or more Roma in the UK also deserve a special category. They are distinguished from other Romani groups, including Gypsies and Travellers, as being sedentary, and having tried to seek refugee status in the early 1990s, then entered following the A8 Accession as, effectively, economic migrants. For further information see http://www.peer-review-social-inclusion.eu/network-of-independent-experts/2011/promoting-the-social-inclusion-of-roma

16 The best recent estimates for the UK suggest a figure of about 800,000 within an active labour market population of about 30 million: i.e. less than 3%.

17 For example, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, a substantial emigration occurred from Romania of Romanian Hungarians, Germans and Jews, together with increased levels of emigration for family reunification.

18 Many migrants from other EU countries to EU member states are themselves white. Whilst this might protect them from the consequences of colour-based racism, it is clear from many reports that racism is equally likely to affect these newer migrants. Unfortunately, there is also growing evidence that EU migrants from East and Central Europe are as likely to be perpetrators of racism as victims of it (Fox 2013).
two-thirds of this wage differential cannot be explained by characteristics such as qualifications and skills.

The issues this mix of migrants raises for integration differ (for example, migrant workers are more likely to be young and single) but also have some commonalities. In relation to the issue of poverty, deprivation and disadvantage, many studies remind us that the long-term marginalisation of most migrants is not only linked to the fact of their immigration (with their previous socio-economic statuses and the experience of the immigration process itself being significant), but is often a function of discrimination and racism based on colour and religion19 (Craig 2007). Thus increasing diversity of itself does not undermine social cohesion (see e.g. Hickman et al. 2008) but political and public responses to it do.

In relation to integration and to access to different aspects of welfare provision, discussed later, what has emerged in most countries (with some exceptions at present, e.g. Sweden) is a situation where access to welfare is highly conditional on immigration status (Bolderson 2011). The mix of minorities described above, including migrants, is numerically large, with some cities and some parts of many towns and cities dominated by what is coming to be known as a super-diverse population.20 However the profile of migrants also varies from one community to another: in the UK, for example, refugees have been dispersed to a number of large conurbations, often ones which already have a substantial minority population (Robinson et al. 2003: Sweden and Netherlands have also had differing forms of dispersal policy), whereas many A8 migrant workers, particularly those working in agriculture, are located in rural areas which have only a very recent history of minorities. Despite sometimes lurid political claims to the contrary (Phillips et al. 2010) there is clear evidence that in the UK at least (and there may be similar evidence elsewhere) ethnic segregation – which might work against the goals of integration – has decreased in most areas (CoDE 2012). This of course makes the issue of integration at the local level in urban settings more pressing, although for migrants in rural areas integration has barely reached the policy agenda.

The question of the relationship between ethnic and/or geographical segregation and integration goals has thus become an issue which has been explored in some detail in many countries and has been shown to be far from straightforward (Peach 2009). Musterd and Ostendorf (2009: 1515) argue that the relationship between segregation and integration ‘suffers from too much political and too little scholarly attention.’ Their evidence suggests that rather than think about large-scale social engineering projects, governments should focus on the role of education and labour market access as the keys to successful integration. As general context to these debates, Bolt and van Kempen (2010: 333) point out that ‘little is known about the residential mobility between neighbourhoods that brings about changes in the patterns of ethnic segregation’. They studied the movement of ethnic minority people into predominantly white neighbourhoods which might be taken as an indication of minority assimilation or integration. They compared the biggest ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands and the native majority and found little confirmation for this view (see also Rhodes 2012). Schlueter (2012), in Germany, looked at interethnic friendships between minorities and host country nationals in particular neighbourhoods and found that these friendships depended

19 ENR (2011) has provided a helpful checklist of ways in which anti-racist principles should inform integration policy and practice.

20 Some towns and cities have 80 or more languages spoken in them (Craig et al. 2009) and there are a growing number of cities, including three in England, where no one ethnic group is in a majority.
critically on the level of education of minorities and are less likely in areas with greater degrees of ethnic segregation, arguing that the overall picture was very nuanced. Against this, Phillips et al. (2010) found that community forums, acting as conscious facilitators, could promote shared understandings between new migrants and settled groups, particularly around housing, neighbourhood and renewal issues, leading to reductions in tensions. The nature of these forums should be tailored to fit the needs of particular neighbourhoods (see also Karner and Parker 2011; Phillimore 2013).

The arguments in support of, if not segregation, then certainly the presence of co-ethnics for new migrants moving into areas, as an aid for integration – by acting as bridges, cultural (and perhaps linguistic) interpreters and generating feelings of security and so on – are strong and are rehearsed below again in particular ‘welfare’ contexts. However this does not necessarily always bring positive results. A study of Polish migrants in Norway shows that despite this kind of co-ethnic support, and the presence of strong social networks, overriding factors such as labour market difficulties could leave migrant workers very isolated, homeless and destitute (Mostowska 2013).

The importance of faith and religion as a factor promoting or impeding integration is also now coming into policy and research focus (Levitt 2008; Flint 2010). In many countries, particularly since the terrorist attacks of 2001 onwards, discrimination based on religion (most of all Islam) as opposed to (or as well as) ‘race’ has become commonplace; a British study however pointed out that religion could be significant in promoting integration, ‘with established Muslim communities [providing] vital support and advice to new Muslim migrants’ and perhaps armed with greater levels of confidence, these Muslims (including women) were able to interact with people from other faith backgrounds in schools, colleges, workplaces and other public places (Compas 2008). This contrasted with the experience of other migrants in the same communities. Being part of a wider community spanning several countries (Lewis 2010) can also have unexpected consequences which may undermine the process of integration within any one country. Engebritsen (2010) recounts the tale of a young Somali man who was struggling to integrate into Norwegian society but was called upon in the context of a strong familial culture, temporarily to support a relative dispersed to another EU country. He felt this process ‘took his life away’; he lost his housing in Norway and had to change schools; staff at the refugee reception centre had changed and the so-called rational process of integration planning was completely undermined by his reality for which the system was not prepared.  

Finally of course, despite the best efforts of local policy-makers and service providers, migrants may decide that, for all sorts of reasons including a lack of particular resources (such as, perhaps religious or shopping facilities), they do not ‘want to live in the mixed communities sought by policy-makers trying to facilitate (community cohesion)’ (Phillimore 2013: 696). Alternatively, Ozuekren and Ergoz-Karahan (2010) argue that, despite being able to move out of lower quality neighbourhoods, migrants may decide not to; their view is that religious and cultural conservatism may shape people’s choices and that we should pay as much attention to internal differences within migrant groups as to differences between different ethnic groups.

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21 This is a little researched area: the turnover of staff in what is a challenging work situation means that an element of continuity and stability through relationships with helpful professionals, so important for many migrants struggling to settle in new countries, can be undermined.
One consequence of the relative ease of travel and communication in recent years, which has challenged a notion of purely local integration, is, as noted above, the growth of transnational communities whereby migrants and minorities more generally are able to establish at least a parallel if not a dominant sense of identity in relation to co-ethnic people migrating in parallel to other states (Lewis 2010; Vasta 2013). It is also worth noting in passing that although this paper focuses on the experience of EU member states, there are many countries outside the EU which are having to address the same political and policy issues, including most obviously, Australia (Collins 2013) and Canada, both of which have backtracked from a more generous multiculturalist policy position, a commitment to integration, and relatively open immigration regime (Jupp and Clyne 2011) in recent years.

What this discussion has hopefully underlined is that local integration of migrants cannot be separated from the wider issue of immigration policy. This is most obvious in the area of the labour market where, as the OECD (2008b) notes, the majority of OECD countries have introduced new measures linking residence permits to work permits. Greve (2011) underlines this point in relation to the labour market by demonstrating the wide range of variations in migration and labour market intersections in terms of types of, respectively, migration, regulation, causes of migration and types of worker. At the same time, all these countries have seen an attempt to promote faster economic and social integration, often accompanied by tests for achieving civic integration and citizenship (as in, for example, the Netherlands, the UK, Norway, Poland, Austria, Portugal, Slovakia and Lithuania). These two factors often collide, particularly in the context of increasing austerity and competition for resources. Early evidence suggests that many countries have cut integration programmes under the guise of fiscal necessity; those that have maintained funding are under increasing pressure also to make cuts (Collett 2011). This, allied to more general cuts in services and high levels of unemployment, will impact both on the possibility of effective integration programmes at local level, and on public attitudes. Already, this mix, often made toxic by political and media commentary, has led to the growth of racist political parties across Europe and to increasing racial tensions. The inevitable links between national immigration and integration policies at a European level have been commented on by Rosenow (2007), who noted the part played by NGOs in the emergence of a European involvement in integration policy-making, but also the necessary condition that the convergence of integration policies amongst member States still had to be located within the field of immigration policies and a developing *European* immigration policy. Robinson and Reeve (2006) summarise a wide range of literature in this territory, pointing out in the context of the links between immigration policy and integration, that restrictive immigration policies in particular can produce a reinforcing cycle of social exclusion; can impede the engagement and active involvement of people seeking asylum; lead to the promotion of community tensions; and deny social justice to migrants in terms of access to services, to their rights and to being able to participate in societies in which they find themselves.

**The meaning of citizenship**

Naturalisation and citizenship is a significant outcome at least for those migrants wishing to make a new home within EU countries, and has been identified as a key factor in promoting integration. It is not possible to summarise every country’s stance but a few examples of differing approaches can be given.
The UK has no written political constitution and the meaning of citizenship is therefore open to political and legal interpretation. Most commentators take Marshall’s (1950) taxonomy of rights as sketching the outlines of what it means to be a British citizen. This covers civil rights (property rights, legal guarantees and freedoms), political rights (the right to vote and rights of association and constitutional participation); and social rights (entitlements to basic standards of education, health and social care, housing and income maintenance). These rights do not, however, have equal weight and in the UK context, access to all of them, and particularly social rights, are strongly associated with access to income and wealth (Dean and Melrose 1999). Marshall’s taxonomy in any case has been overtaken both by recognition of the need to assert the rights of women alongside men – the rights to reproduction and to participation (Lister 2002) – and, in the context of the increasing heterogeneity of national populations, the introduction of a category of cultural rights – that is, the right to be culturally different in a society where civil, political and social rights are open to all (Castles 2000; Craig 2008). The New Labour governments in power till 2010, associated citizenship most strongly with participation in the labour market, allegedly underpinned by a multicultural approach. However, as Lister and others argue (Lister 2001, 2002; Craig et al. 2004), this emphasis on paid work devalued care work, in terms of looking after children or elderly or disabled dependants, thus effectively limiting women’s ability to achieve full citizenship, and also limits the citizenship rights of those not in the labour market. Recent restrictions placed on the social and economic rights of refugees and asylum-seekers further constrain their ability to achieve citizenship rights equivalent to those of the majority population (Bloch and Schuster 2002). Essentially, however, despite there being no constitutional basis for it, citizenship within the UK is ascribed by a legal process and has largely reflected *jus soli*, the right of residence, although for many migrants in the 1960s and 1970s it was ascribed through *jus sanguinis* (blood ties), for example near-family connections, as well as through historical connections (for former colonies).

In France, citizenship is based on the ‘republican’ conception, introduced by the 1789 French Revolution, and reinforced by the republican constitutional regime since the 1880s. From a juridical perspective, ‘rights’ (civil, political but also, to some extent, social) are linked to the nationality of citizens. The 1803 Napoleonic Civil Code (*Code civil*) implemented *jus sanguinis* – the right based on blood – which, at that time, contrasted with the dominant conception elsewhere in Europe. This was abolished in 1889 and replaced by *jus soli* (the right based on place) because of low fertility rates, and in order to integrate into the army the sons of immigrants born in France (Weill 1997). Beyond rights and entitlements, and in a more sociological (Durkheimian) perspective, the social dimension of citizenship also refers, in the French context, to social integration in the Nation, defined – by Renan among others – as a common set of values shared by all citizens, regardless of ethnic, cultural and religious characteristics (Heckmann 1999). The debate which surfaced at the beginning of 2004 concerning the law intending to ban the use of religious symbols, including the Muslim *hejab* (head scarf), is a good example of this ‘anti-communitarianist’ conception of citizenship.

In Germany, the concept of citizenship still remains strongly related to heritage and blood. German discussion on minorities remains concentrated on post-World War II immigrants and does not refer to distinct ethnic minorities living in Germany for centuries – such as the Danish minority in northern Germany or Serbs in eastern Saxony, each possessing recognised rights as a cultural minority, but

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22 It is interesting to note that the ‘right of blood’, adopted in Prussia 40 years later, and which is still predominant in Germany, was directly inspired by the French *code civil*. 
well-integrated into German society. Discussion thus focuses on two distinct immigrant groups: a) those with ethnic German backgrounds, the so-called Aussiedler (resettlers), mainly from former USSR or eastern European states (of whom about 2.7 million migrated between 1987 and 1999) and b) foreign immigrants. The two discussions remain only weakly connected. In recent years, debates about citizenship have begun to recognise the rights of those of Turkish and Greek origin in particular who have lived and worked in the country for many years (with the status of Gastarbeiter – guest workers – who it was presumed would return home) but have only now had the possibility of fuller citizenship status opened up to them or at least to their children (Noll and Weick 2012).

These different understandings of citizenship, together with the patterns of migration, and a growing and widespread trend toward racism and xenophobia, all discussed earlier, thus shape the context within which the notion of integration can be understood in different countries. Most significantly for this paper, debate about the significance of citizenship continues: Phillimore argues (2014) that ‘gaining citizenship is critical if migrants are to access the welfare state regardless of the welfare regime in operation’ (see also Sainsbury 2006). Perhaps controversially, whilst governments also believe that obtaining citizenship is critical to effective integration, a Eurobarometer survey has suggested that citizenship is not in fact necessary for successful integration.23 This finding is in turn contradicted by the OECD (2008a) which suggests that speeding up naturalisation processes can have a positive impact on employment prospects.

Immigration and domestic policies towards migrants

Alongside increasing restrictive immigration policies being imposed by many EU member states, domestic ‘race relations’ policies (also known as inter-cultural policies) have also tended to harden towards ethnic minorities and this has impacted specifically on attitudes and policy towards migrants. In many member states, what have become relatively liberal ‘multicultural’ regimes over the past 30 years have been under attack, with critics arguing that they allowed people from other cultures to enjoy the rights but ignore the responsibilities that living in another country might bring, and effectively to live separate lives. This view has been strongly contested both rhetorically and by research evidence, but political demands on minorities, including migrants, have increasingly required them to integrate with HCNs on the latter’s terms rather than, as multiculturalism implied, negotiating a cultural settlement with them (Craig and Lewis 2014). The political and thus policy direction of travel in many countries has been to imply that minorities need to do more to integrate with HCNs, with national governments, as in the UK, Germany and France, blaming the disturbances in many cities during the late 2000s on the unwillingness of minorities to integrate (Cantle 2002). The particular form this policy trend has taken, and the language used to describe it, obviously differs between countries to some degree. In the UK the policy framework has been badged as social or community cohesion and a very substantial if at times confusing literature has developed around this official framework, much of which has challenged the government’s approach and/or argued that it ignores the impacts of discrimination and racism on minorities and migrants which undermine attempts at cohesion (Worley 2005; Flint and Robinson 2008; Ratcliffe and Newman 2011). In an increasing number of countries (including France and the Netherlands), the framework for integration has moved more strongly towards compulsion, with migrants required to participate in

programmes – which may or may not be free – and to pass certain tests before they become eligible for citizenship and residence (a status confirmed by citizenship ceremonies). Evidence suggests that these are no more successful in promoting integration than non-compulsory frameworks.

**How is integration defined?**

As noted above, substantial interest in the concept of integration began to emerge roughly 10 years ago in response to the pace and volume of immigration, its increasingly mixed nature and political and public concern about the possible downstream impacts of unmanaged immigration, although the concept had been some part of public and political discourse for much longer within particular countries.\(^\text{24}\) Since then, there has been a substantial literature on the issue of definition, identifying key indicators, and evaluating the effectiveness of integration programmes established at both national and supranational levels (e.g. at EU level). This literature can only briefly be summarised here; we will focus in turn on that which has examined the four sectors (housing, health, education and labour market) which are the focus of this paper, and at neighbourhood level. Fundamentally, integration is said to be achieved when outcomes for migrants mirror those of HCNs\(^\text{25}\) but this begs many questions about the variety of outcomes, by gender, class, age and so on, which characterise host country populations (as well as the fact that HCNs actually comprise both people with a long-standing status as HCNs and those acquiring it after migrating in more recent times). Much research has attempted to explore the questions this perspective raises. For example, as Haque (2010) points out, migrants in a particular area might have higher skills levels and qualifications than HCNs, but have the same levels of economic activity. What does this mean about, for example, the influence of discrimination in the labour market? She also reminds us that integration, whilst it might be described as a goal as well as a process, is actually describing something where the goal can never fully be realised, most of all because of continuing demographic changes.

Clearly, although immigration and integration are conceptually different terms, the link between them, as we have argued earlier, is fundamental, particularly when one comes to consider the issue of impacts. Migrants entering a country have a considerable, though variable impact on a wide range of facilities and services including the four which are the focus of this paper. Migrants need housing and healthcare, they and their children need education of varying kinds; but whether the use (or not) of these services promotes the goal of integration is an entirely separate issue. A migrant can make use of healthcare because they need it, for example as a result of a road traffic accident, without in any real sense becoming integrated into the host country as commonly understood. More fundamentally, too, there is a significant political divide between those who believe that integration can only work effectively if immigration is tightly controlled, and those who do not. This has been the basis for much political disputation within nation states and has strongly shaped emerging immigration policies.

\(^{24}\) For example, in 1965 when minorities constituted only about 3% of the UK population the Home Secretary stated that he defined integration ‘...not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Lester 1967: 267).

\(^{25}\) Or possessing the opportunities and skills needed to ensure social inclusion and long-term well-being, a definition which of course should also, but often does not, apply to HCNs themselves (Rutter 2013).
First, we look at underpinning theories of integration. Many of these have developed in relation to the situation of refugees and it is worth stressing that refugees and those other migrants intending to stay permanently in the host country raise separate, albeit sometimes overlapping or complementary, issues from those raised by economic migrants who may be present for a short or intermittent period of time only. Thus, for example, a considerable volume of literature (e.g. Herlitz 2004; Dustmann and Frattini 2011, 2013) has looked at the impact of migration on a range of services and the relative costs and benefits of immigration in any particular country. These have often been driven by key and controversial political issues such as whether migrants ‘take jobs, school places, housing ...’ from host country nationals, or generally crowd out welfare provision for HCNs. These studies tend to challenge the range of myths associated with migration, although seemingly have little impact on the propensity of the media to propagate them. However, whilst the position of migrants in the labour market (generally low skill, low pay, doing difficult, dangerous and dirty jobs) and the costs and benefits associated with migration (usually a net benefit to national economies) are examined in detail, the ways in which migrants may become more integrated with local communities are often disregarded, even though this may be a route to better relationships between HCNs and migrant workers. Numbers of new migrants, and the costs and benefits of migration may be very unevenly distributed across different communities and it is in areas of high new migration where the issue of integration is perhaps most critical.26

**Theorising integration**

Within a growing literature on the meaning of integration, one of the most influential early analyses is that of Ager and Strang (2004) which, whilst focusing on refugees, has significance for other migrants. This built on earlier reports which mapped the field of integration literature both by Ager and colleagues and by others (viz. Castles et al. 2001). Castles and colleagues (p.12), from a very wide-ranging review of the literature, had suggested that there was ‘no single generally accepted definition, theory or model of immigrant and refugee integration.’27 The concept continues to be controversial and hotly debated. Whilst Ager and Strang’s analysis has not stopped this debate (and indeed Phillimore asserted in 2011 that it remained a highly contested subject, whilst also noting that clear trends were beginning to emerge in the literature and in policy), it has provided a clearer analysis which has been built on and amended in successive literature and in the development of policy-making. One driver has been that integration has become a clear policy goal for governments and a desired outcome built into many projects working with migrants of different kinds, particularly refugees. Ager and Strang identified ten domains (and within each domain ten indicators) which were of central importance to the integration of refugees. These include the four domains which are the focus of this paper, seen as the key ‘markers and means’. Achievement in these domains was not to be seen simply as an outcome of integration but as a means to the end of integration, and acting as a means of achievement in other areas. The three key elements which shape integration are about achieving public outcomes equivalent to those within the wider host communities (although this begs questions, as noted, about variations in achievement in the host communities); social connection with their own community, with members of other communities and with relevant

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26 For example, out of more than 400 local authorities in the UK, about 16% experienced a greater than average change over recent years (Phillimore 2013); these were areas of already greatest diversity.

27 A parallel – and also dated – review of literature across the EU comes more or less to the same conclusions: Spencer and Cooper (2006).
services and functions of the state; and having sufficient linguistic competence, cultural knowledge, a sense of security and stability reflecting shared notions of nationhood and citizenship. The connections between the domains are important: thus, as the authors argue (p.15) ‘housing structures much of refugees’ experience of integration. Housing conditions impact a community’s sense of security and stability, opportunities for social connection and access to healthcare, education and employment.’

In a subsequent article, Ager and Strang (2008) indicated the kinds of outcomes which would characterise integration: for education it was the development of skills and competencies, contact with HCNs, language development, support for choice of subjects likely to lead to employment; in the housing area, size, quality and facilities of housing, security of tenancy, safety and security of the housing environment, and the development and continuity of relationships in a neighbourhood; in the area of health, reliable access to health services, good information about healthcare, supportive language provision and attention to gender dimensions of healthcare; and in relation to labour market issues, important outcomes were the promotion of economic independence, enabling future planning, meeting HCNs (typically in the workplace), developing language skills, restoring self-esteem and encouraging self-reliance.

Phillimore’s recent (2012) review of the literature, which continued to stress the multidimensional nature of integration, added some important insights to the discussion, noting that integration could be seen as a two-way process, ‘a possible dimension of the acculturation process’, although one which was not necessarily linear. Refugees themselves demonstrated in their accounts of struggling for citizenship how integration does not occur in a linear fashion but ‘in reaction to everyday experiences, successes and setbacks’ (MST 2007: 1; see also Phillimore 2010b for a discussion on the ways in which stress and a lack of choice may impede refugees’ struggle to integrate). Key themes from the literature were that integration ‘implies the development of a sense of belonging in the host community with some renegotiation of identity by both newcomers and hosts’ (Phillimore 2012: 3), the development of social relationships, social networks, and ‘the means and confidence to exercise rights to resources such as education, work and housing’ (ibid.). Phillimore’s work also tested the framework developed by Ager and Strang and found that a fundamental aspect of integration was interconnectedness, with connections facilitating access to a range of networks, highlighting its multifaceted nature. The two-way nature of integration was also important in promoting institutional change to adapt to the presence of migrants and, perhaps most important of all for funding, the recognition, again, that integration was a long-term process (and not just a policy goal) requiring sustained funding. A later report (Cheung and Phillimore 2013) further emphasised the importance of social networks (which could of course be transnational networks) and introduced the significance of social capital. This challenged Putnam’s (2002) assertion that integration would be more problematic for migrants having regular contact with co-ethnic people. The authors found that those having good co-ethnic contact also had good contact with HCNs. Interestingly, health appeared to be less significant than the other three key domains we are

28 Other (Irish) research has demonstrated the way migrant children renegotiate their identities in order to be accepted by and integrated into their new communities (Personal communication. C. Dorrity 31 October 2013).

29 This should be distinguished from the process associated with migrants entering any particular country; thus in many countries, the asylum process is one which is widely associated with confusion, arbitrary outcomes, unfairness, mystification and, not infrequently, a culture of disbelief by official agencies. This processing of asylum claims can have a profound and negative effect on the later process of integration (Mulvey 2013).
reporting here but perhaps, as these authors note, because health issues only became important when people became ill.

Reflecting the continuing debates about definition, Ponzo and colleagues (2013: 6), in a theoretical and methodological paper exploring integration across European member states, defined integration rather more loosely as ‘the dynamic, multi-actor process of mutual engagement that facilitates effective participation by all members of a diverse society in the economic, political, social and cultural life, and fosters a shared and inclusive sense of belonging’, a process shaped by the unequal relationship between migrants and the receiving society. Ponzo et al. note again that integration processes occur at a number of different levels but that the local level is profoundly important. Whilst this definition is presented in a more general fashion, the discussion following it includes all the key elements alluded to in other definitions and does not appear fundamentally to challenge other key formulations.

Saggar et al. (2012) have reviewed the literature for the UK and identify three different types of integration measures. First, national identity (i.e. the extent to which migrants feel ‘British’ or feel they ‘belong’ to Britain) – which begs many questions, for example many migrants tend to identify much more with a local neighbourhood than with a nation state (Mulvey 2013). Many prefer to have a mixed sense of identity which might perhaps cover being from a country of origin, mixed with some feeling of Britishness which might be regional or sub national, of being European and part of a transnational community. Second, integration by group measures (recognising that integration outcomes vary enormously across different domains and between different groups), linked to measurable progress in these domains – employment levels, educational attainment and so on; and third, cohesion measures in local neighbourhoods (thus seeing cohesion as one subset of a range of measures to assess integration). The latter is very much concerned with issues such as trust and neighbourliness (frequently gathered together in the concept of social capital) and is as much to do with perception as with objective measures.

Underpinning these debates about the meaning of integration is the question of what migrants are integrating into.30 Many of the nations into which migrants are being integrated are characterised by increasing inequalities, by growing forms of discrimination in many services, and by deepening exploitation in the labour market. In these circumstances it is not unreasonable (as in national debates on the goal of social inclusion) to ask whether the goal of integration is an unqualified good. Very often, as many surveys of refugee attitudes have shown (e.g. Mulvey 2013) these reflect a relative acceptance of their new situation, relative that is to the situation they were fleeing, but not an absolute one in terms of the society into which they were being asked to integrate.

Rutter (2013) provides a typology of theories of integration as essentially three-fold in their nature: rights-based – the possession of civil, political and social rights – extended in recent years to the capabilities approach, associated with Nussbaum (2000) for example. This approach is reflected in the MIPEX index, discussed elsewhere; an outcome-based approach, based on minimising inequalities and segregation and measured through the assessment of various indicators such as educational attainment; and a participation-based approach, where integration ‘requires not just access to but social inclusion and participation in the labour force etc.’ (Rutter 2013: 20). The

30 A question which has also been asked of the notion of programmes to promote social inclusion.
boundaries between these approaches are not sharp and it might be argued that all three aspects should be part of an effective integration policy, allowing a recognition of integration as a goal and a process simultaneously. The problem, as she sees it, in any case is that in public discourse, integration is often perceived through a focus on outcomes (or, more often, failed outcomes) rather than an understanding of it as a goal.

The development of integration policy

The issue of integration of refugees and other migrants has, as noted earlier, become a critical policy and political issue and most member states have developed a series of policy documents leading to formal frameworks over the past 10 years. For most East and Central European countries, this has been a very recent development and indeed more generally the pace at which integration policy has developed has been uneven. In Ireland in 2006, for example, integration was regarded as only ‘an emerging debate’ (MRCI 2006: 31). At the time, this Irish experience focused most strongly on the factors inhibiting economic inclusion. In Poland, migration is still largely temporary (largely from Germany and Ukraine with a recent growth in those from Vietnam) and ‘the integration of second-generation migrants has not yet arisen as a problematic issue in Poland’ (Gorny et al. 2010: 151). They also come to a country where the proportion of foreign-born people is relatively low by many EU countries’ standards (for example the proportion in Warsaw is only 3.2 per thousand inhabitants).

We can again only examine the experience of a few states here, representative of different national contexts. Papadopoulos (2011) has developed a typology of integration regimes across all EU member states, focusing in particular on their relationship with welfare state regimes, citizenship and immigration policies and labour market access. This shows that there are as many differences between member states within any one welfare regime category as there are similarities. Thus Sweden, with a comprehensive welfare system, has a composite citizenship and immigration index of 88 (i.e. highly inclusive), whereas the score for Denmark, with a similar welfare regime, is only 44 (amongst the most exclusive). For many of the recently acceded states with rudimentary welfare regimes, data is generally unavailable and the move towards integration represents work in (early) progress.

Saggar and colleagues (2012) argue that three key questions are raised throughout the history of immigration in relation to social or community cohesion (or whatever term is currently in vogue – in some sense community cohesion and integration have been taken as interchangeable in much policy-making although the former has tended to be associated with ethnic minorities and the latter with new migrants): 1. Are they like us? 2. Can they be made to be more like us? and 3. Can we live together? In the UK in the context of continuing discussions about the meaning of community cohesion, and anxiety about inner city disturbances, the government sponsored a Commission on Cohesion and Integration which reported in 2007 (CIC 2007). This was less concerned with new migrants than the existing minority populations which were alleged to be self-segregated. This stance was widely challenged, particularly on the grounds that such segregation as occurred was generated by housing markets which were discriminatory towards minorities, and that the statistical

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31 This section draws on CLIP (2007 2007a) this also provides some useful illustrative case studies of how different European cities have addressed the issue of integration at a local level.

32 One consequence of this stance was that government withdrew funding for single ethnic groups, arguing that they reinforced segregation; this stance was successfully challenged in the courts (Craig and Lewis 2014).
evidence suggested that the group which positively segregated itself most of all was actually the white British group (Finney and Simpson 2009). The CIC produced what it described as a ‘new’ definition of integration linked to the concept of cohesion but distanced from the idea of assimilation which was beginning to gain ground again in political circles. Respondents to the CIC’s consultations interestingly found it easier to talk about race relations and equality rather than integration. The CIC’s definition (actually of a ‘cohesive community’) was (p.40) one where there was ‘a common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities, ... where diversity was valued ... those from different backgrounds had similar life opportunities and where strong and positive relationships are being developed between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods.’ This fairly general formulation, though touching on some of the theoretical positions being developed by researchers, was the foundation of UK government policy statements until the election of the Coalition Government in 2010. It may be argued that the Coalition Government not only sees a very marginal role for government in creating the conditions for integration but ignores the growing levels of discrimination and dismantles the infrastructure created to confront it (Craig 2013). The most recent UK government document does not acknowledge the impact of racism and discrimination on the possibilities of integration, nor the impact that cuts in expenditure might have both directly and indirectly (DCLG 2012). Somerville, writing in 2007 (especially ch.18), argues that UK integration policy has been a more or less total failure: it neglects in many policy documents to identify migrants at all or identify specific indicators for migrants, places ever more strident emphasis on managing migration rather than settlement, and leaves serious data gaps regarding a range of possible measures such as use of services, attitudes of HCNs and the impact of services on inclusion.

In the French approach to integration, however, the republican tradition has tended to generate an assimilationist model where cultural identities are privatised. The impact of the debates between secularism and some Islamic norms pushed the French government into a tougher stance which included attempts to impose dress codes. As several commentators have noted, the invisibilisation of ‘race’ in official statistics makes it difficult to understand what the impact of integration policies might be. It is well known that many migrants to France suffer from poverty and marginalisation (one of the causes of the disturbances in the banlieues in the 2000s) and that racism is on the increase. At present it appears that France has no effective integration model other than to insist that individual migrants (rather than communities) adopt French culture and norms in every way and, at least publicly, to obscure adherence to other values or norms. The general framework is set by the national state but it is left to provincial and local government to manage the tensions resulting from what is in reality largely a policy vacuum.

In the Czech Republic, as in many East and Central European countries, despite some structural initiatives such as legislation, implementation of integration policies is modest. NGOs and religious organisations have a very strong role and the state appears unwilling to promote the civic rights of non-citizens or indeed other minorities - as is reflected in the discriminatory treatment of Roma (in common with all of its eastern neighbours). Generally, the Czech Republic is playing catch-up in terms of the policy norms required by its accession to the EU, and thus integration policy is work in the early stages of progress.

Finland is one of a number of EU states with a limited experience of developing integration policy, having been a country of emigration until quite recently. Immigration policy has been very restrictive
and granting of work permits has been similarly restrictive (although substantial numbers of employers on the margins of illegality have managed to elude these restrictions, for example when employing seasonal workers in fruit picking). The integration of migrants is managed formally by the Ministry of Labour but there appears to be little co-ordination between central and provincial levels of government. Formally, migrants are allowed to maintain their own cultural identity whilst adjusting to Finnish norms: these norms include entitlement to social protection, which suggests that the goal of integration into the labour market may be somewhat undermined.

One aspect of the recent Dutch approach to cohesion and integration is worth mentioning as an example of social engineering to enhance integration between groups. Here urban renewal policies explicitly attempt to engineer a mix of different income groups in what were previously low income neighbourhoods. Dutch HCNs, immigrants and newcomers are mixed within specific neighbourhoods. This is an attempt to bring acceptance of multiculturalism. Smets’ (2005) conclusion is that for the different groups, bonding but not bridging capital is enhanced and that these groups are effectively ‘living apart together’ (see also Verwoort and Dagevos 2011).

In Sweden the government separated out the responsibility for immigration and integration some years ago to two distinct organisations (SIV and SIB) (as initially in the UK where the Home Office was responsible for immigration and Department of Communities for integration, although more recently the Home Office has been increasingly intervening in integration policy and practice). The three goals for Sweden’s integration policy are equal rights and opportunities for all, regardless of cultural and ethnic origin; a sense of community based on diversity, reflected both in policy and process; and a form of community development characterised by mutual respect and tolerance. The SIB sets the general framework and provides some funding streams to facilitate integration, but much of the detailed work is done by local authorities (Robinson et al. 2003). However a critical report points out that whilst the country has scored consistently high in for example the Index developed by the Migration Policy Group, and integration policies in Sweden are far less restrictive or conditional than in other countries with developed policies, OECD data suggests very unfavourable outcomes in terms of labour market participation. This makes the idea of the Swedish model being used as a template for Europe-wide policies most unlikely (Wiesbrock 2011). Sweden also offers an interesting if unusual example of integration being promoted by the use of resettlement from urban to rural areas, the small size of the resettled group and the needs of shrinking rural communities for incomers strongly facilitating the process (Cvetkovic 2009). A study of integration in Sweden, Norway and Denmark points out that though there are some dissimilarities in policies and ideologies, the common approach to welfare, to the importance of family relations and to cultural notions of equality in these countries has led to fairly similar approaches to integration (Olwig 2011).

As national policies have been developed, so there has been a growing interest within the EU as to what the most effective integration policies might be and whether the EU can contribute to the debates, particularly by assessing national policies, facilitating dialogue between member states and consequently promoting a tendency towards convergence in national policies towards a European norm of good practice (IoM 2010b). The European Committee of the Regions has helpfully produced a list of integration policies and practices implemented by local and regional authorities across the EU (CSES 2013). The present project is an instance of this interest. There has been a correspondingly significant growth in Europe-wide research within Europe: for example Penninx et al. (2008) provide a helpful review of the state of research across Europe. The EU, of course, has now defined a set of
common basic principles on integration. However, as the European Network on Racism (ENR 2011) observes, there are tensions between the development of the European common principles for integration and the policies required by the European Council’s Global Approach to Migration (which reflects increasingly restrictive immigration policies largely driven by the tensions arising from migration from Africa and non-EU Mediterranean countries). For example, the common principles include the aim of creating and maintaining societies in which newcomers feel welcome, whereas the Global Approach requires more effective border controls and more action against irregular migrants. This echoes the conclusions of an earlier paper which points out that an effective European integration approach needs to be complemented by a Europe-wide policy for combating racism and discrimination (Rudiger and Spencer 2003).

Huddleston (2010) also points to another lacuna in the development of a European-wide integration policy, which is that separate forms of European cooperation have been established for those working with beneficiaries of international protection (i.e. those seeking asylum or already granted refugee status) and thus that these have not been mainstreamed but rather excluded from the general process of standard setting and financial instruments underway within the EU. This presents particular difficulties for those who are granted refugee status in EU member states because at that moment they are under considerably increased pressure to ‘integrate’; this is particularly the case for UNHCR Gateway programme refugees who have suffered the most traumatic periods in refugee camps before moving to a host country, and may have enhanced problems in achieving some of the most common measures of integration such as grasp of host country language, or of quickly developing skills relevant to labour market entry.

**Testing integration in practice at a local level**

A substantial literature describes attempts to develop local integration strategies or to put them into practice (e.g. SCC 2004; Goodall 2007; Ager and Strang 2008; Threadgold et al. 2008; Waddington et al. 2009; Phillimore 2012; Saggar et al. 2012). Many of these have developed indicators which focus most strongly on the four domains under consideration here although as noted earlier, other domains are also featured: for example, Sheffield City Council in the UK lists indicators in our four domains as including unemployment rates comparable to those of the local population; numbers of refugees involved in voluntary work; proportion of refugees demonstrating English language fluency, the educational success of refugee children and so on; the Mayor of London (Gidley and Jayaweera 2012) adds to the core list of four indicators, measures relating to community safety, children and young people, and participation.

Some reports stress the importance of faith as a form of capital which can link or bridge communities and thus facilitate integration, either by the sharing of a common faith or by having the dimension of a religious faith of whatever kind in common, with many areas developing inter-faith organisations as a response to hostility to particular religious groups (Furbey et al. 2006; Jayaweera and Choudhury 2008). Of course, having different faiths or no faith may promote conflict as much as cooperation, as do the manifestations of faith such as dress codes or the ownership of community buildings. Most of the projects listed here cover a range of (local) domains and indicators with some provisional assessment of the factors which facilitate or hinder integration, but because they do cover a wide

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range of domains, the analysis is not generally very detailed. In the sections below, therefore, we look at the literature relating to projects or studies which have focused on one or at the most two domains, which provides information on facilitative or obstructing factors in much greater detail. There is again quite a wide range of literature (very extensive in the case of the labour market domain), so once more we have had to be selective in our choice of material. For ease of reading, we have underlined the key issues which emerge in terms of either facilitators for or barriers to integration. Please bear in mind also that this is to some degree a meta-review since many of the papers referred to are themselves reviews of relevant literature.

Education

Education is clearly a fundamental building block for other aspects of integration. As the OECD has indicated, ‘if we don’t help immigrant children to succeed in school, [and adults outside it] then we impose on them a penalty that will stay with them for the rest of their lives … they will find it harder to participate in the economy, face a higher exposure to unemployment, earn less… and have lower pensions’ (Keeley 2009: 783). As with the rest of this paper, we are limiting this discussion mainly to migrants who have a legal right to residence within any particular host country within the EU. However, perhaps pointing to the critical importance of education for later life chances, there have been some legal challenges to the restrictive immigration regimes in countries which deny the right to education to the children of irregular migrants (see, in the case of Germany for example, Laubenthal 2011). Here the interplay between a federal structure of government and an international human rights regime has won some concessions for such children.

Rutter’s review (2013) suggests that the two most critical factors in the education domain are fluency in the host country’s language (acknowledged by virtually every commentator in this domain) and a qualification which is recognised locally. In some countries, such as France, the acquisition of fluency in language skills is the basis of a formal contract (the contrat d’accueil et d’intégration) between migrants and the local state, requiring that migrants pass both written and oral tests. However, given that education provision is usually the responsibility of the local state, this may lead to significant variations in the quality and availability of support for the acquisition of language skills between different areas. Rutter notes (p.50) that, as in Sweden, having ‘integration strategies with clear objectives and programmes of work … [including] long-term residence and citizenship, has been found to encourage language learning.’ It is important also to recognise that language learning is a need for both children and adults. If children are helped to learn the host country language but parents are not, then discussion at home will take place in the language of the migrant’s own country: this means that the adults remain less likely to communicate with others, cannot help their children’s educational work and may remain quite isolated. It also places an unreasonable burden on the children. Despite the advantages of bilingualism (especially where the migrant’s native language may have some international resonance), children’s language attainment will be held back by a lack of linguistic continuity between school and home. Language learning of course need not take place only in schools and communities; it can be provided at the workplace to help the integration of migrant workers, and trades unions may have a role in this regard (RAY 2008) as may adult education providers from a number of sectors (Matthews 2006).

Arrival in a host country with a higher level overseas qualification will help in job-seeking but is less significant than a host country qualification. Overseas-born populations tend to have higher rates of
possession of qualifications (although there are enormous variations between and within migrant and differing national groups) but often these are not formally recognised in receiving countries. Therefore improved systems for assessing and recognising qualifications obtained outside the host country are essential and these need to be appropriate for the type of migration involved. Conversely, lack of fluency in the host country language may be a barrier to making effective use of education provision, and those who have come on a short-term basis may regard the use of educational provision as irrelevant. This will impact on the number and types of jobs open to them. Provision of language teaching in the host country language, whilst generally on offer in most countries, is often variable in its quality and accessibility: in some countries (such as the Netherlands and for some migrants in the UK) migrants have to pay for use of such language support, which clearly is an additional barrier for those on low incomes. Migrants coming from former colonies of the host country are likely to enjoy greater familiarity with the host country language (as well as its political, legal and institutional architecture), and therefore to be at something of an advantage. However, research also cautions against making generalised assumptions about the particular need for language support of any one group. This suggests that policy-makers and service providers need to think about the provision of language support at a fine level of detail as different groups (within broader categories such as ‘Black African’, for example) have very different language needs: not doing so will ensure that some groups within these categories remain unintegrated in a linguistic sense (Mitton 2011) which generates wider disadvantage.

For migrants’ children, there are very significant variations in levels of attainment although it appears that, certainly in the UK, girls tend to do better than boys and the children of migrants do better than white children from comparable income groups; for those ethnic groups where attainment has been poor, compensatory programmes have had an impact on closing the gap. These include universal nursery provision (which has been available in many countries for some time), better managed and fair admission systems so that some schools do not become effectively educational ghettos (Nusche 2009), and specific help for those migrant children who arrive with no effective prior experience of education at all. Early years programmes such as the UK Sure Start programme have had some impact on improving attainment for migrant children but these programmes, as with many other special programmes, have been affected by austerity-driven cuts in public expenditure and Sure Start itself was open to the criticism that it was structurally quite racist in its overall approach and was not targeted on migrant and minority children (Craig et al. 2007). Early years and nursery provision has been found to be highly segregated in some areas and this itself impedes moves towards integration with HCNs for both children and their families. One important finding has been that some cultures are strongly pro-learning and schools need to recognise this by affirming the role of appropriate parental support. What is clear is that migrant children (and their parents in general) are at least as keen and frequently more so, to exploit the benefits of education as HCN children (Keeley 2009) and this motivation should be recognised and built on. Another issue is important with regard to the wider role that nursery provision can play. Where nursery education is linked to the monitoring of health care and development, this will provide a stronger push towards integration as it aids the child’s all-round development and possibly that of the parents too (ibid.). Of course, the issue of segregation of migrant children and young people is not confined to very young children. It is not uncommon to find, for example, that Chinese and other international university students are

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34 Many countries have more or less comprehensive provision in any case and do not require additional national programmes although some compensatory work may be undertaken at local levels.
effectively ghettoised in higher education institutions and this impacts on their ability to achieve good qualifications (Adamson et al. 2007) and be integrated in however temporary a fashion. Critically, research demonstrates that the impact of migration on the general level of attainment in individual schools is likely to be positive because of the standard-raising performance of migrant children themselves (George et al. 2011). Having diverse ethnic mixes in classrooms may also help other aspects of integration such as the promotion of tolerance and trust. One multi-country study (Janmaat 2012) found this to be the case in Germany and Sweden but not in England, and found that intended political participation was only enhanced in Sweden: it concluded that country-specific factors were important in shaping this effect although these factors may of course include the national political and ideological context in which children grew up. In Italy, however, migrant children with a poor grasp of the Italian language are often kept down one year in primary school and even in the lower levels of secondary school. The impact of this appears further to disadvantage the children throughout their school and subsequent careers and to compromise their possibilities for full integration (Mussino and Strozza 2012).

The training of teachers is another key area for scrutiny and further action. Many teachers have not received training appropriate for working in a multicultural environment and teach from what is essentially still an ethnocentric curriculum, which is not appropriate. This can be dealt with both by better training but also by the use of appropriately qualified migrant teachers or assistants who can help children by presenting them with a range of images relating to their own culture as well as that of the host country. In Sweden, for example, Roma adults work with Roma children alongside Swedish national teachers (Keeley 2009).

Above the age at which school is compulsory, there are also concerns about the relatively larger number of migrant children not in education, employment or training schemes, although the research base in this area is relatively weak and more research is required, particularly around the intersections between education, training and employment. In the Netherlands (de Graaf and Zenderen 2009) and other countries, high rates of early drop-out and unemployment amongst young migrant people has been attributed largely to their own actions (or inactions); counter to this, a substantial amount of research (e.g. Gilborn and Mirza 2000) demonstrates the continuing impact of racism within the education system which, despite some contradictory trends within certain migrant groups, impedes educational attainment for minority and migrant young people. Additionally the appropriateness of education at the top end of secondary school is often questionable. This has led in some countries to an increased focus on vocational education opportunities. Such evidence seems to contradict the recorded motivation and increasing educational attainment of migrant children and points more to increasing segmentation between different groups. This differentiation is apparent also in established minorities where children (and particularly girls) of Indian and Chinese origin tend to do much better than most other minority children in terms of educational attainment.

At the level of tertiary education, although ethnic minority participation rates exceed those of the native population in many countries, this apparent success story does not at present provide adequate data which distinguishes between different kinds of migrant career within the broader ethnic minority picture. However, it would be surprising, given what we know about the way in which institutional racism and discrimination operates within education and within higher education in particular, if it were not more difficult for certain kinds of migrant to achieve entry to higher status higher education and higher educational institutions (Boliver 2012). A study in the Netherlands
illustrates this with the example of young Turkish migrants where strong pressures to study high status subjects such as law and medicine are negated by the structural barriers to accessing those sorts of courses. As a result many Turkish young people end up in courses such as business studies in professional colleges, which satisfy their parents’ aspirations and their own desire to gain qualifications and to have a better work-life balance than their parents (Pasztor 2012). If full integration means having the same life choices as host country nationals, then clearly the existence of institutional barriers to parental aspirations, leading to young migrants’ ‘realism’, suggests that full integration through to enjoying equivalent higher education choices will not be attained until the issue of racism is dealt with. Tailoring the kind of support to the differing types of migrant has been one theme of this paper and this remains true also for access to higher education. One study of entry to the UK higher and further education system for refugees demonstrates that cuts in specific programmes designed to help refugees into work, education or training (with government conflating the differing categories of migrant into one) ignores the very specific needs that refugees might have: the present UK government ‘no longer demarcates refugees as a group requiring specialised integration support’ (Gateley 2013: 2), a position also taken by the Mayor of London, which has the largest concentration of refugees within the UK. This masking of refugees’ special needs will, in effect, increase their vulnerabilities, as they lose the support needed to negotiate a complex assortment of steps to enter higher education such as admission procedures, rigid enrolment processes, interviews and recognition of qualifications.

Analysis of public expenditure patterns suggests, at least in the UK, that migrants’ demands on education spending are significantly lower (between 16% and 23% depending on the type of migrant involved) than for host country nationals (George et al. 2011); this might suggest that further investment and research generally into migrants’ experience of integration through educational means is not only affordable but also would be of long-term benefit to the host country. Interestingly, in this study it was found that relative expenditure per adult migrant varied across those three regions with the greatest number of migrants, confirming the need for stronger monitoring by central government of the ways in which local authorities might interpret their responsibilities.

The issue of interpreting and translation facilities which, whilst not limited to the education domain, certainly can have a significant impact, has become increasingly contentious. Many now argue that the provision of interpretation for many services is a disincentive to language learning and thus to integration. On the other hand, not providing interpretation facilities (including publicity and written material) about services and how they are accessed, will clearly disadvantage migrants in the earliest periods of their adjustment to a new country. This conundrum has not yet been properly addressed in any country. The literature suggests some countries are taking a fairly rigid stance by stopping such facilities quite abruptly, appearing to expect that language learning will happen overnight. This may simply isolate many migrants and it appears more sensible to devise a phased way in which interpretation and translation is withdrawn from specific groups as their language facility improves.

A study of parental aspirations for migrant children in Spain, whilst slightly marginal to the focus of this paper, shows how these aspirations can be diluted in the context of generally modest expectations of both native and migrant young people; the study notes that if government and school were to make effective use of migrant parents’ ambitions for their children, focusing particularly on parents who were amongst the poorest and most disadvantaged, it would not only help the integration of migrant children and address racial discrimination but raise educational attainment more generally (Portes et al. 2013).
with perhaps generalised but flexible targets for timescales. A concomitant of this is that language support provision is not also withdrawn and unfortunately this is not always the case. It is clearly contradictory to require migrants to learn host countries’ languages and then to remove the support which was designed to enable them to do so. One innovative approach to this problem is to engage HCN children in the task of language tuition for migrant children: in one example, school children are given the task of supporting children whose first language is not that of the host country (Guardian 13 November 2013 Public Sector Awards special supplement). In a similar vein, also maximising resources at relatively small costs, one study argues that interpreters from within migrant communities who perform this task regularly, should be provided with adequate support and training so that issues of empathy and trust can be maximised and the distance and sometimes hostility of professional interpreters employed by service providers can be obviated (JRF 2004), although it is important that those entrusted with this role are helped to have accurate and appropriate information. We have noted elsewhere that time matters. This is demonstrated in the sphere of education where first generation Pakistani migrants in Denmark were content to occupy low-skill low-wage work but second generation Pakistanis are achieving much higher levels of educational participation and attainment, a pattern familiar to most ethnic groups (but not all). This has been partly explained by the fact that as income has improved, migrants have moved to better housing areas with better schools and have mixed with higher income white families, although competition within the community has also had an impact. Their profile of achievement actually outstrips those of the HCN children (Ryutter 2011). Generally, second generation migrants’ educational attainment improves upon that of their parents, often outstripping the attainment of HCN children; an interesting counter to this, which may be a special case because of historical and political circumstances, is provided by the experience of Russian children in Estonia whose level of attainment has decreased compared to that of their parents (Lindemann and Saar 2012).

If education is seen as one key domain within which integration is promoted, it is worth reminding ourselves of the cautionary note inspired by Amin’s paper (2003) referred to above, which challenges the necessary linkages between integration and cultural, ethnic or national identity. A study in the Netherlands (Tolsma et al. 2012) observes that education, as a presumed ‘acculturation’ strategy, does not necessarily enhance support either for ethnically-mixed relationships or detachment from the country of origin. In relation to the former, this seems to be challenged by other evidence, not least the growth of ethnically-mixed marriages and partnerships,\(^\text{36}\) in relation to the latter, having multiple identities appears not to be distressing for migrants, nor does it undermine other aspects of integration. Tolsma and colleagues describe this as an integration paradox: one which may in any case disappear over time as mixed identities become more and more common.

Finally, in a very challenging study, Fossati (2011) has analysed the relationship between political macro-level variables and school performance in 22 European countries and Canada. Her analysis suggests that whilst HCN children generally benefit from social-democratic welfare states and immigration-friendly integration regimes,\(^\text{37}\) immigrant students underperform under these types of regimes. This would appear to put much of the evidence above to one side. Her analysis does not

\(^{36}\) For example, according to the 2011 census the ‘mixed heritage’ category is the fastest growing ethnic category in the UK.

\(^{37}\) Immigration-friendly regimes are seen to be so on a variety of measure including security of residence status, naturalisation regimentation, access to the labour market, family re-unification ruling, social security rights and civil and political rights (Fossati 2011: 394; see also Castles and Miller 2003).
look at the issue of school organisation, at the extent of inequality leading for example to stratification and segregation, nor at the particular profile of migrants to each country, each of which may have had a significant impact. It does suggest the need for a deeper analysis of the situation in each country, since for many of the countries referred to in this paper, the integrative measures pursued by governments seem to have a positive effect on school attainment, contra Fossati.

In summary, drawing on this and much other literature, the key points which facilitate integration in relation to education can be listed as follows:

- Support for language acquisition appropriately shaped to meet the needs of migrants, whether children, young people or adults, and from whatever ethnic and national origin they come;
- Better systems for acknowledging the value of qualifications which migrants bring with them, minimising transitional periods before these qualifications are accepted as entry requirements for education, training or work;
- Targeted support to help migrants negotiate structures and arrangements at every level of the education system;
- School admissions and organisational policies which emphasise integrative arrangements rather than those which segregate, either by age, gender or ability, as between native students and those of migrants;
- Improved training of teachers at all levels to ensure they are sensitive and equipped with the skills to work with a range of cultures and ethnic and national origins;
- Ensuring that the needs and vulnerabilities of specific and particularly more vulnerable groups of migrants (especially refugees, those seeking asylum, and their children, undocumented migrants and some outlying groups of vulnerable migrants) are not submerged beneath a generalised concern with migrants as a whole;
- Stronger monitoring of school performance in the area of integration;
- The building of relationships between schools, the children’s parents and the communities in which the schools are situated;
- Further research on specific areas of concern including the transition from school to work for migrants’ children and young people; and
- Addressing structural and individual racism and discrimination in all its forms and at all levels of the education system.

Health

Although access to healthcare might seem to be a critical element for supporting the general wellbeing of migrants and their ability to participate in the labour market specifically and community life more generally, and thus should be a significant part of any programme of integration at local level (given that in most states, much healthcare is delivered at local or primary levels, through clinics, doctors and community nurses for example), the social sciences and policy literature is relatively sparse in this territory with very little identifying the connections between healthcare and

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38 There was not time in this study to explore more specialised literature such as that from psychology (for the treatment of trauma for example) or clinical medicine. This might be a suitable area for further investigation for KING by someone expert in this territory.
integration. This suggests a continuing need for further *locally-focused research and project work* in this area. In fact, much of the literature around health care rather ironically reviews different aspects of the involvement of migrant workers in the *delivery* of health care (alongside domestic care) rather than its *receipt* (and thus might be seen more as a labour market issue) (see for example Bettio et al. 2006; Ryan 2007; Hussein et al. 2011; Olwig 2012; van Hooren 2012; Williams 2012; Boccagni 2014; Jonson and Giertz 2013).

The demographic changes across many Western and Nordic European countries in particular referred to earlier in this paper, with a shift towards an older age profile and a reduction in the dependency ratio as between economically active HCNs and those who are not, has driven national demand for migrant care workers in many countries. (This trend is also becoming apparent in Mediterranean [‘southern conservative’ welfare regimes] countries despite their historic greater reliance on family as a source of care.) These migrants are thus economic migrants coming for a very specific reason, almost certainly not expecting to stay permanently in the country to which they have migrated (and thus not concerned with the process of integration beyond daily survival and the legality of their status as migrant workers) and entering a sector in most labour markets characterised by poor wages and conditions and by isolated and demanding work situations. Recruitment of *migrant care workers*, either from outside the host country or within it, is a general phenomenon, although some countries have developed recruitment policies based on some specific characteristics required of care workers. There is little evidence yet regarding the process of return of these migrants, the great proportion of whom are young and female (often with children left in the care of relatives in their countries of origin) or indeed as to whether they will in fact return to their home countries.

Most of the studies referred to above note that these care workers are disadvantaged in many ways in terms of wage levels and working conditions for example; they may also suffer particular forms of precariousness because of their migrant status (for example having a higher workload, working more at nights and in less secure employment). Indeed, as Parella et al. (2013) note, they operate within ‘a discriminatory institutional framework that guarantees the availability of a female workforce within the parameters of the “globalisation of care work”’ (see also Zimmerman et al. 2005). As care workers, their situation is thus found to be little different in terms of disadvantage from that of native care workers in some countries (e.g. Sweden) and significantly worse in others (Italy, the Netherlands and the UK), a reflection of the wider issues raised by the type of welfare regime in place in those countries. Insofar as care workers of various kinds are able to meet, they have tended to cluster in ethnically-defined groups (e.g. Filipino domiciliary care workers, Irish nurses) which, whilst affirming their original identity, increases their isolation from wider society and hinders any possibility of integration in wider society. As women and often as mothers, they have particular needs which tend not to be recognised or responded to and this places many female care workers under increased stress. Parella et al. (2013) list the factors which impede their occupational mobility: their level of education and professional experience before migrating, family responsibilities, lifecycle and childcare responsibilities in the host society, and the frequent lack of social networks or ability to access them. This suggests the need for health care aspects of integration to focus on these particular needs or more widely, as Boccagni (2014) has suggested, for ‘investigating the needs of migrant women as transnational mothers and the sources of support available to them’, leading to the concept of transnational social welfare. Williams’ work (2012) points us in the same direction, arguing that despite the intersections of migration regime, care regime and employment regime being to some degree specific to each country, the growing convergence across Europe in the
employment of migrant care labour points to the existence of a ‘transnational political economy of care’.

Turning to the issues of access to healthcare for migrants as residents, although there has been considerable media coverage of the question of ‘health tourism’,\(^{39}\) that is of short-term migrants travelling to countries with better health systems to access healthcare at lower costs to themselves, adding to the alleged increased pressure which migrants place on healthcare systems, much of this coverage appears to have a flimsy evidential base (although it does ironically appear to have an impact in creating perceptual barriers which discourage migrants from accessing care) (MDM 2009). In fact, as noted, there appears to be very little research on health outcomes, needs, care and barriers to care for migrants (Jayaweera 2010). What appears more significant is the difficulty migrants have in accessing care because of confusion about the system and the failure of healthcare providers to be effective in explaining how health systems are structured and what people’s entitlements are (Migge and Gilmartin 2011; Phillimore 2011a). A study of migrants’ experience of healthcare in Ireland suggested that migrants’ perceptions were that the system was poor in adapting to the needs of a rapidly diversifying population and that, where possible (i.e. for economic migrants), they would prefer either to access healthcare in their own countries or at least to confirm diagnoses and medical advice with medical practitioners in their own country. These migrants felt that providers and practitioners showed a notable lack of sensitivity to cultural aspects of health care, including views about conditions, ways of accessing healthcare and negotiating care arrangements.

Many countries have developed relatively sophisticated understandings of health inequalities, their causes and the types of response which might be effective but again, because this analysis tends to be based on ethnicity, there has been less emphasis on ‘the possible impact for migrants such as country of birth, language and length of residence and immigration status …’ (Jayaweera 2010), a comment made in relation to the UK but likely to be at least equally applicable to many other EU countries judging from the limited evidence available. One structural reason for this is that many countries do not collect data in the appropriate way.\(^{40}\) It is only recently that many countries’ health systems have even begun to include data on ethnicity, let alone these important extra variables for migrants. Where data has been collected for migrants, it is usually driven by specific issues for specified groups of migrants, such as the need for trauma counselling for refugees and those seeking asylum, the trauma of the immigration process itself, with the greater risk of isolation and depression (see Phillimore 2011b), and the enhanced possibility of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis brought in from certain countries.\(^{41}\)

\(^{39}\) Interestingly there is some evidence of tourism in the other direction, from northern (often colder) climes to southern ones, as in the case of health migrants moving from Norway to Spain (Breivik 2012) although this kind of migration is numerically insignificant compared with, for example, migration (legal and illegal) from African countries, it still raises questions of integration and identity for host government and migrant alike.

\(^{40}\) One study in the UK (Craig et al. 2009) found that despite legislation being in place since 2000 requiring all public bodies to engage in ethnic monitoring, many healthcare bodies still did not even for their own staff.

\(^{41}\) At least one dataset within the UK could be used to examine the health of migrants but has yet to be analysed specifically for foreign born sections of the population and particularly those with less than 10 years residence in the country: this is the Millennium Cohort Study. The Health Survey for England could also provide some data: the lack of an analysis of either of these for migrants implies that relatively low priority is given to their situations. This is now being addressed by a study managed by Compas at the University of Oxford: www.compas.ox.ac.uk. In one or two instances, (e.g. BCC 2008), reports
Some evidence also suggests that the health of migrants may deteriorate – manifested in such issues as smoking, unhealthy diets, reduction in breastfeeding – during the period after migration because of the stresses caused by the acculturation process (the adaptation to HCN norms and values) (Hawkins et al. 2008) and this tends not to be recognised by health systems at all levels. However, more structural explanations are available which emphasise the barriers to good health caused by poor housing, income poverty, poor health practices in many workplaces employing migrants, poor information on the availability of health services, a lack of knowledge or denial of entitlement to health care for some migrant groups (usually refugees and those seeking asylum), poor language provision by healthcare providers, cultural insensitivity on the part of some care providers and structural and individual racism. Thomas and Gideon (2013) also note that medical and health providers’ responses to the health needs of migrants must include an understanding of indigenous, popular or lay ideas about health when trying to understand why many migrants suffer from poor health relative to their host population.

The lack of connection between health care providers’ attitudes and the perspectives of migrants is actually quite remarkable, given that many national health care systems have relied for their staffing, particularly at the semiskilled and unskilled end of the employment spectrum, on the work of earlier migrants (Spencer et al. 2007). One EU project is addressing the issues this raises for a ‘public health workforce to address migrant health needs in Europe’ (AMAC n.d.). This makes a number of recommendations both at EU level and national levels, for example, for more culturally sensitive and coordinated training, with appropriate accreditation, for health care professionals, and a focus in healthcare training on issues of social exclusion and barriers to migrants’ access to health care. At community level, the AMAC Briefing argues for the need to involve migrants themselves in the design, implementation and evaluation of training programmes, which should have a participatory methodology, with associated research and evaluation. Curricula must have content associated with migration and population mobility and emphasise intercultural competency as part of validation procedures. As with other domains, the voice of migrants is largely absent from the public discourse.

Jayaweera points out that there is a particular need to understand the levels of discrimination and the consequences of restrictions (Jayaweera 2010, see also Fernandez-Kelly and Portes 2012) – which may in some cases lead to increased mortality - imposed by immigration status in relation to access to health care and the impact of this on health outcomes (Jayaweera 2010: 3; also Lewis 2007). She also argues the need for better coordinated and more extensive data systems, to cover the experiences, needs and characteristics of migrant groups, more exploration at community level about the health care needs of differing migrant groups, and a community development-based approach to working with migrant groups to ensure their empowerment, engagement with health systems and appropriate recognition of their differing needs (BME Health Forum 2009).

have been developed on the health needs of newly migrant communities but extensive data collected by the relevant authority was not yet adequate to map these communities with any degree of precision. This is clearly a local variant of the national picture where a lack of appropriate data or analysis impedes the development of appropriate interventions. Birmingham City Council has also commissioned a study of the specific health needs of pregnant migrants (Taylor and Newall 2008) which, based on an analysis of infant mortality data for the city, identified refugees and asylum-seekers at most risk of infant and premature child mortality. This would help target particular kinds of health care for particular migrant groups in defined geographical areas. Women with no recourse to public funds for health care were a particularly difficult group to identify and access.
There are also specific groups of migrants whose health needs have yet to be fully recognised. One group comprises the numerous migrant workers arriving in many countries since EU enlargement from 2004 onwards. Significant numbers of these have ended up in difficult, dirty and dangerous work and indeed in some cases in work which is akin to conditions of modern slavery (Wilkinson 2012; Geddes et al. 2013). As a group, these workers are often subjected to intense mental and physical stress, and acute tiredness due to the pace of work, yet are often working in situations where healthcare facilities are marginal or non-existent. The geographical relationship between workplaces and off-site health provision is a considerable barrier to dealing with these manifestations of ill-health. Weishaar (2008; 2010) argues that they should be seen as a clear specific target for health promotion and health services but this would require a greater emphasis by health care providers on outreach work with tailored support for migrants, as well as a wider recognition of the need for social support. Language problems presented significant barriers, and healthcare systems were not effective in informing and explaining about availability of and entitlement to health care.

A subset of this wider grouping is the Roma, many of whom sought asylum prior to EU enlargement in 2004, particularly in the UK, and have now returned as economic migrants. This group, comprising people of Romani origin from a number of East and Central European states, has represented a significant strand in migration towards western and southern European countries in the past 10 years. What the Roma across the EU have in common is a long history of racism and discrimination and barriers to accessing services. One or two projects have specifically focused on access to health care over the years, on the basis that health care is both a fundamental right and a necessity. A study in East London (IHHD 2010) found a familiar profile of Roma health needs which were more acute than general migrant health needs, including low life expectancy, increased child and adult mortality, increased rates of chronic disease, and mental health issues (arising from violence, war and persecution, as in Kosovo) (see also Brown et al. 2013). Much of this profile of increased ill-health is the result of conditions in their countries of origin which historically have provided poor levels of healthcare (although this picture is generally if slowly improving now). In terms of accessing and understanding the health system, major barriers reported by migrants were language problems (with poor English spoken by Roma from all countries of origin and few translation or interpretation facilities available in healthcare services, including in response to telephone calls), a lack of information (both in English or other languages) and personal knowledge about the availability of healthcare provision (how to register with primary care physicians, how to access emergency and accident provision and so on), a lack of cultural awareness amongst healthcare staff (particularly in relation to conditions about which there might be particular norms or taboos such as sexual health, homosexuality, domestic violence, drug and alcohol abuse, disability and mental health), a lack of awareness amongst the Roma themselves about their own medical conditions, and an almost complete absence of any kind of appropriate advocacy service at community level. In many cases, even where a community organisation did exist, it was not acknowledged by health care professionals as appropriate to be involved. In some areas, cultural taboos such as historic attitudes amongst the Roma to mental health and physical disability, conditions long regarded as shameful,

42 The Roma in the UK are defined much more restrictively than on the European mainland as being sedentary in nature and being recent migrants; on the European mainland, the Roma includes all Romani groupings such as Travellers, Gypsies and Sinti. Since 2004, around 300,000 Roma have migrated to the UK, making them one of the larger minority populations now resident in the country. For a discussion of the Roma in the UK and in a European context see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/roma/national-strategies/index_en.htm.
were very significant barriers, necessitating long periods of negotiation before treatment could be facilitated.

ights and this issue is perhaps of particular significance in the context of health. Some areas of health are regarded as taboo – effectively off limits to western practitioners and likely to cause patients to withdraw when challenged; some, such as female genital mutilation, clearly contravene basic norms of human rights; others, such as early circumcision and scarification, are not necessarily dangerous or challenging to human dignity but can be performed under unsatisfactory medical conditions and can thus be regarded as unacceptable in that sense. There is clearly a great deal of work to be done in this area of cultural negotiation and this is why medical practitioners need a keen sense of cultural awareness in relation to the ethnic and national groups they might encounter. This process may take time but a start needs to be made which goes beyond simply introducing laws which make a particular practice illegal. An Irish study addresses these issues and points out that even where practitioners had checklists of cultural norms, they were not helped to go behind these norms and understand their significance for emotional needs as refugees adapted to their new home country. This is again a medical training issue (Radford 2010). Another example from Sweden, this time in the context of parents with AIDS, shows how it is possible for health care practitioners to negotiate a healthcare settlement which is respectful of cultural norms whilst bringing the best forms of support available to parents for their children (Asander et al. 2013; see also Ochocka and Janzen 2008; Rotheram-Borus et al. 2009).

A study in Finland examined the health care experiences of asylum seekers compared with migrants (foreign born-residents) at five Finnish reception centres and in two communes. Finland has low levels of migration and many of the legally-resident Finns are the equivalent of German Aussiedler, migrants returning from parts of the Soviet Union and from Sweden, on the basis of historical ties with the country. Asylum seekers come from a relatively small number of countries including Iraq, Iran and Somalia. The study concluded that context made a difference in healthcare treatment: the legally admitted foreign nationals seen at community facilities were considerably more likely than were asylum seekers assisted at reception centres to be satisfied with the health care they received (Koehn 2006: 21). One clear conclusion was that the preparation and training of practitioners for ‘international encounters’ needed to be improved (with most clinicians deficient in cultural competence and understanding of how to bridge communication gaps) and that international efforts to promote health needed to recognise the difficulties faced by those whose period of transition to full citizenship status was prolonged and debilitating, thus impacting further on their health. Thus 56% of the asylum seekers interviewed argued that obtaining citizenship was the single factor most likely to improve their mental health.

Another very marginalised group in relation to healthcare provision comprises undocumented (or irregular) workers. As we discussed in relation to education, the needs of this group are not widely

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43 Human rights frameworks in the west are often challenged by countries outside the ‘developed’ world as being an example of western cultural imperialism. One response to this is that these frameworks have been developed over many years and have been signed up to by most countries of the world. Beyond that, it is clearly a clash of notions of morality and social justice.

44 The issue of female genital mutilation is a good example of the failure of this approach: FGM has been illegal in the UK for many years yet there has not been a single prosecution, largely because children who are mutilated are unwilling to give evidence in court against their families.
reflected in policy formulation since they do not, in a strict legal sense, exist and often have none of the rights of citizens even where they are acknowledged to exist. Clearly, for migrants such as these, who tend to live and work in the most marginalised and exploitative conditions, and perhaps particularly for their children, access to health care is critical. In a survey of 11 European countries, it was found that ‘some countries provide no specific protection for children of undocumented parents and/or do not accept these children in the health system’ (MDM 2009: 7), despite the requirements of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child which all EU member states have signed up to. Indeed, in some countries use by ‘undocumented’ children of healthcare systems is required to be reported to immigration authorities, itself a huge disincentive to the use of healthcare and a likely addition to stress levels already faced by their parents in terms of housing conditions, workplace environment (where employers discourage reporting of health ailments and accidents for fear of being investigated), and levels of exclusion and isolation. In this most delicate of areas, information about rights and entitlements is hard to access and is often incorrect, contradictory or inappropriate. Critically, MDM argues, health care systems must be and be seen to be independent of immigration regimes; the reverse appears to be the dominant trend. In 10 of the 11 countries studied by MDM, undocumented workers were allowed to access healthcare but had to pay for it, a significant further barrier to those on very low incomes. The remaining country, the UK, allows general practitioners to provide healthcare for undocumented workers but only for primary care or otherwise for immediately necessary treatment: for example, the result of a traffic accident injury. It is likely that restrictions within the UK will become tighter.

Most migrants reported a series of barriers including racism, delays in treatment, administrative barriers such as the need to find documentary evidence, complexity and fear. Many reported giving up before receiving care. Given again that these migrants are likely to be suffering the consequences of violence, abuse, social exclusion and generally poor health conditions, one can conclude that this should be a huge priority for developing effective health care arrangements (see also PICUM 2007; Lindert et al. 2008; Bischoff et al. 2009). MDM’s experience in London is instructive (MDM 2007): here it ran a free health clinic for two years in a deprived multicultural part of London where many undocumented migrants lived. This concluded that there was no evidence of ‘health tourism’, there was no great burden on the health service and there would be no costs savings from restricting health care access to certain groups of migrants, since any short-term savings would be offset by much larger costs as early treatment at primary level saved higher costs later on in secondary or tertiary care. This clinic was physically accessible, locally situated, and free to all. It operated effectively as a bridge to more integrated healthcare provision and spent a great deal of time and resources dealing with the barriers to accessing this care, including difficulties with language, misunderstandings and lack of information, and the hostility of other GP practice staff and their lack of knowledge of cultural issues and of entitlements to health care.

This shopping list of issues is reflective of more general research findings about the difficulties facing migrants accessing health care (see e.g. WHO 2010). The WHO report notes that special efforts should be made to improve health services for groups with special needs such as those identified above; services must acknowledge gender issues (for example the need not to rely on family translation when dealing with women’s intimate health issues); a focus on developing services which

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45 This term has been coined to refer to those who allegedly migrate in order to access the benefits of health care in other countries.
offer access (in terms of entitlement) and accessibility (in physical and informational senses); addressing the inconsistencies or gaps in entitlement so all migrants can have access on a level playing field with HCNs; reducing and removing fees charged to migrants of whatever kind; recognising the important role NGOs can play in a non-clinical sense in advocating for health care and supporting migrants; an emphasis on outreach work to target those groups which are particularly excluded; and the reduction of linguistic, cultural and social obstacles by, for example, reducing language barriers, using cultural mediators to improve communication between providers and their clients, and improving the cultural competence of providers by initial and later top-up training programmes. Finally, WHO also stresses the importance of migrant user participation in the design and delivery of services, and the need for health care systems to collaborate with other service providers in providing integrated systems of support for migrants.

Finally it is important to remind ourselves that integration is not just a matter of a range of dimensions of wellbeing, but that these dimensions themselves need to be integrated dynamically and inter-related. Thus, a programme of work to prepare young migrants for the labour market in Finland noted that health and wellbeing was important as they entered work and that work promoted their wellbeing later on. This had implications for student health services, before the migrants entered work, and occupational health services once they had done so. These and other services had to address issues such as language competence, cultural adjustments, facing discrimination and developing knowledge about rights and entitlements. This would include discreet questions about the participants’ own health status and their knowledge of health and safety risks within a work environment (Turpeinen et al. 2013).

In summary, key issues for the domain of healthcare within the framework of migrant integration programmes are:

- A clear need for further research and exploratory projects on identified gaps in knowledge;
- Leading to better data systems which can be analysed to show the position of differing migrant groups, trends and needs;
- A recognition of the health care needs of migrant care workers – who are often seen solely as workers and not as migrants – and their own need for greater integrative work;
- Much better information and signposting (in accessible languages and appropriately located) at a local level for migrants as to the availability of healthcare, and their rights and entitlements;
- Recognition by other agencies of the broader barriers to good health amongst migrants, such as poor housing and low income;
- Considerable improvement in the training of health workers at all levels from clinician to clinic receptionists, stressing issues of cultural sensitivity, and the need for a significant degree of outreach work;
- Decoupling immigration status from the right of access to healthcare for both adults and children;
- Health promotion work to be further developed, targeted on specific groups such as economic migrants working in isolated situations and refugees suffering mental health issues;
- Strengthening the gender dimension of health care and linking it to cultural issues where appropriate; and
• Encouraging the participation of migrants themselves in all aspects of healthcare provision including the design of training programmes, the forms of delivery of local services (particularly at more local levels), and identification of needs. This might involve the development of community advocates, especially where there are delicate issues of cultural sensitivity.

Housing

We noted above the relative paucity of literature in relation to the health care dimension of integration: the same is even more so for housing. This may be because housing is a taken-for-granted aspect of integration in the sense that everyone has to have a roof over their heads, but there are nevertheless significant issues which need to be addressed in thinking about how housing conditions but, most of all, location can affect the process of integration. Fundamentally of course, ‘access to good quality, affordable accommodation ... is critical in providing stable circumstances for migrants’ (MIF 2008) and in promoting the process of integration; we might also add the issue of secure accommodation, that is, accommodation should provide safety but also long-term stability and for many migrants, especially refugees and those seeking asylum, this is far from the case (Phillimore 2013). Phillimore’s study outlines the four roles that housing plays in the lives of migrants (and the differing weights attached to each by different migrants): as shelter, status and identity; as a nexus for social relationships; providing safety and freedom; and as the site of the integration process.

The review of the literature needs to be seen in the context that most migrants, and especially those with the least bargaining power (undocumented migrants, those seeking asylum, refugees and those economic migrants at the bottom end of the labour market) start off in the least desirable housing (both in terms of condition and location: usually private rented accommodation but sometimes the poorest kind of social housing) where they are likely to be living in close proximity to many others of the same kind, and poorer HCNs (including earlier settlers); in the UK context of a shortfall in social housing (made much worse by recent austerity programmes) this is likely to create a sense of competition (which may be real in some circumstances) for limited housing resources. The private sector offers some advantages such as mobility and may be the only tenure financially accessible for migrants who cannot afford a mortgage and may not be eligible for social housing (Pearce 2013). This perception of competition, in both social housing and the private rented sector (often seen as the ‘first step’ on the housing ladder for native young people), has been encouraged recently by right-wing politicians and media opposed to migration in general, who often characterise this competition as unfair. The research evidence again challenges this widespread perception (e.g. Robinson and Reeve 2007; Robinson 2009; Vargas-Silva 2013). Robinson analyses the growth of this particular ‘moral panic’, generated initially by a provocative statement by a local MP, with immigrants allegedly unfairly gaining access to social housing becoming one of the top issues cited by the public as an instance of why levels of immigration should be reduced. To counter this, Robinson cites a wide range of literature (e.g. Kofman et al. 2007; Markova and Black 2007; Somerville 2008) regarding the difficulties migrants face in reality in becoming i) eligible for social housing (with rights being very limited for most groups of migrants and the weight of priority given to families rather than single people), (ii) accessing accommodation (with migrants finding huge difficulties in acquiring accurate, timely and helpful information and choices of accommodation often being limited to areas which are
inappropriate for them because of the threat of racism or isolation: Hickman et al. 2008), (iii) maintaining it (because of low incomes with little spare to spend on repairs and improvements), and (iv) generally being obliged to live in housing which is of poor quality, overcrowded, overpriced and otherwise highly exploitative. Difficulties in promoting the integration of migrants in these less desirable housing areas, which are often subject in any case to a process of regeneration, is hampered by the fact that many housing authorities have ‘a lack of knowledge about the diverse housing needs of residents, including those of migrants’ (Phillimore 2013).

migrants of all kinds may have housing careers which are characterised by moves between tenures and between areas: some have gone to areas with relatively modest experience of immigrants – ‘spatial pioneers’ (Phillimore et al. 2008), others may arrive in areas with high levels of diversity but move on, either because they want to or have to – from what are described by Travers et al. (2007) as ‘escalator areas’ to other areas. The former areas may incur considerable costs in settling these migrants only to find these costs are repeated as other cohorts follow them. Phillimore et al.’s analysis of one very diverse inner city area in Birmingham, UK provides a detailed picture of the reasons migrants come to that area, their profile whilst there, and their reasons for moving on.

Much of the literature places the issue of housing within the wider context of the neighbourhood. The evidence suggests that although there are some situations where migrants have competed successfully (although unknowingly) for scarce local housing, the impacts of migration on housing are complex and there are many situations in which migrants have contributed significantly to the process of renewal in run-down neighbourhoods (Craig et al. 2003; Robinson and Reeve 2006; Shelter 2008).

On the whole, there seems to be more literature exploring the impact of migration on housing and neighbourhoods, than there is which explores the experience of migrants in relation to housing. Robinson (2009) suggests there may be three types of explanation for the geographical variations in local experiences or impacts of new immigration: these are in terms of the individuals already living in a place (its local demography); the ‘opportunity structures’ (work, education etc.) apparent in the local environment; and the sociocultural features of local communities (the local mix of class, gender, ethnicity and so on). MIF, in reviewing the impact of migration on the housing sector in the UK, point to a number of factors: these include the need for good coordinated leadership (see below); the need also for good data on migration patterns and their implications for local areas and neighbourhoods; a more simplified system for access to housing and to housing-related benefits for different migrant groups – present systems can be very complex and obscure.

The housing careers of different kinds of migrant may be very different:

- asylum-seekers are often dispersed compulsorily to areas where there are large stocks of vacant property, or appropriate population mixes (although some have been sent to areas with very small minority populations);
- migrant workers from outside the EU are generally required to find their own accommodation (usually in the growing private rented sector, characterised by poor conditions and overcrowding);
- some migrant workers (generally those from post-2004 accession countries, who have normally required work permits) may have their accommodation provided by
employers (‘gangmasters’ in the common argot) and this can range from reasonably good to appalling (such as cold caravans in the middle of nowhere: Scott et al. 2012); most, however, tend to gravitate to poor-standard and often overcrowded private rented accommodation because this is all they can afford on low wages;

- migrants from pre-2004 enlargement countries (who do not need work permits) may have similar housing eligibility to HCNs, provided they are working;
- undocumented migrants, particularly those attached to local businesses such as small textile manufactories or food retail, or simply avoiding the local authorities, may be housed in poor quality properties owned by or associated with the businesses or again in poor quality private rented accommodation.

Robinson (2007) has also demonstrated that new migrant groups typically have different pathways into housing from family reunion migrants who come to longer-established migrant and minority communities. The private rented sector, the size of which may vary from one country to another, is generally the sector which is least well-regulated, most prone to be of poor quality but of relatively high cost, to have irregular tenancies and thus to be a source of considerable tension within neighbourhoods. One review of the sector from the perspective of migrants shows that urgent action is required to bring the sector as a whole up to the standards of social housing (Perry 2012). For high skill migrants (a relatively small proportion of migrants entering any country), a rare analysis suggests that they also tend to live in private rented accommodation but, as they stay longer, their housing careers tend to deviate from those of low income migrants, with the proportion of those in owner-occupation, the highest status in most countries, rising from 20% on arrival to 45% in the UK after five years: although this is substantially below the national average, it is still far higher than the corresponding proportion for most other migrant groups. Although younger and less likely to have children than the native population, over time their profile moves again towards the national average. While most do not come to the UK expecting to stay, within five years almost 30% of this sample acquired permanent status (Whitehead et al. 2011).

What is clear from much of the evidence is that the legal framework for housing migrants is complex, confusing and difficult to understand (Shelter 2008) and requires simplification and better signposting. The role of local advice and law centres is critical in this regard, and particularly advice in appropriate languages for new migrants (Shelter 2007). In some countries, neighbourhood wardens have been appointed to manage housing schemes at a very local level and to help new arrivals settle in and this kind of scheme showed very positive results, particularly where wardens were well-

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46 In the UK, although there are inter-ethnic group variations, the foreign-born population has significantly lower ownership rates, is three times as likely to be in the private rented sector as compared with the UK born population, and shows similar levels of participation in social housing. Recent migrants (arriving in the last five years) are more than twice as likely to be renters compared with other migrants (Vargas-Silva 2013). There is scant evidence about the impact of immigration on housing prices but the overall impact appears to be negligible, unlike in Spain where a significant (one-third) part of price inflation was attributable to immigration (Gonzalez and Ortega 2009).

47 The private rented sector is in such poor condition in many countries that workers have been known to die in house fires caused by faulty wiring in countries such as Germany (Mostowska 2013) and the UK.

48 Interestingly one study from Spain showed that the legalisation of undocumented/irregular workers (which has been advocated in many countries but so far has only been carried out in two, Spain and Italy) increased the home ownership rates amongst the legalised by up to 20%. This is a perhaps unexpected bonus from what is typically a very unpopular political demand (Amuedo-Dorantes and Mundra 2010).
Language is yet again a key issue for effective integration. Shelter argues that this complexity leads to increasing numbers of migrants falling into destitution, a process which clearly impedes any attempts at integration. What is generally clear is that pace the arguments of many governments and commentators, the concentration of minorities and migrants in deprived communities and neighbourhoods on an allegedly self-segregating basis (which drove much UK government community cohesion policy for example) is not the result of choices made by minorities and migrants but a result of their lack of bargaining power within a market driven by income and wealth and not by need. This raises a difficult tension in integration policy with respect to housing. The sustainability of neighbourhoods as cohesive entities may be seen as requiring a stable population base; on the other hand, developing levers for integration at the local level may require a social mix, and housing interventions with integration and cohesion in mind have to address this tension (Robinson 2004). A later paper argues again that this requires a clear sense of leadership amongst housing providers both in terms of neighbourhoods and in frontline services. This requires new forms of leadership which, for example, are community-led, and involve both established residents and new arrivals (identifying people who have shown leadership – skills, knowledge and drive – in other contexts), which address the myths about competition, help to build trust between different actors and are prepared to take risks (Perry 2011). Housing providers can help to develop positive partnerships (between local policy and service agencies and migrant organisations), they can reach excluded groups in neighbourhoods, and build frameworks which aim to minimise conflict.

Many migrants may move on over time or be moved on (for example as those seeking asylum have their status as refugees accepted [Phillips 2006], or economic migrants improve their economic status) but these early housing experiences may have a significant impact on their later process of integration. For asylum seekers in countries where dispersal programmes are in force, the award of refugee status will mean leaving their asylum seeker designated housing and moving elsewhere; although, particularly for those who have waited many years for refugee status to be granted (a not unusual situation), they may have developed strong links with the local community and wider environment in which they were first placed. For many others, particularly where those links are more fragile, this is a moment at which a move to other areas, towns and cities (where perhaps many co-ethnic people or family members are known to live) may be made (Craig et al. 2004); this means that some dimensions of the process of integration (e.g. schools for children, establishing in a new neighbourhood, seeking work) may have to be started all over again. As Larsen (2011: 333) argues, on the other hand, in a Danish context where refugees have to sign up to remaining in a specified community for three years, the presence of co-ethnic people or family members previously arrived may actually help the process of integration for newer arrivals as they can act as ‘mediators between newly arrived refugees and Danish welfare society … they thus introduce refugees to local cultural values and everyday routines and demonstrate how to navigate them’.

In Phillimore et al.’s 2008 study of Handsworth in Birmingham, a range of needs were identified by local migrants which translated into demands for improvements: as with many other studies, migrants were found to be living in poor housing conditions, within poor and unsafe environments, struggling to access a range of welfare provision to which they were entitled, for reasons which were more to do with the delivery of the services, and with their own enforced low standards of living.

49 However, as with the use of community advocates, discussed elsewhere, it is critical that the advice and information provided by these intermediaries is accurate and appropriate (Goodson and Phillimore 2008).
contributing to a further acceleration of disadvantage in the neighbourhood (see also Robinson and Reeve 2006).\textsuperscript{50} Issues raised by migrants included improvements to the state of the local environment which some found shocking; difficulties (particularly for new arrivals) in accessing helpful sources of information in relevant languages about a range of services, with a clear need for a central source of information; difficulties in accessing services such as, relevant to this paper, health, housing and education (with children not attending school for some months), but also utilities and playspace. Migrants felt most positive about local shopping facilities, which were themselves diverse, and the help provided by local community organisations, but felt most anxious about community safety and the lack of visible policing. Migrants made a number of very detailed recommendations for improvements, for example in the form of delivery of language teaching, a more coordinated school admissions system, creating a welcome pack for new arrivals with detailed information in many languages, and working with refugee community organisations to build bridges between different communities and ethnic groups.

Robinson and Reeve (2006) also present a detailed account of neighbourhood experiences of new immigration of all kinds, from the perspective both of existing community members and of new arrivals. Although this shows an increasing diversity in the settlement patterns of new immigrants, it points to the benefits for new immigrants associated with living, at least initially,\textsuperscript{51} in clusters of people from a shared background (which was found to be quite typical of many areas of migrant settlement) or \textit{shared ethnic or cultural identity}, and also reports that community tensions\textsuperscript{52} are not inevitable. This ‘clustering’, or segregation on the basis of shared ethnicity, has been seen to be a public policy problem in many countries (as discussed above) and, certainly in the UK, has been problematised by the drift of much community cohesion policy. However, against this, Robinson and Reeve found that clustering actually provides a sense of identity and security, can counter social exclusion,\textsuperscript{53} and generate a demand for specific culturally-sensitive services as well as mainstream services that are attuned to the needs of different cultures, religious and community facilities and even employment opportunities. This paper argues that apparent segregation should not necessarily be seen as a hindrance to integration of new migrants as long as the policy and service environment, and the continuing process of settlement and movement of migrants, actively facilitates that.

Robinson and Reeve also note that ethnic and cultural identity can affect the process of settlement and thus integration, particularly in racist contexts, where white migrants generally face less hostility than those with darker skin colour regardless of length of settlement or type of migration status. They conclude that the management of migration into neighbourhoods, and thus the beginnings of the process of integration, must be ‘tailored to local circumstances’ (p.40), that tensions can be reduced by \textit{mediating organisations} working to prepare local residents for the arrival of new

\textsuperscript{50} Elsewhere we have noted that the arrival of migrants can contribute to the regeneration of an area. This contradiction is more apparent than real.

\textsuperscript{51} Although dispersal may occur over time. This dispersal is often obscured by the arrival of new cohorts of migrants, suggesting to the casual observer that no such dispersal has in fact happened.

\textsuperscript{52} The particular ethnic mix can be very important and cases have been cited where certain ethnic groups have found it difficult to live together (Beider and Goodson 2005). Sometimes these tensions can be caused as much by the speed of arrival of particular groups.

\textsuperscript{53} This insight has been available to those in the UK wishing to see it since the arrival of East African refugees in 1972 (Robinson \textit{et al.} 2003). The tension between the need for security and the lack of social inclusiveness in much policy has been referred to as an ‘integration paradox’.

46 | IRiS WORKING PAPER SERIES NO.7/2015
migrants (and better coordination between government and local government in planning, for example in asylum seeker and refugee dispersal programmes, avoiding areas with little previous history of migrant settlement), and that the role of the media needs continually to be kept under review for the enormous impact it may have in shaping local perceptions (ICAR 2004). As we noted at the beginning of this paper, they also identify a serious lack of material reflecting the voices of migrants themselves (and perhaps most of all female migrants) and their experiences of neighbourhoods, neighbours, services and policies. Their report also implies the lack of serious long-term sustainable programmes of integration alongside careful and sensitive evaluations not driven by political imperatives.

In summary, key elements of housing policy promoting integration are as follows:

- Better all-round regulation of the private rented sector;
- Government seeing the neighbourhood as a key site for integration work, which recognises the complexity and variety of reasons for migrants coming to, remaining in and leaving particular neighbourhoods;
- Recognising the very important role that co-ethnics may play for new migrants in settling into neighbourhoods and beginning the process of integration;
- The key role that advocates, wardens, community forums, involving migrants themselves, can also play in building bridges between different ethnic groups in neighbourhoods, identifying needs and responding to them;
- Much better information, particularly on legal rights and entitlements to housing but also on other key areas of day-to-day living;
- The demonstration of strong and inclusive leadership in terms of public messages, policy and the delivery of services, in a way which is inclusive of migrants themselves;
- The significance of housing and neighbourhood as a site for safety and security for migrants, many of whom will have suffered trauma and violence and may still be experiencing the effects;
- The need for building migrants’ capacity to create representative organisations and a voice for local migrants’ experience;
- Building a strong gendered dimension into housing policy and provision;
- Recognising that new migrants, with support, can play a significant part in regenerating run-down housing areas; and
- Better evaluation of housing and neighbourhood projects to ensure that new policy developments in the field of housing build on the best available practice.

We now turn to the last domain featured in this paper, that of the labour market.

**Labour market/employment**

a major agenda remains for most countries (some more than others) to ensure universal workers’ rights, including the right to be a part of a trade union (in France non-nationals are excluded from workplace negotiation structures), employment protection and the conditions of the national labour

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54 Many of these elements are reflected in the cross-national study of housing and integration of migrants across Europe undertaken by CLIP (2007b).
market that may limit the contribution of international migrants (p.14). It notes that the MIPEX scale (referred to below) scores most countries better on theoretical employment rights (such as equal access) and employment security (although even this is poor for some groups of migrants) than it does for getting migrants into work in the first place. The benefits of employment are thus not available for many because of the barriers facing them, including discrimination, eligibility restrictions, and language fluency (Behtoui 2013). Specific groups remain largely unprotected by legislation, for example, domestic migrant workers (ENAR 2011; also see www.kalayaan.org.uk).

The literature for this domain far exceeds that for any other, which is hardly surprising given the emphasis which most governments are placing (even as merely a defensive political stance) on the economic contribution that migrants make to their societies, and it will be necessary to be fairly selective in this section to bring out the broad trends which are observable from research and policy to date. Labour market policies are also, as the OECD points out (Keeley 2009) the domain where there is greatest congruence between individual member state policies, because each country has sectors which are now highly dependent on migrant labour and because employment is seen as the best way to underpin wider attempts at integration, providing the basis for avoiding falling into poverty and sustaining social and community links. Conversely, those suffering from poverty may become concentrated in poor housing areas, generating tensions there, and being further isolated from work possibilities, with all the potential for poor school attainment, poor health and problems of disaffection. Employment has also become probably the most contentious domain in the sense that right wing media and politicians have responded in a fairly negative way to the cries that ‘they are taking our jobs’ or ‘they are lowering our wages’ or ‘they are simply here to take benefits’, thus effectively allowing what has largely been shown to be a myth to take root in public discourse. This, and the need for highly skilled workers in some sectors (such as computing and financial services), means that for many countries the balance has shifted in terms of which workers are positively encouraged to come to EU countries. Governments are quite prepared to give the demand for high-skilled workers a significant profile but the integration issues for this group are relatively small (especially as many may be temporary migrants) compared with those for the typically medium or low-skilled workers who come through the low skill economic migrant or refugee route (see Virdee 2006 for a general discussion on employment issues for migrants and minorities).

The weight of available valid research evidence (Glover et al. 2003; Somerville and Sumption 2008; Lucchino et al. 2012; Dustmann and Frattini 2013) suggests that job capture by migrants or displacement of HCNs by migrants is essentially untrue although there may be a few very specific situations in which such displacement has taken place. Somerville and Sumption (2008) show for example that the impact of immigration on wage levels is small, and concentrated, but that other factors such as education, technological change and outsourcing have more significant impacts. Where immigration has negative impacts tends to be in those sectors where immigrants can easily find work because they do not require language fluency, cultural knowledge or local experience, and these are jobs which native workers are increasingly unwilling to fill in any case. One detailed study of new European migrants (from five countries, most of them yet to accede to the EU) found no ‘signs of heavy competition for jobs between the immigrants and long-term residents’, and a labour shortage remained with immigrants reporting low levels of unemployment. This study, from five years ago, might now show a different picture given the economic crisis (Markova and Black 2008: 19).
There are also, of course, many areas of the economy in every EU member state where migrants of all kinds are prone to exploitation with low wages and poor working conditions, and additionally subareas in certain sectors where illegality is the norm. In these cases, new migrants and previous immigrants may be more affected in terms of the concentration than HCNs.

Research suggests, again contra the myths which have been popularised by sections of the media, that migrants' overall impact on the economy tends to be positive: UK data, for example, suggests that migrants pay more taxes and make less use of welfare provision than HCNs in general, although clearly there are groups of migrants who need more welfare support in the early periods of settlement (Lucchini et al. 2012); migrants with low skills and educational attainment levels face strong barriers to labour market success and need increased levels of support here too. Many writers point out that helping immigrants to move out of low-paid, low-skilled jobs both improves confidence in the immigration system generally and, where employers are encouraged to provide training, does not undermine incentives for employers to provide training for all. The concentration of migrant workers in unskilled and semiskilled labour market sectors, partly driven by the enthusiasm of many employers for workers they see as committed, reliable and hard-working (Anderson et al. 2006; Geddes et al. 2013), has another downside, which is that parts of some sectors (such as agriculture, domiciliary care [see above under health] and cleaning) have become almost entirely dependent on a flow of migrant labour, to the point that in parts of some countries they might become unsustainable if immigration policies were tightened even further. This is perhaps a reason why employers' organisations in some countries are generally fairly muted in their critique of immigration policy at present. One response to those who protest (inaccurately) that migrant workers are displacing HCNs would of course be to improve employment conditions and wage levels and see what kind of shift might occur in the workforce.

In the UK, for example, male migrants typically earn 30% less than their UK counterparts (15% less for women). For migrant men, it takes on average 20 years to close this gap but for women, perhaps unexpectedly, it may take as little as six years (possibly reflecting lower wages all round for women). European migrants catch up fastest in this context and ‘more recent migrants have fared better but this is due to smaller pay gaps on entry rather than faster wage growth’ (Dickens and McKnight 2008: 1). Again, a more recent study might find that this catch-up period is extended. This study found that Asian workers tended not to catch up at all, however, a finding supported by a study of young Bangladeshi men in East London (Salway 2008) where, despite many attempts at economic integration, the men were generally still largely unemployed. Exclusion from mainstream society interacts with strong centripetal cultural forces within the Bangladeshi community: young men tried to resist this as they wanted to break out from a cultural ghetto. Salway argues that the answer might be to connect these men across ethnic boundaries to other ethnic groups and ‘to consider carefully what ethnic identity implies in terms of access to resources and opportunities’ (p. 1126).

In general this section of the paper, as elsewhere, limits itself to fairly recent material (i.e. over the last five or six years) although some earlier reviews are helpful in contributing to thinking about the context to which migrants come. Thus for example a review of a number of papers on UK labour market outcomes (Kempton 2002) concluded that it was difficult to try to understand migrant outcomes in terms of their route of entry because of limitations or absence of appropriate data, although it was clear that migrant labour market outcomes were generally well below those of the host country. A review of OECD countries found that immigrant labour market participation was
roughly similar to that of HCNs in about half the 24 countries studied (Keeley 2009) although there were significant differences within and between immigrant groups, with women generally doing less well than men. Immigrants were over-represented amongst the unemployed (by a factor of two in some Nordic countries), notably the long-term unemployed. This remains a problem in many countries. Employment disadvantage in terms of participating in the labour market and finding work was accentuated for those coming from poor countries and/or who had a poor grasp of the host country language, despite higher (albeit variable between ethnic groups) education levels and their relative youth. Migrant communities also tended to be unevenly distributed between different industrial sectors but generally concentrated in those with low prospects overall. In relation to the local perspective on labour market integration, much of the literature, whilst focusing on the outcomes at individual or possibly community level (more probably ethnic community than geographical community), tends to look at the importance of structural factors and higher level interventions (from transnational policy, through that of government, local government or region) rather than at the factors at community level which might facilitate migrant integration. This is simply because most labour market interventions do not take place at community level.

A fairly substantial literature examining the process of integration for long-standing migrants shows, over a long period of time, the convergence between the economic position of established minorities and HCNs in terms of owning businesses (Jones et al. 2012), which might be taken as one good indicator of economic integration. The experience of Turks and Greeks in Germany, with its resistance to the settlement of migrants at all, provides a counter-example (see above). Since the 1980s, when immigration of various kinds increased rapidly, and particularly since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the immigration regime in Germany has begun to open up and demonstrate the same sorts of trends as elsewhere in Europe, for example that adoption of German citizenship and entry into schools at an early stage, significantly affected the likelihood of successful integration outcomes and processes (Noll and Weick 2012). This literature also demonstrates the connections between ethnicity and religion and class, showing that integration has a number of key dimensions (Khattab et al. 2011). It is also necessary to remind ourselves that in terms of participation, levels of activity, skill levels, wages etc., the labour market in all countries is characterised by ethnic inequality, quite apart from the issues faced by migrants of whatever kind; it is not as if migrants are coming to a situation which is a level playing field in terms of economic and labour market opportunity (CoDE 2013). Finally, in thinking about the context for integration it is important to remember that the role of the labour market in promoting (or not) integration goes beyond simply obtaining a job of any kind; it involves questions about the appropriateness of that job and the role of the workplace itself in promoting integration.

Whether the in-migration of people seeking work is inevitable, an accident of history or a matter of policy choice rather depends on the type of migrants in question and the country being considered. Of course, from the importation of slaves into western society, through the use of migrant labour after the First and Second World Wars, governments have shaped particular policies to address labour shortages in their countries, although these policies have often been reversed because of a political outcry about the wider impacts of immigration (Craig 2012). Some governments have been prepared to create the conditions for large migrant inflows, for example the UK which removed

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55 Although this does depend on the type of business. Many Chinese and Bangladeshi entrepreneurs, for example, despite running reasonably successful businesses, are still not regarded as integrated into the wider societies in which they work.
transitional controls at the time of the 2004 EU enlargement, and Cyprus, despite claiming that opening up migration policy might be a temporary measure, attracting proportionally very large numbers since the 1990s. These labour migrants in all EU countries reported here have generally ended up in the worst labour market situations (and of course housed in the worst accommodation). Cyprus is an interesting if unfortunate example in relation to the subject of integration: it ‘has the worst score on family reunion out of the 28 MIPEX countries, the second worst on long-term residence and the fourth worst on labour market access’ (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2011).56 The lack of public debate on integration is therefore perhaps not that surprising. Where migration has been a much longer-standing phenomenon, it is still only fairly recently in many countries that the dimension of integration has come to appear on the policy agenda (Germany, for example, historically regarding immigration as a temporary matter despite the lengthening periods of settlement). Even in countries where the question of integration has been on the policy agenda (albeit with differing terminology – for example assimilation, race relations, community cohesion, multiculturalism), much of the formal literature examining the issue of migrants has tended to focus on migrants’ impact on economic and social dimensions of life in host countries, whilst ignoring their integration (Green et al. 2008). At the same time, labour migration from (or indeed into) the former East and Central European countries is, in the context of post-war migration as a whole, such a new phenomenon, with patterns of migration and the relationship between different new migrant groups and the labour market so varied,57 that it is difficult in many national contexts to establish whether, for example, migration will be temporary or permanent (and the balance of decisions amongst migrants is constantly changing at present) and therefore the particular demands that this numerically significant but recent migration form might make on integration policy.

Anderson and Ruhs (2012) examine these recent migration trends since the EU enlargement of 2004, arguing that the UK’s growing reliance (like other western and northern EU countries) on migrant workers ‘cannot simply be explained by lax immigration controls or migrants’ superior “work ethic”. It arises from the complex interactions between institutions, public policies and social relations’ (p. 23) including skills shortages and demand from employers for labour, for which the government must largely take responsibility. In some countries – Spain is one such – there are concerns about the likely decrease in the population as well its ageing profile (the latter factor affecting many other western countries) and this has prompted calls from time to time for more open immigration policies. Even those arguing for more restrictive immigration, and for a more balanced ethnic profile of migrants (leaving aside the retirees from colder northern European countries, Spain’s immigrants are predominantly from North Africa) accept that unemployment in their country is not caused by immigration but by a liberalisation of the labour market (Toribio 2003).

A number of major studies examine key issues in relationship to the integration of migrants into the labour market in a comparative context. McKay et al. (2009), in a seven country study (including six

56 Study of the factors attracting migrants to Cyprus suggests that, perhaps unsurprisingly, rather than labour market conditions, it is income levels and income gaps which prove to be the main determinant. Having a common language was significant, and most migrants of this kind were in fact from the Greek mainland (Gregoriou et al. 2010).

57 For example, a study of new migrants to the UK shows that new immigrant groups are far from homogeneous in their labour-market performance. ‘Migrants from English speaking and EU15 countries, and migrant men from Hong Kong, China and Japan, have participation and employment rates that exceed those of native whites as well as higher odds of being in white-collar jobs, differences in human capital not being particularly significant. For persistently disadvantaged groups such as Turkish and EU10 migrants, there seem to be few chances of improvement in the future … for new migrant women, inactivity rather than unemployment seems to be the greatest concern’ (Demireva 2011: 651-652).
'old' EU member states and one ‘new’ one – Bulgaria), explore the relationship between migration status and employment outcomes. Although this had an initial focus on illegal/undocumented workers, the study looked at those factors which shaped the pathways into work of all types of migrants. They found, first, as have many other studies, that the ‘universal adoption of restrictive immigration policies together with the criminalisation of migration has been accompanied by a surge in the numbers of undocumented workers’ (p. 6). The links between immigration policy and employment status – whether or not people had a right to work and the kind of work they did – are thus set strategically at a political level. This also led to a growth in subcontracting and self-employment and a rise in the numbers of very vulnerable workers. One interesting factor shaping labour market participation is the fact that many employers appear to have preferred to associate different nationalities with different tasks; this may be to ease issues around translation and interpretation for example (Anderson et al. 2006).

The growth of the informal and casualised sector in all countries studied, covering both undocumented workers and those who had some legal status, meant that migrants bore greater risks, often had to deskil, making them vulnerable to exploitation by employers working on the boundaries of legality, and to the incidence of forced labour (Geddes et al. 2013). Of course, data was not generally available on migrants who were working illegally, except from small qualitative studies (Dwyer et al. 2012; Lewis et al. 2013). Many workers fell into irregularity either because existing work permits had expired or governments had changed the terms of work permits; as a result the transition from regular to irregular work was more common than the reverse. Key elements facilitating undocumented working included the work being of a seasonal kind with fluctuations in demand, declining needs for and systems for skills, work that is generally obscure and hidden from public view (although its products may be publicly on view), and a mass of co-ethnic entrepreneurs. The report by McKay et al. (2009) concluded that the regularisation of undocumented workers (as had happened in Spain – several times – Belgium, and Italy) would not have an impact on the overall numbers of undocumented workers unless accompanied by other measures in the wider industrial relations and employment policies of the member state in question, such as improvements in working conditions, strengthening the role of trades unions and a framework of general law and regulation which is worker-friendly.

Compas (2005) notes in a study of diversity and integration that ‘the omission of regulatory frameworks is particularly significant in the European context’, which omission leaves many migrants to struggle in a fierce marketised economy. This study, which looked at regulation of access to the labour market, and the programmes and benefits which migrants might be eligible for according to their legal status, found that non-European nationals, who are restricted in access to the labour market, perform worse than those groups which don’t have restrictions. In terms of benefits and programmes there was little evidence that migrants made greater use of these benefits than HCNs, although migrants tended to use job centres more. Whilst there was growing awareness of the need to promote economic inclusion for refugees, there seemed to be an almost complete lack of any government-sponsored programmes to promote the inclusion of labour migrants. The role of trades unions could in theory be significant but in many countries, the converse side to the weakening of labour market regulation has been direct or indirect attacks on trades unions, and trades union membership has fallen in most countries. The UK coordinating body, the Trades Union Congress (TUC 2007), has collated data from many migrant workers on the appalling conditions many face at work
and in their accommodation\textsuperscript{58} but at the local level, *trades union* officials seem unable to organise these most exploited workers.

An IoM study (Platonova and Urso 2012) covering 30 countries and including several currently outside the EU, summarises a number of key dimensions with respect to labour market inclusion and integration: these are migration trends, labour market and immigrant inclusion, the *legal framework for admission and employment*, and the *institutional and policy framework* for integration. The key migration trend shows that despite the economic crisis, the proportion of third country nationals residing in the EU is virtually unchanged from immediately previous years. Half the increase in the EU population over the past few years is accounted for by migrants. Although the overall picture is one of gender balance, the proportion of female migrants is much higher in some countries, such as Cyprus and Bulgaria, for various reasons including demand for labour in particular sectors in certain countries; the migrant population also tends to have a younger age profile than that of the HCNs.

The adverse labour market conditions faced in many countries in recent years has impacted on labour migration. Labour shortages were spread unevenly across different sectors, and some countries such as Finland, which actually has a very small proportion of migrant workers overall, still feel the need to promote labour immigration. Labour market outcomes for third country nationals deteriorated across the period studied and unemployment rates, despite some national variations, tended to be higher than for HCNs. *Young people* suffered unemployment rates much higher than those of any other group. There was a *greater concentration of migrants in specific low skill sectors*, including agriculture, cleaning, certain forms of manufacturing, domestic and care services, hospitality and catering. This labour market segmentation does not necessarily represent the skill composition of this group of the population but it does mean that migrant workers continue to be associated strongly with sectors where conditions are poor, wages are low, unionisation sporadic, and employment protection generally unpromising. Governments have generally tightened up *legal frameworks* for admission on the basis of employment alone (by reductions in quotas, removal of some seasonal worker schemes and tightening restrictions on work permits), which, whilst set alongside stricter measures to prevent irregular workers entering member states, including the use of sanctions against employers and removal of rights to various forms of welfare, had the actual effect of driving more workers into irregular status and illegal entry.

The restrictions placed on particular groups of migrants by their *immigration status* has been explored extensively. For example, Bloch (2007) points to the *low levels of labour market activity amongst refugees*, with those actually in work mainly in secondary sector work with little prospect of progression, and those with high levels of skill working in jobs which were not appropriate to their skill level. Women were less likely to be working than men; whilst integration emphasises individual *capacity-building*, it pays no attention to *discrimination or restrictive* policies and employment strategies need to focus on individual employability together with structural barriers. Similarly Shutes (2010) shows that an emphasis on short-term job outcomes not only fails to help refugees find work appropriate to their skills and education but effectively excludes those who are ‘harder-to-help’.

\textsuperscript{58} For example, a quarter of Polish and Lithuanian correspondents had no written contract (one-third amongst agency workers), ten times as many as HCNs were paid less than the minimum wage, and more than half had encountered serious problems in the workplace. One third had accommodation provided by their employer, and more than half of these described their accommodation as poor or very poor. Although only 3\% had joined a union more than half expressed an interest in doing so.
Providers often take the easy options for placing refugees in work, which tends to be self-defeating in the long run.

Some groups of refugees have even greater difficulties accessing the labour market and these include the UNHCR Gateway refugees who have often spent many years in refugee camps before being granted refugee status because of their long-standing vulnerability. An evaluation of the Gateway programme in the UK found that ‘employment aspirations reflected pre-UK qualifications (which may have been obtained many years earlier) and experience but most refugees were applying for any work they could find’ (Evans and Murray 2009: 1). By 18 months after arrival, between 12-40% had worked at some point but few had found sustained employment; most jobs were temporary, poorly-paid, low skill and predominantly found through agencies rather than official government support. Refugees complained that they had not been warned of their employment prospects before agreeing to come to the UK, and the evaluation suggested additional strategies were needed including targeted media campaigns and brokering by employers or NGOs (perhaps through volunteering schemes) to help refugees into work. Another evaluation, this time of local projects funded by the European Refugee Fund (Waddington et al. 2009), found that many of these local projects had had some success in meeting two specific goals, namely supporting refugee social entrepreneurs and enabling women refugees to improve their employability. These aims were part of a wider objective of promoting integration by a variety of means and one route to this, by involving refugees in very local education, training and employment schemes, seemed to be working well compared with other employment strategies; nevertheless this was a relative success and schemes that sought to provide accredited training courses failed to meet their own targets: these may have simply been too ambitious.

The issue of skills levels is covered by several studies: one aspect of this theme is the attempts by some governments to support, through education and training, both on and off the job, the acquisition of skills. More frequently, however, research demonstrates that migrants are employed in jobs for which they have much higher levels of skills or qualifications than are needed (Cook et al. 2008; Keeley 2009). For some this may be a matter of expedience, as many EU migrants working on a temporary basis are prepared to do what for them is relatively well-paid work, regardless of their skills level. For permanent migrants, including refugees, down-skilling is a much more serious issue and reflects both the existence of widespread discrimination in the labour market but also the unwillingness of many governments to put in place effective systems for acknowledging, perhaps with modest retraining, the qualifications which migrants bring with them.

Policies or issues identified by Keeley’s large-scale OECD study (2009) which are thought to be barriers include lack of language fluency, lack of recognition of skills and qualifications, lack of social networks (through which jobs are often more readily located), and discrimination in the labour market. Conversely, language training, mentoring in and out of the workplace, better recognition of skills, and confronting systemic discrimination are factors which aid entry into appropriate jobs. The OECD also argues that much of this work could be done more effectively at the local level, using the skills and local knowledge of NGOs, rather than through government departments. Additionally, there is evidence that making effective use of migrants’ skills and knowledge is likely to aid the competitiveness of businesses and thus contribute to economic growth (SQW Consulting 2008). Another factor which, whilst not identified in the context of migrants in particular, will be of assistance to them is the existence of diaspora-based networks. Kitching et al. (2009) noted that
these can either facilitate or hinder business competitiveness, depending on the levels of resources and opportunities they can make available to new businesses. However ‘they do not negate the importance of class resources such as property, education and skills in the processes of business formation and development’ (p.689), a finding which suggests that these networks, once identified, may only be of support for migrants once they had become fairly well-established in their new country.

We have identified the issues raised by the position of female migrant care workers earlier as an important domain for facilitative local integration. Parella et al.’s (2012) study of migrant workers, including care workers, in Spain suggests that the Spanish reception context is hostile in terms of upward mobility. Previous education is important as is the ability to invest in further education and have recognisable qualifications. The previous sector in which migrants worked is also important, with those previously in domestic service or agriculture doing less well than those from other sectors. Having children ‘shows no clear association with upward mobility’ but where migrant women bring children with them, the attempts to balance work life with childcare is problematic. Overall, in relation to the labour market, female migrant workers more generally tend to be trapped in terms of occupational mobility by structural determinants. The answer to these difficulties for all female migrants (and in virtually all countries) is recognition of existing skills and encouragement to develop further, new, skills together with policies to facilitate the work/family life balance (see also Kofman and Raghuram 2009).

Haque’s (2010) review of what works in integration provides a local perspective on these broader analyses. She draws together evidence from a number of countries to show how local action can be strongly facilitative in helping migrants into the labour market: instances she cites are the use of the technique of early employment experience through temporary employment agencies (Denmark and Sweden); bringing job seekers into contact with employers early; the use of targeted job vacancy consultants to match migrants with opportunities for employment (Belgium); in-depth matching of immigrants with work opportunities, associated with real life language learning, assessment of qualifications and employment support (Sweden). She notes however that many of these local initiatives tend to focus on labour migrants and that most countries still have migrant populations dominated by family reunion, refugees and claims for asylum, for whom many of such approaches have not been tested; it is the latter groups for whom labour market participation rates are lowest and most problematic. She notes that promoting citizenship can have a very significant effect on labour market participation but that local initiatives need to sit within the context of a supportive national policy environment and at present, this rarely exists. She also emphasises the difficulties still faced by most migrants in the labour market in terms of discrimination. Most discrimination policy across the EU focuses on the public sector while the private sector has been left unregulated, despite being the sector where most migrants end up working.

One area less well covered in the literature relating to labour market participation is the role of co-ethnics in supporting those working. Ghanaians in London for example, many of whom came because of disastrous economic and social conditions in their home country in the 1980s, ‘experience a levelling process in their work lives … where they continually juggle between job exploitation, racism and inadequate pay’ (Vasta and Kandalige 2010: 581). Strong family and community ties within the host country are important in helping to sustain them, and whilst much literature suggests that weak ties outside their ethnic community might help provide relevant information, advice and other
resources, Ghanaians found that weak ties within their community fulfilled the same function. For this population, integration did not mean a 'sense of belonging', which they perceived as almost impossible in a racist society, but was about getting a job, being a good worker, a good citizen and contributing to the receiving society (Ibid.: 595).

Another set of projects, brought together in a CLIP (2008) initiative, focused on the issue of equality and diversity in jobs and services, drawing together best practice from a range of cities in relation to the promotion of equality and diversity for migrants. The key areas where this was required (and many cities were found to be deficient in most areas), were in recruitment and promotion, where targeted work on young people was undertaken, keeping a focus on retention as much as promotion once migrants had taken up jobs, generating contacts between migrants and HCNs, developing positive action measures, and making use of effective advertising media to ensure they reach migrant populations; identifying and addressing barriers to migrant participation such as wider labour market conditions, the over-emphasis on formal qualifications in some instances, language proficiency, and 'informal' restrictions on recruiting to certain jobs. Important aspects in the workplace were intercultural and diversity training, identifying significant factors to promote integration such as aligning workplace complaints procedures, working conditions and addressing cultural and religious needs, and ensuring that workers’ rights such as health and safety provision, were equally accessible to all.

However, even where economic participation is secured for large proportions of migrants, other factors may work against integration. A good example of this is in Norway where Polish workers in the construction industry, hired through temporary employment agencies, are unable to move into more permanent jobs currently occupied by Norwegians unless they assimilate to what is called a ‘Norwegian work culture’. This seems to be code for a layer of discrimination which keeps migrant workers within the less well-paid, lower skill and insecure jobs, effectively segregated into an area of work which is ethnically defined (Friberg 2012a; see also Gronseth 2012 for a wider discussion of migrants within the Norwegian welfare system). Van Riemsdijk (2013) notes that this devaluing of the skills and experience of workers whose general employability is equivalent to that of HCNs, is not limited to manual, semi-skilled or unskilled work. She reviews interactions between Polish nurses working in Norway and their counterparts, finding that Polish nurses are in positions lower in the nursing hierarchy for a variety of reasons, such as the official failure to recognise their qualifications and the fact that Norwegian nurses often colluded in this devaluation.

Friberg (2012b) argues that many of those Polish migrants currently perceived as temporary may in fact become permanent – even when faced with discriminatory behaviours within the labour market. This is similar to experience elsewhere where significant numbers of economic migrants might after a period of time, bring their partners to live with them in a host country, or partner with a HCN. Having children who begin to attend school may be a critical factor in ‘sealing the deal’ of permanence (Adamson et al. 2007) although even then this permanence includes periods of return to the home country. Obviously, ease of travel within Europe as a whole makes some of these statuses flexible and mobility within the labour market will be a significant factor, while skills gaps have allowed many migrants to become self-employed and control their own working conditions. Cieslik (2011) examines

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59 In one study in the UK, employers noted that retention was much easier where workers came with a legal status. This study also reminds us that many so-called illegal workers were working illegally before the 2004 Accessions to the EU but became legal, on acquisition of a work permit, once April 5 2004 had passed (Anderson et al. 2006).
the ‘return’ decision-making of migrant workers from Poland within the UK. Here she argues that the quality of work, working conditions, wages, stress levels, interaction with co-workers and security are critical in determining decisions about return. About half of her respondents were planning to return to Poland and most were dissatisfied with their employment prospects and existing work situation. The other respondents found aspects which were encouraging them to stay in terms of the prospects for improvement and professional development in the labour market. Length of work experience was important in shaping choices.

Another study (Kindler and Szulecka 2013) examines the position of Ukrainian and Vietnamese women within the Polish labour market. Here migrant women were directed into the informal labour market because of difficulties with administrative procedures, family obligations and insecure financial status. The Ukrainian women survived by using strong networks of support from their own country whereas the Vietnamese women used similarly strong ties within their own ‘ethnic niche’ in Poland, a strategy familiar in many other countries.

As noted earlier, the factors which shape the possibility of good labour market outcomes for migrants and the prospect of enhanced integration into the host country are largely structural in nature. Employment is an important means for avoiding poverty. Although a migrant’s status may have a significant impact on their medium- and long-term prospects, the fact remains that most enter countries characterised by deepening levels of poverty, increased inequality and a context shaped by racism and discrimination. Most therefore enter the labour market (except for targeted high skill migrants) in positions which are low paid, low skill and with poor working conditions. In many countries too there appears to be an overwhelming concern, both in terms of policy and political and public discourse, with the impact of migrants in the labour market rather than with the issue of integration, whether in wider society, in the labour market specifically or within the workplace.

Public policy is thus critical, whether focusing on skills shortages or labour demand from employers, and the role of immigration policy more generally is also highly important in shaping public perceptions and also in creating disadvantageous prospects for migrants, whether through deregularisation of the labour market, or tightening of immigration policy or the legal frameworks for admission to the labour market, which together lead to a growth in irregular working and worsening of the employment conditions of many migrants. Labour market policy overall also affects refugee migrants in particular, who have greater difficulties finding and keeping decent work because of the many ways in which discrimination operates against them. These include a failure to accept or to find ways of accepting pre-migration qualifications (leading to deskilling and a relatively high level of unemployment for such migrants); the weakening of regulation in the labour market (and the concomitant weakening of trade union activity) which together weaken controls on the operation of discriminatory practices; the unchecked role of populist and often racist media comment, which shapes public opinion; the lack of an evidence-based debate, due to politicians’ desire to be seen to be ‘tough’ on immigration; and the general lack of government-sponsored programmes to promote integration of labour migrants.

There is clearly, from a reading of the literature, relatively little that can be done at a local, community level in the face of these structural barriers, although there are opportunities for
partnership working at different levels of governance, but a small fraction of the literature has pointed to important areas where effective local action can be important. These include:

- Local schemes to promote linguistic ability and fluency in the host language: this includes early schemes for migrants’ children to aid the connection between adults and their new communities;
- Public officials (e.g. in job centres), NGOs and other bodies acknowledging the impact of cultural and religious factors and understanding how these, and how migrants understand their ethnic identity, might impact on their willingness or ability to enter the labour market; in general public sector officials need to understand that long-term work is more significant as an outcome than short-term ‘fixes’;
- Developing targeted local interventions for groups known from research to be at particular risk of unemployment or under-employment: these would include, refugees in general, women, young people and other most excluded groups;
- Local schemes to identify skills gaps or gaps between migrants’ aspirations and the reality of the local labour market, and to work on new skills development or to upgrade skills or existing qualifications to be able to match host country requirements;
- Trades unions to develop their ability to work at local levels in conjunction with community organisations, including migrant representative organisations: this will help confront local manifestations of discrimination and secure labour market protection for those entering work;
- The use of targeted media and advertising campaigns to promote particular job opportunities;
- The development of a local brokerage role involving local employers and NGOs as appropriate which can match workers to job opportunities with upskilling and development of a knowledge base as necessary;
- Using local community organisations, including refugee community organisations, to bridge between migrants and other local residents including HCNs, to help identify labour market opportunities and promote the process of integration in the workplace;
- Providing targeted business support for migrants wishing to become entrepreneurs or otherwise self-employed, making use as far as possible of more extended economic and social networks of co-ethnic and other entrepreneurs to support business development;
- Offering particularly intensive forms of support for refugees becoming involved in very local employment, education and training schemes as a step towards labour market participation;
- For those at the stage of very early employment experience, also providing support through temporary (but regulated) employment agencies, schemes for job matching and the use of designated consultants to seek vacancies, and broker migrants into work;
- Ensuring that all programmes can promote an anti-racist and anti-discriminatory stance, including publishing facts and evidence about the actual impacts of migration on the host country (in a number of languages where necessary), in order to present a context which is welcoming and supportive to migrants at a time of vulnerability; and
- for example develop an individual workplan for each migrant helped.

Does integration work?
In this final major section, before a brief conclusion, we examine the growing literature on the effectiveness of integration measures. As integration programmes have developed, multiplied and attracted greater funding streams, the obvious concomitant has been that schemes have developed to evaluate their effectiveness, against defined measures and goals. Across the EU, a substantial number of such schemes have been set up under a range of EU organisational auspices. This kind of evaluation, like all social policy evaluations, is not an easy task particularly where it is addressed, as it should be, within a formative evaluation framework, as policy and practice are developing on the ground, and it has become even more complex an undertaking as nation states have become more diverse (Catney et al. 2011). Much of this literature underlines the kinds of local action identified in the preceding four subsections of this paper as being key to promoting integration at a local level.

Some of these evaluative reports have tended in practice to focus on the efficiency and effectiveness of the programmes rather than the outcomes for the participants themselves and early reports tended to constitute work in progress, as frameworks for devising evaluation were relatively rudimentary, or firm structural policies and arrangements under-developed, within specific member states (Kantor Management Consultants 2006; CLIP 2013). The CLIP report argued for the need for an integration policy for migrants built on efficient mainstreaming with local government and administration which involved new forms of governance structured around the principles of partnership, power-sharing and participation. In relation to the labour market specifically, it identified a need for greater support for ethnic entrepreneurship as a significant gap, a point noted in the preceding subsection.

One helpful source of data in assessing the effectiveness of integration across a range of states has been the development of MIPEX, the Migration Integration Policy Index, which is an interactive standard-setting and monitoring tool developed by the British Council and the Migration Policy Group, looking at how individual states are promoting the integration of legally-resident third-country nationals by expert assessment of 148 policy indicators (MIPEX at www.mipex.eu). From the perspective of this paper, key indicators are identified for labour mobility, education and long-term residence. MIPEX can show that equal access to employment and self-employment for immigrants on work permits was guaranteed in most countries but that in half the countries surveyed, foreign residents wanting to work in certain employment sectors were obstructed by eligibility restrictions and additional requirements that did not apply to nationals. What a monitoring index of this kind does not do is provide an evaluative infrastructure, i.e. it points to what is happening but not why or how; it is a useful tool for evaluations but is not evaluative itself. Fossati (2011: 407) endorses this limitation stating that ‘with regard to the MIPEX Index, it is not possible to differentiate precisely enough between the inclusion arrangements so that the evaluation of integration regimes in all their complexity remains only tentative.’ Thus for example the political framing of the ‘immigration issue’ might explain enhanced integration efforts in a particular country.

Whilst the central focus of this paper has been on local factors, it remains clear that the national context has to be understood as critical in facilitating integration. It is true that some integration could take place without the involvement of the state at all, but this would be sporadic, serendipitous, poorly resourced and probably also poorly managed (Rutter 2013). The IoM (2010b)

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60 In many countries those seeking asylum are barred from working altogether: many of these, faced with potential destitution because of the length of time they are obliged to wait for a decision on their status and living on very basic levels of financial support, are driven to work illegally (Lewis et al. 2013).
points to the significance of certain national factors: these include the generosity of national welfare systems; an effective infrastructure to prioritize and mainstream integration; a non-discriminatory framework in policy and practice; and a politically active citizenship. Developments in the past decade at a European level are highly significant for, in the context of the subsidiarity principle and ‘following on from the Action Plan implementing the Stockholm Programme, the EU now has an explicit legal basis for assuming a role in supporting and encouraging efforts to promote the integration of legal migrants’ (SMN 2010: 4). The SMN also pointed to the importance at a national level of strategic planning and effective long-term institutional structures for facilitating integration.

There are of course some methodological issues in evaluating integration policies.61 As Huddleston et al. (2013) point out, building on the Zaragoza Declaration, measuring the situation of immigrants is not the same as evaluating the effectiveness of integration policies: this is the familiar evaluative issue of deadweight, what would happen to migrants if no such policies existed? Change may happen for other reasons. Secondly, data is not always available or is incomplete or inappropriate even where proxies may be used. Thirdly, sample sizes may not always be sufficient. With this in mind their pilot project to identify factors influencing societal integration outcomes, and appropriate to the local level, suggested, in summary (pp. 5ff.):

- **Age matters** – outcomes generally improve with age.
- **Origin country matters** – migrants from less developed and non-EU countries face greater challenges in all the domains under consideration, are more likely to be affected by poverty and more likely to naturalise.
- **Social-economic background matters** – social mobility is modest for immigrants.
- **Quality matters** – the issue is not just about having a house, a job, a schooling, and access to health care but the quality of these. Their lives are often characterised by low wages, poor housing, and inadequate education and health facilities, all which exercise a drag on the integration process.
- **Discrimination matters** – immigrants do less well in racist contexts.
- **Context matters** – if the general population has higher outcomes, so too do migrants.
- **Policy matters** – more open policies facilitate integration but little is known yet about the causal effects of specific policies.

Some of these factors relate to the individual characteristics of migrants, others to the national context into which they migrate.

The CSES report referred to earlier provides a useful database of actual practices and policies across the EU (CSES 2013). In doing so, it identifies obstacles to good practice and examples of good practice in a number of domains (with a number of detailed case studies) including the labour market. More than 40% of local and regional authorities surveyed indicated that education and training, and employment schemes, were of the highest importance. Reasons for this included the need to gain a good grasp of the relevant language, and the opportunities work gave for interactions between HCNs and migrants. Authorities demonstrated a range of innovative and alternative approaches to accessing the labour market including those which reduced exposure to racist recruitment practices,

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61 Such evaluations were not originally developed for assessing the situation of migrants but with some improvements in data collection may be used to do so.
non-formal skills development and promoting business ownership, through tailored employment support projects. These again confirm the listings in the labour market section above.

Three major recent reports have analysed the question of ‘what works?’ in terms of integration policy for migrants and in concluding this paper, they are dealt with in turn here. A Runnymede Trust report (Haque 2010) concurs that it is not the fact of immigration itself but its speed which is causing tensions in many neighbourhoods and more specifically, and despite claims by UK governments to the contrary, the lack of adequate structures and policies to help manage it. In common with many other reports and based on pan-European evidence as well as some from outside the EU, it identifies the key roles played by employment and fluency in the native language as drivers for integration, but it also acknowledged the cross-cutting and inter-connecting nature of many indicators. For example, neither of these drivers can work effectively without good social relations with HCNs and good information about a range of other issues. And although time matters, without these two drivers, the length of stay of a migrant may be more or less irrelevant, as the experience of Bangladeshi populations (and particularly Bangladeshi women) in many European countries demonstrates. The report summaries ways of benchmarking integration based on a range of indicators in the four domains central to this report (and others), but urges caution in ensuring that indicators are valid and measure what we think they are measuring. It concludes, to repeat points made earlier in the present report, that immigration policies and integration policies are symbiotic, that meaningful integration needs to take place across all aspects of daily life, that long-term measures are as important as short-term ones, that the experience of HCNs is critical, and that effective integration will not happen unless the poverty and disadvantage experienced by most migrants is addressed. Many of the barriers to integration migrants unavoidably bring with them: their migration history (including their immigration status) and personal circumstances, their lack of human capital and basic social skills; but many others of course are systemic, such as institutional and individual racism and discrimination, which means that services are missing or inappropriate, and resources are not appropriately targeted.

Haque’s study confirms the view of Huddleston that time matters and also that immigration status matters, but introduces a new dimension in terms of labour market integration, which is that many countries have shifted immigration priorities towards high skill migrants. Leaving these aside (and there is growing competition to attract high skill migrants between EU countries and indeed within EU member states between cities and regions) most economic migrants and many other migrants, including refugees, tend if employed, to be working in jobs where they are over-qualified. With this growing focus on attracting labour migrants for identifiable high skill areas, many countries appear now to be giving the integration of humanitarian and family reunification migrants a lower priority, with implications for resources.

In 2012, perhaps concerned by the growth of the ‘integration research industry’, the European Court of Auditors examined the effectiveness of two of the major European funding streams for promoting integration (ECA 2012). Although these were fundamentally programmatic evaluations rather than evaluations of the effectiveness of integration measures per se (and were highly critical), the report contains some useful warnings for those pursuing integration policy. These include the need for programmes, whether within countries or between countries, to have common indicators of integration to ensure comparability; the need for targets (e.g. in terms of numbers of migrants involved) but which are realistic and appropriate given the type of migrant, context and so on (see
also Waddington et al. 2009). One of the problems which arise from time-limited programmatic interventions, such as the European Integration Fund and the European Refugee Fund, is that participating countries may feel driven to implement integration programmes at a speed which is inappropriate simply to be able to draw down funds from the EU, particularly where such countries’ programmes tend to be ‘knee-jerk short-term’ political expedients rather than long-term evidence-based responses to the question of integration (Ramalingam 2013). This may work against the need for integration to be seen as a long-term sustainable process. In some cases the member state’s own immigration procedures tended to undermine the integration programme.

A report from the Institute of Strategic Dialogue examines the general question of ‘What works?’ in integration, focusing on policy and practice levels in a number of EU states (Ramalingam 2013). This report argues that alongside long-term planning of what should be seen, again, both as a process and an outcome, it is possible to identify simple low-cost interventions which can have a significant effect on integration. The six key policy areas identified in this study were economic, legal, welfare, social, political and cultural, the last of which has perhaps had relatively little explicit attention in many local programmes but which is increasingly becoming the site of much contestation. Key insights from this report, which examined integration work in four EU member states (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK), were that:

- Key work needs to be done at local level but that national governments have to provide supportive environments for that to happen, including appropriate policies and adequate funding;
- Language learning is fundamental (but there still remains no common approach to this across countries);
- Cultural integration is important and courses should be developed to facilitate understanding of a country’s customs and values;
- Political participation (of which obtaining citizenship and being active in civil society are significant parts) is a critical goal; and
- Integration is increasingly being seen as an obligation on migrants, with some countries now requiring migrants to take part in integration programmes: against this, some evidence shows that voluntary programmes may be successful and should be pursued.

The ISD argues that four mutually-reinforcing principles should underpin all integration work: access (to democratic rights, the labour market and welfare provision); empowerment (through, for example, community development work and the creation of RCOs); trust and reciprocity between migrants and HCNs (this again does not just happen but often requires facilitation); belonging (a shared sense of belonging is critical for the development of trust). Developed from these principles, and from a range of evidence (as opposed to myths and generalisations), it is possible to identify

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62 From the EU’s own evaluative perspective, one major problem was the overlap between the EIF, ERF and the application of European Structural Funds. This could arise when responsibility for managing these funds was split between several different government departments.

63 The issue of language and the extent to which it might be understood as a cultural trait or one which is fundamental to integration has been considered within other literatures. Thus Barry (2001: 107) argues, in relation to the implications of multiculturalism, that ‘where language is concerned a state cannot adopt a neutral stance: it must provide its services in one or more languages; any language will do as the medium of communication in a society as long as everyone speaks it…… this is one case involving cultural attributes in which “this is how we do things here” – the appeal to local convention – is a self-sufficient response to pleas for the public recognition of diversity.’
what ISD calls The Practice-Based Integration Framework, with goals set out under each of the six policy areas noted above. The report notes also that there is a great need for ‘addressing the divide between political rhetoric and results on the ground’, which is obviously difficult at a time when immigration policy is a central political battleground and in many cases is driven by an underlying racist ideology.

Overall, these evaluative reports and others, point not only to individual key factors facilitating integration at a local level but also the important interconnections between them, between local individual, social and community, structural, political, cultural and environmental levels, and to the need for interconnectedness between migrants and other members of the population whether HCNs or not, as indeed is the case for HCNs wishing to achieve in their own life courses. They also highlight the need, as in many areas of policy-making, to bring to the fore the voice of migrants themselves and their active participation in policy and service development.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the key factors which impede or facilitate integration of migrants at the local level, focusing on the four key domains of education, housing, health and the labour market. It has scoped the state of knowledge about theories of integration and the state of policy development at both national and EU levels. From this we might conclude that although there remains some disputation about definitions, there is more than enough material available to assist those member states seriously concerned to pursue the effective integration of all migrants within a framework of social justice and human rights for both HCNs and migrants themselves, and that resourcing might be better directed towards the development and implementation of integration strategies rather than seeking to develop to any great extent, further theoretical understandings of what integration is. It has also indicated that the question of local integration is contingent on a range of national or even international (i.e. EU-wide or even wider) levels. These include the national immigration policy, the history of immigration, the question of how citizenship is understood and shaped in differing countries, and the structure of welfare regime which has developed in each country. These factors also have a varying impact depending on the type of migrant involved (although perhaps least significant for the relatively few high skilled, high income migrants). Local factors are frequently strongly shaped by these national contexts. As a result, considerable attention has also been paid here to these national factors: local integration simply does not work if these factors are not supportive of this goal. It is also important to note that whilst a degree of local development is very important in promoting integration and the projects and ideas above demonstrate the importance of this role, national governments should not withdraw from the role of, at the very least, resourcing and standard-setting to ensure that local initiatives are well-resourced, properly managed, and effective. Without this central monitoring role, local projects can be poorly managed or resourced or disappear.

Some other general conclusions can be drawn from this account:

- A focus on economic integration, i.e. moving migrants (especially those who have not come as economic migrants) into the labour market, at the cost or even exclusion of other integrative factors, whilst understandable in terms of government’s wider economic strategies and the need to increase national economic efficiency and productivity, is likely to
be self-defeating: other factors such as the need to access decent quality housing, the
acquisition of key knowledge and, to some degree, skills through formal and informal
education, the development of a grasp of host country language, access to and use of
appropriate forms of healthcare, leisure, community facilities, knowledge of legal and policy
institutions etc. and understanding of cultural norms, including modes of community
engagement, all support, sometimes very significantly, the goal of economic integration and
are ignored at policy-makers’ peril.

- Integration has to be understood not solely as a goal, and one which to some degree is never
  achieved, but as a process which is dynamic (i.e. its characteristics change over time), two-
  way, in the sense that integration is dependent as much on the attitudes and actions of host
country governments, institutions, service providers, communities and individuals as it is on
the stance of migrants themselves, and needs to be sustainable. Short and facile attempts at
integration are far less likely to be sustained than those which are long-term in their scope
and this of course has clear implications for the allocation of resources at both supranational
and national levels.

- Within virtually every member state, there appears to be a growing and inexorable tendency
towards racism and discrimination at institutional (policy) and individual levels, manifest in
increasing numbers of incidents of racist violence and abuse and by growing disregard by
institutions to the differing cultural and religious needs of migrants and minorities more
generally. This tendency undermines the process of integration: it places migrants generally
in work which is low paid, low skill, does not acknowledge their qualifications, is often dirty,
difficult and dangerous, locates them in housing which is of poor quality (and for example,
difficult to heat, with implications for energy costs), in areas characterised by poor
healthcare, education facilities and amenities such as leisure provision, access to transport,
play space and so on. Migrants share these difficulties with longer settled minorities and with
a residuum of HCNs, and are structurally driven to compete with them for limited resources.
This generates tensions which are easily manipulated by the same right wing political
tendencies which have created the conditions for the tensions in the first place. Until this
potentially disastrous phenomenon of racism is first acknowledged (Craig 2013) and then
effectively addressed at European, national and community levels, much of the vast amount
of energy put into the integration of migrants, summarised here, will just be wasted.
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