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Ideological Variations in the Representation of Hugo Chavez as a Democratic Leader in Two Different Cultures: A Critical Discourse Analysis

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Module 1- Written Discourse

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Choose two news / current affairs texts, one from English-speaking media (e.g. a British or American TV news report, an Australian newspaper, etc) and the other from a media outlet in another country / language, but both dealing with the same 'global' events (e.g. the war in Iraq, the Asian Tsunami...). Critically discuss the two texts with reference to CDA (see Written Discourse unit 7). What differences in the representation of events, and in relations with the intended audience, can be identified? How might any such differences be related to underlying cultural and/or ideological issues?

1.0 Introduction

In this paper I will critically discuss one magazine article from *The Economist* (U.K.) and one newspaper article from Cairo's *Al-Ahram Weekly*. Both articles involve the Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez, and Venezuela's December 2007 political referendum, which attracted the attention of people and governments around the world because, had the referendum passed, it would have given unprecedented political power to Chavez.

Upon examination of the articles through the lens of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and, specifically, through Norman Fairclough's framework from *Language and Power*, which exposes ideological tendencies in texts, clear evidence emerges of the two texts' representing Chavez and the results of the referendum in completely different terms, ideologically.

In "The Wind Goes out of the Revolution" (hereafter, text one), from *The Economist*, Chavez is associated with 'socialism', 'authoritarianism', and 'tyrants' such as Saddam Hussein. Simultaneously, 'democracy' is represented as an ideal political theory, and in relation to this classification scheme, Chavez is represented negatively.

In the other text, "Tailwinds and Headwinds" (hereafter, text two), 'democracy' is presented, again, as an ideal political theory, the one instance in which the texts harmonize ideologically. However, text two represents Chavez as a democratic leader, explicitly contradicting the other text's representation of him as a despot.

I will argue that this discrepancy in representation of Chavez can be accounted for by the politically motivated cultural context from which each text has been sampled.

2.0 The texts' cultural context

A text's 'cultural context' reveals something about the social and institutional structure its author is affected by (Malinowski, 1935; cited in Coulthard et al., 2000: 121). The texts to be analyzed are written within a cultural context that is characterized by an unequal set of power relations between its participants. These relations exist between the dominant class, capitalists, and the working class (Fairclough, 1989: 32). Capitalists and their alliance of like-interested agents, 'the dominant bloc', maintain power over the

working class by means of coercion or, more effectively and significantly for the present purpose, through hegemonic practices. As it is an established principle of capitalism to maximize profit, hegemony allows the dominant bloc to maintain power over the working class economically rather than through brute force. As Fairclough summarizes:

Hegemony is about constructing alliances, and integrating rather than simply dominating subordinated classes, through concessions or through ideological means, to win their consent... (Fairclough, 1995: 76).

This hegemonic dynamic is reinforced through various social institutions—including education, law, religion, and notably, mass media.

A key factor that allows power relations to be implemented consentingly by the dominant bloc is ‘ideology’, which Fairclough defines as institutional practices that people engage in subconsciously, and seem universal and commonsensical; they have become ‘naturalized’—accepted as natural, every day processes (Fairclough, 1989: 33).

Hence, both texts are written within cultures that are subtly influenced by the global force of capitalism under the hegemonic guise of ‘democracy’, variation in representation of Chavez in relation to ‘democracy’ can be explained by the more overt difference in political and economical context in which each text was produced. The UK’s per capita income is nearly three times that of Egypt’s (imf.org: 2007). The contrast between these countries’ political systems is equally stark: the citizens of the UK live within a representative democracy that promotes a sense of political participation, whereas the citizens of Egypt have lived under the coercive authoritarian rule of Hosni Mubarak since 1981 (Washington Post: 2007).

3.0 Critical Discourse Analysis

Although its usage throughout linguistics is ambiguous, the term ‘discourse’ will be defined here as a conception of language in social practice that is determined by social structures (Fairclough, 1989: 17). Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which is a discipline within discourse analysis, can be understood as an “orientation toward language which associates linguistic text analysis with a social theory of the functioning

of language in political and ideological processes” (Fairclough, 1992b). For the purposes of this paper, it’s important to discern between non -critical discourse analysis, which only describes discursive practices, and critical discourse analysis, which aims to show how discourse is affected and shaped by power and ideology in society. (Coulthard et al, 2000: 117-118). The word ‘critical’ in the acronym CDA conveys “showing connections and causes which are hidden” (Fairclough, 1992a). This process is demonstrated in this paper by use of Fairclough’s framework from *Discourse and Power*. (Complete framework is found in Appendix one. As the most relevant questions from Fairclough’s framework are discussed in the main text, please see appendix 4 for further analysis.)

4.0 Vocabulary.

4.1 What experiential values do words have?

Experiential value in vocabulary items provides a trace of and a cue to the way in which the text producer’s experience of the natural or social world is represented. The producer’s ideological representation of the world is evident in vocabulary items. Experiential value in vocabulary has to do with contents; that is, what is said or done between participants. This includes powerful participants constraining non-powerful participants’ actions (Fairclough, 1989: 46).

There is an axiomatic understanding in the mass media institution, that, within the political reporting discourse authorized by the dominant bloc (U.S., Britain), ‘democracy’ is good, proper, and positive. The common people vote for what they want and the majority wins (Merriam-Webster’s: 307). This raises a significant point about a recurrent classification scheme in the texts.

4.1.1 What classification schemes are drawn upon?

Classification schemes in texts organize vocabulary in discourse types and are somewhat predictable according to the discourse type a text is sampled from (Fairclough, 1989: 114). The texts are taken from the same discourse type, global

news reporting, and not surprisingly they embody the common scheme: ‘democracy as an ideal political system’. In both texts the meaning of ‘democracy’ is synonymous, despite being independent texts from unrelated sources. In fact, as both texts come from the ‘mass media’ social institution, which is controlled by the dominant bloc, it correlates that they both represent democracy positively. Actually, the texts are both preoccupied with democracy, so they seem to have a similar ideological agenda.

Despite this similar ideological agenda of representing democracy positively, there is an obvious difference in representation of Hugo Chavez. Text one represents him negatively in relation to democracy, while text two represents him positively.

Through ideological vocabulary selection, text one represents Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez as being an austere socialist—not a democratic leader:

- ...his [Chavez’s] plan to install what he calls “21st century socialism... T1
- The pluralism enshrined in the current constitution would have been replaced with obligatory “socialism”.
- The president’s drive to turn the armed forces into a tool of his socialist project...

The text’s repeated collocation of Chavez with the word ‘socialism’ causes the reader to associate Chavez with socialism, and not democracy.

But in text two, Hugo Chavez is represented as a democrat:

- There you have it: the ingredients of democracy at work. The referendum was free and fair and more importantly, it exonerates the Venezuelan leader from charges of dictatorship and tyranny. T2

Regarding the results of the December 2007 referendum, the producer of text two uses the same material facts as the producer of text one to present a different account of what happened—the referendum did not pass, but Chavez accepted the result peacefully. Through his actions, Chavez is proving to his people and to the rest of the world that he and his countrymen are democrats and advocates of the same democracy that the producer of text one represents.

4.1.2 Are there words that are ideologically contested?

As text one’s anonymous producer represents the dominant power holders’

perspective, its evident ideological struggle involves ‘socialism’ being synonymous with modern notions of ‘communism’ and ‘totalitarianism’. According to dominant power holders’ ideals, these political theories are hostile to democracy, and more so toward capitalism, although this is rarely stated in explicit terms. Both texts are preoccupied with defining ‘democracy’. Text one’s collocating Chavez with socialism and text two’s collocating him with democracy illustrates a struggle occurring between real events and the producers’ representations of them through arbitrary terminology. According to Fairclough, this type of a struggle is an ideological one (ibid: 114).

4.2 What relational values do words have?

Formally, relational values reveal something significant about social relationships in texts and explore how wordings within a text depend on and utilize social relationships between participants (ibid: 112,115). The title of text one includes ‘Defeat for Hugo Chavez’, an explicitly negative nominalization of the process in which the Venezuelan referendum didn’t pass. The producer could have described the outcome in more neutral terms, such as ‘a result’, but instead portrays Chavez in a negative light with the term ‘defeat’. An author may choose certain formulations when representing reality for seemingly arbitrary reasons (ibid: 117). The author of text one may have chosen to portray Chavez’s loss in a negative light in order to form a relationship of trust and solidarity with the reader. This is not a bold action. “In the British media, the balance of sources and perspectives and ideology is overwhelmingly in favour of existing power-holders” (ibid: 51). Therefore the readers of mass-media publications, like *The Economist*, are already thoroughly accustomed to reading articles that positively reinforce the dominant power-holders’ interests.

Contrary to text one, text two represents the outcome of the referendum as a ‘result’ and not a loss for Chavez:

-The *result* of the Venezuelan referendum proves beyond doubt that the country is a vibrant democracy under Chavez... T2

This not only signifies that democracy is functioning positively, but that it is doing so ‘under’ Chavez. The writer assumes that readers (ideal subjects) in Egypt will agree with and trust him in this representation because, as Fairclough suggests, writers often construct ‘ideal readers’ with specific intertextual experiences of what the writers assume the proper representation of reality should be (ibid: 153). The Egyptian president is an authoritarian who attacks citizens’ and institutions’ freedom not so much with hegemonic inculcation and consent, but with explicit coercive force. Therefore, the writer of text two represents democracy as a positive political value, assuming that as Egyptians become more and more resistant, those who perceive that ‘democracy’ is working in Venezuela will support its installment in Egypt.

4.2.1 Are there markedly formal or informal words?

Formality is a property of social relations that constrains access to discourse. Formal language determines which participants can participate in a given discourse according to qualifications such as specialized vocabularies. Most people don’t acquire the proper language ability to participate even peripherally in formal situations (ibid: 65). Classically, this has caused an explicit demarcation of power relations between participants in discourse. But in contemporary society there has been a movement away from explicit power based systems and relationships, giving way to a system of solidarity that is apparent in both analyzed texts:

- Venezuelans have *seen the future*—and many of them realize that *it doesn’t work*. T1
- The result of the Venezuelan referendum proves *beyond doubt* that the country is a vibrant democracy under Chavez...T2

Despite being the opening proposition of each piece, where one would think the writer would want to impress the reader with formal language, both make blatant use of informal, colloquial, and even cliché language. But there are instances of formal language in both articles, which covertly ‘reminds’ readers that a qualified, intelligent author is in control. “There is a risk that in claiming solidarity, one will be unable to sustain authority, which makes this a problematic mix to achieve” (ibid: 191). The

producers of both texts use a mixture of formal and informal language to balance a relationship of solidarity and authority with the readers.

4.3 What expressive values do words have?

Expressive values provide a trace of the producer's evaluation of reality (ibid: 112) or of presupposed aspects within the producer's interpretation of the intertextual context. Expressive values have to do with the social identities of the subjects involved in the interpretation of the discourse process. It is in this vein that the producer -created 'subject' position, in which the reader enacts presupposed 'ideal' qualities, gains significance (ibid: 152). In text one, there is a coordination of wordings that reflects the author's consciousness of the reader's awareness of the idea that the political leader of a country must not accumulate too much power.

- Their effect would have been to concentrate almost all power in an already top-heavy executive. T1
- But since his reelection last year, Mr. Chavez has overreached himself and provoked some more dangerous opponents. T1

By using declarative, event-process sentences, text one's producer asserts that in performing the standard political duties of a president, (standard for a democratic nation) like increasing solidarity between various intranational political parties, he's 'overreaching' his duty and 'provoking' 'dangerous' 'opponents'. All of these subjective observations experientially represent Chavez negatively, but are asserted matter -of-factly, without any sign of being an opinion. This covertly projects the producer's opinion onto the reader. Expressively, this requires the audience to assume that Chavez's performance of standard political duties is an abuse of power. This evokes an emotion of mistrust in the audience and implants a shared understanding that because Chavez doesn't know what he's doing, he should be removed from office.

In text two, there is a coordination of wordings that suggests the author's expression of reality, which he projects onto the audience, is one in which a democratic people refuse to be controlled, make their own decisions, and are free from tyranny:

- A referendum, as the word intimates, must offer a choice. T2
- Chavez gave his people the choice...
- The poor are restive and that is why they have thrown in their lot with Chavez.

These wordings coordinate to suggest that the people of Venezuela are free thanks to two benevolent forces—Chavez, and his vehicle of good will—democracy. The effect is that the Egyptian audience will more readily support a democratic movement, in turn ousting Chavez’s antithetical counterpart, Hosni Mubarak. This is all conveyed implicitly, illustrating the latent nature of the texts’ ideological content.

4.4 What metaphors are used?

Metaphor is a means of representing one aspect of experience in terms of another. The use of metaphor transmutes meaning from one domain to another, revealing ideological content within a text (ibid: 119). This aspect of Fairclough’s framework may be the most persuasive formal characteristic in identifying implicit ideological values, particularly in text one. In this text, there is a metaphorical theme that makes use of the qualities of wind, air, and air pressure, especially the ability of air to fill up inflatable objects and be deflated from objects:

- The *wind goes out* of the revolution. T1
- ...a giant, *inflatable* Chavez doll lay face-down and *semi-deflated*... T1
- ...*letting the air out* of the doll... T1
- As it is, Mr. Chavez still has the chance to *pump* some *air back into* his project... T1
- ...his plan... has been badly *punctured*. T1

If the wind goes out of the revolution, it is losing power. And it’s Chavez’s revolution, according to the article. Wind is a sort of frivolous, capricious, and ephemeral force, so if the wind represents the vitality of the revolution, the revolution is not attributed with permanence or strength. A ‘semi-deflated Chavez doll’, lying ‘face-down’, suggests that Chavez is a doll, which is a weak symbol (a child’s plaything), especially if it has begun to lose air. It will soon be totally deflated. ‘Letting the air out of the doll’ suggests that Chavez is not in control. ‘Pump some air back into his project’, suggests that the complicated workings of a political revolution are composed of nothing more than air - an inert, malleable gas. Perhaps the most palpable instance of metaphor is the final excerpt.

‘His’ plan, not the nation of Venezuela’s, is as flimsy as an inflatable doll, and vulnerable to puncture, implying the revolution is susceptible to easy defeat, and that it has in fact been punctured and is probably ruined.

This extensive use of metaphor is significant because to the average, unassuming (ideal) reader, the language sounds figurative, descriptive, and poetic—harmless. But it simultaneously contains symbolic representations that associate Chavez with negative values. This works in the interest of the dominant power holders.

5.0 Grammar

5.1 What experiential values do grammatical features have?

Experiential aspects of grammar reveal subtle ideological information about a text, often through seemingly arbitrary grammatical processes and participant types (ibid: 120). Sentence types express process types and there are three main types: Subject/Verb/Object (SVO), Subject/Verb (SV), and Subject/Verb/Complement (SVC). While an overabundant usage of one process type may at first seem arbitrary, it can also reveal important clues to ideological content within the text. In text one, there is a high number of material processes, which denote doing things (Coulthard et al, 2000:128). Most of these Hallidayan material processes simultaneously are, in terms of Fairclough’s process-type framework, action process types that are represented by SVO sentence types. Not surprisingly, Chavez performs the transitive actions in several of these instances:

- ...Hugo Chavez was grappling with how to respond to his first-ever defeat at the polls. T1
- ...Mr. Chavez has overreached himself and provoked some more dangerous opponents. T1

The ideological effect is that Chavez is portrayed clearly as the agent of several causal relationships throughout the text. And in these causal relationships his actions are blundering, not well thought out, and generally destructive to the presupposed notion of ‘western democracy’ that is represented in the text.

In text two there is a high number of relational processes, which “denote existence or states of being or having” (ibid: 128). Relational processes, in Hallidayan

terms, (1985) (cited in Coulthard et al, 2000: 128) function like Fairclough's attribution process type in the form of SVC sentence types.

- There you have it: the ingredients of democracy at work. T2
- Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez is a hero... T2

The ideological effect of this high use of relational processes, in combination with the fact that the author never enters the text explicitly as a participant in the form of an "I" pronoun, is that the producer's subjective impression appears factual to the reader. This projects onto the readership the view that Chavez has exactly those positive characteristics that befit an ideal political leader, and represents Venezuela as a nation operating democratically.

5.1.1 Are processes what they seem?

In both texts agency is predominantly clear. Processes generally represent actions as actions, events as events, and attributions as attributions. But there are exceptions. In text one the author uses the metaphorical description of the setting after Chavez's "loss" as an antecedent to an action process, which actually functions as an attributive process in the mind of the reader.

- On referendum night...a giant, inflatable Chavez doll lay facedown and semi-deflated on a Caracas street. Nothing better summed up the moment. T1

The metaphorical description, which conveys Chavez as weak, or dead, and definitely defeated, shows the reader that the effect of the referendum 'loss' is clear- Chavez cannot recover. Then the following SVO action process 'Nothing better summed up the moment' projects the meaning of the complicated metaphorical sequence from the previous sentence. The seemingly clear agent 'nothing' performs the action of 'summing up the moment'. This is problematic because 'nothing' can't sum anything up. Nothing can't be seen and doesn't exist objectively. So it's a faulty agent in that it's not capable of performing a transitive action. Of course, nothing's antecedent, the entire previous metaphorical imagery showing Chavez's destruction associatively 'sums up the moment'.

This then, functions as a nominalization; a process being converted into a noun. The effect is that the two sentences together present a subjective impression as an objective, factual attribution process: ‘Chavez is weak’, ‘Chavez is finished’, or ‘The revolution is over’. It moves the proposition ‘Nothing better sums up the moment’ (for the author) outside ‘the realm of contestability’ (Coulthard et al, 2000: 130) for the reader. For the ideal reader, the asserted propositions must be agreed with in order to continue reading the article. One must entertain the ideological assertions in order to logically proceed.

5.1.2 Are sentences active or passive?

Most sentences in both texts are active in that active agents perform action processes. This ensures that agency and causality are clear. There are notable exceptions to this tendency.

-Instead, (of following protocol) Mr. Chavez had the m (changes to the constitution) drafted in secret and rubber stamped by a parliament... T1

This use of a passive sentence emphasizes Chavez’s agency and his relationship of causality within the process. Instead of the parliament’s being responsible for a secretive and “unethical” action, Chavez is represented as the instigator of the entire process. This causes the reader to further mistrust Chavez.

It is also possible to create an agentless passive sentence, as the producer of text two demonstrates.

-His (Chavez’s) intransigence is widely seen as both a function of his strength and a contributor to it. T2

Agentless passive sentences obfuscate causality and agency (Fairclough, 1989: 125). Often agentless passivity is used as a means to avoid redundancy, but in this instance it allows the author, who is actually the agent and subject of the sentence, to remain discretely outside the context. The action process becomes an attribution, which allows the opinion of the author to be presented as an objective fact. The same sentence, reconstructed as a true action process, looks like this:

-I, the author of this article, see his (Chavez's) intransigence as a function of his strength and a contributor to it. [My construction]

The difference is clear and demonstrates how the producer of the text hides his opinion within the 'facts' of the article.

5.1.3 Are sentences positive or negative?

In both texts positive sentences are more common than negative ones, but the negative sentences that do occur reveal interesting intertextual significance about their producers' representation of reality. Presuppositions are not properties of a text, but an aspect of a text producer's interpretation of intertextual content. Presuppositions show what aspects of a text can be taken as common ground for all participants by producers. It's when producers challenge or contest presupposed elements in a text that negative sentences gain significance (ibid: 152).

Text One—Negative Sentences

Text Two—Negative Sentences

<i>Were</i> Venezuela the dictatorship that some of his more radical opponents claim, its people <i>might have</i> spent the night toppling bronze statues of the Leader as he fled the country.	And, the results <i>will not</i> detract from his popularity in the developing world.
<i>Were</i> it a parliamentary democracy, the government <i>would surely have</i> resigned.	The referendum results, even if they <i>did not</i> go the way the Venezuelan leader had hoped for...
Their effect <i>would have been</i> to concentrate almost all power in an already top-heavy executive.	-- <i>not</i> just for Venezuela, but for the entire Western Hemisphere and developing countries of the South in Africa...
The pluralism enshrined in the current constitution <i>would have been</i> replaced with obligatory "socialism".	Perhaps <i>not</i> many people outside the country realise that Venezuela ... is the richest country in South and Central America.
And two decades of decentralization <i>would have been</i> reversed: [Italics are my emphasis.]	Until Chavez came to power, they had <i>not</i> profited from the countries vast oil wealth.

According to the table, text two has several standard examples of negative sentences. Each of these instances, though, takes a negative presupposition and uses it in a manner that is positive toward Chavez. 'And the results will not detract from his popularity...' contradicts the common idea that usually when a politician 'suffers a defeat' it is bad for his or her image. But this presupposition is negated, challenging a truism in western thought. The effect is positive for Chavez, and is presented as fact by means of an

attribution process type.

In text one there is a less common form of implying sentence negativity without actually appearing to be negative or even using the adverb ‘not’. Instead, positive sentences in subjunctive and conditional form imply negativity.

-*Were* Venezuela the dictatorship that some of his (Chavez) more radical opponents claim, its people *might have spent* the night toppling bronze statues of the Leader as he fled the country.
T1

The author uses a combination of the present subjunctive mood (Were Venezuela) and past unreal conditional (might have spent) to imply negative presuppositions about Chavez’s intertextual representation. If we look at the sentence with actual negativity by using ‘not’ instead of the subjunctive mood and conditional, the author’s implication is more straightforward:

-Venezuela *is not* the dictatorship that some of his more radical opponents claim, so it’s people *did not* spend the night toppling bronze statues of the Leader.

The effect of representing this event process in simple present tense is clear — it contests the presupposition in the texts’ intertextual space that states, ‘Chavez is a power monger and his loss was so significant that he will never be able to recover.’ Ironically, by using a positive, subjunctive, conditional sentence, the author makes Chavez look bad, whereas the author would have made Chavez look good if he had used a negative sentence to describe the event.

5.2 How are simple sentences linked together?

Cohesion is a formal aspect of a text that enables words and ideas to be temporally, logically, and spatially linked together. Cohesive features often reveal features that seem commonsensical to be, in fact, ideologically commonsensical (ibid: 131). Text one makes repeated use of cohesive features in the form of subordinating conjunctions to allocate Chavez as the cause of problems in Venezuela.

- Since* Mr. Chavez took direct control of PDVSA, the state oil company, *after* the crippling oil strike of 2002-03, *production of crude has declined*. T1
- Food prices have risen even faster, by 29% -- *despite* price controls. *Because* of those controls, *staples... are in such short supply* that shoppers sometimes have to fight for them. T1

‘Since’ implies that as soon as Chavez took control of the state oil company, production declined. Its suggestion is subtle and implied: Chavez is responsible for negative effects in the oil company. Chavez is not overtly mentioned in the second quote, but just by being juxtaposed in spatially close proximity to other negative propositions, he is represented as a culprit. The subordinating conjunctions ‘since’ ‘despite’, and ‘because’ work cohesively to connect separate ideas that together suggest Chavez is responsible for various economic and social problems in Venezuela.

In text two, cohesive features suggest something about Chavez’s potency as an agent.

- ...Venezuelan National Assembly passed the “Enabling Law” bestowing special powers to the president to issue decrees. Chavez *can* bypass the results if he wishes to do so. T2

Here, it is again implied through mere juxtaposition that Chavez does have the power to ignore the results of the referendum, but he doesn’t reject them because he chooses to operate democratically rather than by means of totalitarian control. As Stubbs notes, “whatever two (sentences) occur next to one another, (readers) will attempt to relate them: to use the first as a discourse frame for the second” (1983: 93). The two sentences could easily be linked together by a coordinating conjunction like ‘so’, but juxtaposition of the two simple sentences requires the reader to make the connection on her own. It’s not the presence of a cohesive feature here, then, but the absence of one that creates ideological implication.

6.0 Textual Structures

6.1 What interactional conventions are used?

6.1.1 What larger scale structures does the text have?

Because ordering in newspaper articles is based upon importance and newsworthiness,

(Fairclough, 1989: 137) they often have predictable large-scale structures. As Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard points out in “Women Who Pay for Sex and Enjoy It”, “headlines are the most powerful persuasive and auto-promotional tool used to attract magazine readers” (Caldas-Coulthard: 1999: 257). Headlines, in combination with the lead, are also crucial in newspapers. Text one is taken from a magazine and text two is taken from a newspaper, so this applies to both texts. Examining both articles’ headlines is just like examining the tip of one big continuous iceberg. The structure and ideological content is continuous and can be predicted just by looking at the top.

-Defeat for Hugo Chavez—The wind goes out of the revolution. T1
 -Headwinds and Tailwinds—The result of the Venezuelan referendum proves beyond doubt that the country is a vibrant democracy under Chavez... T2

Text one’s headline is negative toward the revolution and nominalizes the result of the referendum as ‘a defeat’, which is negative toward Chavez. The reader, by inferring this almost unconsciously, reads on expectantly, brave, or unaware that the rest of the article will echo the same attitude as that of the title.

In text two’s headline, “Tailwinds and Headwinds” is at first ambiguous, when looked at intertextually as a rewording of the dominant text. It implements a common defense strategy of less powerful participants in dealing with more powerful participants in a discourse—ambiguity (Fairclough, 1989: 136). In the intertextual domain, text two is the weaker participant because it is attempting to possess the same power as the power holders who represent text one. But, the headline soon moves from ambiguity to explicitness in regard to its stance on Chavez and on democracy in Venezuela. ‘Democracy is flourishing in Venezuela’ and Chavez is directly associated with the positive representation. The article’s ideological content can be predicted from the headline. So, examined in combination with each of their contexts, and knowing the articles’ sources, the title of each text enables the analyst to predict much of the content from the main body of the article before he or she even reads it. And therein lies the ideological content of each text.

Through my analysis and commentary I hope to have illustrated two important points: First, that both texts represent ‘democracy’ synonymously in that democracy is the ideal form of government for successful nations. This is an ideological attitude the dominant bloc takes as a means of controlling the people of the world through hegemony. As the producers of both texts reify the dominant bloc’s ideology, they share similar classification schemes that represent democracy positively.

Point two should illustrate the texts’ ideological difference, and this involves their representation of Hugo Chavez in relation to democracy. Text two represents him positively, while text one represents him negatively. This difference can be linked to cultural differences between England and Egypt, but more specifically to economic and political differences in the two nations’ present cultural context. The Egyptian text’s ideological agenda promotes democracy in Egypt as a means to seize power from authoritarian president Hosni Mubarak, and this is accomplished by representing Hugo Chavez as a good democrat who stands up to existing power holders’ unethical acts of power. Text one’s ideological agenda functions by positioning Chavez negatively in relation to democracy in order to reinforce existing hegemonic practices of the dominant bloc. This is projected onto the readership of *The Economist* by representing Chavez as a socialist and a tyrant—someone who is trying to destroy the lauded system of ‘democracy’.

And finally, implications of these findings include being a ware of the dominant bloc’s overarching political agenda. This agenda is to maintain hegemonic control over the general populous, which is enforced through ideology in the form of inculcated hegemonic practices, and the gauge of capitalism—money. If Hugo Chavez maintains power in Venezuela, he has the means to regulate the fourth largest supply of oil in the world. As he openly opposes capitalist systems, the dominant bloc will stop at nothing to keep Chavez away from power—and one of its own in power. CDA works to expose this, in the words of Jurgen Habermas, “ ‘colonization of people’s lives by ‘systems’ that has reached *crisis* (my emphasis) proportions” (1984) (cited in Fairclough, 1989: 196). If more ‘ideal readers’ were trained in CDA, the world might become a more just medium in which to live.

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Appendix 1:

A. Vocabulary

1. What experiential values do words have?
 - What classification schemes are drawn upon?
 - Are there words that are ideologically contested?
 - Is there *rewording* or *overwording*?
 - What ideologically significant meaning relations (*synonymy*, *hyponymy*, *antonymy*) are there between words?
2. What relational values do words have?
 - Are there euphemistic expressions?
 - Are there markedly formal or informal words?
3. What expressive values do words have?
4. What metaphors are used?

B. Grammar

5. What experiential values do grammatical features have?
 - What types of *process* and *participant* predominate?
 - Is agency unclear?
 - Are processes what they seem?
 - Are *nominalizations* used?
 - Are sentences active or passive?
 - Are sentences positive or negative?
 6. What relational values do grammatical features have?
 - What *modes* (*declarative*, *grammatical question*, *imperative*) are used?
 - Are there important features of *relational modality*?
 - Are the pronouns *we* and *you* used, and if so, how?
 7. What expressive values do grammatical features have?
 - Are there important features of *expressive modality*?
 8. How are (simple) sentences linked together?
 - What logical connectors are used?
- Are complex sentences characterized by *coordination* or *subordination*?
- What means are used for referring inside and outside the text?

C. Textual structures

9. What interactional conventions are used?
 - Are there ways in which one participant controls the turns of others?
10. What larger-scale structures does the text have?

Appendix 2:

Headwinds and tailwinds

The result of the Venezuelan referendum proves beyond doubt that the country is a vibrant democracy under Chavez, writes Gamal Nkrumah

Gamal Nkrumah

There you have it: the ingredients of democracy at work. The referendum was free and fair and more importantly it exonerates the Venezuelan leader from charges of dictatorship and tyranny. The referendum results, even if they did not go the way the Venezuelan leader had hoped (49-51 per cent against), provided a fillip to the popularity of the embattled symbol of hope for many of the world's disadvantaged.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is a hero for many in the underdeveloped countries of the South. He is popular in part because he is a symbol of the developing world's defiance to pax-Americana. He is the refreshing antithesis to the sleaze-prone mediocrities that masquerade as "Third World leaders". His intransigence is widely seen as both a function of his strength and a contributor to it. And, the results will not detract from his popularity in the developing world.

A referendum as the word intimates must offer a choice. Venezuelans voted this week in a referendum of tremendous importance -- not just for Venezuela, but for the entire Western Hemisphere and the developing countries of the South in Africa, the Arab world and Asia. Chavez gave his people the choice, and obviously the country's middle classes rejected his reforms. The poor and underprivileged voted for Chavez, however. It is vitally important to understand this phenomenon. Perhaps not many people outside the country realise that Venezuela, buoyed by soaring oil prices, is the richest country in South and Central America. Venezuela enjoys a per capita income that far exceeds that of Chile, the continent's second richest country. While according to International Monetary Fund figures, Venezuela's Gross Domestic Product per capita is destined to hover around \$10,170 in 2008, Chile's GDP per capita is estimated to be \$7,300. Venezuela's GDP per capita might be poor by Western standards, but for Latin America and the developing countries it is impressive.

Even so, there are dangerous uncertainties that face Venezuelans, like most other Latin American and developing countries. The wide disparities of income threaten the nascent democracies of the region. It is mainly for this reason that the Venezuelan National Assembly passed the "Enabling Law" bestowing special powers to the president to issue decrees. Chavez can bypass the results if he wishes to do so.

The poor are restive and that is why they have thrown in their lot with Chavez. The underprivileged of Venezuela want to see radical changes to the way the economy is run. Until Chavez came to power, they had not profited from the country's vast oil wealth. Worse, they had not been permitted to have a say in the way the country is run -- they have not had a say in the decision-making process. They were economically and politically emasculated. Chavez gave them a chance to do so. Moreover, he has pledged to create a "socialist economy", that is to say one in which the main beneficiaries are the neediest and most vulnerable socio-economic groups in the country. That is why, even after the referendum results, he came out boldly in favour of his agenda. "I would not change a comma in the reforms," he told his people defiantly in a widely televised

statement. Chavez is not changing course, and he knows that he has his poor compatriots firmly behind him, come what may.

However, Venezuela, like Chile, has a large middle class and it is obvious that the majority of them, not to mention the powerful business elite, understand fully that Chavez favours the poor. Amendments to Article 112 to the constitution clearly were intended to advance the economic and social interests of the poor even further. The referendum in Venezuela can only be understood in the context of a class struggle. The middle classes and the disadvantaged know all too well what is at stake. They fully comprehend the implications and are not prepared to budge. The fight is not over. Venezuela's is an ongoing battle with worldwide ramifications.

And herein lies the explanation for the results of the elections. Chavez has not been humbled, because he still strongly believes that he is fighting a just cause. His powerful opponents, too, are determined to fight to the bitter end. He has accused the United States of blatantly interfering in the referendum. He has good cause to be embittered. In a tendentious article in the Washington Post, former US secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld, after his debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan, had the audacity to warn of the grievous consequences if the "aspiring despot" Chavez had his way. "Today the people of Venezuela face a constitutional referendum which if passed, could obliterate the few remaining vestiges of Venezuelan democracy," Rumsfeld pontificated. He does not, however, clarify the real threat that Chavez poses to Washington's interests in the Western Hemisphere.

The real reason why the "aspiring despot" is such a threat in the eyes of Rumsfeld and his ilk is that Chavez's amendments included the threat to ease further expropriation of private companies, though "only for reasons of public benefit or social interest by final judgement, with timely payment of fair compensation, may the expropriation of any kind of property be declared." (proposed amendment to Article 115).

Rumsfeld's aim was to lay a false veneer of credibility over a sham critique. Democracy was not at issue in the Venezuelan referendum; vital economic interests and gargantuan social implications were. That is why the Western media took such an anti-Chavez turn in the run up to the referendum. The controversy was not over whether the Venezuelan president is permitted to assume more presumably undemocratic and dictatorial powers, rather the crux of the matter was whether Chavez would be given a freer hand to carry out the socialist transformation of society, curtail the powers of the country's Central Bank and its control over international reserves, expropriate private property and reduce the work day from eight to six hours.

For all its talk about dictatorship and authoritarianism in Venezuela, the United States cannot deny that democracy was very much in evidence on Sunday. The question in Venezuela, however, is not about democracy Western-style per se. The fight between Chavez and his opponents is not a political or personality contest. Chavez is prepared to withstand this setback, and above all his forward flight to socialism will not be daunted by the turbulence, headwinds or tailwinds of what he pointedly terms "imperialism".

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The Smart Way to Beat Tyrants Like Chávez Donald Rumsfeld. Washington Post
Sunday the people of Venezuela faced a constitutional referendum that, if passed, could obliterate the few remaining vestiges of Venezuelan democracy. The world is saying little and doing less as President Hugo Chavez dismantles Venezuela's constitution, silences its

independent media and confiscates private property. Chavez's ambitions do not stop at Venezuela's borders, either. He has repeatedly threatened its neighbors. In late November, Colombia's president, Alvaro Uribe, declared that Chavez's efforts to mediate hostage talks with Marxist terrorists from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, were not welcome. Chavez responded by freezing trade with Colombia.

With diplomatic, economic and communications institutions designed for a different era, the free world has too few tools to help prevent Venezuela's once vibrant democracy from receding into dictatorship. But such a tragedy is not preordained. In fact, we face a moment when swift decisions by the United States and like-thinking nations could dramatically help, supporting friends and allies with the courage to oppose an aspiring dictator with regional ambitions.

The best place to start is with the prompt passage and signing of the Colombian free trade agreement, which has been languishing in Congress for months. Swift U.S. ratification of the pact would send an unequivocal message to the people of Colombia, the opposition in Venezuela and the wider region that they do not stand alone against Chavez. It would also provide concrete economic opportunities to the people of Colombia, helping to offset the restrictions being imposed by Venezuela -- and it would strengthen the U.S. economy in the bargain.

The importance of the Venezuela-Colombia clash goes beyond turmoil in the U.S. backyard. The episode can help us understand what's at stake in a new age of globalization and information, an age in which trade networks can be as powerful as military alliances. Extending freedom from the political sphere to the economic one and building the global architecture, such as free trade agreements, to support those relationships can -- and should -- be a top priority for the United States in the 21st century.

Since the first years of the Cold War, 10 presidential administrations have operated within an institutional framework fashioned during the Truman administration: NATO, the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the CIA, the Defense Department, Voice of America and the National Security Council. Over six decades, the United States and the rest of the free world have benefited from those institutions, which led to victory in the Cold War and helped maintain international order thereafter.

But with the passage of more than half a century, the end of the Cold War, the attacks of 9/11 and the rise of an Islamic extremist movement that hopes to use terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to alter the course of humankind, it has become obvious that the national security institutions of the industrial age urgently need to be adapted to meet the challenges of this century and the information age. At home, the entrenched bureaucracies and diffuse legislative processes of the U.S. government make it hard to handle security threats creatively, swiftly and proactively. Turf-conscious subcommittees in Congress inhibit the country's ability to mobilize government agencies to tackle new challenges. For example, U.S. efforts to build up the police and military capacity of partner nations such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan to fight al-Qaida and other extremists have been thwarted over the past six-plus years by compartmentalized budgets, outdated restrictions and budget cycles that force a nation at war to spend three years to develop, approve and execute a program.

The United States has also lost several tools that were central to winning the Cold War. Notably, U.S. institutions of public diplomacy and strategic communications -- both critical to the current struggle of ideas against Islamic radicalism -- no longer exist. When

the U.S. Information Agency became part of the State Department in 1999, the country lost what had been a valuable institution capable of communicating America's message to international audiences powerfully and repeatedly.

Meanwhile, a new generation of foes has mastered the tools of the information age -- chat rooms, blogs, cellphones, social-networking Web sites -- and exploits them to spread propaganda, even while the U.S. government remains poorly organized and equipped to counter with the truth in a timely manner. The nation needs a 21st-century "U.S. Agency for Global Communications" to inform, to educate and to compete in the struggle of ideas -- and to keep its enemies from capitalizing on the pervasive myths that stoke anti-Americanism.

Many existing international institutions are also falling short. The United Nations -- which elected Syria and Iran to a commission on disarmament, Sudan to one on human rights and Zimbabwe to one on sustainable development -- can hardly be considered a credible arbiter of international issues and dialogue. Endemic inertia and corruption threaten to render the United Nations even less effective in the 21st century.

NATO, the great bulwark against communist expansion, could be usefully reoriented toward today's threats to the nation-state system -- global problems that can be successfully dealt with only by broad coalitions of nations capable of efficiently executing collective decisions. By building bilateral and regional partnerships with other like-thinking countries -- such as India, Singapore, Australia, Japan, South Korea and Israel -- NATO could evolve into a diplomatic and military instrument of the world's democratic and capitalist societies.

We also must reinvigorate the structures that support global prosperity. Free trade seems to be slipping out of fashion in Congress and the presidential campaign, with some candidates calling for a "timeout" for free trade and the abolition of current agreements, such as NAFTA and CAFTA. But the world will need a network of trading nations to provide a way to change the circumstances of people in poor nations. Strong U.S. economic relations with the countries of Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East would encourage international development and investment even as they build closer ties among the United States and its allies. The prosperity that trade pacts foster has proved to be one of the most effective weapons against internal instability and international aggression.

Appendix 3:

http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10251226

Defeat for Hugo Chavez

The wind goes out of the revolution

Dec 6th 2007 | CARACAS

From The Economist print edition

Venezuelans have seen the future—and many of them realise that it doesn't work

ON REFERENDUM night, December 2nd, a giant, inflatable Chávez doll lay face-down and semi-deflated on a Caracas street. Nothing better summed up the moment. As workers dismantled the stage that was to serve as the scene of his triumph, letting the air out of the doll, Hugo Chávez was grappling with how to respond to his first-ever defeat at the polls.

Were Venezuela the dictatorship that some of his more radical opponents claim, its people might have spent the night toppling bronze statues of the Leader as he fled the country. Were it a parliamentary democracy, the government would surely have resigned. As it is, Mr. Chávez still has the chance to pump some air back into his project and serve out the remainder of his presidency—which now must end in early 2013. But there is no doubt that his plan to install what he calls “21st century socialism” in what was once, in the 1970s, the richest country in Latin America has been badly punctured. And that setback may also take much of the momentum out of his industrious efforts to form a regional block of allies and client states. Voters had been asked for a yes or no on changes to 69 of the 350 articles in the 1999 constitution. Their effect would have been to concentrate almost all power in an already top-heavy executive. The pluralism enshrined in the current constitution would have been replaced with obligatory “socialism”. And two decades of decentralisation would have been reversed: elected state governors and mayors would have been eclipsed by an unelected “popular power” dependent on the presidency.

On any reasonable interpretation of the 1999 constitution (itself drafted and promoted by the chavistas), such fundamental changes should have been submitted to a separately elected assembly. Instead, Mr Chávez had them drafted in secret and rubber-stamped by a parliament, which, thanks to the opposition's boycott of the election in 2005, is overwhelmingly composed of his unconditional supporters.

But by a tiny majority, of around 1.4% according to the official figures, Venezuelans said no. Many supporters of the president stayed at home. Only a year ago he had won a new six-year term with 7.3m votes or 63% of the total; by contrast, only 4.4m voted yes in the referendum.

It is a result that redraws Venezuela's political map. Hitherto, the president has been blessed with an incompetent opposition, tainted by the failures of the 1980s and 1990s, when low oil prices pushed many Venezuelans into poverty. Having sought to overthrow Mr. Chávez, first in an abortive coup and then through a general strike-cum-lock-out, many of the opposition's leaders were too easily dismissed as spoiled “oligarchs”.

But since his re-election last year, Mr. Chávez has overreached himself and provoked some more dangerous opponents. His first mistake came last January, when he summoned the four parties in his coalition and ordered them to merge into a single

Venezuelan United Socialist Party (PSUV), loosely modelled on Cuba's Communist Party. Podemos, a social-democratic party, and two other smaller groups refused. Then, in May, Mr. Chávez decided not to renew the broadcasting licence of the main opposition television channel, ostensibly because it had supported the 2002 coup attempt. This was unpopular with ordinary Venezuelans and was opposed by a new and energetic student movement, which went on to take the lead in the No campaign.

The president's drive to turn the armed forces into a tool of his socialist project aroused the weighty opposition of General Raúl Isaías Baduel, who stepped down as defence minister in July and who is a hero to the chavista grassroots for his role in restoring Mr. Chávez after the 2002 coup. Installed in a sleek glass office block in Caracas, General Baduel, a man as serene as the president is intemperate, has spent the past few weeks telling Venezuelans that the proposed reform amounted to another coup.

On top of that, many chavista politicians were unenthusiastic, since the reform would have let Mr Chávez run indefinitely for president but banned re-election for other posts. The chavista movement suffered “a top-to-bottom split, from state governors down to the grassroots”, said Ismael García, the leader of Podemos.

The emergence of what Mr García calls a “third pole” between the government and the traditional opposition allowed many of the president's supporters to vote no, or at least to abstain, without feeling that they were betraying their leader. The students did much of the hard work of bringing out voters and watching over ballot boxes. And when it seemed that Mr Chávez might be tempted to claim victory, General Baduel played a key role, with an—at least implicit—threat to reject such a result and split the armed forces.

The economy boils over

It is not hard to see what lies behind the decision of many chavistas not to vote. Their continuing loyalty to their comandante is being eroded by mounting economic distortions and the corruption and incompetence of his government. It was Mr Chávez's good fortune to preside over a massive increase in the oil price (to which he made a modest contribution by cancelling plans under which private investment would have doubled Venezuela's oil output). The result has been a wild economic boom (see chart 1). This has prompted a sharp drop in the number of Venezuelans living in poverty, from 43% in 1999 to 27.5% earlier this year, according to government figures. Hundreds of thousands of new cars have turned Caracas into an all-day traffic jam.

The boom has been fuelled mainly by public spending, which has risen from around 20% of GDP in the late 1990s to some 38% last year (including several off-budget funds controlled by the president). It has been amplified by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. To check inflation, the official exchange rate has been pegged at 2,150 bolívars to the dollar. That has been possible hitherto because revenues from oil exports have risen dramatically, from \$17 billion in 1999 to \$58 billion last year.

The result is known to economists as Dutch disease: an overvalued exchange rate favours imports but makes life hard for manufacturers and farmers. In Venezuela's case this has been exacerbated by Mr Chávez's ideological hostility to the private sector, which has involved selective nationalisation and intermittent threats to private property. While many private companies (and banks) have done well out of the boom, they have been loth to make long-term investments. Imports have risen fourfold over the past four years, while GDP has expanded by only half over the same period.

José Manuel Puente, an economist at IESA, a business school in Caracas, sees four

warning lights for the economy: oil output, inflation, fiscal problems and a growing shortage of dollars. Since Mr Chávez took direct control of PDVSA, the state oil company, after the crippling strike of 2002-03, production of crude has declined. That is partly because PDVSA has slashed investment in order to pay for social programmes, and partly because its payroll has doubled to 90,000 in the past four years. The government's policy of maximising its share of oil revenues by obliging foreign companies to become minority partners in joint ventures appears to have intensified the trend. Oil output has fallen for six consecutive quarters, according to the Central Bank. Although officials still insist that oil production is 3.3m barrels per day (b/d), even OPEC, of which Venezuela is a founder member, does not believe this: in October it slashed Venezuela's production quota to 2.5m b/d. The second warning light is inflation (see chart 2). In November prices rose by 4.4%, the highest monthly figure for four years, taking the annual rate to 21%, the highest in Latin America. Food prices have risen even faster, by 29% —despite price controls. Because of those controls, staples such as milk, eggs, black beans and cooking oil are in such short supply that shoppers sometimes fight for them.

To try to slow inflation the government slashed VAT earlier this year, from 14% to 9%. To plug the resulting fiscal gap, in November it imposed a tax on financial transactions — one reason for that month's spike in inflation. Another clear sign of strain is a surge in the parallel-market price of the dollar. Even if oil prices remain at current levels, many economists believe the government will have to devalue and start to cool the economy early next year.

The frustrations of collectivism

That will strain political loyalty further. After nine years of the Bolivarian revolution (named after Simón Bolívar, the South American independence hero) Venezuelans are becoming increasingly disillusioned with its corrupt inefficiency. Look behind the ubiquitous billboards proclaiming the government's social projects, and everywhere the failures and frustrations are palpable.

Take, for example, a model collective farm near the village of Buenos Aires in the coastal plain of Barlovento, an area with a large black population east of Caracas. Set up in 2002, it looks like a neat suburban estate, its one-storey houses for 144 families grouped in 12 circular cul-de-sacs. Three tractors, from China and Iran, are parked nearby. But farming the project's 108 hectares (267 acres) “did not go as we wanted”, says Jacobo Pacheco, one of the community's leaders, with quiet understatement.

Mr Pacheco, who is 62 and whose red beret has an image of Che Guevara, says he continues to support Mr Chávez. But he paints a devastating picture of government mismanagement. Agronomists from the National Lands Institute (INTI), which is responsible for the project, advised the collective's farmers to plant half a dozen different fruits; all but the lemons failed, either because the land was unsuitable or because of defects in the irrigation system. The water supply to the houses has been cut off because a pump doesn't work. None of six promised workshops, providing training and employment in carpentry, metalworking and the like, has been built. The local branch of Mercal, the government's subsidised supermarket chain, has been closed for the past year. The farm's members have to take outside work to make ends meet. Mr Pacheco says that collective farming doesn't suit Venezuelans. He wants INTI to divide the land into individual plots. He has other grievances, too. When invited to an exhibition about the project at the presidential palace he saw pictures and plans of the houses, showing that

they should have been equipped to a higher standard. He has seen receipts for the household equipment and says that between them the officials and supplier involved pocketed 1 billion bolívares (\$465,000).

This story rings true. Many government projects are either misconceived, or unfinished, or both—like the gleaming new fish-processing plant along the coast at Boca de Uchire that has stood empty for a year because a planned wharf remains on the drawing board, while just three carpenters work on the beach building the fishing fleet designed to supply it. Two out of three of the Mercal branches in Caracas have closed, reckons Jesús Torrealba, a former opposition activist who now runs a radio programme on the problems of the poor barrios.

Officials point with pride to the Cuban-designed social programmes known as misiones implemented by Mr Chávez when oil revenues picked up in 2003. Certainly, a primary-health programme called Barrio Adentro, which is mainly staffed by Cuban doctors and dentists, seems to work well, and is valued by residents in poorer neighbourhoods. Yet such evaluations as exist of these programmes suggest they have had little overall impact. Mr Chávez declared in 2005 that thanks to Misión Robinson, a scheme to teach adults to read and write, Venezuela had eradicated illiteracy, a boast quickly parroted by UNESCO officials. But the government was later forced to withdraw the claim after its own surveys suggested that over 1m adults are still illiterate. Perhaps the most successful educational policy has been one to extend the school day and provide meals. This was devised by a previous government, though to his credit Mr Chávez implemented it.

Despite the apparent success of Barrio Adentro, a recent decline in infant mortality merely mimics the historical trend in Venezuela, according to a study by Francisco Rodríguez, chief economist at the National Assembly from 2000-04 and now at Wesleyan University in Connecticut. The incidence of stunting and malnutrition in children has even slightly increased, from 8.4 per thousand in 1999 to 9.1 in 2006 according to government data. That points to the deterioration of public hospitals under Mr Chávez.

Strip away the propaganda, and the government's socio-economic policies do not particularly favour the poor. Much of the extra public spending has gone on arms purchases, bureaucracy (public employment has doubled) and infrastructure (some of it useful, to be sure).

The government also spends money on indiscriminate subsidies. These mean, for example, that a tank of petrol costs less than \$2, and that all credit-card holders get a quota of cheap dollars. Such policies favour the better off—including the new chavista elite of military officers, political leaders and favoured businessmen. According to the Central Bank, the distribution of income has become less equal under Mr Chávez. The Gini coefficient, a standard measure of inequality, has risen from 44.1 in 2000 to 48 in 2005. Over the same period, income distribution has become more equal in Brazil, Mexico and Chile.

A different landscape

Margarita López Maya, a social scientist at the Central University of Venezuela, points to the Bolivarian revolution's success in bringing the poor into politics and giving them a sense of citizenship, partly through a network of neighbourhood councils. Had the constitutional reform been approved, this would have been jeopardised, she says, since the councils would have depended directly on the president and his largesse.

That sense of inclusion remains Mr Chávez's prime political asset. He still controls

almost all the country's institutions, has billions of dollars to spend at will, and for the next nine months—thanks to an enabling law—can rule by decree over wide swathes of national life. He is a man whose political skills have frequently been underestimated, and who could yet bounce back from defeat.

After his reverse, Mr Chávez insisted that his project had not been derailed, merely shunted into a siding “for now”. That was a deliberate echo of the phrase he used after leading a failed military coup in 1992; seven years later, he was president. Maybe the country was not yet “ripe” for socialism, but “there will be no step back”, he said. “You should know that I am not withdrawing a single comma of this proposal.” He promised to reintroduce some bits of the reform by other means.

Nevertheless, the referendum marks a watershed. Mr Chávez “has been winged—he's passed his peak,” says Teodoro Petkoff, a centrist opposition leader and newspaper editor. For the first time in nearly a decade it is possible for Venezuelans to envisage life after Mr Chávez.

The opposition victory, and the admission of defeat by the president, ought to convince radicals on both sides that the only solution to the country's bitter political polarisation is peaceful and electoral. The emergence of the “third pole”, composed of Podemos, General Baudel and the student movement, should in itself herald a less polarised politics. Some talk of calling a constituent assembly to claw power back from the president. Others are looking ahead to elections for mayors and governors next year.

The referendum defeat means Mr Chávez cannot legally run again for the presidency. His aura of invincibility has gone, and the battle for the succession seems bound to begin soon. In the ruling party, political survival no longer demands unquestioning loyalty to the comandante. Fractures have already begun to appear in the supreme court and the parliament.

“This is not a 100-metre sprint, it's a marathon,” cautions Mr Petkoff. But its direction is clear. “Venezuelans have woken up” is a phrase often used by supporters of Mr Chávez to describe the political mobilisation of the poor. The referendum suggests that many of them are waking up to the shortcomings of his revolution.

Appendix 4:

Truncated Questions

4.2.1 Are there euphemistic expressions?

A euphemism is a word that is substituted for a more conventional or familiar word in order to avoid negative values (ibid: 117). Since it is seen as a rewording of text one, the use of euphemism is more prevalent in the second text. In text two, the same 'defeat' is represented as a 'result' and not a loss, which is euphemistic because a result is good, or at least ambiguous, whereas a defeat is explicitly negative for the collocated subject. Through euphemism, text two avoids negative values that would dissuade hopeful democrat converts. Relationally, euphemism effects solidarity and inculcates texts two's audience with the ideological presupposition that democracy can help Egyptians, too.

5.2 What relational values do grammatical features have?

5.2.1 What modes are used?

As text one is taken from a magazine, and text two is taken from a newspaper, this question is irrelevant in regard to exposing ideological content. All modes are manifestly declarative, as there is no place for dialogue between participants.

5.2.2 Are there important features of relational/expressive modality?

While relational modality has to do with one participant's authority in relation to others', expressive modality has to do with one participant's authority in regard to "the truth or probability of a representation of reality (ibid: 126). Because the modal auxiliaries that mark them often overlap within texts (ibid: 128), and especially because they do so in text one and two, they will be discussed here together.

In text two there is a low occurrence of relevant relational and expressive modality, which is not surprising, considering that news reports in newspapers are usually

represented as facts with little intermediate modality (ibid: 129). There are, though, a few instances.

-The referendum in Venezuela can only be understood in terms of a class struggle.

The modal auxiliary ‘can’, in combination with the adverb ‘only’, is associated with a meaning of possibility, which conveys the idea that the only possible way to understand the referendum in Venezuela is in the context of a class struggle. In reality, this is not true. The referendum could be understood in the context of ‘democratic process’ or ‘political processes’, or any one of an unlimited number of possibilities. But, because of the authority that ‘can’ and ‘only’ together carry, the interpreter is barred from considering the referendum in any other context than that of ‘a class struggle’. If ‘only’ were removed, this would not function as a viable example of modality functioning to implicitly enforce power relations within the text. But as it is, the authority of the producer limits the range of possible audience thought processes, enforcing implicit authority claims over it.

In text one the same examples that demonstrate implied negative sentences in section 5.1.3 work as well to illustrate the text’s inherent expressive modality.

Were Venezuela the dictatorship that some of his more radical opponents claim, its people <i>might have</i> spent the night toppling bronze statues of the Leader as he fled the country.
Were it a parliamentary democracy, the government <i>would surely have</i> resigned.
Their effect <i>would have been</i> to concentrate almost all power in an already top-heavy executive.
The pluralism enshrined in the current constitution <i>would have been</i> replaced with obligatory “socialism”.
And two decades of decentralization <i>would have been</i> reversed:
[Italics are my emphasis]

There is a broad variation of modality in this set of examples (‘might’ have, ‘would’ have, ‘should’ have). As broad as it is, though, each modal auxiliary verb still falls between the two extremes of categorical commitment regarding its producer’s commitment to the truth of his or her proposition. One extreme is ‘is/are’, in simple present tense, and the other is ‘isn’t/aren’t’, negative simple present tense (ibid: 129). The significance of this is that by using past unreal conditional, the author does reach the positive extreme of categorical commitment.

-Were it a parliamentary democracy, the government *would surely* have resigned.

Examined from outside past unreal conditional tense the producer asserts a categorical sureness that if the government were a parliamentary democracy (which it isn't), the government *would surely* have resigned. Here's the proposition again in present perfect/simple present tense:

-The government, which is a parliamentary democracy, has resigned.

This is laughable in its ludicrousness and impertinence to reality. This is like saying, "the sun is black and has fallen from the sky"! The Venezuelan government is not a parliamentary government so there's no way it would resign. The two clauses don't rationally go together. It appears to actually be a mistake on the author's part.

-Were Venezuela the dictatorship that some of his more radical opponents claim, its people *might* have spent the night toppling bronze statues of the leader as he fled the country.

This example, too, is irrational, but it demonstrates the producer's arbitrary movement along the spectrum of categorical commitment to the truth of the propositions. The modal auxiliary verb 'might' implies that only perhaps the Venezuelans (like the Iraqis) would have toppled statues of Chavez, if Venezuela were a dictatorship in reality. In present simple/continuous tense it looks like this:

-As some of Chavez's more radical opponents claim, Venezuela is a dictatorship, so the people are possibly spending the night toppling statues of him.

Again, examined in present tense the propositions are illogical/irrational, but the producer's categorical commitment to the proposition's truth is less sure than in the first example. Despite the problem in logic, it still demonstrates the author's presupposed authority of categorical truth, which is implied, and therefore of ideological significance.