

Arg 1: Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur ad aliquid naturaliter. Agens enim naturale dividitur contra agens voluntarium, ut patet in principio II Physic. Non ergo voluntas ad aliquid naturaliter movetur.

Arg 2: Praeterea, id quod est naturale, inest alicui semper; sicut igni esse calidum. Sed nullus motus inest voluntati semper. Ergo nullus motus est naturalis voluntati.

Arg 3: Praeterea, natura est determinata ad unum. Sed voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ergo voluntas nihil naturaliter vult.

Sed contra: est quod motus voluntatis sequitur actum intellectus. Sed intellectus aliqua intelligit naturaliter. Ergo et voluntas aliqua vult naturaliter.

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Boetius dicit in libro de duabus naturis, et philosophus in V Metaphys., natura dicitur multipliciter. Quandoque enim dicitur principium intrinsicum in rebus mobilibus. Et talis natura est vel materia, vel forma materialis, ut patet ex II Physic. Alio modo dicitur natura quaelibet substantia, vel etiam quodlibet ens. Et secundum hoc, illud dicitur esse naturale rei, quod convenit ei secundum suam substantiam. Et hoc est quod per se inest rei. In omnibus autem, ea quae non per se insunt, reducuntur in aliquid quod per se inest, sicut in principium. Et ideo necesse est quod, hoc modo accipiendo naturam, semper principium in his quae conveniunt rei, sit naturale. Et hoc manifeste apparet in intellectu, nam principia intellectualis cognitionis sunt naturaliter nota. Similiter etiam principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum. Hoc autem est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet potentia in suum obiectum, et etiam ipse finis ultimus, qui hoc modo se habet in appetibilibus, sicut prima principia demonstrationum in intelligibilibus, et universaliter omnia illa quae conveniunt volenti secundum suam naturam. Non enim per voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam voluntatis; sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias, et ad totum hominem. Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum obiectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt aliis potentiis, ut cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere et alia huiusmodi, quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quadam particularia bona.

Ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas dividitur contra naturam, sicut una causa contra aliam, quaedam enim fiunt naturaliter, et quaedam fiunt voluntarie. Est autem alius modus causandi proprius voluntati, quae est domina sui actus, praeter modum qui convenit naturae, quae est determinata ad unum.

Objection 1: We thus proceed to the first argument. It appears that the will is not moved toward anything naturally. Natural agents are divided from voluntary agents as is clear from the start of *Physics* II. It is not therefore the case that the will is moved toward anything naturally.

Objection 2: Furthermore, that which is natural is always in a thing, in the way that being hot is in fire. But no movement is always in the will, so that no movement is natural to the will.

Objection 3: Furthermore, nature is determined to a single thing, but the will includes opposites. Therefore the will does not will anything naturally.

On the contrary: the movement of the will follows the act of the intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally. Therefore the will also wills some things naturally.

I reply that, as Boetius says in *De Duabus Naturis* and Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* V, nature has a number of meanings. Sometimes it signifies an intrinsic principle in moveable things, and in this sense nature is either matter or material form, as is clear from *Physics* II. In another way, nature is any substance, or even any being; and in this sense something is said to be natural to a thing if it conforms to it in relation to its substance. And this is what pertains in itself to a thing. But in all things, whatever is not in itself included in the thing can be reduced to something that is in itself included, as its principle. Thus taking 'nature' in this sense, the principle of that which belongs to a thing is necessarily natural. It is thereby manifest in relation to the intellect: for the principles of intellectual cognition are known naturally. Similarly, the principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed. And this is the good in general, to which the will naturally inclines, just as every power inclines toward its object; and it is also the final end, which stands to objects of appetite as the primary principles of demonstrations stand to intelligible objects; and more generally, it is all those things that are naturally in conformity with the one who wills according to his nature. For the will desires not only those things connected with itself, but also things that concern the other powers, and to the man as a whole. Thus a person naturally wills not only the object of the will, but also the things appropriate to the other powers, such as knowledge of truth which conforms to the intellect, and to exist and live and other such things that pertain to natural living. All of these are included in the will's object as many particular goods.

Reply to 1: To the first I reply that the will is divided from nature as one cause from another, for some things occur naturally and others voluntarily. But there is another type of causing that is proper to the will, which is the master of its act, that is in addition to the manner proper to nature, and is determined to one thing.

Sed quia voluntas in aliqua natura fundatur, necesse est quod motus proprius naturae, quantum ad aliquid, participetur in voluntate, sicut quod est prioris causae, participatur a posteriori. Est enim prius in unaquaque re ipsum esse, quod est per naturam, quam velle, quod est per voluntatem. Et inde est quod voluntas naturaliter aliquid vult.

Ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum quod in rebus naturalibus id quod est naturale quasi consequens formam tantum, semper actu inest, sicut calidum igni. Quod autem est naturale sicut consequens materiam, non semper actu inest, sed quandoque secundum potentiam tantum. Nam forma est actus, materia vero potentia. Motus autem est actus existentis in potentia. Et ideo illa quae pertinent ad motum, vel quae consequuntur motum, in rebus naturalibus, non semper insunt, sicut ignis non semper movetur sursum, sed quando est extra locum suum. Et similiter non oportet quod voluntas, quae de potentia in actum reducitur dum aliquid vult, semper actu velit, sed solum quando est in aliqua dispositione determinata. Voluntas autem Dei, quae est actus purus, semper est in actu volendi.

Ad 3: Ad tertium dicendum quod naturae semper respondet unum, proportionatum tamen naturae. Naturae enim in genere, respondet aliquid unum in genere; et naturae in specie acceptae, respondet unum in specie; naturae autem individuatae respondet aliquid unum individuale. Cum igitur voluntas sit quaedam vis immaterialis sicut et intellectus, respondet sibi naturaliter aliquod unum commune, scilicet bonum, sicut etiam intellectui aliquod unum commune, scilicet verum, vel ens, vel quod quid est. Sub bono autem communi multa particularia bona continentur, ad quorum nullum voluntas determinatur.

But because the will is founded upon a kind of nature, it is necessary that the proper movement of nature is shared by the will to a certain degree, for what pertains to a prior cause is shared by the posterior cause. For in all cases, being, which arises from nature, is prior to the will and its volitions. And accordingly the will wills something naturally.

Reply to 2: To the second I reply that in the case of natural things, what is natural in being consequent upon form alone is always actual in the thing, as is the case with heat in fire. But that which is natural consequent upon matter is not always actual in the thing but rather only potentially. For form is an act, whereas matter is potentiality. Movement is an act of something that exists potentially. So in the case of natural things, that which belongs to or arises from movement does not always exist in them, just as fire does not always move upward but only when it is outside in its own space. Similarly, it is not necessary that the will, which is moved from potentiality to actuality when it wills something, be willing something at all times, but only when in some determinate disposition. But God's will, which is pure act, is always in the act of willing.

Reply to 3: To the third I reply that, every nature has one thing that corresponds to it, and is proportionate to that nature. To nature taken as a genus there corresponds something that is one in genus; to nature as a species there corresponds something that is one in species, and to individuated nature there corresponds something that is one individually. Now because the will, like the intellect, is an immaterial power, there is naturally one general thing that corresponds to it, namely the good — just as in the case of the intellect there corresponds one general thing, namely truth or being, or what something is. But under the good in general there are many particular goods, to which the will is not determined.

