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***Emergency Politics and the obligation of securitizing actors***

In this talk I will be discussing the preliminary plans for my current (and just started) book project provisionally called: *Emergency Politics Security, Threats and the Duties of States and other actors*. Since the planned monograph builds directly on my forthcoming book *The Morality of Security: A Theory Just Securitization* (CUP, 2019). I will commence my talk by discussing the basics of just securitization theory as developed in my forthcoming book and from here move to the plan for the new project. The difference between the two projects is that the first develops a theory of when the use of emergency politics (i.e. securitization) is morally permissible, while the latter is concerned with moral obligation. As such it seeks to answer the research question: *Why and* *when, if ever, are relevant actors required to securitize*?

At this early stage this book is planned as a three chapter volume (plus introduction and conclusion). Chapter 1 will focus on the point in time when securitization is morally required for a variety of threats (including terrorism, climate change, organized crime, antimicrobial resistance), regardless of actor. I argue that last point in time emerges when all plausible alternatives to securitizing have been tried for a sufficient length of time. In short, I hold that obligation is tied to necessity. Necessity here is understood in its common-sense meaning of an action Y being indispensable to achieving X. The job of this chapter is then to ascertain what counts as alternatives in the cases of specific threats, and also on the right amount of time for which alternatives have to be tried for the different threat scenarios.

Chapters 2 and 3 will focus on who (i.e. which actors) are – when necessity is satisfied (i.e. chapter 1) - not merely permitted to securitize, but required to do so? From whence does this obligation arise? Chapter 2 focuses on states and sub-state actors. Regarding states, the plan is to chart obligation in terms of contractual responsibility to citizens where matters of national security or of the security of citizens is concerned. Responsibilities to third parties in turn will be charted using David Miller’s (2007) concept of remedial responsibility. However, if it applies as all, I hold that remedial responsibly by unrivalled ability needs to be curbed by prohibitive costs – both immediate and prospective. (I plan to discuss what these are for the threat scenarios discussed in chapter 1). The chapter will also look at sub-state actors and consider whether any of these are required to securitize. I hold that sub-state actors have a duty to securitize when it is necessary, but also –provided they reside within a state and go against it – when there is an unaddressed objective existential threat.

Chapter 3 will focus on collective actors. I plan here to draw a distinction between collective security actors (UN, EU, regional actors) and collective defence actors. This difference is important because while the requirement to securitize (once necessity is satisfied) for loose collectives stems –at best - from remedial responsibility by ability (albeit constraint by cost); in collective defence organizations obligations (NATO) are contractual (Article 5 – now widened to include cyber-attacks). Relevant in the context of collective defence actors is then the burdens question, thus if securitization is necessary, are those member states that outcome responsible for a threat required to do (and pay) more towards securitization, provided ability is the same? Relevant in the context of collective actors is also the issue, what if able collectives are asked for other-securitization by the putative referent object (i.e. the threatened people)? Do such requests imply duties?