

A class of generalized potential games and applications

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First Joint Workshop of Robotics and Mathematics, 12 June 2019

based on joint work with T. H. Dang-Ha (Google, Zurich), Q. B. Tang (Graz, Austria) and H. M. Tran (Esmart Systems, Norway)

Optimization problem


- **Traditional optimization problem:** minimization of a *single* objective function over some admissible set A :

$$\min_{x \in A} f(x).$$

- **The standard gradient descent method**¹

- 1 start with a guess x_0 ,
- 2 follow the direction of the negative of gradient of f :

$$x_{n+1} = x_n - \gamma_n \nabla f(x_n).$$



¹ picture: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gradient_descent

Multi-player differentiable games

n -player differentiable games:

- players $[n] = \{1, \dots, n\}$,
- controllable variables: $D_1 \times \dots \times D_n$ where $D_i \subset \mathbb{R}^{d_i}$ and $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i = d$.
- twice continuously differentiable loss functions:

$$\begin{aligned} \ell_i &: D_1 \times \dots \times D_n \longrightarrow \mathbb{R} \\ \mathbf{w} &= (\mathbf{w}_1, \dots, \mathbf{w}_n) \mapsto \ell_i(\mathbf{w}_1, \dots, \mathbf{w}_n). \end{aligned}$$

The objective of each player is to minimize its loss function:

$$\mathbf{w}_i^* = \operatorname{argmin}_{\mathbf{w}_i \in D_i} \ell_i(\mathbf{w}).$$

\mathbf{w}^* -Nash equilibrium:

$$\mathbf{w}_i^* = \operatorname{argmin}_{\mathbf{w}_i \in D_i} \ell_i(\mathbf{w}_i, \mathbf{w}_{-i}^*) \quad \forall i.$$

Potential games, Monderer-Shapley 1996

Weighted potential game: there is a function $\phi : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and positive numbers (weights) $\{\alpha_i\}_{i=1}^n$ such that

$$\alpha_i \nabla_{\mathbf{w}_i} \ell_i = \nabla_{\mathbf{w}_i} \phi \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, n.$$

when $\alpha_i = 1 \quad \forall i$: exact potential game.

Theorem (Monderer-Shapley 1996)

- *equivalent characterization:*

$$\alpha_i \nabla_{\mathbf{w}_i \mathbf{w}_j}^2 \ell_i = \alpha_j \nabla_{\mathbf{w}_i \mathbf{w}_j}^2 \ell_j \quad \forall i, j.$$

- *potential function (uniquely defined up to an additive constant): for any $z \in C([0, 1], \mathbb{R}^d)$: $z|_{t=0,1} = z_{0,1}$:*

$$\phi(z_1) - \phi(z_0) = \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i \int_0^1 z'_i(t) \cdot \nabla_{\mathbf{w}_i} \ell_i(z(t)) dt.$$

Why potential games?: minimization of the single potential function instead of n loss functions. **Existence and attainability of Nash equilibria**

Many applications: economics, theoretical computer science, computational social science and sociology, wireless networks, and recently in machine learning

Lloyd S. Shapley (1923-2016): Nobel prize in Economics 2012.

Can we enlarge the class of potential games?

The simultaneous gradient of the game:

$$\xi(\mathbf{w}) = (\nabla_{\mathbf{w}_1} \ell_1(\mathbf{w}), \dots, \nabla_{\mathbf{w}_n} \ell_n(\mathbf{w}))^T.$$

weighted potential games:

$$\xi(\mathbf{w}) = M^{-1} \nabla \phi(\mathbf{w}) \quad \text{where} \quad M = \text{dia}(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n).$$

linear relation between ξ and $\nabla \phi$

Our aim is to extend the class of potential games allowing nonlinear relation between ξ and $\nabla \phi$ using a dissipation potential.

Dissipation potential and its dual

dissipation potential: $\Psi : \mathbb{Z} \times T\mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is called a dissipation potential if for all $z \in \mathbb{Z}$

- (i) $\Psi(z, \cdot)$ is convex in the second argument,
- (ii) $\min \Psi(z, \cdot) = 0$ and
- (iii) $\Psi(z, 0) = 0$.

Legendre-Fenchel dual (convex dual):

$$\Psi^*(z, \zeta) = \sup_{s \in T_z \mathbb{Z}} \{ \langle \zeta, s \rangle - \Psi(z, s) \} \quad \text{for } \zeta \in T_z^* \mathbb{Z}.$$

equivalent statements, Fenchel 1949:

$$(i) \xi \in \mathbf{D}\Psi(s) \iff (ii) s \in \mathbf{D}\Psi^*(\xi) \iff (iii) \Psi(s) + \Psi^*(\xi) = \langle \xi, s \rangle$$

Our work: generalized potential games

Generalized potential games: if there exists a dissipation potential Ψ and a potential function ϕ such that

$$\xi(\mathbf{w}) = \mathbf{D}_\zeta \Psi^*(\nabla_{\mathbf{w}} \phi(\mathbf{w})).$$

$\Psi(s) = \frac{1}{2} s^T M s$: recover weighted potential games (exact, $M = I$).

Theorem

- *generalized potential* $\iff \mathbf{D}^2 \Psi(\xi(\mathbf{w})) \mathbf{H}(\mathbf{w})$ is symmetric ($\mathbf{H}(\mathbf{w})$: Hessian matrix, $[\mathbf{H}(\mathbf{w})]_{ij} = \nabla_{ij}^2 \ell_i$).
- for all $z \in C([0, 1], \mathbb{R}^d)$, $z|_{t=0,1} = z_{0,1}$:

$$\phi(z_1) - \phi(z_0) = \int_0^1 z'(t) \cdot \mathbf{D}_s \Psi(\xi(z(t))) dt$$

Generalized potential games: example

Consider a n -player game with

$$l_1(\mathbf{w}) = \sum_{r=1}^R \left(\frac{k_{fw}^r}{\alpha_1^r + 1} w_1^{\alpha_1^r + 1} w_2^{\alpha_2^r} \cdots w_n^{\alpha_n^r} - \frac{k_{bw}^r}{\beta_1^r + 1} w_1^{\beta_1^r + 1} w_2^{\alpha_2^r} \cdots w_n^{\beta_n^r} \right) (\alpha_1^r - \beta_1^r)$$

\vdots

$$l_n(\mathbf{w}) = \sum_{r=1}^R \left(\frac{k_{fw}^r}{\alpha_n^r + 1} w_1^{\alpha_1^r} w_2^{\alpha_2^r} \cdots w_n^{\alpha_n^r + 1} - \frac{k_{bw}^r}{\beta_n^r + 1} w_1^{\beta_1^r} w_2^{\alpha_2^r} \cdots w_n^{\beta_n^r + 1} \right) (\alpha_n^r - \beta_n^r).$$

Notations: for $\mathbf{w} = (w_1, \dots, w_n)$, $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n)$ and $r = 1, \dots, R$:

$$\mathbf{w}^{\boldsymbol{\alpha}} := \prod_{k=1}^n w_k^{\alpha_k}, \quad \boldsymbol{\alpha}^r := (\alpha_1^r, \dots, \alpha_n^r), \quad \boldsymbol{\beta}^r := (\beta_1^r, \dots, \beta_n^r).$$

Theorem

Suppose that there exists $\mathbf{w}_\infty \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ such that

$$k_{fw}^r \mathbf{w}_\infty^{\alpha^r} = k_{bw}^r \mathbf{w}_\infty^{\beta^r} = \kappa_r \quad \text{for } r = 1, \dots, R, \quad (*)$$

then the above game is generalised potential.

(*): detailed balanced condition

Proof.

$$\phi(\mathbf{w}) := \sum_{i=1}^n w_i \left(\log \left(\frac{w_i}{w_{i\infty}} \right) - 1 \right),$$
$$\Psi^*(\mathbf{w}, \boldsymbol{\mu}) = \sum_{r=1}^R \frac{\kappa_r}{2} \ell \left(\frac{\mathbf{w}^{\alpha^r}}{\mathbf{w}_\infty^{\alpha^r}}, \frac{\mathbf{w}^{\beta^r}}{\mathbf{w}_\infty^{\beta^r}} \right) \left(\boldsymbol{\mu} \cdot (\boldsymbol{\alpha}^r - \boldsymbol{\beta}^r) \right)^2 \quad \text{where}$$
$$\ell(a, b) = \begin{cases} \frac{a-b}{\log a - \log b} & \text{for } a \neq b, \\ b & \text{for } a = b. \end{cases}$$

Origin of our generalization

classical gradient flow system: linear relation between rates and driving forces

- \mathbb{R}^d , standard inner product: $\dot{x}(t) = -\nabla f(x(t))$,
- \mathbb{R}^d , weighted inner product, $\langle x, y \rangle = x^T A y$: $\dot{x}(t) = -A^{-1} \nabla f(x(t))$.

generalized gradient flow systems: nonlinear relation between rates and driving forces

$$\dot{x}(t) = \mathbf{D}_\xi(\Psi^*(-\nabla\phi(x(t)))).$$

many applications in the modeling of materials (for examples, for plasticity and ferromagnetism) and in chemical reaction network.

Our construction comes from chemical reaction network.

(i)(applications in machine learning) Decomposition of general games:
Balduzzi et. al. (ICML, 2018) & Letcher et.al. (JMLR, 2019)

$$\textit{general game} = \textit{exact potential game} + \textit{Hamiltonian game}$$

by decomposing the Hamiltonian into a sum of a symmetric and an anti-symmetric part using Helmholtz's decomposition.

on-going work: decomposition of games as in GENERIC-evolution
(Ottinger, 2005)

$$\partial_t z = L(z) \frac{\delta E}{\delta z} + \partial_\xi \Psi^*(z, \frac{\delta S}{\delta z}),$$

where L : anti-symmetric operator, E, S : energy and entropy functional.
GENERIC is both geometrical and physical/thermodynamical meaningful
fulfilling the laws of thermodynamics for a closed system.

(ii) (applying in robotics) optimization under uncertainty

Picheny et.al. (JGB, 2018): Bayesian optimization for black-box function.
on-going work: functional Bayesian optimization.

(iii) **Game theory in chemical reaction networks**: explore more connections between game theory and chemical reaction network.

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THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!