Dr Matthew Parrott

Dr Matthew Parrott

Department of Philosophy
Birmingham Fellow

Contact details

Address
ERI Building
University of Birmingham
Edgbaston
Birmingham
B15 2TT
UK

I am a Birmingham Fellow in Philosophy.  My research focuses on questions in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and psychiatry. But it also takes up issues central to epistemology and philosophy of science.

Qualifications

  • B.A. (Hons) in Philosophy, University of Michigan
  • PhD in Philosophy, University of California,
  • Berkeley Fellow, Higher Education Academy

Biography

Before coming to Birmingham, I was a Lecturer in Philosophy at King’s College London. I was also an Andrew Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow at Oxford.  Prior to that I was in America, where I obtained my PhD from Berkeley and taught for one year at the University of Puget Sound.

Teaching

This academic year, I will be teaching the History of Analytic Philosophy.

Postgraduate supervision

Among other things, I would be keen to supervise postgraduate students working on interesting questions in: philosophy of mind; philosophy of cognitive science, philosophy of psychiatry; epistemology; metaphysics; Hume; and early analytic philosophy.

Research

Presently, I am working on the following complimentary research projects:

My first project aims to understand delusional cognition and the nature of belief formation. More precisely, I am interested in exploring different ways in which cognitive processing may be impaired at distinct points in delusional thinking. I am also interested in the ways in which an individual’s ways of thinking about possibilities affects the things she might come to believe.

My second project is in the epistemology of mind. I am interested in both self-knowledge and our knowledge of others’ minds. More generally, I’m interested in how reflection on topics in the epistemology of mind might bear on traditional problems in the metaphysics of mind.

Publications

  • ‘The Look of Another Mind’, Mind (forthcoming)
  • ‘Self-Blindness and Self-Knowledge’, Philosophers’ Imprint (2017) 17 (16): 1-22. 
  • 'Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion’, Mind and Language (2017) 32 (1): 39-64.
  • ‘Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities', The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (2016) 67(1): 271-296.
  • ‘More Dead than Dead? Attributing Mentality to Vegetative State Patients’, Philosophical Psychology (2016) 29 (1): 84-95. with Anil Gomes and Joshua Shepherd 
  • ‘The Erotetic Theory of Delusional Thinking’ with Phillip Koralus, Cognitive Neuropsychiatry (2015) 20(5): 398-415.
  • ‘Expressing First-Person Authority’, Philosophical Studies (2015) 172 (8): 2215-2237.
  • 'Epicurean Aspects of Mental State Attributions' with Anil Gomes, Philosophical Psychology (2015) 28: 1001-1011.
  • 'Explaining Inserted Thoughts', Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology (2015) 22 (3): 239-242.

Expertise

  • How we know about our own mental state and the mental state of others
  • Delusions