Recent publications
Article
Sullivan-Bissett, E 2022, 'Better to return whence we came', The Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 85-100. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-022-09888-4
Sullivan-Bissett, E 2022, 'Debunking doxastic transparency', European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 5-24. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.18.1.3
Sullivan-Bissett, E & Rush, M 2022, 'Unbiased awarding of art prizes? It's hard to judge', British Journal of Aesthetics. <http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/>
Noordhof, P & Sullivan-Bissett, E 2021, 'The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions', Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03245-x
Sullivan-Bissett, E 2020, 'Unimpaired abduction to alien abduction: lessons on delusion formation', Philosophical Psychology, vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 679-704. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2020.1765324
Sullivan-Bissett, E 2019, 'Biased by our imaginings', Mind & Language, vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 627-647. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12225
Bortolotti, L & Sullivan-Bissett, E 2019, 'Is choice blindness a case of self-ignorance?', Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02414-3
Sullivan-Bissett, E & Noordhof, P 2019, 'The Transparent Failure of Norms to Keep Up Standards of Belief', Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01242-y
Sullivan-Bissett, E 2018, 'Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?', Synthese, vol. 195, no. 8, pp. 3453–3476. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1377-0
Sullivan-Bissett, E 2018, 'Monothematic Delusion: A Case of Innocence from Experience', Philosophical Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2018.1468024
Chapter (peer-reviewed)
Noordhof, P & Sullivan-Bissett, E 2022, The everyday irrationality of monothematic delusion. in P Henne & S Murray (eds), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. 1 edn, Advances in Experimental Philosophy, Bloomsbury Academic.
Sullivan-Bissett, E 2020, We are like American robins. in K McCain & S Stapleford (eds), Epistemic duties: new arguments, new angles. 1st edn, Routledge Studies in Epistemology, Routledge, New York, pp. 94-110. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429030215-8
Bortolotti, L, Antrobus, M & Sullivan-Bissett, E 2019, The epistemic innocence of optimistically biased beliefs. in M Barcerak Jackson & B Balcerak Jackson (eds), Reasoning: essays on theoretical and practical thinking. Oxford University Press. <https://global.oup.com/academic/product/reasoning-9780198791478?q=Reasoning%20essays%20on%20theoretical%20and%20practical%20thinking&lang=en&cc=gb#>
Book/Film/Article review
Sullivan-Bissett, E 2022, 'Believing badly ain't so bad', Philosophical Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2077717
Comment/debate
Sullivan-Bissett, E 2022, 'Against a second factor', Asian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 2022, 33. https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-022-00036-0
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