Colin Rowat

Colin Rowat

The Department of Economics
Associate Professor in Economics
Turing Fellow

Contact details

Birmingham Business School
University of Birmingham
B15 2TT


  • Certificate in Advanced Risk and Portfolio Management (Baruch College)
  • Diploma, MSc and PhD Economics (Cambridge)
  • BA Psychology (Carleton University)


Explainable AI (XAI)


EPSRC grant EP/J007498/1: Formal representation and proof for cooperative games, with M. Kerber, January 2012 - December 2014 (£389,557)

Other activities

Director of MSc Mathematical Finance (incl. admissions), careers and alum link, and chair of the Research Computing Management Committee

Visiting Researcher at Meiji Gakuin University (Tokyo)

MY LINKS:Personal Homepage


Frye, C., Rowat, C, and I. Feige (2000) Asymmetric Shapley values: incorporating causal knowledge into model-agnostic explainabilityNeurIPS 

Kerber, M., Lange, C. and C. Rowat (2016) An introduction to mechanized reasoningJournal of Mathematical Economics, vol 66, pp. 26 - 39.

MacKenzie, S., Kerver, M. and C. Rowat (2015) Pillage games with multiple stable setsInternational Journal of Game Theory, vol 44(4), pp. 993 - 1013,

Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat. (2014). Set Theory or Higher Order Logic to Represent Auction Concepts in Isabelle?. Conference on Intelligent Computer Mathematics No. 8543 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, pp. 236–251, 2014.

M. Kerber and C. Rowat. (2014) Sufficient Conditions for Unique Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage GamesMathematical Social Sciences, vol 69, pp. 69 - 80.

A. Beardon and C. Rowat. (2013).  Efficient sets are smallJournal of Mathematical Economics, vol 49(5), pp. 367 - 374.

C. Lange, M. B. Caminati, M. Kerber, T. Mossakowski, M. Wenzel, C. Rowat and W. Windsteiger.  (2013).  A Qualitative Comparison of the Suitability of Four Theorem Provers for Basic Auction TheoryLecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7961, pp. 200 - 215.

M. Kerber, C. Rowat and W. Windsteiger. (2011). Using Theorema in the Formalization of Theoretical EconomicsLecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6824, pp. 58 - 73.

M. Kerber and C. Rowat.  (2011). A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, vol 40(3), pp. 461 - 466.

I. Ayres and C. Rowat and N. Zakariya. (2011).  Optimal voting rules for two member tenure committeesSocial Choice and Welfare, vol 36(2), pp. 323 - 354.

C. Rowat. (2007). Non-Linear Strategies in a Linear Quadratic Differential Game, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol 31 (10), pp. 3179 - 3202.

C. Rowat and J. Dutta. (2007). The Commons with Capital Markets, Economic Theory, vol 31 (2), pp. 225-254.

C. Rowat and P. Seabright. (2006). Intermediation by Aid Agencies, Journal of Development Economics, vol 79 (2), pp. 469-491.

Discussion papers

A formal proof of Vickrey's theorem by blast, simp, and rule, with M. Kerber and C. Lange. January 2014, Department of Economics Discussion Paper, University of Birmingham, 14-01. (Submitted to the Journal of Mathematical Economics)

View all publications in research portal


Iraqi economy; UK and US Iraq policy; sanctions and their humanitarian consequences

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