The Liar's Revenge

• Julien Murzi (University of Salzburg)

Abstract

I introduce a general revenge argument aimed at showing that any attempt to block the Liar Paradox by invalidating certain classically valid principles gives rise to new Liar-like paradoxes that do not rely on those principles. More precisely, I present a recipe for generating revenge arguments against any non-classical theory that can recapture classical logic for a set of sentences if such a set is closed under certain classical-recapturing principles (Murzi & Rossi, 2020). L. Rosenblatt (‘Paradoxicality without Paradox’) and L. Incurvati & J. Schlöder (Reasoning with Attitude, OUP) have recently argued against such a revenge strategy. After briefly rehearsing Murzi & Rossi’s results, I introduce Rosenblatt's and Incurvati & J. Schlöder's objections, and explain why I am not convinced.