Policy briefs

Mental Capacity Assessments, 26th March 2020


Bortolotti, L. (2020). The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs. OUP.

Edited books

Bortolotti, L. (2018) (ed.). Delusions in Context. Palgrave Pivot (open access).

PhD theses

  1. Motta, V. (2021). Being Present in Times of Absence: A Philosophical and Empirical Enquiry on Loneliness and Solitude. University of Birmingham.
  2. Antrobus, M. (2018). Epistemic and Psychological Benefits of Depression. University of Birmingham.

Special issues

  1. Bortolotti, L. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (eds.) (2017). False but Useful Beliefs. Philosophical Explorations 20 (S1). 
  2. Stammers, S. and L. Bortolotti (eds.) (2020). Philosophical Perspectives on Confabulation. Topoi 39 (1).

Journal articles

  1. Motta, V. and Larkin, M. (2022). Absence of other and disruption of self: an interpretative phenomenological analysis of the meaning of loneliness in the context of life in a religious community. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
  2. Motta, V. (2021). Key Concepts: LonelinessPhilosophy Psychiatry & Psychology 28 (1): 71-81.
  3. Motta, V. and Bortolotti, L. (2020). Solitude as a positive experience: empowerment and agency. Metodo 8 (2): 119-147.
  4. Stammers, S. and Pulvermacher, R. (2020). The value of doing philosophy in mental health contexts. Journal of Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23: 743–752.
  5. Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2020). Unimpaired Abduction to Alien Abduction: Lessons on Delusion FormationPhilosophical Psychology 33 (5): 679-704.
  6. Stammers, S. (2020). Confabulation, explanation, and the pursuit of resonant meaningTopoi 39 (1): 177-187
  7. Gunn, R. and Larkin, M. (2020). Delusion Formation as an Inevitable Consequence of a Radical Alteration in Lived ExperiencePsychosis 12 (2): 151-161.
  8. Puddifoot, K. (2019). Disclosure of Mental Health: Philosophical and Psychological PerspectivesPhilosophy, Psychology and Psychiatry 26 (4): 333-348.
  9. Bortolotti, L. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2019). Is Choice Blindness a Case of Self-Ignorance? Synthese.
  10. Sullivan-Bissett, E. and Noordhof, P. (2020). The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief. Philosophical Studies 177: 1213–1227.
  11. Lancellotta, E. and Bortolotti, L. (2019). Are clinical delusions adaptive? WIREs in Cognitive Science 10 (5): e1502.
  12. Puddifoot, K. (2019). Stereotyping PatientsJournal of Social Philosophy 50 (1): 69-90.
  13. Stammers, S. (2019). Improving knowledge acquisition and dissemination through technical interventions on cognitive biases.Educational Theory 68 (6): 675-692.
  14. Puddifoot, K. and O'Donnell, C. (2019). Human Memory and the Limits of Technology in EducationEducational Theory 68 (6): 643-655.
  15. Boden, Z., Larkin, M. Iyer, M. (2019). Picturing ourselves in the world: Drawings, IPA and the Relational Mapping Interview.Qualitative Research in Psychology 16 (2): 218-236.
  16. Larkin, M., Shaw, R., Flowers, P. (2019). Multi-perspectival designs and processes in interpretative phenomenological researchQualitative Research in Psychology 16 (2): 182-198.
  17. Miller Tate, A. (2019). Contributory injustice in psychiatryJournal of Medical Ethics 45 (2): 97-100.
  18. Puddifoot, K. and Bortolotti, L. (2019). Epistemic Innocence and the Production of False Memory BeliefsPhilosophical Studies 176 (3): 755–780.
  19. Puddifoot, K. (2018). Re-evaluating the Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony: The Misinformation Effect and the Overcritical JurorEpisteme.
  20. Broome, M. and Bortolotti, L. (2018). Affective instability and paranoiaDiscipline Filosofiche XXVIII (2): 123-136.
  21. Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2018). Biased by our imaginingsMind & Language.
  22. Jefferson, A. and Bortolotti, L. (2018). Why (some) unrealistic optimism is permissible in patient decision makingAmerican Journal of Bioethics 18 (9): 27-29.
  23. Polonioli, A., Vega-Mendoza, M., Blankinship, B. and Carmel, D. (2018). Reporting in Experimental Philosophy: Current Standards and Recommendations for Future PracticeReview of Philosophy and Psychology
  24. Bortolotti, L. (2018). Optimism, agency, and successEthical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3): 521–535.
  25. Laakso, M. and Polonioli, A. (2018). Open access in ethics research: an analysis of open access availability and author self-archiving behaviour in light of journal copyright restrictionsScientometrics 116 (1): 291–317.
  26. Polonioli, A., Stammers, S. and Bortolotti, L. (2018). “Good” Biases: Does Doxastic Irrationality Benefit Individuals and Groups?Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'etranger 143 (3): 327-344.
  27. Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2018). Monothematic delusions. A case of innocence from experiencePhilosophical Psychology 31 (6): 920-947.
  28. Polonioli, A. (2018). A Blind Spot in Research on Foreign Language Effects in Judgment and Decision-Making. Frontiers in Psychology 13 (9): 227.
  29. Gunn, R. and Bortolotti, L. (2018). Can delusions play a protective role?Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4): 813-833.
  30. Bortolotti, L. and Sullivan-Bissett (2018). Epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortionsMind & Language 33 (3): 263-279.
  31. Bortolotti, L. (2018). Stranger than fiction: Costs and benefits of everyday confabulationReview of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2): 227-249.
  32. Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2018). Explaining doxastic transparency: Aim, norm, or function?Synthese 195 (8): 3453-3476.
  33. Polonioli, A. (2017). A plea for minimally biased naturalistic philosophySynthese.
  34. Stammers, S. (2017). A patchier picture still: biases, beliefs and overlap on the inferential continuum. Philosophia 45 (4): 1829–1850.
  35. Bortolotti, L. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). How can false or irrational beliefs be useful?Philosophical Explorations 20: sup1: 1-3.
  36. Puddifoot, K. (2017). Stereotyping: The multifactorial view. Philosophical Topics 45 (1): 137-156.
  37. Larkin, M., Boden, Z., Newton, E. (2017). If Psychosis were cancer: A speculative comparisonBMJ Medical Humanities 43: 118-123 (Special issue on Communicating Mental Health).
  38. Stoneham, T. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). Another failed refutation of scepticismTeorema XXXVI (2): 19-30.
  39. Puddifoot, K. (2017). Dissolving the epistemic/ethical dilemma over implicit biasPhilosophical Explorations 20 (S1): 73-93.
  40. Sullivan-Bissett (2017). Biological function and epistemic normativity.Philosophical Explorations 20 (S1): 94-110.
  41. Jefferson, A., Bortolotti, L. and Kuzmanovic, B. (2017). What is unrealistic optimism?Consciousness & Cognition 50: 3–11.
  42. Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). Aims and exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3): 721-731.
  43. Antrobus, M. and Bortolotti, L. (2016). Depressive delusionsFilosofia Unisinos 17 (2): 192-201.
  44. Polonioli, A. (2017). New issues for new methods: Ethical and editorial challenges for an experimental philosophyScience and Engineering Ethics 23 (4): 1009–1034.
  45. Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). Malfunction defended. Synthese 194 (7): 2501-2522.
  46. Bortolotti, L. and Miyazono, K. (2016). The ethics of delusional beliefErkenntnis 81 (2): 275-296.
  47. Bortolotti, L. and Miyazono, K. (2015). Recent work on the nature and development of delusionsPhilosophy Compass 10 (9): 636-645.
  48. Bortolotti, L. and Antrobus, M. (2015). Costs and benefits of realism and optimism. Current Opinion in Psychiatry 28 (2): 194-198.

Book chapters

  1. Vintiadis, E. and Bortolotti, L. (2022). The role of context in belief evaluation. In J Musolino et al. (eds.) The Science of Belief. Cambridge University Press.
  2. Polonioli A. and Bortolotti, L. (2021). The Social and Epistemic Benefits of Polite Conversations. In Chaoqun Xie (ed.) The Philosophy of (Im)politeness. Springer, 55-71.
  3. Bortolotti, L. and Aliffi, M. (2021). The epistemic benefits of irrational boredom. In A Elpidorou (ed.) The Moral Psychology of Boredom. Rowman & Littlefield.
  4. Bortolotti, L. and Stammers, S. (2020). Philosophy as a means of empowerment. In E Vintiadis (ed.) Philosophy by Women: 22 Philosophers Reflect on Philosophy and Its Value. Routledge, chapter 1.
  5. Bongiorno, F. and Bortolotti, L. (2020). The Role of Unconscious Inference in Models of Delusion Formation. In T. Chan and A. Nes (eds.) Inference and Consciousness. Routledge, chapter 3.
  6. Bortolotti, L., Antrobus, M. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2019). The epistemic innocence of optimistically biased beliefs. In M Balcerak Jackson and B Balcerak Jackson (eds.) Reasoning: Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press, chapter 12.
  7. Holroyd, J. and Puddifoot, K. (2019). Implicit Bias and Prejudice. In M. Fricker, P.J. Graham, D. Henderson, and N. Pedersen (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge, chapter 30.
  8. Bortolotti, L. and Puddifoot, K. (2019). Philosophy, Bias and Stigma. In D. Bubbio and J. Malpas (eds.) Why Philosophy. De Gruyter.
  9. Bortolotti, L. (2018). Agency without Rationality. In A. Coliva, P. Leonardi, and S. Moruzzi (eds.) Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis, and History. Palgrave MacMillan, 265-280.
  10. Puddifoot, K. (2018). Epistemic Discrimination. In K. Lippert-Rasmussen (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Discrimination. Routledge, chapter 4.
  11. Bortolotti, L. (2018). Delusion and the Three Myths of Irrational Belief. In L. Bortolotti (ed.) Delusions in Context. Palgrave, chapter 4.
  12. Sullivan-Bissett, E., Bortolotti, L. (2017). Fictional Persuasion, Transparency, and the Aim of Belief: Reviving the teleologist’s dilemma. In Sullivan-Bissett et al. (eds.) Art and Belief. Oxford University Press, chapter 9.
  13. Sullivan-Bissett, E., Bortolotti, L., Broome, M.R. and Mameli, M. (2016). Moral and Legal Implications of the Continuity between Delusional and Non-delusional Beliefs. In G. Keil, L. Keuck and R. Hauswald (eds.) Vagueness in Psychiatry. Oxford University Press, chapter 10.
  14. Bortolotti, L., Gunn, R. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2016). What Makes a Belief Delusional? In I. Mac Carthy, K. Sellevold and O. Smith (eds.) Cognitive Confusions: Dreams, Delusions and Illusions in Early Modern Culture. Legenda, chapter 3.

Research videos

Check the videos describing the research of our project team, our Imperfect Cognitions network members, and our collaborators, exploring belief, delusion, memory, implicit bias, confabulation, rationality, loneliness, and mental health.

Research posters

Check some of the posters illustrating our research that have been presented at national and international conferences by doctoral researchers working for or collaborating with project PERFECT. 

Other relevant publications