Research

 

Research videos

Check the videos describing the research of our project team, our Imperfect Cognitions network members, and our collaborators, exploring belief, delusion, memory, implicit bias, confabulation, rationality, loneliness, and mental health.

Research posters

Check the posters illustrating our research that have been presented at national and international conferences by doctoral researchers working for or collaborating with project PERFECT. 

Books

Bortolotti, L. (2018). Delusions in Context. Palgrave Pivot (open access).

Special issues

  1. Bortolotti, L. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (eds.) (2017). False but Useful Beliefs. Philosophical Explorations 20 (S1). 
  2. Stammers, S. and L. Bortolotti (eds.) (forthcoming). Philosophical Perspectives on Confabulation. Topoi.

Journal articles

  1. Miller Tate, A. (forthcoming). Contributory injustice in psychiatry. Journal of Medical Ethics.
  2. Puddifoot, K. (forthcoming). Re-evaluating the Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony: The Misinformation Effect and the Overcritical Juror. Episteme.
  3. Puddifoot, K. (forthcoming). Stereotyping Patients. Journal of Social Philosophy.
  4. O'Donnell, C. and Puddifoot, K. (forthcoming). Human Memory and the Limits of Technology in Education. Educational Theory.
  5. Boden, Z., Larkin, M. Iyer, M. (forthcoming). Picturing ourselves in the world: Drawings, IPA and the Relational Mapping Interview.
    Qualitative Research in Psychology.
  6. Larkin, M., Shaw, R., Flowers, P. (forthcoming). Multi-perspectival designs and processes in interpretative phenomenological research. Qualitative Research in Psychology.
  7. Jefferson, A. and Bortolotti, L. (2018). Why (some) unrealistic optimism is permissible in patient decision making. American Journal of Bioethics 18 (9): 27-29.
  8. Polonioli, A., Vega-Mendoza, M., Blankinship, B. and Carmel, D. (2018). Reporting in Experimental Philosophy: Current Standards and Recommendations for Future PracticeReview of Philosophy and Psychology https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0414-3.
  9. Bortolotti, L. (2018). Optimism, agency, and successEthical Theory and Moral Practice.
  10. Laakso, M. and Polonioli, A. (2018). Open access in ethics research: an analysis of open access availability and author self-archiving behaviour in light of journal copyright restrictionsScientometrics 116 (1): 291–317.
  11. Polonioli, A., Stammers, S. and Bortolotti, L. (2018). “Good” Biases: Does Doxastic Irrationality Benefit Individuals and Groups? Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'etranger 143 (3): 327-344.
  12. Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2018). Monothematic delusions. A case of innocence from experiencePhilosophical Psychology 31 (6): 920-947.
  13. Polonioli, A. (2018). A Blind Spot in Research on Foreign Language Effects in Judgment and Decision-Making. Frontiers in Psychology 13 (9): 227.
  14. Puddifoot, K. and Bortolotti, L. (2018). Epistemic Innocence and the Production of False Memory Beliefs. Philosophical Studies.
  15. Gunn, R. and Bortolotti, L. (2018). Can delusions play a protective role? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4): 813-833.
  16. Bortolotti, L. and Sullivan-Bissett (2018). Epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortionsMind & Language 33 (3): 263-279.
  17. Bortolotti, L. (2018). Stranger than fiction: Costs and benefits of everyday confabulationReview of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2): 227-249.
  18. Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2018). Explaining doxastic transparency: Aim, norm, or function? Synthese 195 (8): 3453-3476.
  19. Polonioli, A. (2017). A plea for minimally biased naturalistic philosophySynthese.
  20. Stammers, S. (2017). A patchier picture still: biases, beliefs and overlap on the inferential continuum. Philosophia 45 (4): 1829–1850.
  21. Bortolotti, L. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). How can false or irrational beliefs be useful? Philosophical Explorations 20: sup1: 1-3.
  22. Puddifoot, K. (2017). Stereotyping: The multifactorial view. Philosophical Topics 45 (1): 137-156.
  23. Larkin, M., Boden, Z., Newton, E. (2017). If Psychosis were cancer: A speculative comparisonBMJ Medical Humanities 43: 118-123 (Special issue on Communicating Mental Health).
  24. Stoneham, T. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). Another failed refutation of scepticismTeorema XXXVI (2): 19-30.
  25. Puddifoot, K. (2017). Dissolving the epistemic/ethical dilemma over implicit biasPhilosophical Explorations 20 (S1): 73-93.
  26. Sullivan-Bissett (2017). Biological function and epistemic normativity. Philosophical Explorations 20 (S1): 94-110.
  27. Jefferson, A., Bortolotti, L. and Kuzmanovic, B. (2017). What is unrealistic optimism? Consciousness & Cognition 50: 3–11.
  28. Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). Aims and exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3): 721-731.
  29. Antrobus, M. and Bortolotti, L. (2016). Depressive delusionsFilosofia Unisinos 17 (2): 192-201.
  30. Polonioli, A. (2017). New issues for new methods: Ethical and editorial challenges for an experimental philosophyScience and Engineering Ethics 23 (4): 1009–1034.
  31. Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). Malfunction defended. Synthese 194 (7): 2501-2522.
  32. Bortolotti, L. and Miyazono, K. (2016). The ethics of delusional beliefErkenntnis 81 (2): 275-296.
  33. Bortolotti, L. and Miyazono, K. (2015). Recent work on the nature and development of delusionsPhilosophy Compass 10 (9): 636-645.
  34. Bortolotti, L. and Antrobus, M. (2015). Costs and benefits of realism and optimism. Current Opinion in Psychiatry 28 (2): 194-198.

Book chapters

  1. Bortolotti, L., Antrobus, M. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (forthcoming). The epistemic innocence of optimistically biased beliefs. In M Balcerak Jackson and B Balcerak Jackson (eds.) Reasoning: Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press.
  2. Holroyd, J. and Puddifoot, K. (forthcoming). Implicit Bias and Prejudice. In M. Fricker, P.J. Graham, D. Henderson, and N. Pedersen (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge.
  3. Bortolotti, L. and Puddifoot, K. (forthcoming). Philosophy, Bias and Stigma. In D. Bubbio et al. (eds.) Why Philosophy. Noesis Press.
  4. Puddifoot, K. (2018). Epistemic Discrimination. In K. Lippert-Rasmussen (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Discrimination. Routledge, chapter 4.
  5. Bortolotti, L. (2018). Delusion and the Three Myths of Irrational Belief. In L. Bortolotti (ed.) Delusions in Context. Palgrave, chapter 4.
  6. Sullivan-Bissett, E., Bortolotti, L. (2017). Fictional Persuasion, Transparency, and the Aim of Belief: Reviving the teleologist’s dilemma. In Sullivan-Bissett et al. (eds.) Art and Belief. Oxford University Press, chapter 9.
  7. Sullivan-Bissett, E., Bortolotti, L., Broome, M.R. and Mameli, M. (2016). Moral and Legal Implications of the Continuity between Delusional and Non-delusional Beliefs. In G. Keil, L. Keuck and R. Hauswald (eds.) Vagueness in Psychiatry. Oxford University Press, chapter 10.
  8. Bortolotti, L., Gunn, R. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2016). What Makes a Belief Delusional? In I. Mac Carthy, K. Sellevold and O. Smith (eds.) Cognitive Confusions: Dreams, Delusions and Illusions in Early Modern Culture. Legenda, chapter 3.

Other relevant publications