Political change in Nepal and rural-urban transition

Earlier this month, Nepal experienced one of the most unprecedented political upheavals in its history.

The country has seen several waves of political unrest, including a 10-year Maoist insurgency in the 1990s-2000s, a People’s movement which overthrew the monarchy in 2006, and a string of regionalised movements seeking to correct age old ethnic and regional inequalities. However, what was unique about the recent movement was that it was largely youth led, and culminated in the collapse of the government in just 48 hours. Sadly, over 72 people died in police firing, and the subsequent arson attacks.

With an interim government now sworn in, Nepal faces significant political challenges in the months ahead, yet it is also an opportune moment to consider the political economy behind recent events.

Notably, what is happening in Nepal is not unique.

There have been a string of youth led movements across Asia and Africa, with recent examples including Madagascar, Kenya and Indonesia. Three decades of neoliberal globalisation have failed the rural majority in many low- and middle-income countries, and growing integration into international markets has brought with it rising inequalities, surging costs of living, rural monetisation, and with that, a spiralling demand for cash. This hits the peasantry particularly hard in import dependent countries such as Nepal.

Agriculture is becoming increasing unviable to support a family, and the younger generation, integrated into globalised cultural flows, and aware of the struggles of the elder generation, have a dwindling interest in rural life.

Leaving the countryside

Transition away from subsistence agriculture is however, not a smooth process.

Unlike in Europe during industrialisation, countries such as Nepal do not have a vast industrial sector to absorb those who leave the land. Nevertheless, with an increasingly multi-polar global economy, there are rising opportunities for labour not at home, but overseas.

This supports the cash component of fragile agricultural livelihoods – but does not necessarily lead to ‘exit’ from agriculture. Within this context, a unique political economic equilibrium has been reached over the last two to three decades.

Across rural Nepal, families work the land, with young men (but also women) working as migrant workers in higher income economies, usually in the Gulf states, and sending money home, only for these migrants to retire to the farm in later life.

However, the new generation of youth are more than ever before, seeking to break out of this cycle of farming and menial migrant labour, aided by another significant change over the last few decades – the dramatic rise in the education sector. The older generation, in a bid to support their children in meeting these aspirations, have invested heavily in education for the young.

Across the region, families are investing remittances in education. Not only in higher fee private schools (which are particularly widespread in South Asia), but also in university and college education. This opens new horizons – either work in the only area seeing major growth post-liberalisation in Nepal – the service sector, or also, the opportunity to migrate for skilled work to more ‘lucrative’ high income destinations such as Australia, Korea, Portugal or Japan.

Middle class aspirations

A new wave of urbanisation is associated with rural youth moving to not just the capital, but second and third tier towns, to pursue higher education.

Research under the University of Birmingham co-led AGRUMIG project, which conducted fieldwork in a number of remittance dependent countries, including Nepal, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, found that much of this education driven movement to towns is dominated by what one may call the ‘upper’ or ‘middle’ peasantry – farming families who have some land and assets, and the ability to take loans with collateral, or purchase a small plot for a house in the town.

They often move with the sole purpose of pursuing an education, with the extended family remaining on the farm. These young people join more established urban youth, whose parents left agriculture a generation or two ago, and together, they share middle class aspirations.

However, there is growing frustration within this demographic.

The growth of the higher education sector and rise in education levels, has far surpassed the expansion of high paying ‘professional’ jobs. Access to the most coveted jobs in the service sector, are often out of reach to those lacking political connections, caste networks, or capacity to afford more exclusive private education.

Similarly, the more lucrative overseas migration opportunities entail highly competitive visa selection processes, and a foreign employment industry rife with exploitative practices and ‘middlemen’ – making it an extremely costly process. Also, not all these young people who have invested heavily in education necessarily want to migrate.

Political dilemma

We are now seeing a vast army of ‘educated unemployed’ – the presence of which is one of the biggest policy and political dilemmas of the 21^st century, not just in Nepal, but globally.

It is against this context one can better understand the recent events in Nepal. They are a potent political force - deeply integrated into global information flows, including knowledge of youth movements elsewhere in the region. They are as a result also increasingly aware not only of political issues, but of the acute inequalities which are emerging in the third decade of the twenty first century.

For instance, there was widespread anger amongst young protestors in Nepal at a new elite of youth who have amassed wealth through rent seeking and corruption of their politically connected parents, and were flaunting their ill-gotten wealth on social media.

This is a phenomenon unique to the influencer culture of the post-2010s smartphone era and anger at these so called ‘nepobabies’ has been present elsewhere in Asia, particularly in the Philippines.

It is in this context that frustration amongst urban youth over corruption, limited opportunities, and wasted education investments are now fuelling youth-led revolutions across the region.

However, there are some deeper political questions and dilemmas in the days ahead. These include the overwhelmingly urban nature of these movements - and the fact that they do not necessarily represent the poorest citizens, however ‘progressive’ their agenda appears on the surface.

In countries such as Nepal, despite the recent change outlined above, a majority of citizens are still rural, engaged in marginal agriculture or menial migrant labour – and even the most basic university or college level education opportunities remain out of reach. In Nepal, the rural inequalities which drove the earlier Maoist insurgency persist in rural areas, and long overdue land reforms remain as elusive as ever. Elections are now slated for March 2026.

Lasting political change will only occur if the new political establishment has the interests of the rural majority at its core, including several million citizens whose families will remain tied into the agriculture-migrant labour circuit for the foreseeable future.