Stronger powers alone won’t stop waste crime – understanding behaviour must be part of the solution

The UK government’s announcement that Environment Agency officers could be granted police-style powers to tackle fly-tipping and illegal waste disposal marks a significant shift in how waste crime is treated in England. Under the proposals, officers may be able to search premises without a warrant, seize assets and arrest suspected offenders, bringing waste crime more squarely into the category of serious and organised crime.

From an enforcement perspective, this is a clear signal of intent. Waste crime causes serious environmental harm, blights communities and costs the economy around £1 billion a year. Yet for decades it has often been treated as a low-risk, high-reward activity. Giving regulators stronger powers may help close that gap.

However, enforcement muscle alone will not be enough. Our research at the University of Birmingham suggests that if we want these new powers to deliver lasting change, they need to be complemented by a deeper understanding of the behaviours that drive waste crime in the first place and, crucially, of what actually works to deter it.

Why deterrence doesn’t always deter

Waste crime is not a single behaviour carried out by a single type of offender. It ranges from organised criminal networks running large illegal waste sites, to small operators cutting corners on disposal costs, and even individuals making one-off decisions to dump waste illegally. These actors respond very differently to the threat of punishment.

Traditional deterrence theory assumes that people weigh up the risks and consequences of being caught. A useful way to think about this is in terms of three basic elements: how likely people think they are to be caught, how severe the consequences are, and how quickly those consequences follow. In practice, this calculation is often distorted by people’s perceptions of what the risks and benefits are. Detection rates for waste crime are low, penalties may not be seen as credible or immediate with consequences from enforcement being anything but swift. Thus, while enforcement muscle may help, the key question is not simply how tough the system is, but which mix of these elements of deterrence delivers the greatest benefit from taxpayers’ money. This is important as deterrence is not costless so resources need to be smartly allocated to maximise harm reduction.

Understanding how to optimize deterrence is a central focus of the CENTRE‑UB project An Empirical and Experimental Investigation of Waste Crime Deterrence, which is being carried out in partnership with the Environment Agency. The project examines why existing deterrence measures do not always work as intended and how enforcement strategies might be redesigned to be more effective, taking account of how people react to different deterrence factors and messaging related to it.

What behavioural evidence adds

Our research combines large‑scale administrative data with experimental methods to understand how different enforcement signals influence behaviour. One key insight is that how enforcement is communicated can matter as much as how severe it is.

For example, messages that emphasise the certainty of detection, rather than the severity of punishment, may be more effective at changing behaviour. Similarly, timely and targeted interventions — such as letters or warnings that reference specific behaviours — may have a stronger deterrent effect than generic threats of prosecution. Small changes in how enforcement is made visible can therefore generate meaningful impacts without requiring large increase in resources.

This matters in the context of the government’s new announcement. Police-style powers may increase the ability of regulators to act swiftly, but without careful design, they risk being seen as distant or reserved only for the most extreme cases. Behavioural evidence can help ensure these powers are deployed in ways that maximise their deterrent impact across the whole system.

From punishment to prevention

Another insight from behavioural research is that deterrence works best when it is paired with prevention. Many waste crimes occur at pressure points in the system — when waste changes hands, when paperwork is unclear, or when disposal costs suddenly increase. Intervening at these moments can prevent offences before they occur.

The CENTREUB project explores how changes to enforcement practice—such as clearer information about legal responsibilities, or better-timed compliance checks—can reduce opportunities for illegal behaviour. These approaches are often more cost-effective and more scalable than relying solely on prosecutions after the fact. It will also test whether a clearer understanding of the harm caused to others by waste crime can complement traditional deterrent messaging. This is important to consider as there are scenarios where we exhibit ‘other-regarding’ preferences and care for the harm our actions may cause other people. Understanding the context in which appeals to our better selves are likely to be successful remains a key mission of the project.

In this sense, the government’s proposed powers should be seen not just as tools for punishment, but as part of a broader strategy to reshape incentives across the waste sector.

A system‑wide challenge

Waste crime sits at the intersection of environmental regulation, economic incentives and human behaviour. Treating it purely as a law-and-order issue risks overlooking the structural conditions that allow it to persist.

The upcoming Waste Crime Action Plan offers an opportunity to embed behavioural insights into national policy — ensuring that new enforcement powers are targeted, proportionate and evidence-based. This means understanding how offenders perceive risk and respond to enforcement, and how those responses can be shaped to deter crime effectively.

Research partnerships between universities and regulators, such as the collaboration between the University of Birmingham and the Environment Agency, play a crucial role in this process. They allow policy to be informed not just by what seems intuitively tough, but by what works.