"With global temperatures continuing to rise, the imperative is to act in concert"
Professor Robert Lee warns of increasing unfairness and inequities among the COP30 nations in the global race for renewable energy technology.
Professor Robert Lee warns of increasing unfairness and inequities among the COP30 nations in the global race for renewable energy technology.

As we approach the 2025 conference of the parties at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP30), we are witnessing global energy transition. State parties to the Convention seek to diversify their energy systems to deliver on their net zero carbon pledges under the Paris Agreement. The transition relies on the development of renewable energy technologies, and it is easy to think of these as drawing upon freely available natural resources in the form of wind, sun and tidal or geothermal waters.
There is another side to the story, however, as renewable energy infrastructure depends upon less readily available resource in the form of critical raw materials (CRMs) – especially in the form of minerals such as lithium, cobalt and rare earths. While these are crucial in delivering low carbon energy, through wind turbines and solar panels and in the development of electric mobility, reliance on these CRMs raises questions of a just transition, which is one of the themes of COP30.
This question of climate justice arises for two reasons. First, access to CRMs is not evenly distributed across the world, creating a vulnerability for countries with little opportunity to extract or process minerals needed for climate change mitigation. Secondly, the mining of these minerals has generated, historically, significant environmental and social costs. Nature is depleted or polluted and miners (including sometimes child labourers) are exposed to unsafe and unhealthy working conditions.
The collapse of a tailings dam at a copper mine in Northern Zambia in February 2025 offers an illustration of possible adverse effects of mining on communities. Acidic pollutants killed fish and other aquatic life in the Kafue River, contaminated drinking waters and destroyed crops. There is a danger that countries like Zambia bear the cost of energy transition; the benefits of which accrue in countries far less exposed to the extremes of climate change than central Africa.
There is one further discernible effect of energy transition which is a growing protectionist stance on the part of nation states departing from longstanding principles of free trade. The Paris Agreement, in urging states to make nationally determined contributions to climate change mitigation, unwittingly triggered a race to become a winner not a loser in the development of a green economy. Elements of the transition, such as the phasing out of internal combustion engine vehicles, have spawned a sprint to take a lead on international competitors in the new markets that result. There may be some benefits in terms of better stewardship and re-use of CRMs within circular economy models, but there may be downsides in the form of much greater protectionism.
We see this in the tariff wars waging between the USA and China in which CRMs feature very prominently and a desire to access CRMs explains certain curious features of US foreign policy. Why might the USA have designs on Greenland or be prepared to welcome Canada as a 51st state? Could access to CRMs lie at the heart of this as it surely does in the USA sponsored joint-investment fund for post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, funded by revenues from the extraction of Ukrainian natural resources destined for the USA?
Meanwhile in the EU there are new targets for European mineral extraction and processing in the Critical Raw Materials Act 2024. Alongside this is the imposition of a carbon border adjustment mechanism in the form of a levy on imports which fail to meet EU standards of sustainable production to combat ‘carbon leakage’. This is widely criticised by developing countries which tend to have neither domestic carbon pricing nor extensive capacity for carbon reduction. This raises a question of how CBAM aligns with the principle of common but differentiated responsibility – a key part of the Paris Agreement.
The Paris Agreement seeks to address a global problem of the impact of atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions causing the warming of the planet. These emissions are diffuse and contribute to global warming wherever they are emitted. The Framework Convention on Climate Change aims to stabilise GHG concentrations at a safe level through international cooperation and the Paris Agreement should voice that commitment. Like all international treaties, these instruments depend on collaboration and the commitment to joint efforts under international law.
Currently, however, the geopolitical signals suggest a degree of discord rather than harmony, certainly in terms of access to CRMs. There is more contestation than collaboration as countries compete for natural resources to facilitate decarbonisation. With global temperatures continuing to rise, the imperative is to act in concert. Yet the mood is one of national self-interest and protectionism. There is a danger that the shift to low carbon energy will replicate the unfairness and inequities that attached to the exploitation of fossil fuels. If COP30 is to guide a just energy transition, that cannot be allowed to happen.