Venezuela and the return of imperial power in the Americas

Dr Marco Vieira examines the return of imperialism to the Americas following the US's removal of Nicolás Maduro from power in Venezuela.

South America and North America on an old fashioned globe

What is it that has shocked the world about former President Nicolas Maduro’s forcible extradition from the heart of Venezuela?

The dramatic seizure of Nicolás Maduro in the heart of Caracas by US special forces sent shockwaves around the world and dominated international headlines.

Media coverage and expert commentary quickly focused on three questions.

First, there was widespread alarm at the Trump administration’s blatant violation of international law.

Second, analysts warned of the wider implications for great-power behaviour, particularly the risk that China and Russia might feel emboldened to carry out similar actions within their own perceived spheres of influence in Asia and Eastern Europe.

Third, attention turned inward to Venezuela itself: what would happen to the regime, and whether the country would, in practice, become a US protectorate?

These are all serious and necessary questions. Yet from the perspective of Latin American states, the most troubling development lies elsewhere. What truly marks a turning point is the unprecedented act of direct military aggression against a South American country. The United States did not rely on direct intervention in South America during the Cold War, exercising power primarily through indirect means. Sovereignty formally remained in place, yet it was tightly constrained by US influence over national militaries, economic dependence, and close intelligence cooperation.

For regional leaders, the uncomfortable question now is how that peace can be preserved in the face of an unrestrained and openly imperial US foreign policy.

Dr Marco Vieira, University of Birmingham

Comparisons are often made with the US invasion of Panama in January 1989, when American forces captured Manuel Noriega. But Venezuela is not Panama. It is vastly larger, far richer in natural resources, and firmly embedded in South America, a region that, despite internal political tensions and occasional conflicts, has largely avoided major interstate wars. For regional leaders, the uncomfortable question now is how that peace can be preserved in the face of an unrestrained and openly imperial US foreign policy.

In the past, efforts to manage and contain US power relied heavily on regional legal and institutional frameworks. The Organisation of American States and the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance were intended to provide collective security and to restrain unilateral intervention. Today, however, these mechanisms appear increasingly hollow, rendered ineffective by Trump’s open disregard for international law and established norms.

As a result, issues that once seemed unthinkable are moving to the centre of regional debate.

Brazil and Argentina developed nuclear programmes during the Cold War but ultimately abandoned weapons ambitions in favour of regional cooperation and non-proliferation commitments. But now, discussions of deterrence, ranging from renewed interest in nuclear programmes to closer strategic alignment with China, are likely to gain traction.

Ironically, this would amount to a backlash against Trump’s stated ambition of reasserting imperial control over the region.

Some may argue that this is precisely what China is counting on: that an aggressive and coercive US approach will ultimately prove counterproductive, accelerating China’s efforts to expand its influence in Latin America through multilateralism, economic cooperation, and investment rather than overt force. China could position itself as an independent and strategically indispensable partner, offering an alternative to US dominance rather than merely operating within it.

When it comes to postcolonial states, particularly those that challenge US authority, legal principles appear negotiable. The result is a hierarchy of legitimacy in which violence is relative, and some lives and political orders are treated as more disposable than others.

Dr Marco Vieira, University of Birmingham

The European dimension of this episode is equally revealing.

Actions that would be unthinkable if directed at a European state are rendered permissible in the Global South. Sovereignty has long been conditional and unevenly recognised, such as in Libya in 2011, where NATO intervention quickly turned into regime change, or in the case of European support for the invasion of Iraq.

The muted response from European capitals to this clear violation of international law, invoked so forcefully in defence of Ukraine, exposes a troubling double standard.

When it comes to postcolonial states, particularly those that challenge US authority, legal principles appear negotiable. The result is a hierarchy of legitimacy in which violence is relative, and some lives and political orders are treated as more disposable than others. In the process, Europe has sacrificed its commitment to a ‘rules-based international order’ on the altar of self-preservation through continued US alignment.

Ironically, the defence of international law and multilateral order now seems to rest not with the traditional guardians of the post-war system. Rather than Western Europe and the United States, newer and often contested actors, including China and its BRICS partners, have consistently denounced the US-led dismantling of that order.

In Latin America, particularly among progressive governments such as Brazil’s, China is increasingly viewed as a potential partner in building alternative forms of multilateral cooperation capable of resisting Trump’s imperial designs.

In the case of Venezuela and the Americas, Trump’s imperial march is likely to do exactly the thing that Trump said wouldn’t happen: “American dominance in the western hemisphere will never be questioned again.” Will it?